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Abstract 
 
In the context of the worst economic shock that the world has experienced for 
eighty years, the New Zealand Government has announced a campaign to 
establish “a more focused, efficient and productive public service” (Whitehead, 
2009).  As the emphasis of managing the performance of the public service swings 
away from effectiveness and outcomes back towards efficiency and outputs, the 
practical and underlying tensions of managing within individual agencies remain.  
This research explored these tensions in relation to the performance measurement 
and management practices in three of New Zealand‟s public service agencies, 
namely Work and Income, Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service.   
 
For each of these agencies, the official performance management models as 
defined in relevant legislation and the agencies‟ external accountability documents 
(primarily their statements of intent and annual reports) are described.  Note is 
also made of the „formal‟ frameworks encoded within each agency‟s computer 
applications.  These frameworks are then compared to an analysis of interviewees‟ 
descriptions of the performance measurement and management practices in use 
within those agencies.   
 
A framework by which the official, formal and in use performance management 
models within public service agencies may be better understood and aligned is 
then explained.  This model utilises a competing values framework composed of 
two axes.  The first of these, the rationality of control is explained in terms of the 
nature of the major functions involved, the ease with which they may be 
measured and managed, in what forms information is represented and the nature 
of the rationality employed.  It is argued that these factors support models that 
exist along a continuum that extends from the use of regulative control to control 
based on shared understandings. 
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The second axis reflects the locus of control and is explained in terms of the 
political saliency and perceived complexity of the agency‟s core functions, the 
extent to which sensegiving activities are internally and/or externally driven 
(Maitlis, 2005), and the extent to which management invest in the agency‟s public 
capital.  These factors are used to explain a continuum on which agencies 
experience more or less operational autonomy and management discretion.   
 
The combination of these factors produces four possible models that may be 
described as: 
 an administrative control model with a principal focus on managing inputs; 
 a rational goal model employing the language of (quasi) markets and a 
principal focus on outputs;  
 a multiple constituency model that acknowledges the shared responsibility 
for outcomes and a need to establish „joined up‟ mechanisms with other 
agencies within government and the community; and  
 a professional service model that seeks to manage specific targets and 
focuses on the processes or activities that managers manage.   
This model is then applied to each of the case study agencies to reveal the, at 
times competing, forces that shape performance management practices.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last twenty or so years in New Zealand, as in most other developed and 
transitioning economies, the measurement and management of the performance 
of public sector1 organisations has been the major focus of an ongoing series of 
reforms.  The initial reforms, hailed as a “new paradigm for the administration of 
public affairs” (Aucoin, 1995, p.3), were shaped by a theoretical framework drawn 
from public choice theory, agency theory, and transactional cost economics.  They 
were also heavily influenced by private sector, practitioner-based models, 
generically referred to as „managerialism‟, which emphasised an increased focus 
on performance and results (Aucoin, 1995).   
 
Pollitt (1990) has suggested that these private sector practices are premised on a 
set of clear and mutually compatible objectives that are first defined and then 
translated into a limited set of agreed performance targets.  However, in a public 
sector context, in the absence of a singular performance metric such as profit [“a 
bottom-line” (Boston et al, 1996)] or clearly specified and stable priorities and 
objectives (Pollitt, 1990), defining, monitoring and managing such targets has 
proved problematic.  Indeed, as Boyne (2003) has pointed out, there exists little 
from either the academic or practitioner communities by way of a definition of 
what, in a public sector context, is meant by „performance‟.  This may reflect the 
complex nature and objectives of the public production process, the intangible 
nature of many of the outputs produced by public sector agencies, the level of co-
                                               
1 As explained in Chapter 4, while much of the literature on public sector management refers to the 
broader public sector as a whole, including state-owned enterprises and local government, this research 
focuses on the core public service which represents the ministries and departments of New Zealand‟s 
central government.   
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production or interdependencies with other organisations, and/or the diverse 
range of stakeholders with an interest in the results of the process (Wilson, 1989; 
Alford, 1993; Metcalfe, 1993; Gregory, 1995a).  More simply, as Kanter and 
Summers (1994) suggested, it may be: “the centrality of social values over 
financial values that complicates measurement for non-profit organisations” 
(p.98).     
 
The measurement and management of the performance of public sector 
organisations remains a contested field of interest to the academic community, to 
practitioners within the public sector and to the general public whom the sector 
seeks to serve.  In New Zealand, at least in part, this debate is fuelled by the 
ongoing changes to public sector management systems that have continued since 
the initial reforms of the mid 1980s and early 1990s.  Those initial reforms gave 
rise to what has subsequently been referred to as “the New Zealand Model” 
(Boston et al, 1996) which was applauded for the rigour of its theoretical integrity 
(Hood, 1990b; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and has internationally been a subject 
of significant interest for both academics and practitioners.  Subsequently, 
although the New Zealand Model has undergone a number of changes in 
emphasis, its underlying concepts and key structures can be seen to have 
remained intact.  However, what have been referred to as “continuing dilemmas” 
(Boston et al, 1996), or “perennial tensions” (Pallot, 2001), also remain.  Those 
tensions can be seen to be manifest in a series of paradoxes that include: 
 the attempt to provide increased operational autonomy to public service 
managers at the same time as strengthening formal centralised controls; 
 an official concern with outcomes and outputs accompanied by a practical 
focus on more detailed processes and inputs; 
 the use of an instrumental logic that stresses quantified measurement 
together with the application of professional experience and judgement; 
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 a need to be able to demonstrate the economy and efficiency of service 
provision as well as the less tangible, and at times conflicting, criteria of 
effectiveness and equity;   
 a literature and discussion of public sector management that is principally 
framed in the context of a concern with the management of the public 
sector with little focus on managing within the public sector.   
 
This thesis seeks to explore those paradoxes in the context of three agencies of 
New Zealand‟s public service.   
 
1.2 Autonomy and Accountability  
The reforms that created the New Zealand Model (like public sector reforms 
elsewhere in the world) sought to devolve operational freedom and responsibility 
to individual public sector agencies and their managers while, at the same time, 
using mandated performance measurement systems, in respect of outputs and 
outcomes, to reassert “political control over the state apparatus in order to direct 
change in accordance with political priorities” (Aucoin, 1995, p.4).  According to 
Aucoin, the effect of public sector reforms towards the end of the twentieth 
century was as if the pendulum of power had swung in two directions 
simultaneously, empowering both elected representatives and the professional 
bureaucracy.  Carter (1989) similarly noted how, in theory, performance measures 
provide a mechanism by which the elected Government can retain firm control 
over its departments by exercising a „hands off‟ rather than a „hands on‟ strategy‟.   
 
However, in practice, politicians have proved to be prone to being involved in 
operational matters and appear somewhat reticent to take responsibility for 
broader strategic issues.  Also, although the official logic of the New Zealand 
Model contains a structure of ex ante performance agreements and ex post 
 15 
performance reports, their use in practice may be questioned.  Thus Norman 
(2003) reported a public servant as stating: 
The real substance of accountability to the Minister does not come through the 
formal processes and documents, but through weekly meetings and informal 
exchanges.  The formal system is only relevant for when there are problems. (p.147) 
More simply a Minister interviewed for the current research suggested that “no 
one in their right minds thinks we use [the formal accountability documents] to 
manage performance”.   
 
1.3 Outcomes, Outputs, Processes and Inputs 
A consequence of the reforms of the mid to late 1980s was a reduced focus by 
central agencies2 on the specification and management of inputs and an increased 
emphasis on departments‟ accountability for the delivery of outputs3.  Outcomes4 
were to be the domain of ministers who would define the priorities of the 
Government and set the strategic objectives for their departments.  As noted 
above, and explored further in the next chapter, the involvement of ministers has 
frequently extended beyond broader strategic issues.  Subsequent reforms to the 
New Zealand model have recognised that this division of responsibility has proven 
to be less clear cut.  However, while an increased emphasis has been placed on 
departmental responsibility for outcomes, a clear and consistent strategic 
framework for public service agencies remains, as one New Zealand Prime Minister 
remarked, “the magic that eludes us” (Shipley, 1997).  The extent to which those 
agencies effectively manage for outcomes is, therefore, questionable (Gill, 2009).   
The extent to which both outcomes and outputs represent factors over which 
managers within individual public service agencies are able to exercise control has 
                                               
2 Those central government agencies that are charged with management of the public sector as a whole; 
namely, The Treasury, State Services Commission and the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.   
3 Outputs are defined by the Public Finance Act 1989 as “the goods or services that are produced by a 
department, Crown entity, Office of Parliament, or other person or body”.   
4 Outcomes are defined by the Public Finance Act 1989 as “the impacts on, or the consequences for, the 
community of the outputs or activities of the Government.   
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also been questioned (Dormer, 2001).  Rather, those managers are more able to 
exert control over the processes or activities that drive resource consumption and 
contribute to the delivery of the agency‟s outputs.  Thus, while the New Zealand 
Model continues to use the language of outputs and outcomes, performance 
measurement and management both within individual agencies and, at times, by 
ministers and their advisors in central agencies, continues to focus on procedural 
management and the control of inputs.   
 
1.4 Measurable Deliverables and Value Judgements 
The ideas underlying the reforms that created the New Zealand Model placed an 
emphasis on a means-ends calculus that focuses on factors that are able to be 
defined in advance and subsequently measured in quantified terms.  This was, in 
turn, linked to a focus on the economy and efficiency with which organisational 
objectives are achieved.  As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, at different 
times and in different organisational settings varying emphasis has also been 
placed on the effectiveness and equity of public sector performance – criteria 
which are less easily defined and measured in objective terms.  Similarly, the 
management of the ongoing capacity of both individual agencies and the sector as 
a whole and, less explicitly, the trust and confidence in individual agencies held by 
ministers, other organisations and the general public represent performance 
criteria that are more subject to judgement and interpretation.   
 
1.5 Management of the Public Sector and Management within the 
Public Sector 
Although the reforms of New Zealand‟s public sector have been the subject of a 
great deal of interest and discussion, much of that discussion has focused on the 
mechanisms by which the performance of the sector as a whole is measured and 
managed.  Similarly, over the last two decades, the principal concern of policy 
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makers who have proposed further reforms of the New Zealand Model has been 
management of the public sector as a whole rather than management within 
individual public sector agencies.  The development of formal performance 
management regimes has, therefore, been somewhat one-sided as the 
predominant influence has been that of the elected representatives and those 
officials in the central agencies seeking to exercise control over the public sector 
as a whole.  Individual agencies and their managers have been assigned a 
subordinate role (Schick, 1996; Norman, 2003).   
 
As in other countries, this has resulted in the risk that formal performance 
management systems established within individual agencies are orientated 
towards providing performance information to support external accountability at 
the cost of not providing sufficient and appropriate performance measurement 
information to support the agency‟s operational and technical management.5  A 
focus on measures designed for management of the public sector as a whole 
requires operational managers to provide information for purposes of upward or 
external accountability – notwithstanding that they may view this as unrelated to 
information required for their own decision making.  Indeed, the disconnect 
between external concerns and internal operational practice may be such that it 
becomes impractical, if not impossible, to measure some factors that are required 
to be reported for upward or external accountability purposes.  This may arise, for 
example, as a consequence of the adoption of contractual models that create 
distinct roles for purchasers and providers of services, as part of the New Public 
Management.  Such models usually stress quantification of purchased outputs 
even when these involve work, such as community liaison, that does not readily 
lend itself to measurement.  As a consequence operational managers may give 
little regard to the reporting process and the information reported may have, at 
                                               
5 There are ironic parallels here with Johnson and Kaplan‟s 1987 criticism of private sector performance 
information in „Relevance Lost‟.   
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best, a tenuous relationship with operational reality.  Hofstede (1978) suggested 
that “pseudo-control” occurs when that which is formally reported and that which 
is actively managed represent different factors.   
 
Even at a senior level, performance measurement systems may compile 
information for symbolic or legitimising purposes associated with managing 
relationships with external stakeholders rather than for practical or organisational 
decision support purposes.  de Lancer Julnes and Holzer, (2001, p.696) used the 
term “symbolic action” to describe the process by which organisations may satisfy 
a law or administrative regulation by collecting and publishing required data 
despite it not being used by managers to support their internal decision-making 
processes.  Along these lines, Modell (2001, p.447) found that Norwegian hospitals 
reported performance measures that were requested by State agencies but which 
were not used internally.  Similarly New Zealand‟s Controller and Auditor-General 
has commented: 
I am concerned that senior managers and governors do not give external performance 
reports the attention they merit.  The reports are not aligned to the information used 
to plan and monitor performance.  I have found that the report preparation is often 
contracted out and is not connected with organisational strategy development and 
implementation, creating the risk that the reports become vehicles for public 
promotion rather than the basis for accountability and transparency.  (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2008, p.13) 
This view contrasts with an earlier report by Schick who, in his 1996 review of 
New Zealand‟s public sector reforms, observed: 
The accounting and financial management innovations were introduced to comply with 
external reporting requirements; the next frontier in New Zealand financial 
management will be to devise systems and practices for internal management needs.  
(Schick, 1996, p.68) 
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To the extent that both of these findings are still valid, it would appear that the 
performance information is not adequately fulfilling the requirements of either 
external accountability or internal management control.   
 
1.6 Multiple Performance Management Models 
However, performance measurement and management practices are not confined 
to a dichotomy of models concerned either with external accountability or internal 
management control.  The external or official performance management model 
does not exist as “a monolithic framework … imposing homogenous requirements 
on passive organisations” (Scott, 2008, p.430).  In discussing the existence of a 
model of New Public Management, Pollitt (2001) has observed that words and 
concepts can develop lives of their own to the point that talk, symbolism and 
organisational pronouncements may not reflect day-to-day practices.  But while it 
may be true to suggest that the words and concepts (the „theory‟) of New Public 
Management defined in an academic context may not reflect a consistent pattern 
of practice (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000), this represents a somewhat simplistic 
approach to the understanding of performance measurement and management 
models.  It reflects the idea of an official model that exists independently of 
practice rather than an official model that exists in a number of differing versions 
that are enacted in the context of local institutions and cognitive frameworks.   
 
When differing models of performance measurement and management serve 
different purposes the relationship between them has been characterised as being 
loosely coupled or de-coupled.  Brignall and Modell (2000) have argued that the 
use of de-coupled performance measures, that are contradictory in themselves or 
reflect inconsistent goals, may be a rational response by managers to the diverse 
and conflicting objectives of the wide range of stakeholders which characterise 
public sector entities.  It may, for example, reflect the difficulty of expressing in 
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the quantitative or financial terms required by external stakeholders the due 
process and qualitative concerns of internal manages and professional stakeholder 
groups.  Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004) have also observed that this de-
coupling is a result of incongruence between the goals of the broader, external 
environment and those of the entity itself.  They suggest: “The implementation of 
an institutional practice is symbolic, or decoupled, if it is not integrated into the 
management and organisation processes” (p. 518).  A disconnect may therefore 
exist between the performance measurement model official by Government 
Ministers (and the central agencies) and that used by individual agencies.   
 
However, differences between performance management models are not limited to 
those between exogenous definitions of the official model and the manner of its 
enactment in individual organisational settings.  Within each organisation there is 
likely to co-exist fragmented and conflicting understandings and uses of 
performance information.  Within those agencies loose or decoupling may also 
exist between a corporate framework and the frameworks used by separate 
functional groups or locations (Modell, 2009).  The risk of disconnect will be 
further heightened where the performance measurement frameworks actually 
used by managers (particularly at grass roots level) are significantly different from 
those incorporated in the communication and information technologies (i.e. 
computer systems) which codify a formal (organisational and/or sector wide) 
approach to measuring and managing organisational performance.  Whatever the 
extent of that disconnect, the significant fact is that those often divergent models 
exist in parallel to one another.   
 
It is posited that these models may be generically grouped in three ways, namely: 
 the official „New Zealand Model‟, i.e. the nationally defined model that 
seeks to govern the performance of public sector organisations and is 
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contained within legislation, Cabinet instructions and the guidance material 
of central agencies; 
 formal models, i.e. the performance management models encoded within 
computer systems and other artefacts on the basis of a set of ideas and a 
cognitive framework in place at the time of their creation; and 
 in use models, i.e. performance measurement and management practices 
that are employed by the managers and their staff to support operational 
decision making within a particular organisational setting.   
 
1.7 Lenses on Performance Management 
It is posited that the range of different models, within which both internal and 
external stakeholders define and seek to influence organisational performance, 
may be understood via three lenses.  From differences in the functions performed 
(i.e. the nature of the work being measured and managed), from the purposes for 
which performance is measured and managed, and from the differing perspectives 
of those for whom the performance is measured and managed and/or have an 
influence on those practices.  These three approaches are represented in Figure 
1.2 and discussed below.   
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Figure 1.1:  Approaches to Performance Management 
PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT
(i) FUNCTION
What is being measured
and managed?
(iii) PERSPECTIVE
For whom is 
performance measured?
(ii) PURPOSE
What is the performance 
information used for?
 
 
(i) Function 
Approaches to performance management are influenced by the nature of 
the work being measured.  Notwithstanding significant reductions in the 
range of activities undertaken by public sector organisations following the 
reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a significant diversity of 
functions is still performed by the agencies of New Zealand‟s public service.  
These extend from relatively routine tasks such as issuing permits or 
passports, to the more complex and knowledge intensive tasks associated 
with community corrections or child welfare.  The nature of public sector 
services varies in terms of the degree to which it is possible to (i) predefine 
the activities being undertaken and (ii) observe the results achieved.  In 
this respect Wilson (1989) categorised organisational functions into the 
following four broad groups based on the extent to which their activities 
(outputs) and their results (outcomes) can be observed:  
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(a) Production organisations – that undertake standard tasks, such as 
issuing passports, for which it is possible to observe both the work 
being done and its results. 
(b) Procedural organisations – that provide services such as policy 
advice for which it is possible to observe the work being done but 
not its results.  
(c) Craft organisations – that include organisations, such as those 
involved in environmental conservation, for which is possible to 
observe the results of work done but not the work itself.   
(d) Coping organisations – such as those involved in social work, for 
which it is not possible to observe either the work done or its 
results.   
Wilson acknowledged that such a broad classification should be applied with 
caution as, for example, even in a coping organisation some elements of 
the work done will be able to be observed and controlled by managers.  As 
discussed in greater detail below, while in a particular public sector agency 
there may be a principal function, and an accompanying dominant culture 
and management logic possibly reflecting a principal professional or 
functional grouping (Bettis and Prahalad, 1986; Mintzberg, 1996), each 
agency undertakes a range of different functions.  However, as Gregory 
(1995b) has noted, those managing the performance of public sector 
agencies have tended to adopt a „one size fits all‟ approach that inherently 
views all agencies as „production‟ organisations.  Gregory suggested that 
public sector managers should exercise more “conceptual discrimination” in 
order to recognise the diversity of functions undertaken by, and within, 
public sector agencies.   
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(ii) Purpose 
In addition to recognising the variety of functions performed by public 
sector agencies, it is necessary to recognise that performance is measured 
and managed for a number of different purposes.  These include:  
 accountability to external stakeholders and/or internal 
management; 
 direction setting, i.e. as a means of establishing priorities and 
targets; 
 strategic evaluation of both the current external environment and 
indicators that might point to future trends;  
 resource planning and allocation; 
 control of existing standard procedures; and 
 improvement in the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of key 
activities or programmes.   
A more detailed consideration of these purposes is provided in Chapter 2.   
 
(iii) Perspective 
Differences in the perspectives of those for whom performance is measured 
is a third factor affecting the performance framework adopted and the 
aspects of performance prioritised by and within an organisation.  The 
parties for whom performance is measured and/or who influence that 
practice are the constituencies mentioned in the discourse of organisational 
members and in organisational documents.  They embrace the full range of 
individuals or groups who may evaluate the performance of the agency (or 
components thereof) and are not limited to stakeholders who have a direct 
association with the organisation concerned (Connolly et al., 1980).  For 
example, the general public has no direct association with any public sector 
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agency but may have a significant opinion on, and may influence, agencies‟ 
performance measurement and management practices.6 
 
Particularly when trying to identify the relevant constituencies of public 
service agencies it becomes apparent that there is no singular perspective 
by which an organisation‟s performance is defined and evaluated.  The 
priorities assigned to the interests of different constituencies by different 
public sector agencies vary and are affected by a range of factors.  These 
include: 
 the existence (or absence) of strong professional cultures within the 
agency; 
 the degree of centralised as opposed to decentralised control within 
the agency; 
 the degree of „sensegiving‟7 undertaken by managers within the 
agency and/or by external stakeholders; 
 the size of the agency; 
 the roles performed by external control agencies such as the 
Treasury and the State Services Commission; 
 the strength and role of the agency‟s other stakeholder groups; and 
 the political saliency (i.e. profile and sensitivity) of the agency‟s 
tasks.   
 
Performance management practices are also, at least in part, affected by 
the perspectives or cognitive frameworks of those measuring and managing 
the work.  Different agencies and functional groups within agencies tend to 
                                               
6 This may be illustrated, for example, by public sector agencies, such as Public Prisons and the 
Community Probations Service, which are subject to public criticism when their performance fails to 
meet public expectations.   
7 Sensegiving is defined by Gioia and Chittipeddi, (1991) as “the process of attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others towards a preferred re-definition of organisational 
reality”.   
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have their own „culture‟ or mode of working, objectives and value set 
(Wilson, 1989; Gregory, 1995a; Henri, 2006).  For example, the modes of 
working and conceptual frames employed in managing the largely cerebral 
work of a policy function, which undertakes activities such as providing 
advice to government Ministers and developing proposed legislative and 
regulatory frameworks, and for which it is difficult to define the details of 
the end product, tend to focus on due process or how work is done.  The 
concept of performance applied in such entities is likely to be defined in 
terms of efficiency and public accountability.  In contrast, those employed 
in managing the more emotional or „caring‟ work of a human services or 
welfare function, where operators have considerable professional discretion 
regarding what gets done and when, may rely on a more substantive logic 
and the ethos or sense of duty of individual organisational members.  Such 
groups are more likely to conceive of performance in terms of serving the 
interests of clients and broader issues of social intervention.  In both of 
these cases (agencies primarily engaged in „cerebral‟ as opposed to „caring‟ 
work) different ways of working, reinforced by different induction and 
training regimes, support the creation of different sets of shared beliefs or 
organisational “myths” (Modell, 2004).  Yet, despite their fundamental 
differences, both the cerebral and caring functions may exist within the 
same public sector agency (as is the case, for example, in the New Zealand 
Ministry of Social Development), potentially complicating performance 
measurement in such agencies.     
 
1.8 A Dominant Logic 
Notwithstanding the varying influences on performance management of functions, 
purposes, and perspectives, Bettis and Prahalad (1986) pointed to the emergence 
of a „dominant logic‟ that represents the purposes and perspective of the most 
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influential group within an organisation, or component thereof.  This dominant 
logic acts as a filtering mechanism for information.  According to Bettis and 
Prahalad (1995, p.7): “These filtered data are then incorporated into the strategy, 
systems, values, expectations and reinforced behaviour of the organisation”.  
Further, such filters put constraints on the ability of the organisation to learn as 
only anticipated information is received and new or unexpected stimuli are missed.  
Weick (1995) used the concept of „requisite variety‟ (proposed by Ashby, 1952) to 
highlight the benefits of multiple perspectives for organisations that function 
within complex and dynamic environments.  He suggested that for an organisation 
to respond effectively to the stimuli of a complex environment it needs to contain 
matching complex elements.  The ability of managers to interpret or make sense 
of complex environments is thus largely dependent on the sensitivity of an 
organisation‟s performance measurement systems to this diversity.  As Weick 
(1995) noted: “seeing what one believes and not seeing that for which one has no 
beliefs are central to sensemaking” (p.87).   
 
Public sector organisations frequently have to balance multiple objectives and 
sometimes conflicting mandates and functions that overlap those of other agencies 
(Trebilcock, 1995; Boston et al., 1996).  Tolerance, and indeed encouragement, of 
a diversity of perspectives may, therefore, be seen as highly desirable for a public 
sector organisation dealing with a range of different organisations and 
stakeholders.  However, a politically encouraged bias for risk aversion may also 
work against diversity of perspective and promote the establishment of a 
dominant logic that simplifies decision-making but may be “blind” to some of its 
implications. 
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1.9 Theoretical Approach 
In order to explore the relationships between the official, formal and in use 
performance management models at various levels within New Zealand‟s public 
service agencies, it is necessary to understand the functions, purposes and 
perspectives underlying the performance management frameworks applied to, and 
used within, those agencies.  An appropriate theoretical approach to 
understanding the effects of these factors is that of social constructionism and new 
institutional sociology.   
 
As is explained in more detail in Chapter 4, this approach recognises that 
organisational performance does not exist independently of the minds of those 
who define and measure it.  Rather, the diverse understandings of organisational 
performance are socially constructed in the context of each organisational setting.  
Those settings being composed of the existing institutional structures and the 
actions or agency of actors both within the organisation and externally exerting 
influence on it.   
 
1.10  Agency Selection 
As noted earlier, the functions of public sector agencies in New Zealand are 
diverse and, as a consequence, the performance management model which is 
appropriate in one agency may not be appropriate in another.  Therefore, in order 
to investigate the performance management models defined for and used within 
New Zealand public sector agencies, it is appropriate to select for study a small 
sample of agencies, each with an array of functions but whose functions as a 
whole differ significantly.   
 
Three agencies were selected, namely: Work and Income (within the Ministry of 
Social Development), and Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service 
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(both within the Department of Corrections).  These agencies have varied 
functions which, in terms of the categorisation suggested by Wilson (1989) 
(outlined above), include the following: 
 production tasks for which both the work being done and its results can be 
observed; for example, paying benefits by Work and Income;  
 procedural tasks for which the work being done but not its results can be 
observed; for example, the provision of policy advice to relevant Ministers 
by Work and Income, Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service;   
 craft tasks for which the results but not the work done can be observed, as, 
for example, is the case with the social development functions of Work and 
Income; and 
 coping functions for which neither the work done nor its results can be 
observed, as, for example, the rehabilitative functions of the Community 
Probation Service   
Figure 1.2: Example Functions of the Agencies Selected for Study 
Function Example Agency 
Production Paying benefits Work and Income 
Procedural 
Provision of policy 
advice to Ministers 
Work and Income, Public Prisons, & 
the Community Probation Service 
Craft Social Development Work and Income 
Coping Rehabilitative services Community Probation Service 
 
As noted by Wilson (1989) and Gregory (1995a), each of these broadly defined 
functional categories gives rise to a different management culture and thereby a 
different approach to performance management.  However, differing functions is 
not the only factor shaping performance management frameworks; for example, 
external stakeholders may also be influential in determining the factors that are 
included in an agency‟s performance management framework (Brignall and Modell, 
2000).   The performance management frameworks adopted by and within the 
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three case study agencies may, therefore, be affected by the strength of their 
links with other public service agencies, community based groups, the media, and 
the general public.   
 
Little empirical research has been conducted into the existence of and 
relationships among different approaches to performance management within 
public sector agencies in New Zealand.  Ultimately, the lack of knowledge of these 
matters hampers understanding of why the performance measurement 
information of public sector entities is generated and how it is used.  This, in turn, 
may have a detrimental impact on, or at least preclude improvement of, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organisations.  As Modell (2004) has 
suggested, “Future research exploring the development of performance 
measurement „myths‟ … needs to map the collectively shared interpretive schemes 
within and across various groups of influential actors” (p.50). 
 
1.11 Research Aim and Objectives 
Following from the above discussion, the aim of the research is to develop an 
analytical framework by which the official, formal and in use performance 
management models within public service organisations may be better 
understood.   
 
In order to achieve this aim the research has the following objectives, which are 
described below and shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.4.  The research 
objectives are:   
(i) to define performance and performance management within the context 
of the New Zealand public service and, more specifically, the three 
agencies selected for study;   
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(ii) for each of the case study agencies, to identify and describe the 
performance management framework espoused in relevant legislation 
and accountability documents (the official performance management 
model); 
 
Figure 1.3:   Research Aim and Objectives 
 
Objective 2 -
the espoused
framework
Objective 3 -
the formal
framework
Objective 4 -
the in use
framework
? ?
?
Function
Purpose
Perspective
Function
Purpose
Perspective
Function
Purpose
Perspective
An analytical model 
of performance 
management 
frameworks
Objectives 5 & 6
Objectives 5 & 6Objectives 5 & 6
 
 
 
(iii) for each of the case study agencies, to determine the role of the formal 
performance management frameworks that are encoded within the 
agency‟s information technology (IT) systems and other artefacts (the 
formal performance management model); 
(iv) to identify the performance management frameworks adopted at 
different hierarchical levels within each of the case study agencies (the 
in use performance management models); 
(v) to ascertain the level of congruence (or incongruence) between the 
official, formal and in use performance management models within each 
of the case study agencies; and 
Objective 1 – Performance and Performance Management 
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(vi) to provide a framework that encompasses and explains the structures 
and practices that form performance measurement and management 
models.   
 
1.12  Research Methodology  
In order to achieve these objectives the following research methods were adopted.   
 
1.  Literature Review 
Literature from the fields of management accounting, public management, 
organisational studies and cognitive psychology, as they pertain to the 
measurement and management of performance in public sector organisations was 
reviewed.  The literature was identified by inputting key words such as 
„performance measurement‟, „public sector‟, „public sector reform‟, „institutional 
theory‟, „organisational sense making‟, and „loose coupling‟ into databases such as 
the Web of Science, Science Direct and EBSCOhost.  The literature reviewed 
included academic and professional journal articles, books, research monographs 
and conference papers.  Prior doctoral and masters degree research in the United 
Kingdom, Canada, the United States, South Africa and Australia were also 
identified by conducting searches on international theses databases including 
Dissertation Abstracts, Index to Theses and the Australian Digital Theses Program.  
Reference lists in the literature accessed by these means were reviewed to identify 
further literature not identified through the database searches.   
 
This review of relevant literature enabled prior research and theories relating to 
performance management in public sector entities to be identified and examined in 
the light of the research aim and objectives of the current study.  It also resulted 
in the adoption of the three lenses on performance management (i.e. function, 
purpose and perspective) as the bases for analysing the empirical research data.   
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2.  Document Study 
A range of documents were examined in order to ascertain the official performance 
management models of each of the case study agencies.  The documents studied 
included legislation (such as the State Sector Act 1988, the Public Finance Act 
1989, the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004, the Social Security Act 1964, and 
the Corrections Act 2004), relevant instructions and guidance material published 
by the Treasury and State Services Commission, and speeches by key players 
such as relevant Government Ministers and the State Services Commissioner.   
 
Documents relating to the performance measurement frameworks within each of 
the case study agencies were also examined.  These included the agencies‟:  
 external accountability documents (i.e. their 2006/2007 Statements of 
Intent, Output Plans, and Annual Reports);  
 documents relating to their formal performance measurement frameworks 
and supporting IT applications (such as information systems architecture 
diagrams, user documentation and examples of the outputs of these 
systems); and  
 artefacts such as wall posters and desk calendars which carry key 
performance related messages.   
Other organisational documents, including managers‟ business plans, management 
reports and the agenda and minutes of internal management and project meetings 
were also examined.   
 
These documents provided insight into the extent to which the official and formal 
performance management models impacted on the decisions of managers and the 
in use performance management frameworks within each case study agency.    
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3.  Observation of Meetings 
In each case study agency, a routine meeting of operational managers was 
observed in order to gain insight into the performance management practices in 
use in that agency.  Notes were taken in each meeting on the issues discussed, 
priorities established and language used.   
 
4.  Semi-Structured Interviews 
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with between 11 and 14 
members of each case study agency.  These included operational supervisors and 
local managers as well as more senior and Head Office based managers.  The 
interviewees were asked to define their performance objectives and the factors 
that affect their ability to achieve them.  They were also asked about the factors 
or issues they are required to measure and report on, and whether these are 
useful in practice for planning and monitoring progress in achieving their 
objectives.   
 
These interviews provided insight into the performance measurement frameworks 
in use at different levels within each agency and the extent to which these 
frameworks differ from, or are consistent with, the frameworks used in other 
components (or levels) of the agency.  They also enhanced the insights, gained 
from the document study and the observation of meetings, into the extent to 
which the in use performance management frameworks are congruent with the 
official and formal models.   
 
5.  Feedback 
Opportunities were sought to provide early feedback of the research findings 
relating to each agency to the relevant senior management team.   These 
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meetings enabled the preliminary findings to be discussed and interpretations of 
the findings to be evaluated.   
 
1.13 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 1 Introduction: This chapter provides the background to the 
study and identifies issues that are central to performance measurement 
and management in public service agencies in New Zealand.  It also 
specifies the research aim and objectives, outlines the methodology 
adopted for the research, and identifies the contribution and limitations of 
the study.   
 Chapter 2 Public Sector Reform and Public Sector Management: This 
chapter describes the context of the research, namely New Zealand‟s public 
service, and provides a summary of the motives and ideas that shaped the 
initial reforms of New Zealand‟s public service in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and those that have influenced its subsequent evolution.  This 
enables a description of the official model by which the service is managed 
and a brief discussion of the tensions which remain within it.   
 Chapter 3 Performance Measurement and Management in a Public 
Sector Context: This chapter provides a definition and description of what 
is encompassed by the terms „performance‟ and „performance 
measurement‟ in the context of the New Zealand public service and, more 
specifically, the three case study agencies.  The chapter also describes the 
factors that create distinct challenges for measuring performance in public 
sector organisations. 
 Chapter 4 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Research: This chapter 
outlines a number of extant theories and ideas that have been influential in 
the area of public sector performance management and identifies their 
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limitations in explaining performance measurement and management 
practices in public service agencies.  It then proposes an alternative 
theoretical approach, based on social constructionism, new institutional 
sociology and the idea of organisational sensemaking.   
 Chapter 5  Methodology: This chapter provides an explanation of the 
theoretical approach adopted for the research and the methods used to 
collect and analyse the data.  It also explains how the research results are 
reported.   
 Chapter 6  Function: This chapter outlines the construct of function and 
examines the functions of the three case study agencies (namely, Work 
and Income, the Public Prisons Service, and the Community Probation 
Service).  For each agency, the functions as official in relevant legislation 
and key accountability documents, and those identified by the interviewees 
as being used in practice, are reported and discussed.   
 Chapter 7  Purpose: This chapter outlines the construct of purpose and 
reports and discusses the purposes for which performance is measured and 
managed as identified by interviewees in each of the three case study 
agencies.   
 Chapter 8  Perspective: In this chapter the construct of perspective is 
outlined and the perspectives of those for whom performance is measured, 
as described by interviewees in each of the three case study agencies, are 
reported and discussed.  The influence different perspectives have on 
performance priorities, as identified by the interviewees, is also discussed.   
 Chapter 9 An Explanatory Framework: This chapter draws together the 
findings of the literature review, document study, interviews and 
observations at meetings within the case study agencies.  It proposes a 
single model of performance management that encompasses the, at times 
competing, forces that shape performance measurement and management 
practices in the case study agencies.   
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 Chapter 10 Missing Links - Conclusions: The final chapter summarises 
the key aspects of the research and its findings.  It also outlines the 
contribution and limitations of the research and identifies future research 
opportunities.   
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Chapter 2  
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
… it is common knowledge that the world economy is convalescent and the 
domestic economy sick; that public expenditure must therefore be 
constrained; that obtaining value for money has become a matter of acute 
necessity.  The desirability for improved public sector performance assessment 
is therefore „obvious‟.  (Pollitt, 1986, p.158).   
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides a background to, and description of, the official „New 
Zealand Model‟ of public sector performance measurement and management over 
a period in which the economic cycle, that was a major impetus to public sector 
reform in the 1980s, has come full circle.  That model represents the conceptual 
framework, or “web of beliefs and reasoned arguments” (Puxty, 1993, p.4), within 
which the objectives and challenges of public sector performance are, largely, 
defined and understood.  Whilst locally, within individual organisations, other ideas 
may intervene, the institutional structures created by the New Zealand Model 
represent a dominant logic.   
 
The initial impetus and conceptual framework are first described before the 
model‟s inherent tensions and criticisms are discussed.  These criticisms have 
given rise to an ongoing series of reviews and adjustments, if not fully fledged 
reforms, to the model.  The reviews and resulting changes to legislation and the 
guidance material of the central agencies represent an ongoing debate in respect 
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of how the performance of public sector organisations should be measured and 
managed.   
 
2.2 An Overview of New Zealand’s Public Sector and Core Public 
Service 
As noted in Chapter 1, the research focuses on performance measurement in three 
agencies within New Zealand‟s core public service.  The public service needs to be 
distinguished from the broader state sector and still broader public sector.  As can 
be seen from Figure 2.1, the term public service refers to the departments and 
ministries of central government.8   
Figure 2.1 The Public Sector 
 
The state sector includes the public service but also encompasses state-owned 
enterprises (such as New Zealand Post Limited), Crown entities (such as the Civil 
Aviation Authority of New Zealand and the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa 
Tongarewa), offices of Parliament (such as that of the Controller and Auditor-
General) and a number of other agencies of central government such as the New 
Zealand Police, the Parliamentary Council Office and the Reserve Bank of New 
                                               
8 Although the terms department and ministry are frequently used interchangeably, generally 
departments are considered to be those agencies of central government that are principally 
concerned with the delivery of services and ministries to be those agencies that are principally 
concerned with the provision of policy advice to Ministers.  Given the common practice of blurring 
this distinction, in this thesis the term department is used to refer to both types of agency.   
THE PUBLIC SECTOR – the state sector plus the public 
service plus local government 
THE STATE SECTOR – the public service and 
entities such as state owned enterprises 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
– departments and ministries 
of central government 
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Zealand.9  The term public sector refers to all of the departments and agencies of 
the state sector and also includes local authorities and local authority trading 
enterprises (LATEs) such as Wellington City Council‟s Wellington Waterfront Ltd 
that implements the Waterfront Development Project, manages daily activity on 
the waterfront, and runs the Wellington marina.    
 
While this research focuses on three agencies within the core public service (Work 
and Income, Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service), it draws on 
prior studies and extant literature that is concerned, in general, with changes in 
management practices within the public sector as a whole.   
 
2.3 Public Sector Reform - Motives and Concepts 
Since the early to mid 1980s, many countries in the developed world have 
introduced a series of reforms to their public sector‟s structure and management.  
Most notably, in the United States of America and in the Westminster democracies 
of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, a pattern of change 
emerged that has been referred to as “the New Public Management” (Hood, 1990; 
Hood & Jackson, 1991).  Aucoin (1995) suggested that these changes were 
occasioned by three major factors, namely:   
1. The advent of economic pressures that resulted in growing public 
indebtedness and a requirement to restrain and reduce public sector 
expenditure.  (A problem that has returned to influence public sector 
management at the end of the first decade of the new century.) 
2. A growth in consumer awareness and expectations that fuelled a decline in 
public confidence in the effectiveness of public policies and the quality of 
public services.  This, in turn, led to calls for “government that works better 
but costs less” (Gore, 1993).  
                                               
9
  A diagram summarising New Zealand‟s state sector is provided as Appendix I. 
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3. A recognition that, while governments may become smaller in size, they 
still play a crucial role in facilitating national wellbeing and prosperity.   
To these motives Boston et al. (1996) added the following: 
4. A general ideological shift to the right which reinforced calls for a smaller 
public sector and greater reliance on market mechanisms such as 
contracting out, corporatisation and privatisation.   
5. A desire by politicians for greater insight into, and control over, the 
activities of public sector agencies. 
6. A desire for an improvement in the transparency and accountability of the 
executive to the legislature (Parliament).   
 
In their book entitled Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler (1993) 
famously claimed that global forces would inevitably lead to the spread of what 
they termed “entrepreneurial government”.  However, in practice, the reforms of 
the New Public Management in different countries have not resulted in a singular 
model but rather a pattern of not dissimilar responses to local contingencies 
(Pollitt, 2001).  In New Zealand, as elsewhere, these responses included: 
1. the corporatisation, commercialisation or privatisation of a range of 
functions previously undertaken by agencies in the core public sector; 
2. the devolution of increased management responsibilities to the chief 
executives of public sector agencies; 
3. public sector agencies being subject to tighter ex ante performance 
specifications;  
4. stronger ex post accountability mechanisms involving a shift in emphasis 
from input and process controls to results (expressed in terms of the 
outputs produced and outcomes achieved); 
5. the separation of commercial from non-commercial activities; 
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6. the separation of responsibility for the provision of policy advice from 
responsibility for policy implementation and service provision; and  
7. all service provision being made as contestable as possible.     
 
The reforms that embodied these response and shaped New Zealand‟s model of 
public sector management have been explained by commentators such as Boston 
et al. (1996), Scott, Ball & Dale (1997), and Scott (2001), in terms of a group of 
theories, that are generally grouped under the rubric of institutional economics, 
and the apparent desire by politicians for public sector entities to adopt private 
sector management practices („managerialism‟).   
 
The theories, namely, public choice theory, transaction cost economics and agency 
theory, seek to explain the relative costs and the form, function and behavioural 
impacts of man made institutions such as organisational structures and 
behavioural norms.   
 
Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory, espoused by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), challenged the 
view that politicians and bureaucrats are driven primarily by ideology and the 
public interest; instead, it assumes they operate out of self interest in an 
environment of multiple, and often conflicting, objectives.10  It suggests that, as 
rational, self-interested utility maximisers, politicians will seek to increase their 
chance of re-election (Downs, 1957) and officials will seek to inflate their 
departmental budgets (Niskanen, 1971).  In effect, this theory views the political 
process as inefficient and lacking the stabilising influence provided by the „invisible 
                                               
10A recent Treasury survey of public service chief executives and chief financial officers showed that a 
critical financial risk for chief executives over the next three years is management of conflicting 
priorities (76% rated this moderate to high).  Conflicting priorities primarily refer to the tensions 
between Ministerial decisions and issues such as managing day-to-day cost escalations and 
maintaining a focus on long-term goals with the former two impacting on the ability to do the latter.  
(Treasury, 2009c) 
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hand‟ in the open market system.  Whilst in the private sector context of a open 
market it has been argued that self-interested behaviour is ultimately beneficial to 
the community, this contention has not been advanced in relation to the public 
sector.  Rather, public choice theorists contend that, to prevent the number and 
size of government agencies growing beyond the level necessary to perform their 
designated functions, the role of the State should be subject to explicit and 
transparent controls.  Further, to avoid biased advice and bureaucratic capture, 
policy, service delivery and regulatory functions should be separated and services 
provided by the State should, wherever possible, be made contestable.   
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics is generally associated with Williamson (1985) who 
defined it as: “an examination of the comparative costs of planning, adopting and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures” (p. 2).  It 
recognises, in the decision-making of rational actors, both the direct costs of 
production and the costs of exchange (transaction costs) associated with different 
organisational settings.  It therefore supports consideration of how the production 
of goods and services occurs in different organisational settings and the nature of 
their related governance structures.  It assumes that rational actors will select 
governance structures that minimise the aggregate of their production and 
transaction costs.  In some circumstances, transaction costs will be lower in the 
context of an open market and in other cases they will be lower if the transactions 
occur within an integrated organisation.  These circumstances rest on three key 
determinants of transaction costs, namely: 
 frequency: infrequently traded goods or services will tend to have higher 
transaction costs as a consequence of the need to establish specific terms; 
 uncertainty: transactions occurring within a short timeframe (for example, 
in a „spot market‟) will tend to have lower transaction costs; long term 
transactions or contractual relationships are more likely to be subject to 
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bounded rationality (all eventualities cannot be foreseen), information 
asymmetries and the danger of opportunistic behaviour, and thus will incur 
higher transaction costs;   
 asset specificity: where transactions involve assets whose value is solely, 
or principally, related to that transaction, the related transaction costs will 
tend to be higher in an open market as it will be relatively expensive for 
new suppliers to enter the market.   
It is therefore argued that the production and exchange of some goods and 
services are more suited to an open market while others are “much better suited 
to hierarchical or rule-governed organisations, such as a public bureaucracy” 
(Boston et al., 1996, p.23)  
 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory views social and political life as a series of „contracts‟ in which one 
party (the principal) enters into an agreed relationship (i.e. a contract) with 
another party (the agent) under which the latter agrees to undertake a task or 
deliver goods or services in accordance with the terms of the contract.  However, 
the very nature of, and need for, the agreement is predicated on different levels of 
knowledge and will, to a greater or lesser extent, involve the agent acting beyond 
the vision and direct control of the principal.  The central problem, as identified by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), is that of “inducing an agent to behave as if he [or 
she] were maximising the principal‟s welfare” (p. 309).  In a public sector context, 
agency relationships exist between, inter alia, the electorate and its elected 
representatives, Ministers and departmental chief executives, and departmental 
chief executives and their managers.     
 
Agency theory assumes that principals and agents have different objectives which 
may not necessarily be driven by self-interest but which will, nonetheless, be 
based on differing beliefs and, as a consequence, will inevitably give rise to a 
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conflict of interests.  Thus, although both principal and agent are prone to utility 
maximisation, agency theorists largely focus on the role of agents and how to find 
the least costly way to negotiate, specify and monitor the agency „contracts‟ so as 
to minimise the likelihood of the agent engaging in behaviour contrary to the 
principal‟s interests.  Principals can employ various forms of incentives and 
sanctions and/or closely monitor the agent‟s behaviour, both of which will give rise 
to „agency costs‟ for the principal.  It is claimed that these costs are lower when 
an agent serves only one principal thereby avoiding multiple contractual 
arrangements and accountabilities.  The challenge is to establish a process for 
specifying, negotiating and monitoring contracts that minimise both the agency 
costs and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by the agent that is not 
congruent with the best interests of the principal.  The application of agency 
theory to public sector management has, therefore, resulted in performance being 
defined in terms of the interests of the principal and performance measurement 
being concerned with establishing accountability mechanisms over the activities of 
the agent(s) (Anderson & Dovey, 2003).   
 
Together these three theories underpinned a utilitarian or instrumental view of 
organisations (Etzioni, 1961) in which performance can be specified in advance 
and subsequently managed by the institutional structures and incentives that are 
put in place to control the actions of rational and largely self-interested actors.  
This was also a singular perspective that took the position of a principal (in the 
form of the central agencies and their political masters) that seeks to manage 
public sector organisations against a consistent set of principles and toward public 
policy objectives.   
 
Managerialism 
In addition to the theoretical approaches outlined above, a set of ideas, generally 
referred to as managerialism, influenced the development of New Zealand‟s model 
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of public sector management.  These ideas were drawn less from the theoretical 
world of the academic community than from the accumulated experience of 
practitioners and consultants.  An underlying assumption of these ideas is the 
existence of a generic management discipline, or set of practices and rules, that 
can be applied equally to entities in the private and public sectors.  „Management‟ 
is seen as an activity, distinct from public policy, that “offers our society the best 
chance of material progress” (Pollitt, 1998, p.47).  The argument that private 
sector management practices should be applied to the public sector was not new 
when it was adopted to underpin the reforms of the late 1980s; it was 
recommended by the 1912 Commission of Inquiry into the New Zealand public 
service (House of Representatives, 1912).  However, a significant difference 
between 1912 and the 1980s was the growing body of popular management 
literature, largely pioneered by Peters and Waterman‟s 1982 book In Search of 
Excellence.  In New Zealand, the early success of privatisation initiatives, and of 
the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, in producing dramatic reductions in costs, 
also fuelled the perceived validity of these ideas.   
 
A key theme of managerialism is the improvement in the economy and efficiency 
of organisational performance accomplished by giving managers the freedom to 
manage whilst making them accountable for the results of their activities.  Hood 
(1990b) has suggested that this has led to the adoption of a thermostatic form of 
performance management (or control) in which “those who select the preferred 
policy temperature are, at least within limits, indifferent to how it is delivered” 
(p.312).  For politicians this equates to “steering not rowing” (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992).  For public sector managers, it means being given the scope and authority 
to deliver but also being held accountable for the delivery of agreed outputs.  
Central to being accountable is the requirement to provide information and explain 
achieved performance.  This information has been couched in the language of the 
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private sector in terms such as „business plans‟, „strategic intents‟, and 
performance contracts.   
 
In New Zealand the impact of these motives and concepts on the model of public 
sector management that emerged in the late 1980s can be summarised as 
follows: 
 a belief in the superiority of private sector performance management 
models that should, therefore, be adopted in the public sector; 
 the performance of public service departments defined in terms of the 
goods and services they provide (their outputs) rather than the inputs they 
use and/or the processes they follow; 
 a strong emphasis on ex ante specification of performance and ex post 
measurement and reporting of results; 
 a requirement that departmental financial and non-financial performance 
information be reported (and audited) in a Statement of Service 
Performance which for all significant outputs reports the quantity, quality, 
cost and, where relevant, time and location of delivery of the outputs 
(Neale & Pallot, 2001); 
 an implicit assumption that the impact of departmental outputs on the 
community (their outcomes) is the responsibility of relevant Ministers, not 
of departmental chief executives; 
 an increase in the authority of departmental chief executives to purchase 
and manage inputs; 
 a series of cascading formal (as opposed to relational) contracts and 
performance agreements linking principals with agents designed to achieve 
the accountability of departmental chief executives and their managers 
(Yeatman, 1995); 
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 an avoidance of multiple accountability arrangements so that each „agent‟ 
should only be accountable to one „principal‟; 
 the organisational separation of commercial and non-commercial activities 
and advisory, delivery and regulatory functions, as a guard against provider 
or bureaucratic capture;  
 a general focus on increased economy and efficiency as: “doing more for 
less and achieving value for money became the objectives of this finance 
centred perspective on public management reform” (Aucoin, 1995, p.9).   
 
2.4 The Continuing Evolution of the New Zealand Model  
While the comprehensive and theoretically consistent nature of the New Zealand 
model of public sector management generated international interest and many 
plaudits, the tensions inherent within its framework have also been recognised by 
a number of commentators (for example, Pallot, 1991; Gregory, 1995b; Boston, 
1995).  Thus, for example, while the theoretical rigour of Government 
Management (Treasury, 1987) attracted praise, it also gave rise to concerns that 
inadequate consideration had been paid to the social, cultural and ethical 
constraints which, together with more tangible rewards and sanctions, govern 
human relations (Boston et al., 1996).  If the concern of public sector managers is 
limited to efficient delivery, broader normative considerations, such as concern for 
others, professional integrity and/or the pursuit of a more just and equitable 
society, are excluded.  Gregory (1995a) warned that such a framework could 
challenge the ethos of what it means to be a public servant and encourage narrow 
self-interested behaviour.  Similarly Hood (1992) observed that in the public 
sector replacing relational modes of contracting (based on high levels of trust) 
with more formal classical modes of contracting (which assume low levels of trust) 
may result in a reduced level of trust and commitment from those involved.   
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In addition to these commentaries, since the initial legislation that introduced the 
public sector reforms in New Zealand (the Sate Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the 
State Sector Act 1988, and the Public Finance Act 1989), a number of reports on, 
and reviews of, the New Zealand model have been written.  Whilst these 
acknowledged the accomplishments of the reforms they also provided criticisms 
which have resulted in some modifications to the original model.  Three key 
reports, namely the Logan Report (1991), the Schick Report (1996), and the 
Report on the Review of the Centre (State Services Commission, 2002a) are 
discussed below.   
 
1) Report of The Steering Group on the Review of State Sector 
Reforms (Logan, 1991) 
In 1991 the Government requested that a Steering Group, led by Logan, a former 
chief executive of IBM New Zealand, undertake a review to “assess the 
effectiveness of the State sector reforms, brought about by the State Sector Act 
1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989, in improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Public Service” (Logan, 1991, p.121).  The resulting „Logan 
Report‟ noted that the reforms had delivered significant improvements to the 
management of the New Zealand‟s public service but it also identified a number of 
perceived shortcomings.  Three of these, relating to the performance management 
arrangements, are particularly significant.  They are: 
i) limited consideration being given to the wider public interest; 
ii) the lack of a strategic framework; and 
iii) poorly specified performance agreements.   
Each of these is discussed below.   
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i) Limited consideration being given to the wider public interest 
The New Zealand public service reforms, inter alia, devolved accountability for 
output production to departments through what was initially referred to as a 
Purchase Agreement (subsequently reframed as the Output Plan) between a 
purchasing Minister and a department.  Purchase Agreements required Ministers to 
specify the outputs to be provided by the relevant department with terms and 
conditions similar to private sector contracts (Treasury, 1996).  Each Purchase 
Agreement was also cross-referenced to the relevant Chief Executive‟s 
Performance Agreement that existed between the Responsible Minister for the 
department and the department‟s chief executive.  The Chief Executive‟s 
Performance Agreement also included expectations in respect of the financial 
performance to be achieved by the department, the management practices to be 
followed, and any personal performance issues for the chief executive.  The Logan 
Report noted that Ministers were concerned that these arrangements with 
individual departments and their chief executives had eroded consideration of the 
wider collective interest of government.  Inadequate consultation between 
departments, and insufficient consideration of the impacts of departmental 
decisions on other agencies and the wider interests of government, were also 
noted.  These concerns have remained a consistent theme in the subsequent 
reviews.   
 
ii) The lack of a strategic framework 
The Logan Report also noted chief executives‟ concerns about of the lack of a 
Cabinet defined, strategic framework within which coherent decisions could be 
made.  This was initially remedied when, beginning in 1993, the Government of 
the day introduced a system of strategic result areas (SRAs), representing its 
major priorities and goals, and key result areas (KRAs), which represent each 
department‟s contribution to these goals.  However, in 1999 the Labour/Alliance 
Government abandoned this more explicit strategic framework contained in SRAs 
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and KRAs.  In its place, that and subsequent Governments have issued a high 
level, and much less explicit, statement of their key priorities.  Departments are 
now required to outline their contribution to these priorities in their own longer 
term accountability document (their Statement of Intent).  
 
iii) Poorly specified performance agreements 
In 1991, when the Logan report was written, the intended structure of 
performance agreements between Ministers and departmental chief executives 
had not been fully implemented by all Ministers.  The report observed that some 
Ministers were not entirely convinced about the benefits of these agreements as 
they believed they tended to “focus on the readily measured aspect of 
performance rather than the more qualitative dimensions of the Minister and chief 
executive relationship” (Logan, 1991, p. 61).  While significant improvements have 
since been made to the specification and management of departmental 
performance (State Services Commission, 2002a), as late as 2001 an informed 
commentator was led to observe: “On the whole the system has not been 
developed to the point where Logan‟s concerns can be set aside” (Scott, 2001, 
p.48).  More recently, Chief Executive Performance Agreements have been 
replaced by a letter of expectations which outlines general expectations in respect 
of performance with few, if any, quantified targets.   
 
2) The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a 
Time of Change (Schick, 1996) 
Another formal review of the New Zealand State sector was undertaken in 1996 by 
Schick (a Professor of Public Policy in the School of Public Affairs at the University 
of Maryland), at the behest of the State Services Commission and the Treasury 
(Schick, 1996).  His report suggested that, whilst the reforms undertaken over the 
preceding eight years had successfully transformed public management in New 
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Zealand, a number of issues remained to be addressed.  These included questions 
relating to: 
i) organisational capacity; 
ii) strategic capacity; and 
iii) departmental accountability.   
 
i) Organisational Capacity 
Schick argued that Ministers‟ dual roles, as purchasers of departmental outputs 
and as owners of the departmental capacity to produce those outputs both 
currently and in the future, inevitably pull in different directions.  He suggested 
that, as a consequence of the application of a formal contractual logic, the 
purchase role had dominated Ministers‟ accountability arrangements with 
departmental chief executives and that this should be countered by strengthening 
a broader set of accountability arrangements (p.44).  According to Schick, this 
could be achieved by more detailed specification of ownership interests in the 
Performance Agreements between Ministers and departmental chief executives 
and by the examination of expenditure on critical inputs that contribute to 
maintaining or enhancing productive capability (for example, staff training and 
development).   
 
ii) Strategic Capacity 
The report also noted that the New Zealand model was “still more geared to short 
term production of outputs than planning for the long haul, and to account for 
what has been produced than to evaluate progress in achieving major policy 
objectives” (p. 53).  It suggested that Ministers and central agencies (i.e. the 
Treasury, State Services Commission, and Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet) needed to promote, and provide more input to, departmental strategic 
planning.  The report also suggested that the existing annual appropriation 
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process be amended to include a multi-year framework in order to encourage a 
more strategic approach to the allocation of resources.  Such an approach to 
resource allocation might also be supported by giving Ministers a broader portfolio 
of activities.    
 
iii) Departmental Accountability 
In relation to departmental accountability, Schick noted that a focus on ex ante 
specification of outputs had created a reliable basis on which to enforce 
managerial accountability.  However, it had also led to something of a checklist 
mentality rather than the use of good indicators of performance.  He argued for a 
broader accountability framework based, not just on compliance with the delivery 
of agreed outputs at an agreed price, but also on “values, judgement and 
leadership”.  The need for increased accountability for departmental effectiveness 
was also acknowledged but in this respect Schick sounded a note of caution.  He 
suggested that, given their many formative influences, some of which may be 
beyond the control of departments, “Outcomes should be seen not as measures of 
impact but as indicators of direction.  They should be employed more for 
formulating policy than maintaining accountability” (p. 61).   
 
Schick further noted that the accounting and financial management reforms 
introduced in the mid 1980s and early 1990s were designed to be parts of a 
regime of external accountability.  He suggested: “the next frontier in New 
Zealand financial management will be to devise systems and practices for internal 
management needs” (p.68).   
 
When Schick‟s report was released in 1996 it promoted considerable debate.  
However, little further reform occurred until 2000 when a range of initiatives 
began to take shape.  These included: 
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 the establishment of the State Sector Standards Board to review, and make 
recommendations on, the perceived erosion of normative controls within 
the State Sector; 
 increased focus on the development of public service managers, centred on 
the Executive Leadership Programme; 
 the Pathfinder Project on outcomes, including the introduction of new 
departmental Statements of Intent, which sought to refocus departmental 
planning on outcomes and capability as well as on outputs; and 
 work, led by the Ministry of Social Development, to identify a range of 
appropriate social outcome indicators.   
 
3) Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre.  
In 2001, a Ministerial Advisory Group which included public service chief 
executives, external commentators and a representative of the Public Service 
Association11, undertook a further review of New Zealand‟s public management 
system and how well it was responding to the needs of Ministers and citizens.  The 
Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre (State Services 
Commission, 2002a) provided a more coherent framework for the initiatives noted 
above and identified three priority areas for change, namely:   
i) citizen-focused service delivery; 
ii) a whole of government focus; and 
iii) public service values.   
Each of these is discussed below. 
 
                                               
11
 The major Union of public sector workers.   
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i) Citizen-focused Service Delivery 
The Advisory Group noted a need to achieve better integrated, citizen-focused 
service delivery, particularly where complex social problems are dealt with by 
multiple agencies.  The language used is significant; a focus on “citizens” as 
opposed to “customers” or “clients” represents a step away from the purity of 
managerialist rhetoric.  It recommended that improved service delivery should be 
achieved with the aid of a range of mechanisms to encourage and increase inter-
agency coordination.  These included front-line based “circuit breaker teams” 
tasked with providing creative solutions to previously intractable problems.  The 
Advisory Group suggested that integration of service delivery could be facilitated 
by ensuring that public sector agencies focus on “the results that citizens and 
Government want in terms of outcomes and services” (p.19).     
 
ii) A Whole of Government Focus 
The Advisory Group also saw fragmentation in the large number of state sector 
agencies as a major inhibitor of effective policy formulation and service delivery.  
It suggested that individual agencies had placed emphasis on vertical 
accountability to their purchasing Minister and had not taken adequate account of 
broader, whole of government interests.  The Advisory Group therefore 
recommended a less rigorous approach to the separation of policy and service 
delivery functions that would, over time, see the creation of a smaller number of 
larger, sector-based agencies.  An early example of this strategy was the re-
amalgamation, in 2003, of the Department of Courts and the Ministry of Justice.  
In 2006 it also included the “merging” of the Department of Child, Youth and 
Family Services into the Ministry of Social Development.   
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iii) Public Service Values 
In a broader review of the impacts of the New Public Management, Sinclair (1996) 
suggested that the reforms associated with the use of private sector models had 
resulted in “a lost discourse” that has been replaced by one that “casts public 
sector management as a technical activity rather than a social commitment or 
moral practice” (p. 227).  In terms of the people and culture of the New Zealand 
State sector, the Review of the Centre also saw a need to build a strong and 
unifying sense of values associated with a spirit of service to the community.  The 
Advisory Group noted the existing work of the State Sector Standards Board 
(State Services Commission, 2001) in re-stating the ethos of the public service, 
and recommended that increased responsibility be given to the State Services 
Commissioner to broaden and reinforce this work.  The Advisory Group also 
emphasised the need to strengthen human resource management practices, 
particularly in respect of the development of staff and leaders who would “actively 
model and develop a professional public service culture” (State Services 
Commission, 2002a, p.30).  This again indicates a shift from a more general 
managerialist approach to one that is more relevant to public sector management.   
 
More specifically, in respect of performance measurement, the Advisory Group 
expressed concern over the lack of information in respect of both performance in 
relation to outcomes and the Government‟s non-financial interests as owners of 
State sector organisations (p.16).  It recommended that ex ante performance 
specification should be concentrated in a single document, a departmental 
Statement of Intent (SOI).  This should include information on a broad range of 
performance factors including targeted outcomes and organisational capability as 
well as the outputs to be produced.  The latter would still also be specified in an 
Output Plan that, in essence, combined the previously separate Purchase 
Agreement and Chief Executive‟s Performance Agreement.   
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The Advisory Group further noted there was a need for improved information 
“about actual performance, in both outcome and service delivery terms” (p.24).  It 
encouraged all government agencies to place more emphasis on ex post 
evaluation but also suggested that central agencies12 should have an increased 
role in evaluating organisational performance.   
 
2004 Legislative Change 
Further refinement of, and statutory support for, the changes recommended by 
the Advisory Group was provided by what the then Minister of Finance identified as 
“the first major change to State sector governance in a decade” (Cullen, 2003).  
Enactment of the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004, the State Sector 
Amendment Act 2004, and the Crown Entities Act 2004 (all in December 2004) 
resulted in significant changes to the key legislation that had shaped the New 
Zealand Model of public sector management for nearly twenty years.  In relation 
to management of the performance of public service organisations, five legislative 
changes provided both opportunities and, potentially, further challenges.  These 
involved: 
i) possible changes to the structure of Votes13 [Public Finance Amendment Act 
2004, s. 5(28)]; 
ii) the possible introduction of more broadly scoped multi-class output 
expense appropriations [s. 7(3)(b)]; 
iii) an ability for departments to incur expenses on behalf of another 
department (s. 20); 
                                               
12In general, the term “central agencies” is used to refer to the Treasury, State Services Commissioner, 
and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.   
13A Vote is an appropriation, or a grouping of one or more appropriations, that is granted by 
Parliament and represents an authority to incur expenses, or capital expenditure, up to a specified 
amount.   
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iv) a requirement for more detailed performance information (s. 40); 
v) increased statutory responsibilities in respect of the development of 
management capability (State Sector Amendment Act 2004, s. 9) and the 
maintenance of appropriate public service values [State Sector Amendment 
Act (No 2) 2004, s. 11].   
These changes are discussed in more detail below. 
 
i) The Structure of Votes 
Appropriations are grouped into Votes for presentation to Parliament.  Prior to the 
amended legislation, a Vote was the responsibility of one Minister and one 
department.  Each ministerial portfolio thus required a separate Vote.  The Review 
of the Centre had pointed to structural fragmentation amongst State Sector 
agencies and, in a Parliamentary Briefing Document on the introduction of the 
legislation (State Services Commission, 2003a), it was suggested that the 
compartmentalising of appropriations into approximately seventy different votes 
had created barriers to collective decision-making and added compliance costs in 
respect of co-ordination between departments and Ministers.   
 
Section 5(28) of the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004 redefined a Vote so that, 
in the future, it could represent a grouping of appropriations which are the 
responsibility of one or more Ministers.  However, it remains clear which Minister 
is accountable to Parliament for each separate appropriation and each 
appropriation is administered by one department.  It was thought that this might 
allow better integration of decision-making and resource prioritisation, particularly 
if, in the future, Votes were formed around sectors in which more than one 
Minister has an interest.  In effect, this has the potential to both widen the scope 
of Ministers‟ purchasing decisions and to better integrate departmental activities.  
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However, despite this legislative provision, Votes have largely remained structured 
to reflect the funding and responsibilities assigned to individual agencies.     
 
ii) The Scope of Appropriations 
Formally, each appropriation within a Vote was limited to a single class of (similar) 
outputs.  Although Ministers and departmental chief executives were able to argue 
for a simpler and more flexible set of fewer, more broadly specified appropriations, 
the desire to maintain clarity around purchase and funding decisions worked 
against this happening.  As a result of the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004, s. 
7(3)(b), an appropriation can now cover more than one class of outputs – given 
prior approval by the Minister of Finance and inclusion of the reasons for so doing 
in the Estimates documentation.  Accountability for departmental performance 
remains at the level of individual output classes (i.e. a grouping of similar outputs) 
in both the prospective Statement of Intent and the retrospective Statement of 
Service Performance included in the departmental Annual Report.  Within a 
multiple output class appropriation, departments have the ability to change the 
level of funding between output classes without the need for further Parliamentary 
approval.  It is, therefore, possible that multiple output class appropriations, 
grouped around the achievement of particular outcomes, will permit a greater 
devolution to chief executives of decision making in respect of resource switching 
or usage.  This potential grouping of inter-dependent activities might also address, 
or at least ease, the problem of managing the inter-dependencies of output class 
appropriations within departmental output costing systems, particularly for 
relatively small output classes that are more noticeably affected by changes in 
overhead allocation.   While multiple output class appropriations might reduce the 
need (created by the prior inflexibility) to broadly define output classes and 
therefore support more transparency in the funding of public services, to date little 
evidence exists of this having occurred.     
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iii) Expenses Incurred on Behalf of Another Department 
Whilst government departments have always been able to purchase services from 
each other, this has previously required an expenditure appropriation (i.e. an 
authority to incur the related expense) to be held, and accounted for, by both of 
the departments involved.  However, an appropriation is no longer restricted to 
expenditure incurred within a single department (or, to put it another way, a 
department can incur expenditure for which it is not appropriated) as Section 20 of 
the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004 allows one department to incur output 
expenses for and on behalf of another department.  In effect, this expenditure will 
be funded by inter-departmental revenue but it requires an exact off-set of 
revenue and expenditure.  Any unused revenue must be returned to the funding, 
or purchasing, department.   
 
This has simplified accountabilities to the extent that only one department is 
required to obtain, and account for, the appropriation.   It might also facilitate 
joint initiatives that struggle with issues associated with separate departmental 
fiefdoms and who holds the purse strings.  However, as is the case with the 
legislative initiatives outlines above, there is little evidence that this change has 
affected performance management practices.   
 
iv) More Detailed Performance Information 
In terms of performance measurement, the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004 
gave legislative recognition to, and requirement for, more detailed reporting of 
both departmental intentions and results.  This includes reporting both financial 
and non-financial information in respect of outputs, their related outcomes, and 
each department‟s future capability.  More specifically, as well as forecast financial 
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statements for the ensuing year, the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004, s.40, 
requires each department to report: 
 the nature and scope of its functions and intended operations; 
 the specific impacts, outcomes or objectives it seeks to achieve or 
contribute to; 
 how it will: 
o perform its functions and conduct its operations, and  
o effectively manage those functions; 
 the measures or standards it will use in respect of: 
o its impacts, outcomes and objectives; 
o the cost effectiveness of its interventions; and 
o its organisational health and capability; 
 any other information that may be necessary to explain the department‟s 
operating intentions and direction.   
The Responsible Minister is also required to confirm that the above information is 
consistent with the policies and performance expectations of the Government.   
 
Prior to these legislative changes, instructions and guidance material issued by the 
central agencies in relation to the production of departmental Output Plans and 
Statements of Intent (State Services Commission, 2003b), had included many of 
these items.  However, these requirements are now enshrined in statute.  
Nevertheless, questions remain as to the extent to which departments are able 
(i.e. have adequate systems in place) to report all of the required information for 
this more comprehensive view of organisational performance.  A review of the 
2007/2008 public service accountability documents by the New Zealand Controller 
and Auditor-General resulted in the following observation: 
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Overall we were disappointed that many entities‟ service performance information did 
not set out coherent performance frameworks showing logical links from the medium-
term outcomes sought by the entity to the annual outputs (goods and services) 
delivered by the entity.  Many SOIs [Statements of Intent] did not have well-specified, 
relevant performance measures and targets for both the medium term and SSP 
[Statement of Service Performance] information.  (Controller and Auditor-General, 
2008, p. 21) 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, with reference to mandated reporting requirements in the 
Norwegian (Modell, 2001) and American (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001) 
public sectors, the extent to which the information reported for purposes of 
external accountability is applied to internal management functions also remains 
questionable.   
 
v.) Public Service Capability and Culture  
Concerns in relation to the maintenance of a body of suitably qualified and 
experienced managers and the maintenance of appropriate public service values 
were noted in the work of the State Sector Standards Board and in the Review of 
the Centre.  A number of changes aimed at addressing these concerns were 
introduced in the State Sector Amendment Act 2004.   
 
The original State Sector Act 1988 provided for a Senior Executive Service (SES) 
which was designed to promote some cohesion and co-operation among 
departments, to maintain a core pool of talented executives and, albeit indirectly, 
to contribute to the maintenance of relevant public service values.  However, in 
practice, the Senior Executive Service faced a number of operational problems and 
received little support from departmental chief executives and “by 2000 the SES 
was moribund” (Scott, 2001).  The 2004 amendment of the State Sector Act 1988 
removed the relevant provisions and replaced them with a responsibility, shared 
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by the State Services Commissioner and departmental chief executives, to develop 
senior leadership and management capability in the public service.  The 
Commissioner was also specifically tasked with providing advice on, and setting 
minimum standards for, the integrity and conduct of state sector employees.  To 
assist in the discharge of this responsibility the Commissioner was given powers to 
conduct inspections and investigations, summon witnesses, obtain information, 
and enter premises.   
 
It remains to be seen to what extent the legislative provisions can facilitate 
change to the ethos and culture of the public service.  It may, in part, depend on 
how active the Commissioner is prepared to be.  One initiative in that respect was 
the 2005 launch of the „Development Goals for the State Sector‟.  This aimed to 
both define what the New Zealand State Sector should “look like in 2015” and 
annually report on progress towards that end (State Services Commission, 2005).  
By 2007 the Development Goals had been re-stated as follows: 
 Employer of Choice: ensure the State Services is an employer of choice, 
attractive to high performers who are committed to service and the 
achievement of results. 
 Networked State Services: use technology to transform the provision of 
services for New Zealanders. 
 Value-for-Money State Services: use resources and powers in an efficient, 
appropriate and effective way.   
 Coordinated State Agencies: ensure the total contribution of government 
agencies is greater than the sum of the parts. 
 Accessible State Services: enhance access, responsiveness and 
effectiveness, and improve New Zealanders‟ experience of State Services. 
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 Trusted State Services: strengthen trust in the State Services and reinforce 
the spirit of service.   
However, while the language of these goals may have entered agencies‟ external 
accountability documents and the performance conversations of some public 
servants, since the change of Government in November 2008 the State Services 
Commission no longer formally reports on the progress of the Development Goals 
framework.   
 
2009: Changes in Emphasis 
In an environment of contracting economic activity, rising unemployment and 
reducing tax revenue, the New Zealand Government, like many others around the 
world, has been set new priorities for the management of the public sector.  In 
particular, with an increased emphasis on cost efficiency, public service agencies 
are being asked to provide performance information to demonstrate how they are 
delivering “better, smarter public services for less” (Treasury, 2009a).  As the 
Minister of Finance announced in respect of an initial „value-for-money‟ exercise: 
The scrutiny of existing baselines is not a one-off exercise.  In future Budgets we will 
continue to seek to shift spending away from lower-priority areas.  This will require a 
new way of working from the public sector and a focus on delivering better services 
with the same resources.  (Treasury, 2009b) 
 
The renewed emphasis on departmental accountability for outputs has been 
reinforced by the Government‟s introduction of an “enhanced reporting and 
monitoring regime” (CAB Min (09) 17/10) which requires each public service 
agency‟s (usually) quarterly reporting to its Minister against its Output Plan to be 
also provided to the Treasury and State Services Commission.  Those latter 
agencies are then, bi-annually, to provide a consolidated report to the Cabinet 
Expenditure Control Committee which is itself to play a more active role in 
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monitoring agency performance against agreed “performance improvement 
actions” (PIAs).     
 
2.6 Remaining Tensions 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the ongoing changes described above, a number 
of issues, or what Pallot (2001) termed “perennial tensions”, remain within the 
public service management systems.  These include:   
i) increased management autonomy and enhanced central control; 
ii) control, accountability and „real work‟; 
iii) short term efficiency versus long term capacity; and 
iv) measuring the immeasurable.   
Each of these is explained below.   
 
i) Increased management autonomy and enhanced central control   
Although the State Sector Act 1988 devolved increased autonomy in decision 
making to agency chief executives, departments are still required to provide 
performance information in conformance with the accountability regime by which 
the public service as a whole is managed.  This regime is largely operated by the 
central agencies14 who also retain significant influence in decision-making 
processes relating to the structure and funding of individual agencies.  Thus, while 
the reforms of the late 1980s gave departmental chief executives “unprecedented 
degrees of managerial freedom” (Scott, 2001, p.1), that freedom was not 
unencumbered and has been the subject of ongoing debate.   
 
Norman (2003) has noted that the emphasis placed on central versus 
decentralised controls varies over time but “[t]he period since mid 2000 has been 
                                               
14
 See footnote 8.   
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one of increasing evidence of a pendulum swing away from the model of 
[decentralised] control adopted in the late 1980s” (p.209).  This has involved 
central agencies playing an increased role in strategic coordination, management 
of the public service ethos, and maintenance of departmental capability (Scott, 
2001).  This more active role of the central agencies was reinforced when, in 
2006, the former Government announced a series of departmental reviews aimed 
at improving performance and value for money within and across Votes (Mallard, 
2006; Treasury, 2006).  Although these reviews were conducted by the agencies 
concerned, they also involved active participation from the central agencies.  
When considering the proposal to undertake the reviews, the Cabinet also agreed 
that Ministers would “consider opportunities for central agencies to serve all 
Ministers, including Vote Ministers, further in improving performance” (Treasury, 
2006, p.4).   
 
In 2008, the Auditor-General‟s critical review of performance reporting in the 
public sector concluded that the central agencies should play a more active role in 
both setting and monitoring performance reporting standards.  As noted above, in 
2009 the new Government gave some form to this recommendation by requiring 
departments‟ (normally) quarterly reports to their Minister to also be provided to 
the Treasury and State Services Commission who are then to, biannually, prepare 
a consolidated review for the Cabinet Expenditure Control Committee.   
 
Like the role played by the central agencies, that played by Ministers in managing 
departmental performance has also varied over time.  The original (1980s) 
devolution of increased decision-making to departmental chief executives was 
linked to improvements in their accountability to Ministers for the outputs 
produced and an underlying assumption that politicians would concentrate on 
indirect steering of departmental performance by using output targets as a means 
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of control (Hood, 2002).  In practice, outputs are not always easily defined and, 
when this is the case, politicians may resort to controlling inputs (Trebilcock, 
1996).  Alternatively, and more simply stated, politicians may, on occasion, wish 
to exercise more direct control than setting output targets allows, particularly 
when the outputs concerned are politically salient and/or are more significant in 
terms of the size of their budget (Pollitt, 2006).   
 
ii) Control, accountability and „real work‟ 
The increased information requirements of the accountability regime created by 
the Public Finance Act 1989 and its 2004 amendment, has placed significant 
demands on the information systems of public service departments which, at least 
initially, many have not been able to meet.  Departments‟ external accountability 
requirements include reporting output measures in their Statement of Service 
Performance, the costs of outputs and output classes, and their contributions to 
targeted outcomes.  Since 2004 they have also been required to report on 
organisational health and capability.  However, these requirements may have 
more to do with making the activities of departments visible to Ministers, 
Parliament and the public than with effectively supporting managerial decision-
making within those organisations.   
 
The possible disconnect between information required for external accountability 
and that required for management decisions in reflected in Power‟s (1997) 
observation that there has been an explosion in controls based on procedures for 
“making things auditable” which is associated with declining trust in traditional 
styles of professional regulation.  As Hood et al. (1998) concluded from a two year 
study of British government: “internal regulation [is] in some ways moving in the 
opposite direction from operational management, as increased management 
discretion is balanced by more explicit and intrusive regulation” (p.65).   
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Hood (2002) has also pointed to the assumption, inherent within the New Public 
Management‟s thermostat-like model of information feedback,15 that the 
performance of public sector agencies is monitored by a relatively non-distorting 
information gathering regime with which managers comply.  As observed in 
Chapter 1, that compliance with the reporting regime may have more to do with 
the need to demonstrate external legitimacy than reflecting or guiding 
management practice.  Or, more simply, there is a risk that departments will 
regard the information required to support that regulation as divorced from their 
„real work‟.  Interviews with a large number of New Zealand public service 
managers conducted by Norman in the late 1990s and early 2000s provided a 
“distinct impression” that “the rituals and routines of control operate at a level of 
abstraction.  Participation in these rituals is a necessary process for securing 
financial resources, job preservation and patch protection” (Norman, 2003, 
p.220).   
 
The simple thermostatic models of control that underpinned the initial reforms of 
New Zealand‟s public service have not fitted easily into its world of competing, and 
not always clear, objectives.  Brignall and Modell (2000) have, therefore, 
suggested that loosely coupling, or decoupling, of external and internal 
accountability mechanisms may be a rational response to complex or competing 
objectives 
 
                                               
15 The machine-like, thermostatic model is based on the idea of a preset goal and a feedback mechanism 
that signals any divergence from that goal and institutes corrective action to bring performance back in 
line with the goal.  Hood (2002) notes: “the incentives and sanctions that operate to ensure that 
managers follow the goals set by politicians are like switches that turn the current to heating elements 
or exchangers on or off” (p.312).   
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iii.) Short term efficiency vs. longer term capacity 
In New Zealand, a clear distinction has been drawn between the dual roles of 
Ministers as purchasers of departmental outputs and as owners of the 
organisational capacity that allow these outputs to be produced.  However, the 
primary emphasis of the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s was on the 
purchase role (Schick, 1996; State Services Commission, 1998).  The 
accompanying focus on increased efficiency in the production of public sector 
goods and services allowed little, if any, consideration to be given to the need to 
maintain organisational capacity and capability to produce goods and services in 
the future (Controller and Auditor-General, 1999).  The resulting erosion of future 
productive capacity, in effect, represented an under-costing of current goods and 
services.   
 
Whilst the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004 introduced a requirement for 
departments to report on organisational health and capability to perform its 
functions and conduct its operations effectively (s.40(d)(iii)), it remains to be seen 
to how well this occurs in practice.  It also remains to be seen how consideration 
of the longer term requirements of departments will affect Ministers‟ funding 
decisions, particularly in an environment of renewed economic pressure and fiscal 
constraint.    
 
iv) Measuring the immeasurable 
As noted above, the rational logic of ex ante output specification and ex post 
performance measurement has not proved to be uniformly straightforward.  Many 
of the functions retained in the core public service are there largely because they 
cannot be clearly specified in advance and subsequently monitored.  If this had 
not been the case, they may well have been contracted out or corporatised.  While 
defining and (quantitatively) measuring outputs has not always proved to be 
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straightforward, defining and measuring their contribution to government 
outcomes is even more problematic.  The measurement of outcomes often 
requires a less quantitative and more values-based approach that involves the use 
of judgement in respect of the “performance story” (State Services Commission, 
2008).  The requirement of the 2004 legislative amendment to report on 
organisational health and capability introduces a further level of sophistication and 
a set of related reporting challenges.   
 
With these unresolved tensions the New Zealand Model did not, and could not, 
represent a singular solution and model but rather a work in process that has 
continued to evolve.   
 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the public sector reforms which commenced in New 
Zealand in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  These reforms gave public service 
departments authority to source and allocate inputs (such as personnel, office 
accommodation and motor vehicles) and made them responsible for the provision 
of outputs (goods and services such as policy advice, the payment of social 
welfare benefits, or the management of prisons) which were agreed in formal, 
quasi-contractual documents.  Ministers were responsible for selecting and 
„purchasing‟ these outputs for a specified level of funding, either from these 
departments or, through the departments, from private or not-for-profit 
organisations, in order to achieve the desired outcomes (such as social 
development or a lower crime rate) for which they were, at least implicitly, 
responsible.   
 
However, the performance measurement and management model introduced by 
the initial reforms has continued to evolve.   Together with an increased focus on 
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chief executives‟ responsibilities in respect of the health and capability of their 
organisations, subsequent reforms have also placed more emphasis on the 
contributions of public service departments to the longer term outcomes desired 
by the Government.  More recently, and in the context of the worst economic crisis 
for decades, the New Zealand Government has announced a campaign to establish 
“a more focused, efficient and productive public service” (Whitehead, 2009).  This 
has heralded a swing in emphasis away from outcomes and effectiveness back 
towards outputs and economy and efficiency.  It has also resulted in the central 
agencies (in particular the Treasury and State Services Commission) playing a 
more active role in the oversight of the performance of departments.   
 
Despite the ongoing reforms, a number of perennial tensions remain.  These 
tensions are reflected in continuing concerns about the extent to which there is 
adequate coordination between individual departments and recognition of the 
wider interests of government.  The management of departmental performance in 
silos may be an inherent characteristic of a quasi-contractual model that narrows 
the focus of accountability to the deliverables for which individual agencies can be 
held accountable.  Tensions are also evident in criticisms of the quality of both 
financial and non-financial performance information that plausibly results from the 
difficulty of defining performance in the objective terms conceived in the New 
Zealand model as initially created in the 1980s.  Although some of the subsequent 
guidance material of the central agencies has recognised the benefit of a broader 
set of performance information based on values and judgement, such an approach 
does not fit comfortably with the calculation-based logic within the conceptual 
framework that underpinned the creation of the New Zealand Model.    
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The next chapter reviews the formal definitions of „performance‟ and „performance 
measurement‟ and discusses in greater depth their application in the context of 
the public service.   
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Chapter 3 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
Performance is not a unitary concept, with an unambiguous meaning.  Rather it must 
be viewed as a set of information about achievements of varying significance to 
different stakeholders.  (Bovaid, 1996, p.147) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter the meanings ascribed to the terms „performance‟ and 
„performance measurement‟ are further explored.  The chapter first sets out the 
definitions of performance provided by dictionaries, generally accepted accounting 
practice (GAAP)16 and the official model of performance management in New 
Zealand‟s public service.  It then considers the distinctive features of performance 
management in a public service context and describes two models which highlight 
the differing concepts of performance both between and within public service 
agencies.   
 
3.2 Definitions of Performance 
A formal definition of „performance‟ is generally absent from the extensive 
literature on performance measurement and management.  Nevertheless, some 
definitions are provided in dictionaries and in the literature of generally accepted 
                                               
16 The preface to the New Zealand equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards states:   
In the case of state sector bodies and local authorities, the term „generally accepted accounting practice‟ means:  
(i) approved financial reporting standards, so far as those standards apply to the state sector body, local 
authority or council-controlled organisation; and 
(ii) in relation to matters for which no provision is made in approved financial reporting standards and that are 
not subject to any applicable rule of law, accounting policies that are appropriate in relation to the state sector 
body, local authority or council-controlled organisation and have authoritative support within the accounting 
profession in New Zealand.  (NZICA, 2009) 
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accounting practice.  Guidance is also provided in a number of publications by 
central government agencies, both in New Zealand and elsewhere.   
 
(i) Dictionary Definitions 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2005) defines performance as: 
The carrying out of a command, duty, purpose, promise, etc.; … the accomplishment, 
execution, carrying out, working out of anything ordered or undertaken; the doing of 
any action or work; … something performed or done; an action, act, deed, operation.   
This definition indicates that „performance‟ involves the undertaking of some form 
of command or predetermined action.  A further element of the meaning of the 
term is provided by the Collins English Dictionary (2003) which defines 
„performance‟ as:  
1. the act, process or art of performing; 
2. an artistic or dramatic production: last night‟s performance was terrible; 
3. the manner or quality of functioning: a machine‟s performance; 
4. Inf. Mode of conductor behaviour, esp when distasteful: what did you mean by that 
performance at the restaurant?   
This brings within the meaning of the term „performance‟ the notion of how an 
action or work is performed.  Together these dictionary definitions support the 
suggestion of the Canadian Auditor-General that: “The concept of „performance‟ 
requires a comparison of what was expected with what was achieved” (Mayne, 
2003, p.1). 
 
 (ii) Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) 
Although New Zealand‟s Public Finance Act 1989 does not explicitly define 
performance, it requires each public service agency to provide details of future 
operating intentions (s.40) and a subsequent statement of actual service 
performance (s.45A), both of which are to be prepared in accordance with GAAP.   
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In New Zealand, GAAP principally encompasses financial reporting standards 
based on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that have been 
approved by the Accounting Standards Review Board.17,18  In the absence of an 
applicable standard, GAAP allows for the application of standards approved by 
similar bodies in other countries such as the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board.  Additionally, GAAP includes accounting practice widely accepted as 
appropriate and prevailing within the industry or sector concerned, and extends to 
the pronouncements of authoritative bodies such as the New Zealand Treasury 
and the Controller and Auditor-General as well as those of similar bodies overseas.   
 
Whilst GAAP does not provide a specific definition of performance, it discusses the 
concept in three key documents, namely:  
 The New Zealand Framework for Differential Reporting for Entities Applying 
the New Zealand Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards 
Reporting Regime (the Framework) (NZICA, 2009); 
 The New Zealand Equivalent to International Accounting Standard (NZ 
IAS1): Presentation of Financial Statements (NZICA, 2007a); and 
 Technical Practice Aid (TPA) 9: Service Performance Reporting (NZICA, 
2007b).   
 
New Zealand GAAP principally equates performance with changes in the financial 
position of an entity.  The Framework therefore provides the following definition of 
performance as: “… the relationship of the income and expenses of an entity, as 
                                               
17 The Accounting Standards Review Board is an Independent Crown Entity established by the Financial 
Reporting Act 1993 to give direction as to accounting policies that have authoritative support within 
the accounting profession in New Zealand, and to review and approve financial reporting standards in 
New Zealand.   
18 The applicability of these standards to New Zealand‟s public sector has recently been questioned by 
the Auditor-General who, in noting his concern, stated: 
Taking standards created by the International Accounting Standards Board for one purpose (i.e. for application 
by large profit-orientated entities accessing capital markets) and using them for another purpose relies on 
relevant and appropriate changes being made to IRFS.  Unfortunately there have been few changes and little 
guidance included in [New Zealand versions of IRFS] to assist public sector entities to apply the new 
standards.  (Controller and Auditor-General, 2009a, p.6) 
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reported in the income statement” (NZICA, 2009, p.53).  However, in relation to 
non-financial performance, NZ IAS1 notes that the elements of service 
performance are “inputs, outputs and outcomes” and states that, where relevant, 
each output should be described in terms of its quantity, quality, time, location 
and cost (NZICA, 2007a, p.55).  A broader discussion of these concepts is left to 
TPA 9 which explains that “actual performance” is the results achieved measured 
against the performance targets or standards.  Targets are defined as: 
 … the precise levels of performance that are to be delivered or achieved within the 
performance period (usually one year).  Performance targets can be expressed as 
numbers, percentages or ratios, and/or point estimates or as a range.  (NZICA, 2009b, 
p. 48) 
More specifically, TPA 9 explains that the aim of government and other not-for-
profit agencies is to improve the well-being of the community through delivering 
outputs.   It states that agencies are accountable for outputs although contextual 
information should also be provided in respect of outcomes.  In respect of 
outcomes, TPA 9 explains:  
 … for effective accountability to occur, it is important to distinguish responsibility for 
assessing outcomes, advising on outcomes and implementing changes to outputs to 
better achieve desired outcomes, from responsibility for the outcomes themselves.  (p. 
6) 
 
It should be noted that the Framework, NZ IAS1 and TPA 9 principally focus on 
performance in the context of external accountability and, therefore, particularly in 
the case of TPA 9, adopt a perspective and language that reflects the separation of 
the roles of purchasers and providers of outputs.  Little attention is given to other 
roles and perspectives such as those of owners (which, as is explained below, in a 
public sector context are generally not the same as purchasers), organisational 
members, service users, or the general public.  The focus on outputs contained 
within these documents also reflects an instrumental rationality in which outputs 
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are readily definable and means-ends relationships between outputs and intended 
outcomes are able to be identified.   
 
(iii) Guidance from Central Government Agencies 
The New Zealand Model, as initially implemented in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, did draw a distinction between the role of Ministers as purchasers of 
departmental goods and services and their dual role as owners of departmental 
tangible and intangible assets.  However, the quasi-contractual underpinnings of 
that model placed significant emphasis on the former with a resultant focus on 
departmental accountability for outputs, although, it has subsequently been 
claimed, that was not the intention of those leading the reforms (Scott, 2001).  
Certainly the perceived failure of the New Zealand Model to adequately focus on 
accountability for outcomes led, between 2000 and 2008, to a new “managing for 
outcomes bargain” Baehler (2003, p.25) between Ministers and departmental chief 
executives.   
 
In the same period the potential scope of departmental performance was widened 
further by the New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General who suggested that 
performance is a “comprehensive concept” (Controller and Auditor-General, 
2002a, p.5) and stressed the need for a more comprehensive measurement 
framework.  He indicted that such a framework encompasses: 
 results, or what a public entity achieves in terms of outcomes; 
 the specific goods and services produced (i.e. the outputs); 
 how they are produced, in terms of the agency‟s ethical standards and 
interaction with the public; and 
 the cost incurred, including any diminution of the agency‟s future 
capability.   
The implication of the Auditor-General‟s stance is that the performance of public 
sector agencies is to be considered, not only in terms of the economy and 
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efficiency of output delivery, but also in the light of less tangible factors such as 
the contribution of those outputs to broader outcomes, the manner or ethos with 
which outputs are produced, and the „organisational capital‟ or ongoing capability 
of the agency to deliver them.   
 
The State Services Commission (2004) further suggested that, in assessing 
agencies‟ performance, increased recognition should be given to how agencies 
interact and support joint contributions with other agencies, local government, 
community providers and communities.  The Commissioner observed: 
… many of the major objectives of government cannot be easily delivered by a single 
agency. … This means delivering better results for New Zealanders will require 
government agencies to work together in many instances.  (State Services Commission, 
2004, p. 3)   
However, as noted in the previous chapter, the vertical accountability 
arrangements which arise from, and reflect, simple Minister-chief executive 
relationships begin to break down when agencies share responsibility for achieving 
an objective or outcome.  Recognising this, some characteristics of effective joint 
working and power sharing relationships (such as clarity of purpose, agreed and 
clear roles and responsibilities, and Ministerial support) were suggested by the 
State Services Commission, although how these might be achieved and monitored 
was not discussed.   
 
A focus on outcomes and concepts of joint responsibility moves performance 
assessment and accountability away from notions of objective measurement 
towards ideas requiring interpretation.  This has been noted as a concern by a 
number of commentators; for example, in a State Services Commission working 
paper Anderson and Dovey observed, in respect of the performance management 
of, and accountability arrangements for, outcomes: 
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One significant risk for MfO [Managing for Outcomes] is that the increased subjectivity 
associated with process and outcomes will blur accountability too much – that the „hard 
edge‟ of out-based accountability will be replaced with waffle.  (State Services 
Commission, 2003b, p.10) 
 
This broadening of performance focus, together with its attendant challenges, is 
not unique to New Zealand.  In the United Kingdom, for example, Public Service 
Agreements which set out “what the Government aims to achieve” have become 
increasingly focused on outcomes as part of a broader framework of outputs, 
processes and inputs (Comptroller & Auditor General, 2001).  In Australia, the 
Australian Steering Committee for the Review of Government Performance 
(ASCRGP), which publishes annual reports on the comparative performance of 
State government agencies, has “a focus on outcomes” as a guiding principal 
(ASCRGP, 2005).  In Australia, as in New Zealand, it is acknowledged that, given 
the range of factors that may impact on societal outcomes, attributing cause and 
effect poses significant problems.  Nonetheless, given the underlying instrumental 
rationality of explicit means-ends relationships, the performance of individual 
agencies is still defined in terms of their contribution towards an outcome rather 
than overall responsibility for an outcome.  In Canada, the Auditor General, 
similarly grappling with problems associated with defining and measuring 
outcomes, has suggested a more detailed analysis of outcomes in the context of a 
„results chain‟.  This links outputs to immediate outcomes (or the first level effects 
of these outputs), immediate outcomes to intermediate outcomes (which are 
defined as the benefits and changes resulting from the outputs), and intermediate 
outcomes to the ultimate outcomes (which represent the final or long term 
consequences of the outcomes) (Mayne, 2003, p.2).   
 
The tension between agency performance defined and managed in terms of the 
specific deliverables associated with outputs, and the broader and longer term 
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concepts of performance defined in terms of outcomes, has remained within the 
formal discourse associated with the official New Zealand Model of public sector 
performance management.  In 2008, in the context of “the worst economic crisis 
the world has faced for 80 years” (Whitehead, 2009, p.1), the New Zealand‟s 
newly elected Government swung the emphasis back towards outputs and the 
cost-effectiveness of their delivery.  Following decisions to place caps on 
government expenditure and the size of the public service (CAB (09) 111), the 
Secretary to the Treasury suggested: “at times we‟ve hidden behind the focus on 
outcomes to be less rigorous on output performance than we should” (Whitehead, 
2009, p.1).   
 
While the debate around outputs and outcomes has largely focused on the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which public services are delivered, 
some consideration has been given to a wider set of performance criteria.  In the 
United Kingdom, the Comptroller & Auditor General (2001) has proposed a 
broader framework for measuring and reporting public sector performance.  This 
specifies four criteria for evaluating performance, namely: 
 economy - how funding is used to provide inputs to the agency‟s 
processes; 
 efficiency - the relationship between the use of those inputs and the 
agency‟s outputs.  (The Australian Steering Committee for the Review of 
Government Performance (ASCRGP, 2005) has referred to this as technical 
efficiency); 
 cost effectiveness - the relationship between resources or inputs and the 
outcomes that occur; and 
 programme effectiveness - the relationship between outputs and outcomes 
(whether those outcomes are intended or unintended). (The Australian 
Steering Committee (ASCRGP, 2005) describe this as the relationship 
between programme or service objectives and outcomes).   
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These four criteria, and their relationships to resources, inputs, outputs and 
outcomes, are presented diagrammatically as follows. 
Figure 3.1: Measuring the Performance of Public Service Agencies 
 
 Source: Comptroller and Auditor General, (2001, p.2) 
 
The Australian Steering Committee (ASCRGP, 2005) added a further criterion to 
performance measurement by separately identifying the importance of measuring 
equity in service provision.  Focusing on how (rather than what) goods and 
services are delivered, equity is seen to encompass both: 
 horizontal equity, which refers to services that are made available to 
everyone in the community without restriction (for example, police 
services); and  
 vertical equity, which recognises the special needs of some groups within 
the community and adjusts aspects of service provision accordingly (for 
example, welfare services).   
The former is defined as “the equal treatment of equals” and the latter as “the 
unequal but equitable treatment of unequals” (ASCRGP, 2005, p. 115).  In part, 
the significance of this criterion for performance management is its recognition 
that equity may be achieved at the cost of efficiency in service delivery.  However, 
it should also be noted that the idea of equity (or, as it is on occasion termed, 
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„fairness‟) does not sit comfortably with the instrumental rationality of institutional 
economics.  Rather, it reflects a more substantive rationality that employs values-
based judgements.   
 
3.3 Performance Management in the Public Service Context 
In practice, measurement of the economy and efficiency of service provision has 
proved easier than measurement of cost and programme effectiveness and equity 
and, as a consequence, economy and efficiency have been the principal focus of 
performance measures reported by public service agencies.  To report on broader 
issues such as effectiveness and equity agencies require a more comprehensive 
and complex set of information on the societal impacts of their activities.   
 
The requirements of this comprehensive and complex set of performance 
information also do not fit easily in public service agencies where performance 
management models developed in a private sector context have been applied.  In 
New Zealand, the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 corporatized a number of 
State owned trading entities, such as the Post Office and the State Insurance 
Office, and required them to operate profitably in a manner similar to private 
sector organisations.  This conversion of public sector agencies into commercially 
orientated organisations provided some, at times, dramatic improvements to the 
economy and efficiency with which their goods and services were produced 
(Boston et al., 1996; Scott, Ball & Dale, 1999; Scott, 2001).  This encouraged 
Ministers and their advisors to seek similar improvements in the economy and 
efficiency of the agencies that comprise the core public service.19  While, at a micro 
level, managers in the public service may do similar things to their private sector 
counterparts, at a macro level the tasks undertaken, and the decisions made, 
                                               
19 Stan Roger, the then Minister of State Services, was quoted as stating in respect of the State Owned 
Enterprises Act (1986): “ given the freedom to run their business on a profit motivated but highly 
accountable basis, many in those organisations are finding a new lease of life.  The State Sector Act 
will have the same effect on the public service as a whole and those who work within it.”  (Evening 
Post, 30 March, 1988).   
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display some significantly different characteristics.  To understand the distinctive 
characteristics of management within the public service it is helpful to adopt what 
Metcalf (1993) has referred to as a focus, as opposed to a locus, approach: 
instead of distinguishing between the private and public sectors (i.e. where, in 
terms of the sector in which an organisation is situated), it is more helpful to focus 
on what is done (i.e. what is the nature of the functions being performed).    
 
In a similar vein, Alford (1993) has argued that, while both the private and the 
public sectors are concerned with the production of goods and services of value to 
those within their environment, the production process in the two sectors differs in 
four key ways.  Specifically in the public sector it has: 
(i) broader objectives,  
(ii) a more complex environment,  
(iii) more diverse resources, and  
(iv) different productive capabilities.   
Two further distinguishing characteristics of public, as compared to private, 
entities may also be identified, namely:  
(v) goods and services of a different nature are produced, and  
(vi) different mechanisms of accountability apply.   
Each of these factors is discussed below.   
 
(i) Broader Objectives 
Alford described the private sector production process in terms of financing and 
reward; that is, obtaining money from customers and investors in return for the 
provision of perceived value.  He noted that private sector objectives are generally 
stated in quantifiable terms such as profit, return on assets employed (or equity) 
and/or market share.  However, in much of the public sector, and especially in the 
public service, money is provided as a result of rationing decisions made by those 
in authority (i.e. the Government) in the context of, often non-quantifiable, value-
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based criteria.  Unlike the private sector, the public service produces goods and 
services which are associated with non-market, as well as market, values.  These 
non-market values relate to social objectives and involve more substantive issues 
such as equity, impartiality, and participation; they are not measured in monetary 
or market terms and, as noted below, may be implicitly included in decision-
making processes rather than being explicitly measured and evaluated.  Alford 
also observed that the mechanisms employed to achieve public sector objectives 
are frequently concerned with the explicit redistribution of resources or wealth and 
are based on criteria which differ from those implicitly embodied within the market 
mechanisms used by private sector organisations.   
 
However, while the objectives of public sector organisations, particularly in the 
core public service, may be broader than those in private sector entities, the 
mechanisms used to achieve them are also often more clearly prescribed, 
generally by legislation.  For example, most government departments have 
specific legislation governing the scope and nature of their activities.  More 
broadly, pursuant to the New Zealand Public Finance Act 1989, Parliament 
provides funding Ministers, and thence to the chief executives of public service 
agencies, for reasonably specific purposes which are defined in the Estimates 
documents and, without prior approval, that funding may not be used for any 
other purpose.  These chief executives may not raise money from investors or 
from customers by means of creative pricing policies, nor may they use their 
funding as they believe most appropriate within their organisation or, through 
reinvestment, in other organisations.  Given these restrictions, information in 
respect of the scope of organisational activities plays an important role in 
monitoring and managing the performance of public service agencies.   
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(ii) A More Complex Environment 
Alford also suggested that the environment in which public service goods and 
services are produced is much more complex than the private sector business 
environment in terms of both the relationships with others involved in achieving 
the same objectives and the range of stakeholders to whom public service 
agencies are accountable.  In the private sector, clients and customers participate 
in market-based transactions that are distinguished by their voluntary nature and 
the existence of an exchange.  In the public service, not only are these 
characteristics often missing but managers also have a responsibility to the 
general public that goes beyond that of private sector managers to their 
customers or clients.  In this regard McGuire (1997) observed: 
The relationship between customers who pay for public services, providers who deliver 
public services, clients who co-produce and directly consume public services and 
citizens who indirectly fund and benefit from public services is far more complex than 
the relationships between customers, providers and consumers of private services. 
(p.112) 
Mintzberg (1996) similarly described a spectrum of relationships that extends from 
the rights of customers and clients to the reciprocal obligations of citizens and 
subjects.   
 
The complexity of the public sector environment is further complicated by the 
redistributive processes referred to in relation to the broader objectives of public 
sector agencies [see (i) above].  Every alternative deployment of public resources 
to one group will have a different impact on other elements of the public and this 
must be taken into account when making an allocation, particularly when such 
groups are structured into cohesive interest groups.  Government processes 
associated with protecting or managing natural resources provide an example of 
where the interests of different stakeholder groups may come into conflict as 
decisions to resolve one issue rarely have a neutral impact on all stakeholders.  
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For example, a government decision to reduce water-borne nitrogen levels caused 
by run off from agricultural land that are polluting and damaging life in a lake, and 
thereby threatening an important recreational fishery, could require changes that 
may limit the permissible activities of farmers and reduce their profitability but 
would benefit recreational fishers and the local tourist industry.   
 
Thus, in public service organisations, decision-making takes place in a complex 
environment of competing, but plausibly valid, values and objectives.  Different 
groups in society may have different views, and place different emphases, on how 
and where services are (or should be) delivered, or, for example, the extent to 
which equitable delivery of services should compromise cost-effectiveness.   
 
(iii) More Diverse Resources 
In addition to the broader objectives and the complex environment which 
characterise public sector entities, Alford (1993) pointed to the use of more 
diverse resources in public, compared to private, sector production processes.  
These include not only economic resources similar to the revenue or investment 
returns provided to private sector organisations but also the use of broad powers 
such as the coercive power of the State.  Thus, in the public service, departments 
may acquire property by compulsory purchase or remove or detain people against 
their, or their guardians‟, will.  Just as economic resources have a cost, the 
exercise of public power has costs or side effects that arise from the nature of its 
use.  As McGuire (1997) observes: 
The task of public sector managers is thus to maximise benefits to the public while 
minimising resource costs - not only dollar costs but also the costs of using public 
power.  (p.140) 
 
In relation to resources, it is pertinent to note Martin‟s (1994) observation that, in 
the public sector, resource availability is a more significant issue than in the 
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private sector as it is frequently constrained by the fiscal policies of Governments.  
Indeed, as Bower (1977) noted, whereas private sector business strategy is 
frequently characterised by the application of massive resources to limited 
objectives, for a public service agency: “strategy might be called the art of the 
imperfect – the application of limited resources to massive objectives” (p.135).   
 
(iv) Different Productive Capabilities 
The fourth difference in the production processes of public, compared to private, 
sector entities identified by Alford (1993) is the public sector‟s use of a more 
sophisticated range of productive capabilities.  These encompass not just the 
resources within the organisation (such as labour, equipment, etc.) but also the 
external resources of other organisations.  For example, in order to prevent child 
abuse and to manage the wellbeing of children and young people, New Zealand‟s 
child welfare agency, Child, Youth and Family Services, works closely with other 
government and non-government organisations such as schools, local medical 
centres and community providers of welfare services.  The way in which the public 
sector functions across a range of organisations, rather than in terms of individual 
entities pursuing their own objectives, was also identified by Metcalfe (1993) who 
suggested: 
If management in general is about getting things done through other people, public 
management is getting things done through other organisations.  (p.296) 
As was noted in the previous chapter, New Zealand‟s public sector reforms of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s were subsequently criticised for creating structures 
that separated individual departments with little incentive to work with other 
organisations towards the wider interests of government.  However, it is apparent 
that considerably more emphasis is now placed on how departments and their 
managers develop relationships and work with other organisations.  In this respect 
it is notable that feedback from departmental chief executives‟ peers now plays a 
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significant role in their annual performance assessment by their employer – the 
State Services Commissioner.   
 
(v) Different Goods and Services 
While Alford focused on differences in the production processes of public and 
private sector entities, public service entities may also be distinguished from other 
public and private sector organisations by the nature of the goods and services 
they produce.   
 
A key result of New Zealand‟s public sector reforms is a significant reduction in the 
range of goods and services that remain to be produced by the core public service.  
In cases where goods and services, and their related production processes, can be 
defined in advance and subsequently monitored, their provision has been easier to 
privatise, corporatise or outsource (as applies, for example, to the provision of 
postal and insurance services).  The goods and services that remain to be 
produced by the public service are generally less easily defined in advance and 
subsequently monitored and, as a consequence, give rise to a range of challenges 
as to how they are measured and managed.  In areas such as child welfare or 
policing, for example, it is both difficult to pre-define the work to be undertaken in 
any detail, or to directly equate that work with the results achieved.  These 
challenges are explored further below.    
 
Public sector goods and services also include those for which there is an element 
of market failure in that their delivery involves the provision of economic 
externalities (that is, costs and/or benefits that are unintentionally or unavoidably 
imposed on, or acquired by, third parties).  More particularly, public goods20 such 
as policing or street lighting are likely to be either under-produced or not produced 
                                               
20A public good is defined as one that is either non-rival, in that its consumption by one person does 
not prevent someone else from consuming it, or non-excludable, in that it is particularly difficult or 
costly to exclude the consumption of the good by others (Victorio, 1995, p.54).   
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if left to the private sector and individual responses to market mechanisms.  
Nonetheless, such goods and services have a value to society as a whole and so 
governments are prepared to purchase them.  However, the quantum of that 
value and the question of how much is appropriate for them to purchase remain 
issues of debate.    
 
(vi) Different Accountability Mechanisms 
At the same time as public sector reforms have reduced the range of the goods 
and services produced by public service agencies, public expectations and scrutiny 
of those agencies has become far more intense than formerly and may well exceed 
that of consumers and the media of private sector organisations.  In a public 
sector setting, that scrutiny is part of a broad accountability framework that is 
central to the model of devolved management responsibility provided by the New 
Public Management.  In an organisational context, accountability requires those in 
a subordinate position to give an account of their activities, and the results of 
those activities, to those in a superior position; in a public sector context the 
hierarchy of accountability includes managers, chief executives, Government 
Ministers, elected Members of Parliament, and the general public.   
 
Each of New Zealand‟s public service agencies is also subject to oversight from 
other government agencies, such as the Treasury, the State Services Commission 
and policy departments such as Te Puni Kōkiri (the Ministry of Maori Development) 
specifically charged with oversight of public sector service delivery.  Oversight also 
routinely occurs by parliamentary select committees, the press and (particularly 
where levies or user charges recover some departmental costs, as is the case for 
the Ministry of Fisheries) from consultation with affected groups in society such as 
industry groups or resource users.  Additionally, recent changes to the legislative 
framework governing the New Zealand public service (especially those introduced 
by the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004) have placed more stringent 
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requirements on public service agencies to report, in some detail, both their future 
operating intentions and their actual performance.   
 
However, in what is a risk adverse environment, this oversight of public service 
agencies frequently focuses on the management of functional and behavioural 
boundaries (i.e. what activities are allowed to be undertaken and how they should 
be performed) and, thereby, on the avoidance of unforeseen problems (i.e. no 
surprises).  It pays much less attention to the recognition or celebration of 
success.  Ingraham (2005) observed that the nature of the accountability regime 
surrounding public agencies is such that “we judge [their] performance by failure, 
and not by success” (p.391).  She argues that the public takes for granted what 
government agencies do really well and that good management is frequently 
associated with “averting crisis, preferably in a way that no one ever knows about” 
(p. 394).   
 
Boston et al. (1996) note that, within the public service, the absence of a market 
as a resource allocation mechanism results in the general absence of clear links 
between the level of an organisation‟s performance and the level of funding it 
receives.  As a result, the incentives for, and resultant focus on, efficiency is far 
greater than on effectiveness.  However, Allison (1982) suggested that, without 
external market stimuli, even the drive for efficiency is less acute in the public, 
than in the private, sector.21  The absence of a (practical) market often removes 
external competitive benchmarks against which the efficiency of public service 
organisations may be compared, although surrogates or overseas organisations 
may be used for this purpose.  This may be illustrated, for example, by the 
introduction of quasi-markets in the health and education sectors of the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand.   
                                               
21As is explained the previous chapter, in New Zealand, initiatives and legislative changes associated 
with „managing for outcomes‟ attempted to address this issue.  The extent of their success remains a 
matter of debate (see Gill, 2008). 
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3.4 Conceptual Discrimination between Models of Public Sector 
Performance 
Whilst public sector performance is often presented as the objectively measured 
result of rational activity, in practice the causes and character of performance may 
be less evident.  Indeed where outcomes are the focus of performance 
measurement and management they may not be readily identifiable and are 
frequently likely to be the result of a range of factors (both planned and 
unplanned) rather than the efforts of a single function or agency.  At a lower level, 
even the definition of contributing outputs may require some “conceptual 
discrimination” (Gregory, 1995b) if a realistic and practically useful description of 
performance is to be achieved.  Two models which adopt a flexible approach to the 
definition of the performance of public sector organisations have been suggested.  
The first of these focuses on differences in the work undertaken and the effects of 
that work.  The second focuses on the factors that differentiate that work.  Both of 
these models are discussed below.   
 
(i) Observable Work and Results 
Recognising that different performance measures will be relevant to different 
organisations, the New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General (2002, p.53), 
amongst others (for example, Gregory, 1995b; Norman, 2003), has drawn on the 
work of Wilson (1989) to distinguish between different types of public agencies.  
Wilson suggested that it is possible to distinguish between different public sector 
organisations based on the extent to which (i) outputs (in this context Wilson is 
referring to the work done) and (ii) outcomes (the effect or results of that work), 
can be defined in advance and subsequently monitored.  Based on this 
proposition, Wilson identified four types of organisation that are represented in a 2 
by 2 matrix.  This is shown in Figure 3.2 and described below.   
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Figure 3.2:  Wilson’s Organisational Types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Gregory (1995b) 
1. Production Organisations 
According to Wilson, “production organisations” are characterised by the 
ability to define and observe both the work done and its effects.  This 
applies, for example, in the issuing of passports by the Department of 
Internal Affairs.  In such organisations, the definition and measurement of 
work done, i.e. outputs, is relatively straightforward.  However, the 
Auditor-General suggested that the performance of these organisations 
should also be defined and measured in terms of progress towards 
outcomes.  But outcomes frequently have long lead times and are the 
result of factors other than the contribution of an individual agency.  
Further, as the Auditor-General remarked, society and governments do not, 
in effect, achieve outcomes; rather they are the subject of continuous 
adjustment as priorities and conditions change.  He therefore suggested 
that performance measurement should focus on “intermediate outcomes” 
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that are results, or indicators of results, which can be measured over the 
short term (for example, a three year period corresponding with New 
Zealand‟s election cycle) and which “show the extent of progress in the 
desired direction”.  (Controller and Auditor-General, 2002, p.27).   
 
2. Procedural Organisations 
“Procedural organisations” are those in which the work done but not its 
effects is observable.  Such characteristics are evident, for example, in the 
policy advice functions of the Ministry of Women‟s Affairs.  The Auditor-
General contended that in such organisations performance will tend to be 
conceptualised and managed in terms of how closely the work done 
conforms with „due process‟.  It follows that, in such entities, performance 
measures are likely to focus on process related metrics such as the time 
taken to complete a task or whether all steps in the due process were 
completed.   
 
3. Craft Organisations 
In “craft organisations” the results of work done, but not the work itself, 
are observable.  This applies, for example, in the case of the investigation 
activities of the New Zealand Customs Service and the environmental 
protection work of the Department of Conservation.  The Auditor-General 
suggested that, in such organisations, performance will tend to be defined 
in terms of particular goals.  Performance measurement will therefore be 
concerned with the progress towards, or completion of, particular pieces of 
work such as elements of an annual work programme.  However, Wilson 
(1989) suggested that, given the difficulties in measuring outcomes 
(discussed above), “craft organisations” are unlikely to rely on goal-
oriented management alone.  Rather, they will tend to place strong 
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emphasis on the professional and ethical standards by which goals are 
achieved.     
 
4. Coping Organisations 
The fourth group of agencies identified by Wilson (1989) are referred to as 
“coping organisations”.  They are characterised by an inability to observe 
either the work done or the results of that work.  An example is afforded by 
the social work undertaken by Child, Youth and Family Services which 
usually takes place away from the office environment and for which the 
results, in terms of the outcomes for children and young people, can only 
be determined at some indeterminate time in the future, often many years 
hence.  For “coping organisations” measuring performance poses distinct 
problems.  The Auditor-General suggested that, for such organisations: 
“there may be few or no objective, readily observed measures [that are] 
appropriate” (Controller and Auditor General, 2002, p.53).  Wilson (1989) 
observed there is a risk that performance will be defined in terms of factors 
that are easily measured but what is measured may not adequately 
represent the entity‟s activities.  Gregory (1995a) went further to state 
that, in such environments, a concern to be able to „give an account‟ of 
performance: “creates strong incentives for managers and operators to 
collaborate in constructing a body of „artifactual‟ knowledge [which] 
becomes, in effect, the agency‟s own officially created reality” (p.63).  An 
alternative suggestion by Trebilcock (1995) is that, where outputs are 
difficult to observe and measure, managers will inevitably be driven back to 
the management of inputs.   
 
(ii) The Nature of the Work 
A similar approach to identifying and measuring performance based on the nature 
of the work undertaken, has been proposed by the Organisation for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2000).  The OECD suggested that outputs 
may be more or less easily defined and measured depending on the following two 
factors: 
 knowledge of the production process - how well the production process is 
known and can be defined in advance and consistently followed; and  
 the number of exceptions - to the standard output, i.e. the ability to predict 
the detailed characteristics of each unit of output.    
As is the case with Wilson‟s recognition of more or less observable outputs and 
outcomes, the OECD‟s two factors also give rise to a 2 by 2 matrix.  This is 
presented in Figure 3.3 and explained below.   
 
Figure 3.3: Ability to Measure Outputs 
 
Source: adapted from OECD (2000) 
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standard output.  An example is provided by the payment of welfare 
benefits by the Ministry of Social Development.  The OECD suggests that in 
such cases performance criteria will focus on quantity, unit cost and 
timeliness of output delivery.   
 
2. Reliance on Predictability 
Quadrant 2 represents the situation in which production processes are not 
well articulated but outputs are relatively standardised and few exceptions 
occur.  An example is provided by public prosecutions undertaken by the 
Ministry of Justice.  Where this situation exists, management will rely on 
the predictability of outputs and performance criteria will focus on quality, 
average unit cost and possibly timeliness of output delivery.   
 
3. Reliance on Known Processes  
In quadrant 3 outputs have known and clearly defined processes but 
considerable variability occurs across units produced.  This is the case, for 
example, with prison management and fisheries patrol and surveillance.  In 
these situations management will rely on known processes and procedural 
forms of control and performance will be defined in terms of adherence to 
procedural standards, quality, the range of unit costs, and timeliness.   
 
4. Uncertain Outputs 
In quadrant 4, production processes are not well established and 
articulated and there is considerable variability between units of outputs 
(for example, policy advice and diplomatic representation).  In such cases 
it is difficult to both specify in advance, and subsequently monitor, 
performance.  Under these conditions management will tend to focus on 
factors such as total cost and quality as defined by externally referenced 
professional standards.   
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As the authors of both of these models acknowledge, their distinctions are broadly 
representative rather than specifically applicable to individual agencies.  However, 
the models do present a strong argument for a more sensitive approach to what is 
being measured, both between individual agencies and between the varying 
functions within individual agencies.  Measuring the performance of public sector 
organisations is often difficult, either because of the complexities of the activities 
involved or because of the range of extraneous factors that may be involved in the 
accomplishment of organisational goals.  In the context of complex environments 
and imperfect information, measurement mechanisms that use calculation 
orientated models of rational cause and effect may need to be supplemented with 
a more substantive rationality that employs more subjective forms of information 
such as narrative.  Mayne (1999) has suggested that it is necessary to recognise 
the limits of measurement and the need to accept a level of uncertainty as, 
“[m]easurement in the public sector is less about precision and more about 
increasing understanding and knowledge” (p.5).   
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter explored the meaning of the terms „performance‟ and „performance 
measurement‟ in the context of the public service.  Performance is broadly defined 
as how some pre-defined task or action is undertaken and with what results.  Both 
the „how‟ and the „results‟ may be evaluated against a number of different criteria 
that extend beyond what Pollitt (1986) has referred to as “that triumvirate of 
virtue: economy, efficiency and effectiveness”, to also encompass the equity of 
service provision and the extent to which organisational capital is maintained, 
enhanced or eroded.   
 
A review of GAAP and the guidance material associated with the official New 
Zealand Model of public sector management was presented and showed that this 
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largely focuses on performance in relation to the external accountability 
requirements of public sector organisations and the interests of Ministers as 
purchasers of departmental outputs.  This is based on an economic rationality that 
is concerned with the most efficient mapping of means to desired ends.  
Performance is then: “judged in relation to consequences as compared with other 
alternative courses of action” (Townley, 2008, p26).  While the focus of the official 
model has broadened from its original emphasis on the responsibility of individual 
departments for outputs, in the context of economic recession and declining 
government revenues the New Zealand government, like many governments 
elsewhere, have more recently placed revised emphasis on the economy and 
efficiency of output delivery.   
 
To explore the distinctive features of performance measurement and management 
in a public service context, and within individual public service organisations, it is 
necessary to adopt a focus rather than a locus based approach.  It is then possible 
to identify the varying characteristics by which the production processes, goods 
and services (outputs), and accountability mechanisms of public sector 
organisations differ from those of private sector organisations.  Although broadly 
descriptive rather than specifically applicable, the models suggested by Wilson 
(1989) and the OECD (2000) provide strong arguments in favour of the complex 
and distinctive nature of performance management in a public service context.   
 
The next chapter explains that, although influential in shaping the official New 
Zealand Model for management of the public sector, the theories drawn from 
institutional economics and ideas borrowed from private sector management 
provide a limited insight into performance management within individual 
organisations.  An alternative theoretical approach is therefore proposed.   
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Chapter 4 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The world is not a fixed, solid array of objects, out there, for it cannot be fully 
separated from our perception of it.  It shifts under our gaze, it interacts with us, and 
the knowledge that it yields has to be interpreted by us.  There is no way of 
exchanging information that does not demand an act of judgement.  (Bronowski, 
1973, p.364) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter first outlines the reasons why the theories and ideas that underpin 
the official New Zealand Model of public sector management do not adequately 
explain performance management practices within individual public service 
agencies.  An alternative theoretical approach is then proposed based on new 
institutional sociology and the notion of organisational sensemaking, which 
overcomes the evident deficiencies in the application of the extant theories and 
ideas to performance measurement and management practices.   
 
4.2 Institutional Economics and Managerialism and Performance 
Management Practices in the Public Sector 
Research into, and understanding of, organisational performance management 
practices involves a set of assumptions and theories about how organisations, and 
the individuals within them, work.  The assumptions and theories that 
underpinned the reforms that shaped the New Zealand Model were outlined in 
Chapter 2.  While these theories and ideas formed an explanatory and normative 
logic for those devising and implementing the public sector reforms of the late 
1980s and early 1990s, their role should not be overstated.  Even in New Zealand, 
which has been applauded for the theoretical consistency of its reforms (Hood, 
1990b), one of the officials closely involved with their development and 
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implementation has noted that politicians instituted the reforms for practical 
reasons such as economic pressures and growth in consumer awareness and 
expectations (Scott, 2001).  Boston (1996) has also suggested that, “despite the 
clear conceptual linkages between the major reforms”, they did not emerge in any 
predefined manner.  Rather, they were sequentially developed as a result of “a 
continuous process of debate and refinement, evaluation and modification” 
(p.117).   
 
It has also been argued that the theories and ideas underpinning the reforms, 
together with their related rhetoric, came to assume a life of their own, at times 
independent of the reality of organisational practice (Pollitt, 2001).  In introducing 
the logic by which an espoused set of ideas provide legitimacy to the existence 
and activities of organisations, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) noted; 
Administrators and politicians champion programs that are established but not 
implemented; managers gather information assiduously but fail to analyze it; experts 
are hired not for advice but to signal legitimacy.  (p.3)  
Pollitt (2001) similarly pointed to how language (i.e. the particular words and 
concepts employed in communications) helps define and reinforce communities of 
interest.  In respect of the spread of the New Public Management, he suggested: 
… convergence, in the sense of replication of rhetoric, forms and practices across the 
world, may have more to do with government fashions, symbolism and the propagation 
of norms than with the grim dictates of the global economy or the functional necessity 
for increased efficiency. (p.934)  
Thus it seems that the ideas contained within the New Public Management have 
assumed a normative significance that has served to justify changes to the 
structure and to the funding of public service organisations but which may not 
always have been absorbed into operational decision-making.  To the extent that 
this normative framework supports a model of performance measurement and 
management that is disconnected from the decision-making practices of 
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operational managers, it is pertinent to explain why these theories and ideas do 
not explain managerial practice.   
 
The institutional economics of public choice theory, transaction cost economics and 
agency theory, is premised on a view of humans as rational, self-interested utility 
maximisers.  As theoretical frameworks which explain performance measurement 
and management practices within an organisational setting they fall short for at 
least the following four reasons:   
i) the validity of more than one perspective of what represents 
performance is not recognised;   
ii) people are subject to more than just economic motives; 
iii) performance information serves purposes other than accountability and 
control; and; 
iv) performance is considered to be an objective reality.   
Each of these reasons is discussed below. 
 
(i) Multiple perspectives on performance 
A singular view of performance poses problems in an organisational setting in 
which the, often divergent, roles and interests of different stakeholders are 
recognised.  Particularly in the context of the public service, there is no “one party 
who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972); 
rather, public servants tend to serve as “partial agents” for a range of principals 
(Boston et al., 1996).  In New Zealand these principals include a Vote Minister, a 
Responsible Minister,22 Cabinet, Parliament, and the State Services Commissioner 
                                               
22 As the Treasury (1996) has explained:  
A Vote Minister seeks appropriation from Parliament to purchase classes of outputs produced by a department or 
other supplier, or otherwise to incur expenses, for example, for social welfare benefits.  The Minister is, in this 
role, requesting Parliament to vote resources.  Each department has a Responsible Minister who agrees specific 
ownership priorities with the chief executive.  The Responsible Minister, on behalf of the Government and the 
people of New Zealand, represents the owner of the capital invested in the department.  Responsible Ministers are 
concerned with ownership performance in relation to departments, whereas Vote Ministers are concerned with 
the purchase of outputs through votes administered by departments.  Frequently the Vote Minister will also be the 
Responsible Minister. (p.16) 
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as well as parties outside the public sector such as professional bodies, community 
groups and the public in general.  Within individual organisations there will also 
exist differing and competing professional, functional or geographic perspectives 
on what represents good and bad performance.  A theoretical framework which 
can adequately explain performance management in the public service therefore 
needs to take account of the different external and internal perspectives of 
performance that shape the beliefs and  behaviours of the actors involved.   
 
(ii) More than just economic motives 
The premise that rational self-interest dominates human behaviour is subject to 
question.  As Boston et al. (1996) have noted, human beings “are not merely 
economic beings, but also political, cultural and moral beings”.  As such the 
actions, motivations and interpretive mechanisms of public service managers (like 
others) will be shaped by a range of factors other than self interest.  Public choice 
theory, transaction cost economics and agency theory pay little attention to these 
factors which nonetheless have, at least a modifying, influence on opportunistic or 
self-interested behaviour.   
 
In particular, performance management frameworks that reflect governance 
systems based on formal contractual models, inherently assume lower levels of 
trust than those associated with relational or more informal agreements.  Indeed, 
their potential to reinforce behaviours based on lower levels of trust and 
commitment has led to a search for a more comprehensive model for measuring 
and managing the activities of organisational members (see, for example, 
Gregory, 1995a; Yeatman, 1995).   
 
More simply, the assumed divergence of interest between principal and agent does 
not always exist as both parties may recognise and wish to achieve common goals 
(Cribb, 2005).  
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(iii) Purposes other than accountability and control 
The central question that institutional economics in general brings to the 
performance measurement arena is how might performance measurement be used 
to more effectively monitor and control the activities of agents (be they 
employees, contracted providers, or funded agencies).  However, performance 
measurement information may be used for a range of different purposes which 
include the following:   
 Accountability – performance measures may be used to provide 
assurance to more senior managers and external stakeholders that 
elements within the organisation are, or the organisation as a whole 
is, engaging in legitimate activities and meeting the required 
standards.   
 Direction Setting – performance measures may be defined as 
standards against which actual performance can be measured and 
which can signal what is important.  Henri (2006) refers to this 
purpose as “attention focusing” in as much as top management use 
performance measures as cues to lower level managers as to what 
they should focus on.  All performance measurement tends to 
impact behaviour because those whose performance is to be 
evaluated will focus on the matters that are to be measured and 
reported.   
 Strategic Evaluation – performance measures relating to both the 
organisation and its broader environment may be used to shape and 
monitor strategy.  Simons (1995) suggested that “interactive control 
systems” provide performance measurement information which 
enable managers to monitor and respond to their environment by 
changing strategies in a process of double loop learning (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978).   
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 Resource Planning and Allocation – performance information may be 
used to allow managers to identify resource requirements, make 
resource allocation decisions and monitor the efficiency of resource 
usage.   
 Process Control – performance measurement may also be used to 
control routine process.  Henri (2006) identified this purpose as 
“monitoring” by which a cybernetic logic involves the use of 
information for single loop learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978) in as 
much as a predefined process is monitored and managed within 
acceptable limits but the process itself is not changed.   
 Performance Improvement – performance information may be used 
to benchmark and improve key processes or systems.   
 
If it is acknowledged that the value of any performance information is associated 
with the relevance it has to a particular decision-making process, dangers exist to 
the extent that a given set of performance information is used for the wrong 
purpose.  Institutional economics does not help to explain what these purposes 
are, how they arise, or what sustains them.   
 
(iv) Performance is considered as an objective reality 
The theoretical approaches that shaped New Zealand‟s model of public sector 
management in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflect the measurement principles 
of scientific management whereby resources (inputs) and final goods and services 
(outputs) are viewed as being objectively defined and measured so as to control 
and optimise the economy and efficiency of each agency‟s work.  Performance is 
viewed as an objective reality that is able to be measured and managed through 
the use of scorecards, performance rankings, benchmarking, cost-benefit ratios, 
etc.  In this world of measurement, “phenomena are turned into crisp facts and 
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figures, states of affairs can be assessed and comparisons with earlier, other, or 
imagined states of affairs can be made” (Noordegraaf, 2008).   
 
However, this instrumental approach to the measurement and management of 
performance has been criticised by those who perceive the work of public sector 
managers as being less concerned with rational decision making and more an 
exercise in “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1955) or “management by groping 
along” (Behn 1988).  While measurement and analytical techniques are not 
discounted they are given less emphasis in favour of the inclusion of other forms 
of knowledge such as previous experience and „gut feeling‟.   
 
Hyndman and Eden (2001) also criticise the use of a “rational management 
model” to improve performance in the public sector on the grounds that: 
 the expectation that management has the skill and time to operate such a 
model is misplaced; 
 'rationalist' models often over-emphasise quantitative performance 
measures at the expense of qualitative and strategic factors as elements of 
the decision-making process; and 
 its tendency to ignore the political and cultural context in which decision 
making takes place. 
Thomas (2008) has therefore suggested that a more intuitive approach is perhaps 
more rational than the 'rationalist' approaches since it more closely matches the 
conditions of decision-making in the real world. 
 
In summary, while the ideas provided by the theories drawn from institutional 
economics provided a normative logic for the reform of New Zealand‟s public 
sector, that logic was better suited to a model for the management of the public 
sector than it is for management of the complexity of performance management 
within specific organisational settings.   
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4.3 Performance as a Social Construct 
The functionalist paradigm (Jackson, 2003) on which the official New Zealand 
Model is based and which views performance as an objective reality, subject to ex 
ante specification and ex post measurement, contrasts with an interpretivist view 
of performance.  The latter conceives performance as a socially constructed 
phenomenon that is subject to explanation on the basis of prior experience and 
current values and expectations.  The socially constructed view of performance 
contends that, unlike tangible objects such as buildings and equipment, 
organisational performance does not exist independently of the rules or 
frameworks created by those who measure, monitor and manage it.  
Organisational performance is, therefore, seen as a product of social interaction 
and shared experience and cognitive frameworks.   
 
Social constructionism is defined by Crotty (1998) as:  
… the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is 
contingent on human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between 
human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essential 
social world.  (p.42)   
A social constructionist thus understands human knowledge as emerging from 
human interactions with the world and other people within the world.  While that 
world, in an absolute sense, remains „out there‟, truth or meaning does not; 
rather, meaning is created by different people in different ways depending on how 
they interact with the world and with each other.  The meanings people give to the 
world and their interactions with it are neither consistent nor constant; they 
emerge as a consequence of ongoing interactions which vary between different 
groups of people and in different circumstances.  They are dynamic, in that 
meanings are reinterpreted as new or changed experiences differ from those of 
the past and challenge existing sense-making frameworks.  Social constructionism 
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is, therefore, also relativist in that it recognises that at different times, and in 
different places there have been, and are, very different interpretations of the 
same phenomenon (Crotty, 1998).   
 
Following this approach it is proposed that the social construction of what 
constitutes organisational performance is embodied within three separate, but 
interlinked, measurement frameworks, namely:  
 formally defined codes or rules (the official model); 
 computer systems and other artefacts which themselves embody and 
represent a set of assumptions about reality (the formal models); and  
 the differing practices or routines of groups within and outside of the 
organisation (the in use models).   
Each of these frameworks contains and reflects a set of standards, norms and 
expectations that validate the perceived reality of organisational performance.  
Indeed, socially constructed reality (i.e. what is perceived and understood to 
occur) is determined with reference to a set of standards or expectations which 
are themselves valid only to the extent that they are understood and accepted.  As 
Mouck (2004) observed in respect of financial reporting standards, once they are 
no longer accepted, because they no longer conform to, or explain, perceived 
reality, these standards are changed.   
 
Searle (1995) has suggested that there is no privileged vocabulary for describing 
reality: “different and even incommensurable vocabularies can be constructed for 
describing different aspects of reality for our various different purposes” (p.155).  
Therefore, in an absolute sense, no one approach to performance measurement 
(be it contained in an official, formal or in use model) is any more valid than 
another; although it may sit more comfortably with a particular perspective.  
Quattrone (2000) argues that, from the viewpoint of a constructionist 
epistemology, “what is valid inside a system of knowledge is not/may not be valid 
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out of the context that binds the observer and his/her own observations” (p.141).  
He quotes Ceruti (1986) to suggest that the issue no longer seems to be “that of 
rendering homogeneous and consistent differing points of view; it becomes that of 
understanding how different points of view are reciprocally produced” (p.26).  
 
To facilitate that understanding a number of theories from the substantial body of 
work contained within the literature on performance measurement and 
management may be drawn upon.  However, given the epistemological approach 
outlined above, the relevant literature can be refined to include that based on new 
institutional sociology and the idea of organisational sensemaking.  From this 
literature it is possible to identify prior research and a number of theories that 
better help to explain performance management practices in a public service 
context.  These are summarised below.   
 
4.4 Institutions and the Rationality of Control   
Institutional sociology provides an insight into how management controls are 
shaped within differing organisational settings.  This section explains the nature of 
institutional structures and how they shape and are shaped by the practices of 
organisational actors.  It then describes how the institutional characteristics of a 
particular organisational setting may be understood.   
 
Institutions Defined 
An early definition of institutions was provided by Hughes (1939) who suggested: 
“institutions exist in the integrated and standardised behaviour of individuals” 
(p.319).  Early writers in this field stressed that within organisations, institutional 
patterns, or standardised modes of action, are not simply the result of rational 
decision-makers‟ conscious efforts to maximise efficiency by securing coordination 
and control of work activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996); 
they also hold symbolic significance that may be unrelated to, or even counter-
 109 
productive to, organisational efficiency.  Such symbolic significance is seen as 
providing legitimacy to the actions of the actors, thereby supporting the 
acquisition and/or retention of resources irrespective of whether such resource 
acquisition or retention is justified on grounds of efficiency and/or effectiveness.  
As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explained, “organisations compete not just for 
resources and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for 
social as well as for economic fitness” (p.150).   
 
Early institutional theorists assumed individuals experience institutions as 
objective, social facts that constrain and shape organisational structures and 
behaviours (Durkheim, 1901).  They viewed the replication of institutions over 
time as being based on rules and supported by rewards and sanctions that reflect 
a broader (societal) structure of norms and values.  However, more recently it has 
been recognised that institutions exist neither passively nor independently of 
organisations and individual actors.  As Scott (2008) has suggested institutions 
(such as those comprising the New Zealand Model of public sector management) 
do not represent a monolithic framework “imposing homogenous requirements on 
passive organisations … [rather they are] subject to interpretation, manipulation, 
revision and elaboration by those subject to them” (p. 430).  Institutions are 
therefore: “both the medium and the outcome of the practices they recursively 
organise” (Giddens, 1984).  From this viewpoint, institutions are also experienced 
subjectively as the products of human action by which they are created, reinforced 
and revised.  This action is governed not only by attention to rules and the 
operation of norms but also by shared cognitive mechanisms and cultural 
frameworks.   
 
Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004) have noted that institutional theory provides 
“a way of thinking about formal organisational structures and the nature of the 
historically grounded social processes through which these structures develop” 
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(p.508).  One such set of structures are the frameworks (official, formal and in 
use) within which organisational performance is defined, measured and managed.  
The content of these structures is likely to vary between organisational settings 
which may be dominated by technical, economic or physical factors that reward 
organisations for the efficiency and effectiveness with which they deliver goods 
and services.  Alternatively, organisational structures that favour social, cultural, 
legal and/or political factors “reward organisations for conforming to values, 
norms, rules and beliefs upheld by social institutions” (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006, 
p.86).   
 
Many researchers and writers in the field of institutionalism have constructed ideas 
that largely focus on the level of the broad social, economic and political 
environment, the level of the organisational field, or the level of individual 
organisations (Burns & Scapens, 2000).  Little attention has been paid to the 
intra-organisational level.  As a result, the analysis of institutions has assumed a 
rather unitary perspective.  Whilst Zilber (2002), amongst others, has observed 
that institutional meanings are a consequence of and medium for the use of power 
within organisations and it may thereby be appropriate to refer to a dominant 
logic, or view of reality, (Bettis & Prahalad, 1986), such a logic is only dominant, 
to a greater or lesser extent, amongst other logics.  It is not an exclusive logic.  As 
Morgan (1997) has observed:  
In any organisation there may be many different and competing value systems that 
create a mosaic of organisational realities rather than a uniform corporate culture.  
(p.137) 
 
How Do Institutions Shape Management Controls? 
Zilber (2002) has argued that institutions should be analysed as a non-automatic 
interplay of three inter-related yet separate components – actors, actions and 
meanings.  Scott (2001 and 2008) has argued that these meanings represent 
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shared conceptions of the nature of social reality that are framed by the interplay 
of regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive mechanisms.  He presents these 
mechanisms as “pillars” that support differing “underlying assumptions, 
mechanisms and indicators” and provide a framework to facilitate understanding 
of the social structures and interactions within which institutions are preserved or 
modified.  In a given organisational context, the relative importance of each of 
these pillars varies on a continuum “from the conscious to the unconscious, from 
the legally enforced to the taken for granted” (Hoffman, 1997, p.36; quoted in 
Scott, 2001).  They are explained as follows: 
 
 The regulative pillar encompasses mechanisms that stress rule-setting, 
monitoring and sanctioning activities that range from informal, customary 
systems to highly formal and explicitly defined systems.  Thus, Scott 
suggests, powerful actors may impose their will on others.  They may, for 
example, provide rewards to induce compliance or, most frequently, they 
may use authority which legitimises coercive power through a normative 
framework that both supports and constrains the exercise of that power.  
From a regulative perspective, organisational actors achieve legitimacy by 
compliance with relevant laws and regulations.  DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) have suggested that this compliance occurs through processes of 
“coercive isomorphism” that are particularly prevalent in organisational 
environments with clearly defined legal and technical requirements.  Such 
is the case in the New Zealand public service, where the measurement, 
management and reporting of organisational performance occurs not only 
in the context of the specific requirements of the Public Finance Act 1989 
and generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP),23 but also in response 
to the detailed reporting requirements of the New Zealand Treasury and, to 
                                               
23 As explained in Chapter 3, generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) is the term used to define 
the standard framework of guidelines for financial and non-financial reporting.   
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a lesser extent, the State Services Commission.  However, as noted in 
Chapter 1 and discussed further below, the implementation of externally 
mandated reporting frameworks does not always result in their being 
adopted within the organisation (McKevitt & Lawton, 1996; de Lancer 
Julnes & Holzer, 2001).  Such performance measurement frameworks may 
thus be decoupled from those used to support decision-making within the 
organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), even to the extent of setting up 
within the organisation specialist and largely autonomous units to manage 
the provision of information for externally mandated frameworks (as is the 
case in many of New Zealand‟s public service departments).   
 
 The normative pillar is centred on social obligations that define both goals 
or objectives and the appropriate means by which they should be achieved.  
The mechanisms involved include both values and norms.  Scott (2001) 
defines values as “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together 
with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviour 
can be compared or assessed” (p.54).  Norms, on the other hand, specify 
how things should be done in this context, the “legitimate means to valued 
ends” (p.55).  Scott also suggests that certain values and norms are only 
applicable to certain actors and thus become embodied in social functions 
or roles.  This creates expectations among other actors and pressure, or at 
least influence, on the focal actor to conform to those expectations.  Public 
servants, for example, are expected to act in an unbiased manner, provide 
free and frank advice to elected politicians and provide services equitably to 
the public.   
 
Normative legitimacy is more likely to involve intrinsic as well as extrinsic 
rewards and, therefore, has a more internal basis than regulative controls.   
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 The cultural-cognitive pillar represents “shared conceptions that constitute 
the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made” 
(Scott, 2001, p.57).  Thus, the primary mechanisms are common beliefs 
and shared logics of action.  DiMaggio and Powell (1991) note the 
importance of formal education processes, the role of professional networks 
that span organisational boundaries, and the “filtering” of personnel that 
occurs through employment processes as mechanisms that reinforce these 
common beliefs and logics of action.  Weick (1995) suggests that such 
shared conceptions are often based on shared experience which then 
becomes a language or code for sensemaking of subsequent events.  In 
this way, cultural and cognitively-based institutions are less a reflection of 
„what we do around here‟ and more of „what we have done around here‟.  
In a number of countries (including New Zealand), a consequence of the 
reforms which created the New Public Management (Hood, 1990a; Hood & 
Jackson, 1991) was the erosion of some of the shared beliefs and logics of 
action that had previously characterised public servants.  This occurred as 
the boundaries between public and private sector management practices 
converged and career public servants were replaced with generic managers 
and staff whose careers might span both the public and private sectors.  In 
New Zealand, concern over the perceived erosion of a public service ethos 
led to initiatives such as the State Sector Standards Board (State Services 
Commission, 2001) which sought to re-establish and confirm a set of 
distinct (non-market) values.   
 
Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is arguably stronger than regulative and 
normative legitimacy in that it involves preconscious, taken-for-granted 
understandings.   
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While a regulative legitimacy may allow for some decoupling of performance 
management frameworks used for decision making within organisations from 
those needed to generate the information to meet reporting requirements defined 
at a higher organisational level or externally, such decoupling becomes 
progressively more difficult with the adoption, and internalisation, of normative 
and cultural-cognitive mechanisms.   
 
Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004) provide an alternative view of the context 
within which institutions, such as those associated with the measurement and 
management of organisational performance, are formed.  They suggest that 
context is formed by three “axes of tension”, namely:   
(i) representation, i.e. “the way that reality is framed and symbolically 
described” (p.517); 
(ii) rationality, that provides the logic by which criteria and actions are 
evaluated; and  
(iii) power, or “the means and degree of control over human and material 
resources” (p.518).     
 
(i)  Representation 
Dillard et al. (2004) suggest representation occurs along a continuum that 
extends from being more objective to more subjective.  Objective 
representation occurs in situations where a formal logic or “scientific calculus” 
can be applied; this occurs, for example, in a “production” organisational 
environment (Wilson, 1989) in which work done and the results of the work 
may be observed, and goals and means-ends relationships are well defined 
and able to be monitored.  Such an environment facilitates specific and 
quantitative measurement.  Objective representation is, therefore, a feature of 
what Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) refer to as “output controls” which focus on the 
measurement of the results of work (such as the number of clients served or 
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complaints received) or of the work itself (such as the time taken to serve a 
client).   
 
At the other end of the continuum, subjective representation is socially 
constructed through social interaction, based on shared values, norms and 
goals.  Rather than quantitative information, it employs anecdote, narrative 
and direct observation.  This applies, for example, in organisational 
environments in which means-ends relationships are not clearly defined (as in 
Wilson‟s (1989) “coping” organisational environment), and the final goods or 
services are highly variable.  In such environments performance is 
benchmarked against professional standards and normative frameworks 
(OECD, 2000).   
 
(ii)  Rationality 
The actions of organisations, and of groups within them, may be justified by 
formal and/or substantive rationality.  Dillard et al. (2004) suggest that formal 
rationality is “calculation orientated”, empirically-based knowledge that 
supports the logic of economic efficiency by which the ratio of outputs to 
inputs is optimised.  More specifically:  
 … the representational schemes would be expected to contain concrete, 
quantitatively measurable elements.  The representational context relates to 
finding “the” answer or specifying “the” norms and values as well as articulating 
processes that attain “the” goal.  (Dillard et al., 2004, p.517).   
 
As noted in section 4.2 above, the initial reforms of the New Zealand public 
sector (in the mid to late 1980s) were largely based on theories that stressed 
the use of formally rational models that employ standardised and value 
neutral performance information.  However, as Simon (1957) pointed out, the 
limited information, cognitive ability and time available to decision-makers 
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results in the desired optimal solutions being displaced by satisfactory 
solutions based on an existing set of values.  As was explained in Chapter 2, 
notwithstanding the theoretical underpinnings of the initial reforms of New 
Zealand‟s public sector, the performance of many public sector organisations, 
particularly those in the core public service, is also evaluated on the basis of a 
substantive rationality, that is “ends orientated, associated with ethics, values 
and actions that promote the ends implied therein” (Dillard et al., 2004, 
p.518).  Such values-based, substantive models are also orientated towards 
demonstrating equity or fairness rather than simply economy and efficiency.   
 
Dillard et al. (2004) have noted that a tension exists between formal and 
substantive rationalities as ways of knowing, or understanding reality, and 
therefore justifying action.  As Weber (1947) observed, humanity becomes 
imprisoned in an “iron cage” when formal rationality is applied independently 
of a substantive rationality.  It is not, therefore, a question of either-or, but 
rather the degree to which formally defined objectives and substantive values 
are embodied within the applied rationality.   
 
(iii) Power 
As noted above, Dillard et al. (2004) define their third institutional „axis of 
tension‟, power, as the means and degree of control over material and human 
resources.  In the context of bounded rationality and differing, and at times 
competing, goals, power may also reflect the extent to which the definition 
and meanings of performance are able to be influenced by others.  Hatch and 
Cunliffe (1996) have identified a range of mechanisms by which power may be 
exercised by organisational actors, namely: 
 coercion (the threat or use of force); 
 the position held within a formal organisational hierarchy; 
 personal characteristics (i.e. charisma); 
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 expertise (skills and knowledge that are required by others);  
 control over scarce resources (e.g. funding); and 
 the ability to apply normative sanctions established by cultural 
values and expectations.   
Dillard et al. (2004) suggest that these mechanisms lie along a continuum 
whereby “control can be exercised either through the implementation of 
formal hierarchical structures or through social consensus” (p.518).  At one 
end of the continuum the logic of action is defined by formal organisational 
structures and levels of authority and the other end by ongoing social 
interaction, communication and consensus.   
 
How May Institutions Be Understood? 
The institutional structures by which organisations define, measure and manage 
their performance develop and change over time.  Institutions are subject to both 
recurrent reinforcement and periodic revision - a revision that will sometimes be 
characterised by a slow and evolutionary drift from pre-existing structures, 
sometimes by more sudden transformation occasioned by social or technological 
change.  Zucker (1977) suggested that, for a particular organisation, institutional 
change may variously arise from the broader environment, inter-organisational 
ties, other organisations, and/or from within the organisation itself.  The nature 
and extent of change also depends on the context and the ability of actors to 
intervene in their social world by altering the rules and/or the distribution of 
resources (Scott, 2001).  The extent and speed of institutional formation and 
change is facilitated by what Scott (2001) referred to as “carriers”,24 which 
represent links between the realms of action and institution.  He identified four 
types of “carriers”, namely: 
(i) symbolic systems,  
(ii) relational systems,  
                                               
24
 Or what Giddens (1976) referred to as “modalities”.   
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(iii) routines, and  
(iv) artefacts.   
 
(i) Symbolic systems  
Symbolic systems reflect an existing culture or the “symbolic and learned 
aspects of human society” (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, 2006) by which 
socially established structures of meaning are transmitted.  Culture exists as 
widely held beliefs, classifications, models or rules that are viewed by 
organisational actors as the formally recognised way that things should be 
done (Burns & Scapens, 2000).  In general, symbolic systems exist externally 
to those actors and their adoption is supported by coercive mechanisms.  
However, they may also represent values, standards or standardised 
processes that have been internalised and exist “in the heads of organisational 
actors” (Scott, 2001, p.79).   
 
It should also be emphasised that, within a given organisation, culture is not a 
singular construct; different functions and social groupings may create 
different cultures of varying strengths, each with its own structure of rules, 
values and symbols.  Thus, performance management frameworks will vary 
within and between organisations to the extent that they reflect different 
cultures.  This seems particularly likely in organisational settings containing 
strong professional groupings which in each case have a distinct culture.   
 
(ii) Relational systems  
Relational systems act as institutional carriers to the extent that they 
represent patterned expectations that are associated with particular social 
positions or roles.  These systems may be more or less structured depending 
on the degree of formality of those relationships and the clarity of the goals to 
which they are orientated (Scott, 1987).  Weick (1995) distinguished between 
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“intersubjective” and “generically subjective” systems (p.71) by which 
meaning or sensemaking is created and reinforced.  Intersubjectivity refers to 
processes by which, in uncertain environments, “individual thoughts, feelings 
and intentions” become merged into shared understandings and commonly 
applied frameworks.  Generic subjectivity occurs in more stable environments 
when, within the relational system, the individual identity becomes 
replaceable by “an interchangeable part - a filler of roles and a follower of 
rules” (Weick, 1995, p.71).  In this context, the meanings provided by 
institutions are passed by relational systems to those who did not participate 
in their initial creation.  As Weick (1995) pointed out, in practice 
intersubjectivity and generic subjectivity coexist, to a greater or lesser extent, 
depending on the degree of ambiguity within the environment.   
 
Thus, the nature of performance measurement frameworks and the 
relationships between them are affected by the strength of networks of social 
positions and roles which are, in turn, affected by the stability of the 
organisational environment.   
 
(iii)  Routines 
According to Burns and Scapens (2000) routines are: “the patterns of thought 
and action which are habitually adopted by groups of individuals”, that is, the 
practices actually in use.  Scott (2001) suggests that these patterned actions 
reflect the tacit knowledge of the actors concerned.  The creation of routines 
also plays a significant role in the revision of institutions as “practical drift” 
occurs to modify formally sanctioned institutions (Snook, 2000).  Such local 
routinisation by groups of actors may be either deliberate, in that it represents 
conscious resistance to, or rejection of, an official view or it may more simply 
be the result of unconscious adaptation to local conditions.  Burns and 
Scapens (2000) suggest that unconscious change is likely to occur in the 
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absence of systems which effectively monitor practice or where routines are 
not properly understood or accepted by the actors.   
 
Within New Zealand‟s public service considerable effort is invested in 
monitoring and ensuring that performance measurement practices comply 
with (externally) mandated standards.  However, this does not preclude local 
managers from developing their own performance measurement routines 
which may parallel or replace those that are formally mandated.   
 
(iv) Artefacts 
According to Scott (2001), artefacts also act as carriers of institutional 
information and facilitate their formation and maintenance.  They include not 
only physical objects such as wall mounted mission statements but also 
information systems embodied in both hardware and software.  As carriers of 
institutions, artefacts generally embody a particular cognitive framework and 
set of rules which constrain organisational structure and behaviour 
(Woodward, 1958; Blau et al., 1976).  As a consequence, the social forces 
underlying the design and creation of an artefact prior to its establishment are 
particularly significant.  Once established, artefacts tend to be treated as 
objective facts or as „black boxes‟ whose logic is somehow sealed.  
Nevertheless, as Scott (2001) pointed out, the ongoing potential for users to 
physically and/or socially change artefacts, through ongoing interaction with 
them, should not be discounted.  There is also no guarantee that artefacts 
such as computer technologies will be used as intended or even adopted by 
organisational members; their implementation may at times, in the words of 
Kanter (2001), be more akin to “putting lipstick on a bulldog”.   
 
Artefacts in the form of information systems provide formal codifications of 
the frameworks by which organisations define, measure and manage 
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performance.  However, while these have been seen as systems of intelligence 
that may represent the very foundation and form of the organisation (Morgan, 
1997), it should not be assumed that they will either reflect the official 
performance management model or that they will be used as intended.  This 
latter point is illustrated by the findings of McKevitt and Lawton (1996) who 
surveyed a range of British public sector organisations in the early 1990s.  
They found that “overwhelmingly” top-down external forces exerted the 
greatest influence in the development of performance measurement systems, 
if not in their practical use in management decision making.  In reviewing the 
impacts of the United States Government Performance and Results Act 
(1993), de Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) also drew a distinction between 
the implementation of mandated practices and their practical use in 
management decision-making processes within the agencies studied.  They 
suggested that, if performance measurement information is to be used to 
support managerial decision-making at all levels, rather than solely for 
purposes of legitimisation, a much broader constituency than those seeking to 
exercise control over the sector as a whole needs to be involved in its 
formulation.   
 
These carriers also represent “scripts” (Barley, 1986) that can be empirically 
identified and „read‟ within the contexts of a particular organisational setting.  
Barley and Tolbert (1997) described such scripts as “observable and recurrent 
patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting”.   
 
The institutions that shape and direct the logical framework within which 
organisational performance is measured and managed, i.e. the rationality of 
control, are, therefore, embedded in: 
 formal rules and procedures (i.e. the way things should be done); 
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 routines (that may exist independently of formal rules and procedures and 
represent the way things are done); 
 artefacts, in the form of both tangible objects and communication and 
information technologies, that are central to modern organisations;  
 social networks of roles and positions; and 
 shared understandings and logics of action.   
However, as noted above those factors often vary both between and within 
individual organisations.   
 
De-coupling of Performance Measurement and Management Frameworks   
Advice provided by New Zealand‟s State Service Commission and Treasury (State 
Services Commission, 2008) suggests that performance information provided by 
each public service entity for purposes of external accountability should represent 
a sub-set of the more detailed information used by managers within the 
organisation.  It states: “ … it is critical that the same body of data that is used for 
internal decision making be used for external reporting” (p.9).  The New Zealand 
Controller and Auditor-General has similarly stressed the importance of “a 
common set of performance reporting information” (Controller and Auditor-
General, 2008, p.10).  Indeed, the Auditor-General‟s proposed practice standard 
for the audit of service performance reports (Controller and Auditor-General, 
2009b) requires external reporting of performance to be evaluated in the context 
of the organisation‟s internal management control environment.  This includes: 
  … processes for measuring and reporting performance throughout the 
different levels within (and outside) the agency; and 
 how the entity assesses its performance information needs for the purposes 
of management decision making and accountability.  (p.18) 
 
However, as noted above and in Chapter 1, managers may be required to measure 
and manage performance for purposes that are concerned more with legitimising 
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their roles (and that of their organisation) and ensuring the continued supply of 
resources, than with supporting their own decision-making processes.  Such 
divergence of objectives is a reflection of performance being measured and 
managed in the context of competing rationalities.  In this respect Townley (2002) 
observed: 
… coercive pressure results in procedural compliance, a mechanical process of 
implementation focusing on external needs and requirements, to ensure legitimacy, 
but a lack of embeddedness, as performance measures fail to become part of 
operational management.  (p.175) 
Differing rationalities can, therefore, lead to “symbolic action” (de Lancer Julnes & 
Holzer, 2001) whereby reported results are gamed or, more simply, limited 
emphasis is placed on the accuracy of those reports.  It is suggested that de-
coupling of the official, formal and in use performance measurement and 
management models will become more difficult as the institutional structures and 
the effective rationality of control move from being more regulative to more 
culturally and cognitive-based.  A summary of this continuum – from formal, 
externally defined rules to internalised shared understandings – is shown in Figure 
4.1 and is explored further, in the light of the empirical research, in Chapter 9.    
 
Figure 4.1:  Institutional Carriers and Framework Decoupling 
Carrier  Example 
Formal rules and procedures 
Regulative Controls 
(Decoupling more 
likely) 
Job descriptions and manuals 
Routines  Reporting cycles 
Artifacts 
 Computer systems 
Uniforms and epaulettes 
Social networks of roles and 
positions 
 Rank 
Community relationships 
Media relationships 
Shared understandings and 
logics of action 
Cultural/Cognitive 
Controls 
(Decoupling less 
likely) 
Team briefs 
Professional cultures 
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In summary, the rationality of control – the logical framework within which 
performance is measured and managed – will vary between different 
organisational settings.  It can be seen to exist on a continuum at one end of 
which the rationality of control is more regulative in nature and at the other end 
more culturally and cognitively-based.   
 
4.5 Sensemaking and the Locus of Control  
As reflected in their definition, institutions are standardised modes of action or 
responses to stimuli; they are also mechanisms which enable organisational 
members to make sense of those stimuli in the context of the limited knowledge 
that is usually available in complex organisational settings, that is, in the context 
of bounded rationality.  The concept of, and literature on, „sensemaking‟ provides 
a window into the performance measurement and management practices of 
organisational actors – who are either within a specific organisational setting or 
externally exerting influence upon it.  In a world of bounded rationality, socially 
created institutions (that are based on past experience, assumptions and 
interests) function as filters of current experience to enable plausible, consistent 
and socially acceptable “sensemaking” to occur (Weick, 1996).  In their decision-
making, organisational actors cannot hope to absorb and consider all available 
information and thus they seek cues which are accepted “as the equivalent of the 
entire datum from which it comes” (James, 1890, quoted by Weick, 1996, p.49).  
Performance measurement frameworks are, in essence, a series of extracted cues, 
ordered in a predefined format, which represent, and provide a sensemaking 
device for, the reality of organisational actions.   
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Sensegiving and Sensemaking 
However, sensemaking practices are also influenced by the degree and manner of 
„sensegiving‟ undertaken by internal leaders and/or external stakeholders, which is 
in turn influenced by the political saliency or sensitivity of an agency‟s core 
functions.  Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) define sensegiving as “the process of 
attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others 
towards a preferred re-definition of organisational reality” (p.442).  In DiMaggio 
and Powell‟s (1983) terms, this represents the use of power to define norms and 
standards by which performance measurement and management practices are 
shaped and guided.  Sensegiving practices range from the use of physical artefacts 
such as wall mounted mission statements or messages on a computer screen 
saver, to formal staff briefings delivered by a chief executive, or the public 
pronouncements of Government Ministers.   
 
From a study of three British orchestras, Maitlis (2005) identified sensegiving 
activities undertaken by internal leaders and external stakeholders.  She proposed 
that different combinations of these activities produce four different forms of 
organisational sensemaking, namely, “guided”, “fragmented”, “restricted” and 
“minimal”.  As shown in Figure 4.2, each of these sensemaking forms produces 
different accounts (descriptions of an issue and its context) and actions (i.e. 
organisational decisions) (Maitlis, 2005, p.32).  Maitlis found, for example, that 
organisational settings that are subject to limited sensegiving by internal leaders 
and significant sensegiving by external stakeholders will hold multiple accounts of 
reality that give rise to an emergent and inconsistent pattern of action.  However, 
such fragmented accounts and patterns of action are dependent on the number 
and diversity of external stakeholders.  Many public sector organisations are likely 
to exhibit a form of “restricted sensemaking” in which there is either significant 
internal leader sensegiving and limited external stakeholder sensegiving, or limited 
internal leader sensegiving and significant levels of sensegiving from a single 
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stakeholder or united group of external stakeholders.  In either case sensemaking 
is likely to produce a unitary but narrow account and a single action or series of 
consistent actions.   
Figure 4.2:  Forms of Organisational Sensemaking 
Sensemaking Type Resulting Account and Action 
GUIDED SENSEMAKING  
Significant leader sensegiving 
Significant stakeholder sensegiving 
A unitary account that is rich. 
An emergent but consistent series of actions 
FRAGMENTED SENSEMAKING  
Limited leader sensegiving 
Significant stakeholder sensegiving 
Multiple accounts that are narrow 
An emergent and inconsistent series of 
actions 
RESTRICTED SENSEMAKING  
Significant leader sensegiving 
Limited stakeholder sensegiving 
A unitary account that is narrow 
One time actions or a planned series of 
consistent actions 
MINIMAL SENSEMAKING  
Limited leader sensegiving 
Limited stakeholder sensegiving 
Nominal accounts 
„One off‟ compromise actions 
Based on Maitlis (2005) 
 
Maitlis also noted that the risk of “minimal sensemaking”, in which both internal 
leaders and external stakeholders undertake little sensegiving activity, is likely to 
result in the production of “nominal” accounts which neither synthesise the views 
of multiple stakeholders nor provide a single, well articulated logic of action.  In 
this situation, the actions of managers are more likely to represent „one off‟, or 
short term, compromises in the face of conflicting objectives.   
 
The extent to which public sector agencies are subject to external sensegiving, 
and the resulting impact on their performance management practices, was also 
explored by Pollitt (2006a).  A study of four agency types (forestry, meteorology, 
prisons and social security) across four European states (Finland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom), identified three factors that affect the extent of 
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external sensegiving and the degree to which managers have discretion or 
experience operational autonomy.25  Pollitt suggests these are: 
 the political salience of the agency‟s primary task; 
 the nature of the agency‟s primary task; and 
 the relative size of the agency‟s budget.   
 
In respect of the first factor, Pollitt suggested that the greater the political salience 
of the agency‟s primary task, the more external interest there will be in setting 
targets and monitoring its performance and the less operational autonomy will be 
provided to its managers.  From the European survey it was noted, for example, 
that compared to the other functions studied:  
Prisons are much more in the daily eye of the politicians and the media.  Prominent 
escapes are news, especially if the escapees go on to commit further crimes.  Whether 
the prisons are becoming “too soft” has been an issue in all four countries, as has the 
abuse of drugs by inmates”.  (Pollitt, 2006a, p.37) 
In New Zealand public concerns associated with crime, and the perceived risk of 
crime, work to ensure that the functions of both Public Prisons and the Community 
Probation Service are politically salient.  A succession of high profile incidents 
being reported in the media in recent years have embarrassed Ministers and 
provided ammunition to opposition parties.  As Pollitt observed:  
… when embarrassments, scandals or disasters occur, politicians and the media 
suddenly take on an enormously detailed interest in organisational activities they have 
never asked about before.  This interest includes performance data, but those data are 
unlikely to be given any privileged standing during bouts of political conflict – more 
probably they will just be treated as extra ammunition.  (p.39)   
Along related lines a New Zealand ex-Minister explained: 
                                               
25 As Wilson (1989) has explained autonomy does not imply complete freedom of action but rather the 
ability to choose how most appropriately to operate within a given jurisdiction.   
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In a portfolio like Corrections there are always problems.  People escape - there‟s just a 
myriad and endless – it‟s just a difficult portfolio because you‟re never really on top of 
it.  (COR external 5) 
 
The second factor identified by Pollitt relates to the nature of the agency‟s primary 
task and the extent to which it is “relatively simple, understandable and 
measurable” (Pollitt, 2006a, p.29).  The more technically complex the task is 
perceived to be, the greater the reliance that is placed on the professional training 
and knowledge of its managers and the more operational freedom they will 
experience.  As Pollitt observed, “Ministers are understandably more cautious 
about intervening in the details of the activities that they realise (or believe) they 
do not fully understand” (p.36).  In New Zealand, the activities of Public Prisons 
(i.e. locking people up) are not seen as complex, despite the complexity of the 
offenders concerned.  Similarly, the activities of the Community Probation Service, 
although at times extremely complex (given the variety of community-based 
sentences and offenders) are viewed by the public and media in relatively simple 
terms associated with whether the community is or is not perceived to be safe.   
 
The third factor identified by Pollitt relates to the relative size of the agency‟s 
budget.  He suggested that big budget agencies are more likely be of interest to 
Ministers and their advisors and thus their managers will have less freedom to 
operate „under the radar‟.  However, in practice, that logic may apply in reverse 
for very small agencies, such as the New Zealand Ministry of Women‟s Affairs, 
whose small budget will constrain the scope of their activities.  In contrast, the 
size of the appropriations provided to the larger agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Social Development, provides increased scope for budget management and 
operational flexibility.   
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Notwithstanding Pollitt‟s (2006a) thesis, political saliency and the perceived 
complexity of an agency‟s core functions are not conditions that are determined 
simply by the nature of those functions.  They are able to be influenced by the 
sensegiving and communication strategies undertaken by the agency‟s 
management.  How managers interact with the media, the public, other 
organisations, and Government Ministers will either enhance or erode 
understanding and hence the trust and confidence in their agency.  Moore (1995) 
has suggested that the management of public capital (and more broadly „public 
value‟) requires non-elected public servants to assume an active role in the 
external authorising environment to promote and maintain the trust in, and 
legitimacy of, their agency.  As Coates and Passmore (2008) explain: 
Public value assumes that public managers will try to both shape public opinion and 
have their views shaped in turn.  This is much more of a continuous conversation than 
an exercise in market research and should be viewed as a serious effort to restore trust 
in the public realm. (p.8) 
 
The relative strength of internal as opposed to external sensegiving can, therefore, 
be seen as a reflection of the degree to which an organisation is, more generally, 
internally or externally focused.  In particular, those public sector agencies that 
are more externally focused will be concerned to develop their „public capital‟, that 
is, the trust and confidence that Government Ministers, other agencies, and the 
general public have in them.  While Moore (1995) and Talbot (2008), among 
others, have explained the positive impacts of trust and legitimacy, Yang and 
Holzer (2006) have observed:  
… distrust can be used as a political discourse to attack government programmes, 
reduce government funding, and ultimately impair government performance.  To 
restore public trust, public administrators must improve their performance and 
communicate26 it to citizens.  (p.116)   
 
                                               
26
 Emphasis added. 
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In New Zealand the importance of public capital has been recognised by the 
inclusion of “Trusted State Services” as one of the key “State Sector Development 
Goals” promulgated by the State Services Commission (2006a).  The Commission 
explained that attainment of this goal would reflect the fact that New Zealanders 
“have confidence in the people, the systems and processes and the way in which 
New Zealand‟s State Services are delivered” (State Services Commission, 2006b, 
p.61).  That confidence has subsequently been the subject of two surveys (in 2007 
and 2009) that have sought “to find out more about New Zealanders‟ experience 
of public services” (State Services Commission, 2009).  Significantly, those 
surveys showed that perceptions of service quality in terms of equity and 
responsiveness (i.e. how services are delivered) are more important contributors 
to public capital than the results or outcomes of those services.  Therefore, while 
public capital is, in part, based on the rational analysis of evidence of agency 
performance provided in external accountability documents, it is also based on 
more subjectively framed information.  Of equal, if not greater, significance are 
public expectations, anecdote, partial understanding and emotional responses – 
factors that contribute to the political salience of, and external influence on, an 
agency‟s core functions.   
 
In summary, public service agencies are subject to, and engage in, varying 
degrees of interaction and sensegiving with external stakeholders.  The nature of 
that interaction reflects, and is affected by, the (internal or external) locus of 
control over how the agency‟s performance is defined and driven.   
 
4.6 A Proposed Framework of Performance Measurement and 
Management Models 
A means by which the interplay of organisational goals and institutional 
characteristics may be analysed, is provided by a competing values framework 
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that combines the two continua of the rationality of control and the locus of 
control.   
 
The competing values framework was initially developed in the 1980s by Quinn 
and others as a tool to analyse organisational culture (Quinn, 1988; Quinn & 
McGrath, 1982) based on the dimensions of (i) control versus flexibility and (ii) 
internal versus external focus.  However, it has been used in other contexts that 
have included analysis of organisational efficiency (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983), 
and of performance measurement and management frameworks that attempt to 
encompass the often competing objectives inherent in the public sector (Boyne, 
2003; Talbot, 2008).  An adaptation of the competing values framework may 
similarly be derived from the theories, ideas and conclusions discussed above to 
provide a model that encapsulates the characteristics of performance 
measurement and management practices in New Zealand‟s public service.   
 
As may be seen from Figure 4.3, the proposed framework encompasses four 
quadrants, defined by two continua that shape performance measurement and 
management practices within public service organisations.  The first of these 
continua represents the rationality of control and reflects the regulative, normative 
and cultural/cognitive institutional pillars described by Scott (2001).  At the 
regulative end of the continuum, the focus is on performance management 
executed through rules and fixed targets that are seen as objectively represented 
in numerical information and constructed by the application of a formal, 
calculation-orientated rationality.  Such measures are more likely to relate to 
inputs, processes and outputs.  At the shared understanding end of the 
continuum, performance management is exercised through culturally and 
cognitively-based mechanisms.  These reflect a concern for learning and employ 
more flexible targets that are subjectively interpreted with the aid of narrative, 
anecdote and direct observation.  The measures used are likely to relate to 
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outputs and outcomes, and the rationality employed will be substantive, ends-
orientated with an increased focus on ethics and values.   
 
As noted earlier, decoupling of the official, formal and in use performance models 
becomes less likely as the control mechanisms move away from being regulative 
towards being based on shared understandings.   
 
Figure 4.3:  Performance Measurement and Management Models 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONTROL MODEL
RATIONAL GOAL 
MODEL
MULTIPLE 
CONSTITUENCY MODEL
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICE MODEL
REGULATIVE CONTROL
(rules & fixed targets)
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS
(learning & flexible targets)
INTERNAL 
POWER
EXTERNAL 
POWER
• inputs and processes
• objectivity, measurement & facts
• rules & fixed targets
= regulative controls
• low saliency
• internally-directed sensemaking
• high public capital
= high autonomy
• outputs
• formal rationality
• objectivity and facts
= regulative controls
• high saliency
• externally-directed sensemaking
• low public capital
= low autonomy
• outcomes
• subjectivity, interpretation and judgement
• cultural & cognitively-based controls
• flexible targets & learning
= shared understanding
• low saliency
• externally-directed sensemaking
• high public capital
= high autonomy
• outputs and outcomes
• subjectivity, interpretation and judgement
• cultural & cognitively-based controls
• flexible targets
= shared understanding
• low saliency
• internally-directed sensemaking
• high public capital
= high autonomy
 
The second dimension reflects the locus of control in relation to the influences on 
an agency‟s activities, resource allocation and performance priorities.  At one end 
of the continuum, where these influences are principally located externally, 
agencies are more likely to have core functions that are politically salient and not 
perceived by external stakeholders as being particularly complex or difficult to 
measure.  Such agencies are likely to have lower levels of public capital and be 
subject to higher levels of external stakeholder sensegiving in respect of their 
performance objectives and measures.  They will, therefore, experience less 
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operational autonomy and management discretion.  At the other end of the 
continuum, where internal rather than external influences dominate, agencies will 
be subject to significant internal sensegiving and are likely to have core functions 
that are not politically salient but which are perceived to be technically complex 
and difficult to measure.  These agencies will also have higher levels of public 
capital.  They are, therefore, likely to experience more operational autonomy and 
management discretion.   
 
As shown in Figure 4.3, these two continua define the nature of four possible 
models of performance management that may be described as follows. 
 
(i)   The Administrative Control Model: Public service agencies (or parts 
thereof) which adopt an administrative control model of performance 
management utilise a calculation-orientated logic, based on empirical 
knowledge, that focuses at the level of inputs and processes.  Performance 
management is characterised by regulative control with clearly defined rules, 
fixed targets and a formal rationality that is conceptualised as value neutral 
and universally applicable.  In such an environment the official model of 
performance measurement and management may be loosely-coupled with the 
model(s) used by operational managers.   
 
The functions managed by agencies whose characteristics are reflected in this 
model are not politically salient and may be perceived by external 
stakeholders as technically complex and difficult to measure.  There will, 
therefore, be limited external stakeholder sensegiving but internal sensegiving 
will produce organisational sensemaking that is restricted to a unitary but 
narrow account, and a series of consistent actions.  The organisation is likely 
to experience higher operational autonomy.   
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(ii)  The Professional Service Model: Public service agencies which are 
characterised by the professional service model of performance management 
adopt a more substantive logic that is ends-orientated.  As well as quantified 
data, this model places emphasis on more subjectively framed information 
and judgement based on values and norms.  Performance is measured and 
managed at the level of processes and outputs utilising flexible targets and 
highlighting the importance of learning.  The rationality of control is more 
culturally and cognitively-based.   
 
Such agencies are also likely to be principally concerned with functions that 
are not politically salient and may be perceived by external stakeholders as 
technically complex.  They will not, therefore, be subject to high levels of 
external stakeholder sensegiving.  Higher levels of public capital, associated 
with perceptions of professional expertise, may further impact on the degree 
of operational autonomy experienced by managers of agencies, or parts of 
agencies, in this quadrant.   
 
(iii) The Rational Goal Model: Agencies characterised by the rational goal 
model of performance management use a calculation-based logic that employs 
empirical knowledge and focuses principally on the delivery of outputs.  It 
places an emphasis on regulative control through the use of fixed targets and 
a formal rationality that may not reflect the exigencies of, and will therefore 
be loosely-coupled with, operational management.   
 
This model is also likely to be concerned with the measurement and 
management of functions that are politically salient and not perceived as 
technically complex.  This will encourage external stakeholders to engage in 
sensegiving activities that, without a similarly strong pattern of sensegiving by 
internal leaders, will result in fragmented sensemaking activities in respect of 
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its performance, and an emergent and inconsistent series of actions.  A strong 
external influence on the organisation‟s activities and allocation of resources 
will further result from it having limited public capital, i.e. low public, and 
hence, political, trust and confidence in the management of its performance.  
In such situations, the organisation is likely to experience limited operational 
autonomy.   
 
(iv) The Multiple Constituency Model: Agencies that characterise the multiple 
constituency model embody a more substantive, ends-orientated rationality 
that, as well as quantified data, employs more subjectively framed information 
such as narrative and direct observation.  Performance is measured and 
managed at the level of outputs and outcomes, using flexible targets and 
giving recognition to learning processes.  The rationality of control is culturally 
and cognitively-based, and supports an integration of the formal performance 
framework with those used by operational managers.   
 
The functions managed by organisations with the characteristics of the 
multiple constituency model are not politically salient and may be perceived as 
technically complex and difficult to measure.  These organisations are likely to 
possess a higher amount of public capital and thus experience more 
operational autonomy.  However, in this externally focused organisation high 
levels of interaction with stakeholders will result in both internal leader and 
external stakeholder sensegiving that produces guided sensemaking practices 
that also richly encompass the range of external stakeholder perspectives.   
 
In proposing this competing values framework of performance management 
models which may apply to public service agencies in New Zealand, it should be 
stressed that the analysis does not support the commonly made suggestion that: 
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 … the competing values framework highlights that it is impossible for organisations to 
emphasise simultaneously control and flexibility, or to be responsive primarily to both 
internal and external stakeholders … movement into one box … must be traded against 
movement out of another.  (Boyne, 2003, p.220) 
Rather, it is proposed that the characteristics of each quadrant overlap, to varying 
degrees in different organisational settings.  As Talbot (2008) observed:  
The absolutely key point about [the competing values framework] is that it is not an 
„either/or‟ model but rather a „both/and‟ approach.  In other words, every organisation 
will have some degree of each of the characteristics of each quadrant – whilst some 
organisations may exhibit stronger tendencies in one direction or another at different 
times, all will have some element of all four sets of characteristics.  (p. 12) 
 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter began with a critique of theories drawn from institutional economics 
which, together with ideas drawn from private sector management practices, 
formed a normative logic for the reforms of New Zealand‟s public sector in the mid 
1980s to early 1990s.  It was suggested that these theories are more concerned 
with explaining changes to practices associated with management of the public 
sector, rather than explaining performance measurement and management 
practices within specific organisational settings.   
 
To explain the performance measurement and management practices in use within 
individual public service agencies it is necessary to understand the factors driving 
the behaviours of organisational members.  To this end it has been proposed that 
ideas drawn from new institutional sociology and organisational sensemaking 
enable the development of a competing values framework representing the two 
continua of the rationality of control and the locus of control.  This framework 
contains four ideal type performance management models by which the practices 
in use within individual organisational settings may be located and explained.   
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In the next chapter the methodology used to explore the performance 
management practices in use in the three agencies chosen for study is described.  
The findings of the study are presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.   
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Chapter 5 
METHODOLOGY ADOPTED FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology employed to gather evidence of 
performance measurement and management practices within three agencies 
selected from New Zealand‟s public service.  To paraphrase Mason (2002), this 
evidence was gathered to resolve a puzzle that is both “mechanical” and 
“comparative” in as much as it seeks to understand how performance 
measurement and management practices are constituted and operate by 
comparing the differences and similarities between three case study agencies.  A 
qualitative approach was adopted in order to remain sensitive to context and the 
complexity of the processes by which performance measurement and 
management practices are formed and maintained.   
 
Four different approaches were used to gather data, namely: 
 semi-structured interviews with staff from each of the case study agencies; 
 observation of meetings at operational sites; 
 a review of the formal accountability documents and internal reports 
produced by each agency; and 
 feedback from agency members on the initial findings of the research.   
By these means evidence was gained of the concepts of performance held by 
members of the agencies and contained in formal accountability documents.  Note 
was also taken of the performance frameworks contained in organisational 
artefacts the most significant of which were the agencies‟ computer systems.  
Agency members‟ descriptions of their interactions with these systems were also 
noted.   
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In the following sections the basis of the selection of the case study agencies is 
first explained and then the four different approaches used to gather data and its 
subsequent analysis are described.   
 
5.2 Agency Selection 
The three agencies selected for study, namely Work and Income, Public Prisons 
and the Community Probation Service, represent a cross-section of New Zealand‟s 
core public service and present the problems and paradoxes associated with 
measuring and managing performance in that sector.  All three agencies have a 
significant national office establishment in Wellington as well as service delivery 
functions distributed in offices throughout New Zealand.  They operate through a 
tiered management structure encompassing national, regional and local levels.   
 
At least in theory, Work and Income‟s core functions of paying social security 
benefits and placing people into employment give rise to performance measures 
(such as the number of people receiving benefits, the value of benefits paid out, or 
the number of people placed into employment) that are definable and measurable 
in objective terms.  However, Work and Income also presents more challenging 
performance issues associated with its objectives in respect of social development 
for which the results will only be determined over a number of years.  Those 
results will also be influenced by a range of extraneous factors beyond the 
agencies control and will inherently involve more subjective, value-based 
measures.  Similarly, determining the success with which both Public Prisons and 
the Community Probations Service manage the rehabilitation and reintegration of 
offenders also gives rise to problems of measurement and attribution given the 
complex social and psychological issues that those offenders carry.  The extent to 
which behavioural change is engendered in offenders is often a matter of 
professional expertise and judgement rather than quantified measurement.  
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However, at least for a broad range of the New Zealand electorate, these issues 
are frequently simplified down to the measurement of punishment in terms of 
objectively represented measures of sentence completion.    
 
5.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
A series of semi-structured interviews was conducted with individual members of 
each case study agency in order to gain insight into the performance 
measurement and management frameworks in use at different hierarchical levels 
within and between each organisation.  The key objective of theses interviews was 
to reveal the in use, rather than the official and formal, performance measurement 
and management models within each of the case study agencies.  Semi-structured 
interviews were used in order to allow the interviewees‟ own thoughts to emerge 
and, where necessary, be able to be explored via further questioning.     
 
Before the interviews were conducted, the interviewees were provided with a note 
(a copy of which is attached as Appendix II) explaining the purposes of the 
research and that their contribution would remain anonymous and confidential.  
Each interviewee was also asked to sign a consent form (shown as Appendix III), 
in which they acknowledged their agreement to participate in the research and 
also to the interview being recoded.  They were informed that, if at any time they 
wished to withdraw from the research, the interview would be stopped and the 
recording deleted.  Interviewees were not provided with a formal list of questions 
although, to facilitate consistency of approach, an interview guide outlining the 
topics to be addressed in each interview was used by the interviewer.  A copy of 
the guide is provided in Appendix IV.  Broadly, each interviewee was initially asked 
to define what their agency does and the specific functions undertaken by 
themselves and their team.  They were then asked to define their performance 
objectives and the factors that affect their ability to achieve them.  They were also 
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asked about the factors or issues they are required to measure and report on and 
whether these are, in practice, useful in terms of planning for, and monitoring 
progress in achieving, their objectives.   
 
In order to obtain opinions from the various hierarchical levels within each agency, 
the interviewees included operational supervisors and local managers as well as 
regional and national office based managers.  For Work and Income and the 
Community Probation Service, both of which have offices spread throughout the 
country, offices were selected to give a diverse geographic (i.e. both rural and 
urban locations) and demographic mix.  For Public Prisons, a male and a female 
prison were chosen as interview sites.   
 
Whilst these interviews, and their subsequent analysis, were categorised into three 
organisational levels (local, regional and national), there were variations in the 
organisational structure and number of levels of each agency.  Simplification into 
three hierarchical levels facilitated consistency in the treatment of the three 
agencies and did not detract from the relevance of the interviewees‟ comments.  A 
list of the interviews conducted is provided in Appendix V and summarised in the 
following table. 
Figure 5.1: Interviewee Selection 
Agency Local Regional National External Total 
Work & Income 6 2 3  11 
Public Prisons 10 1 2 1 14 
Community Probation Service 7 2 4  13 
 
The interviews lasted for between 45 and 75 minutes, although the majority were 
kept to about an hour.  Notes were taken during the interviews which were also 
 142 
recorded.  The recordings were transcribed into Microsoft Word and a copy of the 
transcript returned to each interviewee for their review and to enable them to 
make any corrections and/or to provide any further comments they considered 
appropriate.  Required amendments were effected and then each transcript was 
analysed on the basis of the three lenses on performance measurement and 
management described in Chapter 1, namely Function, Purpose and Perspective. 
Each of these lenses provided a different view of the factors shaping performance 
measurement and management practices in the case study agencies.     
 
The analysis of the interview data involved successive readings of the transcripts 
during which codes were created to identify the factors that emerged.  These 
codes were assigned to relevant passages of the text and the coded passages 
copied and pasted into separate Word documents.  The process of analysis was 
grounded in that the detailed codes, representing identified factors, were allowed 
to emerge in the coding process rather than being predefined and used to test a 
particular hypothesis.  By adopting this „bottom-up‟ approach, other than the 
lenses selected, the interview data was allowed to speak for itself and the codes 
emerge “to produce data that represents insiders‟ lived experience” (Stablein, 
1999).  The use of predefined coded factors would have created the risk of missing 
important, but unexpected, themes within the data.   
 
Taking each lens in turn (i.e. Function, Purpose and Perspective), the coded text 
was analysed to ascertain the number of statements made by each interviewee in 
respect of each of the coded factors.  The number of statements made by an 
interviewee in respect of a coded factor was then calculated as a percentage of the 
total statements made by the interviewee in relation to the lens in question.  The 
interviewees‟ „scores‟ were then grouped by hierarchical level (i.e. national, 
regional, and local) within the agency and weighted by the number of interviewees 
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at each level.  This generated a percentage for each coded factor which reflected 
the proportion of statements made in respect of the factor of the total statements 
made by all interviewees within the particular agency at that level.  This 
summarisation process enabled any bias resulting from the following causes to be 
eliminated.   
 The spread and number of interviewees varied at each hierarchical level 
within the three case study agencies as a result of different organisational 
structures within the agencies.   
 There were more interviewees at the local than at the regional or national 
office levels because of the geographical spread of operations. 
 The scope and length of the interviews, and therefore the number of 
statements made, was significantly greater for more senior managers than 
for local level staff.    
 
The percentages of statements made by interviewees at the three different levels 
within each agency, in respect of each coded factor, were then presented in 
summary tables for each of the lenses.  This enabled the relative importance of 
the coded factors within the three agencies, and at the different hierarchical 
levels, to be compared.  These tables – relating to function, purpose, and 
perspective – are presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively.  The percentages 
of statements made by interviewees in respect of each coded factor are also 
presented in graphical form (histograms) in each chapter.  When reviewing these 
tables and histograms it needs to be borne in mind that they reflect the 
percentages of the total number of statements made by the interviewees in 
relation to the coded factors, irrespective of whether the statements were negative 
or positive in nature.  They therefore provide high level cognitive maps of the 
factors (or themes) that the interviewees associated with performance 
measurement and management in their agency.   
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For each of these chapters the coded Word documents were reviewed to identify 
patterns and themes relating to each of the coded factors which were then plotted 
on „mind maps‟ (Buzan, 2003) to facilitate the creation of summaries for each case 
study agency.  More simply this can be seen as a four step process, represented 
as follows:   
Figure 5.2: Analysis of Interview Data 
i. Lenses, of function, purpose and perspective, provide a 
mechanism to categorise the data at a broad level.  They 
were defined prior to the analysis process.   
 Lenses 
(Function, 
Purpose & 
Perspective) 
   
ii. Codes are attached to factors mentioned by, or reflected in 
the comments of, interviewees.  Factors emerged during the 
coding process.  
 
Codes 
   
iii. The coding process resulted in a broad range of coded 
factors that were reviewed and appropriately grouped. 
 
 
Groups of Codes 
   
iv. It was then possible to identify key themes and emphases 
that are described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.   
 
 
Themes 
 
5.4  Observation of Meetings 
For each of the agencies studied, a routine meeting of operational managers and 
staff was observed for two key purposes: 
1. to gather further evidence of the performance measurement framework(s) 
in use within each agency; and  
2. to gain additional insights into local cultural norms and „the way things are 
done around here‟.   
In each meeting notes were taken on the issues discussed, the priorities 
established and the language used.   
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Together with the site visits required for the semi-structured interviews, attending 
these meetings provided an opportunity to observe the physical environment in 
which performance is measured and managed.  Relevant factors observed included 
the layout of desks and offices and the impact of such arrangements on the extent 
to which performance, in terms of client or offender interaction, is directly 
observable.  Note was also taken of relevant local artefacts such as posters and 
wall charts which also provide insight into sensegiving practices in respect of the 
measurement and management of organisational performance.   
 
Where relevant, the observations from the operational meetings and site visits are 
reported in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.   
 
5.5 Document Study 
In order to ascertain the official framework or meta narrative by which 
performance in New Zealand‟s core public service is conceived and measured, a 
range of documentary sources relating to the case study agencies was examined.  
These included the legislative framework provided by the State Sector Act 1988 
and the Public Finance Act 1989.   Other documents studied included the 
publications and guidelines of the control agencies (e.g. Treasury Instructions 
2004 (The Treasury, 2004) and Getting Better at Managing for Shared Outcomes – 
A Resource for Agency Leaders (State Services Commission, 2004)).  Databases, 
including the Te Puna Web Directory, were also used to search for published 
speeches by key players such as relevant Government Ministers and the State 
Services Commissioner.   
 
Within each of the three case study agencies documents relating to the official 
performance management model were also examined.  These included legislation 
specifically relating to the Ministry of Social Welfare (e.g. the Social Security Act 
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1964) and the Department of Corrections (e.g. the Corrections Act 2004) and the 
formal accountability documents of each organisation including their Statements of 
Intent, Output Plans, strategic plans and plans for the current year (2007).   
 
In addition to documents relating to the agencies‟ official performance 
management model, documents relating to the formal performance management 
systems and supporting computer applications, such as information systems 
architecture diagrams, user documentation and examples of the outputs of these 
systems, were also examined.   
 
Other organisational documents such as managers‟ business plans, management 
reports and the agenda and minutes of internal management and project meetings 
over the preceding twelve months, were studied for insight into the official 
performance management model and also to identify the performance 
management models in use by the various managers and their teams.   
 
This study enabled comparisons to be made between the official, formal and in use 
models but, in order to not prejudice the questions asked in the interviews, the 
document review was not undertaken until after those semi-structured interviews 
were complete.   
 
5.6  Feedback 
Opportunities were sought to gain early feedback from a meeting with senior 
managers from each case study agency.   The objective of these meetings was to 
promote discussion to test and validate the preliminary research findings and 
interpretations.   
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5.7 Synthesis 
To provide an explanatory logic to the data an “abductive research strategy” 
(Blaikie, 2000) was utilised to move back  and forth between the empirical data, 
the researcher‟s own experience and the broader concepts provided by the 
structure of the public management and institutional literature described in 
Chapters 2 to 4 (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996).  Thus, rather than deductively testing 
a particular theoretical framework, or inductively proposing a new one, the 
common and divergent themes identified by the analysis of the empirical data 
(described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8) were framed via a recursive process that 
involved returning to the initial literature review to select appropriate ideas from 
which propositions could be derived and tested against the research findings.   
 
From this process pertinent theories were selected to form an explanatory 
framework that encompasses the, at times, conflicting themes that emerged from 
the empirical data.  The application of this framework to the case study agencies is 
presented in Chapter 9.   
 
Performance measurement and management practices in an organisational 
context are socially constructed by the modes of rationality, norms and values of 
organisational actors in different functions and at different organisational levels.  
To explain this complex picture three forms of triangulation were employed in the 
empirical research design to “overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single-
methods, single-observer, and single-theory studies” (Denzin, 1970).  These are 
as follows: 
1. Perspective triangulation (Patton, 1990) – was provided by the three lenses 
of function, purpose and perspective to map out how performance 
information is defined and used within the context of each of the case study 
agencies. 
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2. Source triangulation – was provided by the use of semi-structured 
interviews, meeting observations, document reviews and feedback.  It gave 
explicit recognition to the fact that different elements of performance 
measurement and management practices will be captured in the data 
provided by the various sources.   
3. Theoretical triangulation – involved the use of a number of theoretical 
models which were drawn from the public management and institutionalist 
literatures each of which casts the data in a different light but which 
together provide a richer, more textured picture of the phenomenon.   
 
5.8  Summary 
In this chapter the selection of the case study agencies was explained and the 
methods used to accomplish the empirical research have been described.  The 
chapter has also explained how the interview data was analysed through the 
lenses of function, purpose and perspective.  These findings are reported in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively.   
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Chapter 6 
FUNCTION AS AN ELEMENT OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT IN THE CASE STUDY AGENCIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, three lenses by which we may examine performance 
measurement and management practices are function, purpose and perspective.  
This chapter outlines the construct of function and compares the functions as 
espoused in relevant legislation and key accountability documents with those 
identified as in use by the interviewees from each of the case study agencies.  The 
nature of those functions is explored together with the extent to which the work 
involved and its results are able to be defined in advance and subsequently 
measured.  Consideration is also given to the extent to which that definition and 
measurement occurs in terms of the inputs, processes, outputs and/or inputs 
involved.   
 
Finally consideration is given to the extent to which the interviewees at the 
national, regional and local levels of each agency describe and seek to manage the 
same functions.   
 
6.2 The Construct of Function 
The construct of function refers to the purposeful activities which are undertaken 
by the members of an organisation.  In the context of the New Zealand model of 
public sector management these activities are, at least in the official model, 
principally directed to the delivery of outputs and outcomes, which are defined in 
formal accountability documents, together with information relating to the 
maintenance or enhancement of their capacity and capability, which receives 
rather less formal definition.   
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For the Government as a whole, largely financial information relating to the 
functions of each public service agency is published in the annual Estimates of 
Appropriations documents.  Each agency also produces its own accountability 
documents which provide more detailed financial and non-financial information, 
principally in the form of:   
 a Statement of Intent which sets out the agency‟s functions and medium 
term objectives; 
 an Output Plan which sets out the specific outputs that relevant Vote 
Ministers will „purchase‟ from the agency during the ensuing financial year; 
and 
 an Annual Report which provides information on outputs delivered, costs 
incurred and contributions to outcomes achieved during the previous 
financial year.   
The specific functions and purposes of each public service agency are also set out 
in legislation relevant to that agency (such as the Social Security Act 1964 and the 
Corrections Act 2004).   
 
Notwithstanding these official specifications of an agency‟s functions, those 
working within the agency may have a different understanding of their, and their 
agency‟s, functions.  As reported in Chapter 5, in order to ascertain the 
understanding of managers and staff in the three case study organisations, semi-
structured interviews were conducted in which the interviewees were asked, inter 
alia, „what does your organisation do?‟ and „what do you and your team do?‟.  
From their responses, nineteen separate functions were identified.   
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Figure 6.1:  Functions Identified by Interviewees 
 
Employer relationships & opportunities
other 
Managing providers organisations
Joined up government & community
Managing staff performance
organisational 
Managing the organisation functions
Managing external accountabilities
Social development
Managing outcomes
operational FUNCTION
Local community issues & risk management  - What does 
the agency do?
Managing broader social issues  - What do you and 
 your team do?
Paying people's benefits
Getting people into work
Safe, secure & humane confinement
Rehabilitation & reintegration
Reports to other agencies service
delivery
Managing clients
Managing offenders
Complying with due process
Managing local operations
 
 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the functions identified by the interviewees may be 
categorised based on the extent to which they are concerned with:  
 managing interfaces with other organisations, 
 managing the organisation itself, 
 operational management, and 
 more detailed process management.   
Although the interviewees‟ responses indicated that institutional, managerial and 
technical functions are all important, their relative importance differs between the 
three agencies.  This is reflected in Figure 6.2 which presents a summary of the 
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interviewees‟ responses.  As explained in Chapter 5, the findings reported in 
Figure 6.2 reflect the percentage of the total statements made by each 
interviewee about the functions of his/her agency,27 with the interviewees grouped 
according to their sphere of authority within the agency, that is, national, regional 
or local.   
 
Figure 6.2: Summary of Interviewees’ Statements Concerning Function 
for Each Case Study Agency 
FUNCTION  Public Prisons Service
National Regional Local Average National Regional Local Average National Regional Local Average
Other Organisations
Managing employer relationships & 
opportunities
3            3            5            -         -         -         -         -         -         
Managing providers -         3            -         -         -         -         2            -         3            
Managing joined up government & 
community
9            24          4            6            10          1            1            11          8            
Total %  of issues mentioned
12% 29% 9% 17% 6% 10% 1% 6% 3% 11% 11% 8%
Organisational Functions
Managing individual (staff) performance -         -         -         8            -         13          1            4            17          
Managing the organisation 33          21          4            19          -         10          47          36          18          
Managing external accountabilities 4            -         -         6            20          1            8            15          1            
Total %  of issues mentioned
37% 21% 4% 21% 33% 20% 24% 25% 56% 55% 36% 49%
Operational Management Functions
Managing social development 23          3            10       -         -         -         -         -         -         
Managing outcomes -         -         -      6            -         -         7            -         2            
Managing local community issues and 
risk
2            8            9         3            -         -         3            4            1            
Managing broader social issues 5            16          1         -         20          -         -         -         -         
Total %  of issues mentioned
30% 27% 20% 26% 8% 20% 0% 9% 11% 4% 3% 6%
Service Delivery Functions
Paying people‟s benefits 8            7            13          -         -         -         -         -         -         
Getting people into work 12          15          20          -         -         -         -         -         -         
Managing safe, secure and humane 
confinement
-         -         -         27          10          6            -         -         -         
Managing rehabilitation and 
reintegration
-         -         -         22          40          17          14          4            4            
Provide reports to other agencies -         -         -         -         -         -         3            -         10          
Managing clients -         3            34          -         -         -         -         -         -         
Managing offenders -         -         -         3            -         13          7            15          25          
Complying with due process -         -         -         3            -         21          6            11          6            
Managing local operations -         -         -         -         -         18          -         -         6            
Total %  of issues mentioned
20% 24% 67% 37% 54% 50% 75% 60% 30% 30% 50% 37%
Total
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
PERCENTAGE OF ISSUES MENTIONED
Community Probation ServiceWork and Income
 
 
                                               
27 The total statements made by interviewees include statements reporting that the function was not a function of the 
agency (or the interviewee, or his/her team) as well as those identifying the function as that of the agency (or the 
interviewee, or his/her team).   
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From Figure 6.2 it may be seen that the national level interviewees from Work and 
Income were principally concerned with functions associated with the management 
of the organisation and its strategic focus on social development.  While Work and 
Income‟s regional level interviewees were reasonably evenly split across all four 
categories, interviewees at the local level emphasised the service delivery 
functions relating to their clients.   
 
In contrast interviewees at all three organisational levels of the Public Prisons 
Service emphasised the service delivery functions associated with prison 
management.  In the Community Probations Service national and regional 
interviewees principally described functions associated with managing that 
organisation while local level interviewees placed most emphasis on service 
delivery functions concerned with managing offenders in the community.  
interviewees from Work and Income indicated that the agency‟s activities are fairly 
evenly divided between institutional and technical functions.  This contrasts with 
the Public Prisons Service where the focus appears to be on technical functions, 
and the Community Probation Service in which institutional functions seem to be 
the most important.  Managerial functions are least important in all three agencies 
but remain significant in Work and Income.   
 
For each of the case study agencies the functions, as specified in the 
accountability documents and those described by their interviewees, are reported 
in more detail below.   
 
6.3 Work and Income 
 
6.3.1 Official Functions of Work and Income 
Work and Income is a major service line within New Zealand‟s largest public 
service agency, the Ministry of Social Development (MSD).  The Ministry embraces 
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a range of other service lines including, for example, Family and Community 
Services, Child, Youth and Family Services, and a Social Services Policy Group.  In 
the 2006/2007 financial year, Work and Income operated from its national office 
in Wellington, 11 regional offices, 141 service centres and 5 contact centres.  It 
was responsible for the payment of approximately $6.2 billion in social security 
benefits and $6.7 billion in New Zealand Superannuation entitlements.   
 
The principal functions of Work and Income are set out in:  
(i) the legislation it administers (for example, the Social Security Act 1964 
and the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001),  
(ii) the Government‟s Estimates of Appropriations documentation, and  
(iii) MSD‟s own key accountability documents (the Statement of Intent, 
Output Plan and Annual Report).   
 
Section 1A of the Social Security Act 1964 establishes the following functions: 
(a)  [T]he provision of financial and other support as appropriate –  
(i) to help people to support themselves and their dependents 
while not in paid employment; and 
(ii) to help people find or retain paid employment; and 
(iii) to help people for whom work may not currently be 
appropriate because of sickness, injury, disability, or caring 
responsibilities, to support themselves and their 
dependants.   
(b) [I]n certain circumstances the provision of financial support to people to 
help alleviate hardship.   
 
In the context of the broader MSD accountability documents, three “high level 
outcomes” are identified to which Work and Income contributes.  The first and 
most significant is entitled Working Age People and is defined in the MSD‟s 
2006/2007 Statement of Intent as follows:  
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People achieve economic independence throughout their working lives.  They are able 
to participate in and contribute to society and have a sense of belonging.  (MSD 
2006, p. 18) 
Secondly, Work and Income contributes to MSD‟s outcome entitled 
Families/Whanau which includes the goals: 
Families and whanau are active participants in working and community life, and 
obtain the resources to play a fully functional role in supporting their members and 
communities; and 
Families and whanau are a safe and secure environment where all members live free 
from violence.  (MSD 2006, p.18)   
Providing an overall context for the previous two outcomes, the third high level 
outcome Leading Social Development is defined as: 
A whole of government approach to achieving the Government‟s social vision.  (MSD 
2006, p.18) 
This is supplied by, inter alia, the following lower level outcome:  
Facilitate and promote collaboration among social sector service delivery agencies at 
the regional and local level.  (MSD 2006, p.18) 
 
The Government‟s Estimates documentation and the MSD‟s 2006/2007 own 
accountability documents specify four classes of outputs that facilitate 
achievement of these outcomes and encapsulate the official functions of Work and 
Income.  These are: 
(i) Services to minimise the duration of unemployment and move people into 
work; 
(ii) Services to provide benefit entitlement and obligations to working age 
beneficiaries and to promote self sufficiency; 
(iii) Service to Seniors; and  
(iv) Social Development Leadership.   
Each of these is explained below. 
 
 156 
(i) Services to minimise the duration of unemployment and move people into 
work.  This class of outputs contributes to the high level outcome for Working 
Age People and includes the following major functions:   
 assessing clients‟ capability to work;   
 supporting job seekers to develop skills and knowledge relevant to 
labour market opportunities;   
 working with industry to identify opportunities for job searching 
clients;   
 matching job seekers to appropriate employment opportunities;     
 providing clients with support once they are placed in employment; 
and 
 assisting disadvantaged communities and groups to recognise and 
develop their own labour market initiatives and to use their own 
assets to create employment opportunities that lead to self-
sufficiency and contribute to the local economy (MSD 2007, p.60).    
 
(ii) Services to provide benefit entitlement and obligations to working age 
beneficiaries and to promote self sufficiency.  This class of outputs includes the 
functions: 
 providing information on the full range of assistance available so 
people can apply for assistance for which they might be eligible; 
 informing people of their rights and obligations when they receive 
income support;   
 assessing, verifying and paying income support; 
 managing people‟s needs for income support and other assistance, 
including responding to changes in people‟s circumstances in a timely 
and appropriate manner;   
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 managing client debt repayment in a way that balances the client‟s 
ability to repay with the need to ensure integrity of the benefit 
system;   
 providing individual assistance to those for whom an employment 
outcome is not an immediate option, for example single parents, 
people who have ill health or people with a disability; and 
 providing information on social community and employment services 
and referring people to the agency that best suits their need (MSD 
2007, p.64).   
 
(iii) Service to Seniors.  This class of outputs includes the functions: 
 assessing, paying and reviewing entitlements for New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZ Super) and supplementary benefits, grants, 
allowances and subsidies paid to NZ Super clients or pensioners 
(MSD 2007, p.66).   
 
(iv) Social Development Leadership.  This class of outputs includes the functions: 
 leading, facilitating and contributing to “whole of government” 
regional and local social development initiatives; and 
 identifying social, economic and infrastructural issues of high priority 
to the regions, communicating these priorities to Wellington [national 
office] and facilitating progress through government agencies‟ work 
programmes (MSD 2007, p.70).    
 
The functions of Work and Income outlined above are largely associated with the 
core functions of helping people into sustainable employment and paying people 
their correct benefit entitlements.  In terms of the framework shown in Figure 6.2, 
these are characterised as service delivery functions.  However, the function 
“assisting disadvantaged communities and groups to recognise and develop their 
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own labour market initiatives” (MSD 2007, p.60) reflects the operational 
management function, Managing Social Development (see Figure 6.1).  Along 
similar lines, the function “work in partnership with industry to identify skill and 
labour shortages” (MSD 2007, p.60) reflects the organisational function Managing 
Employer Relationships and Opportunities.  These are discussed further below, in 
the context of the findings of the interviews with Work and Income staff.   
 
It should be noted that the key public accountability documents identified above 
largely assume a „purchase‟28 perspective and place little emphasis on functions 
associated with the „ownership‟ role of Ministers and the stewardship role of the 
agency‟s managers.  However, MSD‟s 2006/2007 Statement of Intent does explain 
the need to strengthen the organisation‟s capacity and capability by reconfiguring: 
 … the skill base of our workforce both at the front line and within national office to 
assist in shifting from a transactions approach to one of achieving outcomes … [and 
providing] our staff with the right systems and tools.  (MSD 2006, p.95) 
To this end, the same document states that MSD will: 
 strengthen our understanding of client needs and requirements … ; 
 provide information and promote choices [to clients] … ; 
 develop our capability to work more effectively with clients who have high and 
complex needs … ; 
 develop a new assessment tool, including an automated assessment and job 
matching tool … ; 
 increase our knowledge of the local labour market.  (MSD 2006, p.67) 
 
Despite these statements, little specific information is provided in respect of how 
these initiatives will be measured and monitored.  In comparison, in the 
                                               
28
 Within the public service context, it has been suggested that Ministers have dual roles as „purchasers‟ of goods 
and services from the government agencies and as „owners‟ of the assets and productive capabilities that deliver 
those goods and services currently and in the future (see, for example, Treasury 1996, pp. 15-16).  However, little 
legislative recognition has been given to these dual responsibilities of Ministers and matching functions of chief 
executives.  Although the Public Finance Act 1989 requires public service departments to report on 
“organisational health and capability” (section 40(d) (iii)), no further definition of that requirement is provided.  
Similarly, no mention of maintaining departmental capability and capacity is included in the responsibilities of 
departmental chief executives as defined in section 32 of the State Sector Act 1988.   
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Statement of Intent, Forecast Output Performance Statements provide detailed 
cost, quantity and quality criteria for each output.  Similarly, MSD‟s 2006/2007 
Annual Report notes the need for “strong foundations” (p.38) and reports: 
 good progress in developing an integrated client management system; 
 the development, in Auckland and Canterbury, of offices shared by front 
line staff from the Ministry‟s various service lines; 
 a staff turnover rate of 13% which is in line with the rest of the public 
service; 
 a graduate recruitment programme that attracted 470 applications; and 
 and annual regional Maori hui and national Pacific fono.29   
However, like MSD‟s other accountability documents, the Annual Report provides 
no more detailed information in respect of the progress or results of these 
initiatives.   
 
Figure 6.3, below, summarises the official functions of Work and Income which are 
defined in the agency‟s governing legislation, the Government‟s Estimates 
documentation, and in MSD‟s own accountability documents.  In all three sets of 
documents, the focus is on the provision of appropriate benefit payments, 
assisting people into paid employment and on leading social development.  The 
stewardship function of managing organisational capacity and capability is 
mentioned in both the Estimates documentation and in MSD‟s Statement of Intent 
and Annual Report.  Promoting collaboration among social sector agencies, 
although closely linked to leading social development, is only specifically 
mentioned in MSD‟s Statement of Intent and Annual Report.   
 
 
                                               
29 Meetings for Maori and Pacific Island staff in which their cultural practices are adopted.   
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Figure 6.3: Official Functions of Work and Income 
 Service Delivery (Purchase 
Perspective) 
Stewardship (Ownership 
Perspective) 
Legislation The provision of financial and 
other support as appropriate –  
(i) to help people to support 
themselves and their dependents 
while not in paid employment; 
and 
(ii) to help people find or 
retain paid employment; and 
(iii) to help people for whom 
work may not currently be 
appropriate because of sickness, 
injury, disability, or caring 
responsibilities, to support 
themselves and their dependants.   
In certain circumstances the 
provision of financial support to 
people to help alleviate hardship.   
 
Government 
Estimates 
Services to assess and pay the 
appropriate entitlement of social 
assistance to beneficiaries and to 
protect the integrity of the benefit 
system, including management of 
debt. 
Services to assist people into 
employment. 
The provision of social 
development leadership, including 
support of cross-sectoral 
government collaboration at a 
local level.   
Expand the capacity and 
strengthen the capability of 
regional offices 
Departmental 
Statement of 
Intent and 
Annual Report 
Services to minimise the duration 
of unemployment and move 
people into work; 
Services to provide benefit 
entitlement and obligations to 
working age beneficiaries and to 
promote self sufficiency; 
Service to seniors; and  
Social development leadership 
Strengthen the agency‟s capacity 
and capability 
Facilitate and promote 
collaboration among social sector 
service delivery agencies  
 
 
The observations by interviewees from Work and Income reported below identify 
the agency‟s key functions as perceived by them and provide an insight into the 
extent to which they reflect the official functions outlined above and support the 
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desired shift in focus from transactions to outcomes noted in MSD‟s 2006/2007 
Statement of Intent.     
 
6.3.2 Interview Findings Related to Functions of Work and Income 
As might be expected, and as reflected in Figure 6.3, the interviewees‟ 
descriptions of their functions varied with their role within the agency‟s 
organisational hierarchy.   
Figure 6.4: Functions of Work and Income Identified by Interviewees 
Grouped by Level in the Organisational Hierarchy 
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Thus, for example, descriptions of client-related (i.e. service delivery) functions 
were more prevalent at the Service Centre level (identified in Figure 6.2 and 6.4 
as „local‟) but at national office level greater emphasis was placed on Managing the 
Organisation and on the operational management function Managing Social 
Development.  
 
Organisational Functions of Work and Income 
As reflected in Figures 6.2 and 6.4, the interviewees from Work and Income 
referred to the following two organisational functions: 
(i) Managing the Organisation; 
(ii) Managing External Accountabilities; 
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For this agency the most significant organisational function is that related to 
Managing the Organisation; this concerns developing and communicating strategy 
and facilitating the provision of the required organisational capability and capacity.  
As might be expected, national office managers, and to a lesser extent regional 
managers, focused principally on this function and, in particular, its broader 
strategic element.  A senior national office manager, when describing Work and 
Income‟s evolving role, asked, “What can you actually do to influence direction 
and have people thinking in different ways?” (WI national 7)30.  Another national 
office manager explained that his/her role was to: 
Put Work and Income in a place three to five years ahead and say this is where we 
want to be, or collectively this is where we feel we want to be, how are we going to 
get there, what do we want to focus on, how do we communicate that to our staff, 
how does it relate in a practical way to the operational side of things? (WI national 6) 
Similarly reflecting the strategic element of their function, national office 
managers mentioned their roles in “setting targets that our regions need to 
perform to” (WI national 6), and allocating funding on the most effective basis (WI 
national 11). 
 
Managing the Organisation also appears to be important at a regional level (see 
figure 6.3) but, at this level, it seems that the focus is principally on the 
organisational capability and capacity element of the function.  This is reflected in 
the observations of a Regional Commissioner who stressed the importance of 
“training and development and investment”, and stated:  
… what we‟re talking about now is let‟s step back … and focus more on how we do 
things … and to develop our foundation, to make sure that it‟s really strong and we 
have the capability and the capacity to do the best possible job that we can; that 
                                               
30 Quoted comments are identified by the agency of the interviewee (i.e. „WI‟ for Work and Income, 
„PP‟ for Public Prisons and „CPS‟ for the Community Probations Service), their level in the 
organisational hierarchy (i.e. „local‟, „regional‟, „national‟ or „external‟) and a unique numerical 
identifier.   
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everybody understands why they‟re here; that we invest heavily in our training so 
that people know how to do what we expect them to do.  (WI regional 9)   
This interviewee also stressed the importance of managers as leaders being able 
to “encourage, support and develop the potential of your people”, but noted that 
problems exist with attracting and retaining appropriate staff. (S)he explained:   
Because [we are part] of the public service … we basically just inherit people and 
they stay forever; and to be quite frank about it, the worse they are the longer they 
are likely to stay especially if they recognise that they are not very good because the 
realties are where would they go and who would have them? (WI regional 9)   
As is noted below, this issue was similarly mentioned by interviewees from both 
the Public Prisons Service and the Community Probation Service.   
 
Although Managing the Organisation did not feature significantly in the responses 
of Work and Income interviewees at the local level, a local Service Centre Manager 
conveyed elements of both the strategic and the people elements of the function.  
This interviewee observed:  
… it‟s important that I paint the bigger picture and then I drill it down into the 
detailed stuff so they actually know that what we are trying to do is not because I am 
telling them to do it, it‟s because it feeds into this and then that feeds into this and 
just so [into] the bigger picture stuff as well.  So they see what they do on a daily 
basis is important and it‟s meaningful.  (WI local 4)   
 
Distinguishing features of public service organisations lie in the scope of the 
information they are required to provide for purposes of external accountability 
and in their relationship with the media which is often hungry for stories.  
However, as reflected in Figure 6.2, unlike the other two case study agencies, the 
function of Managing External Accountabilities did not feature prominently in the 
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responses of interviewees from Work and Income.31  Nevertheless the function 
was mentioned by a national office manager who explained:  
We are also heavily involved in Work and Income‟s input into the Statement of 
Intent, the Output Plan, [and] a whole range of key, significant documents that the 
Ministry produces …   
(S)he further explained:  
What we are doing, or are planning to do this year, is make sure we have a key 
performance indicator report that is really aligned to [the Ministry‟s] Statement of 
Intent and our Output Plan whereby we could quite happily present that externally 
and it‟s, sort of, the public face of our reporting.  (WI national 6)   
This observation suggests that, in the past, internal and external reporting have 
been more loosely coupled.     
 
Functions Relating to Other Organisations 
Interviewees from Work and Income also identified three functions relating to 
other organisations, namely: 
(i) Managing Joined Up Government and Community; 
(ii) Managing Providers; and 
(iii) Managing Employer Relationships and Opportunities.   
 
The most important function relating to other organisations identified by 
interviewees from Work and Income is that of Managing Joined Up Government 
and Community.  This function is aligned to the managerial function of managing 
local community issues but reflects an emphasis on broader relationship building.  
A senior national office manager described the function in the following terms: 
 … it is about what we need to do as an organisation in terms of collaboration, 
working with other agencies, working with non-government organisations, 
                                               
31 However, at national office level, Work and Income has a significant communications function.  In the past, 
under the high profile chief executive Christine Rankin, the agency attracted considerable media attention.  More 
recently, it has plausibly managed the organisation‟s profile, and relationship with the media, more successfully 
and, in so doing, has provided more „operational space‟, or less distraction, for its managers.      
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developing those kind of relationships across the board so that we can get the best 
outcomes.  (WI national 7)   
(S)he added to this by asking:  
[H]as it ever occurred before where a government agency develops partnerships with 
industry and then develops relationships with training organisations so it‟s a three 
way partnership, getting people trained for specific jobs and paying them for the 
outcome that you get? (WI national 7)   
 
Managers at all three hierarchical levels described working with other agencies 
within the Ministry of Social Development, such as Family and Community 
Services and Child, Youth and Family Services, as well as with other central 
government agencies, such as Housing New Zealand and the Police.  Several 
references were also made to working with organisations such as councils, 
hospitals and schools.  Nevertheless, this function (i.e. Managing Joined Up 
Government and Community) appears to be particularly important at regional 
manager level.  A Regional Commissioner observed, for example:   
We do have to spend a lot more time as we are trying to get more collaborative, 
working with other agencies, even internally, a lot of time trying to work out where 
all the crossovers are.   (WI regional 3)   
However, a local service centre manager also displayed a concern for collaborative 
effort.  In relation to social development and building community capability, (s)he 
observed:  
… we can‟t do that by ourselves we need the help of the community that we service 
and other organisations whether that‟s government organisations or non-government 
organisations.  (WI local 4)   
This interviewee explained that his/her service centre enlists the help of other 
agencies by inviting them into the service centre from where they can assist the 
members of the local community:  
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… Inland Revenue are here once a week.  Citizens Advice are here twice a week.  
Housing New Zealand are here three times a week.  So we are becoming a one stop 
shop where someone can come to and get all of their needs addressed (WI local 4).   
 
The importance of this function within Work and Income is also reflected in the 
fact that being able to demonstrate, or provide evidence of, collaboration with 
other governmental and non-governmental organisations is an element of both 
managerial and individual staff member performance.  A senior national office 
manager noted, for example: 
There‟s a bunch of stuff in there about collaboration I think.  I‟m not sure if it‟s in the 
Output Plan, it‟s certainly in my performance agreement.  (WI national 7)   
 
A function, which appears to be of relatively minor importance in Work and 
Income (as in the other two case study agencies), is that of Managing Providers.  
Work and Income relies on a large number of external providers for services such 
as training programmes that help to prepare clients for future employment.  
However, this function was mentioned only by a Regional Commissioner who 
noted:  
We don‟t purchase training for the sake of training and that sort of stuff.  …  We 
actually say, well tell us about the outcomes which you‟ll get.  … instead of us paying 
for the course, we‟ll actually pay you for each [client] that you get into employment.  
So if you get lots of people into employment, that‟s good, you will make some 
money; if you don‟t, you won‟t get paid and you might have spent all that time doing 
all that training for no reason; because, if it doesn‟t achieve the outcomes, why 
would we purchase it?  (WI regional 3) 
 
Aligned to managing providers of services is the function Managing Employer 
Relationships and Opportunities.  This involves developing and maintaining 
relationships with employers, as well as identifying specific job opportunities for 
clients.  Although not particularly significant at any one hierarchical level, it was 
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mentioned by interviewees from all three levels.  At national and regional levels, in 
particular, managing employer relationships has the objective of establishing 
industry partnerships that allow Work and Income to identify the staffing 
requirements of employers and to fill these with appropriately qualified and 
experienced personnel.  Thus, a Regional Commissioner provided an example of a 
“Uniformed Services Strategy” in which: 
… we are going to try and implement a process where we can bring young people 
through a range of intervention or preparatory processes so that they can have an 
opportunity to enter any one of the armed or uniformed services, be it from the 
Police, to the Navy, to even the security industry, or prison guards, that type of stuff.  
Because those are the areas where there is a huge skill shortage and there‟s long 
term sustainable employment there.  (WI regional 9) 
At a local level, Managing Employer Relationships is a key part of the role of Work 
Brokers.32  A Local Service Centre Manager explained that Work Brokers are: 
… out on the streets.  They go out and they talk to big companies, they talk to little 
businesses - sort of like an employment agency but for free.  And employers now are 
starting to refer to us because of the clients that we can refer to them.  (WI local 1)   
 
Operational Management Functions of Work and Income 
As shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.4, the interviewees from Work and Income 
identified three operational management functions, namely: 
(i) Managing Social Development; 
(ii) Managing Broader Social Issues; and 
(iii) Managing Local Community Issues.   
Each of these managerial functions was referred to by interviewees from all three 
organisational levels but with a different emphasis.   
 
                                               
32 Work Brokers are employed at local Service Centres and have the principal responsibility of identifying 
employment opportunities in the local community.   
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The most significant managerial function, particularly at national level, is that of 
Managing Social Development.  This function reflects a broadening of Work and 
Income‟s operations, beyond the transactional processes of paying benefits and 
placing people in employment, to issues potentially affecting the broader 
outcomes the agency is trying to achieve.  A senior national office manager 
explained that Managing Social Development: 
 … is very much focused on improving the lives of our clients and their families.  You 
could say, what does that mean?  I guess we started out by thinking that getting 
people a job would make a difference when we started getting people off 
unemployment benefit.  But what we found … was that actually it made a difference 
right across their lives and their families if they were in employment just because of 
the way it makes them feel; and it kind of gets them out of that dependency frame 
and provides opportunities for them and the kids.  (WI national 7)   
(S)he went on to suggest that the nature of this function led to the agency 
engaging in activities that were not included in its formal accountability 
documents: 
[T]hat performance starts to go outside the agreement that we have with 
Government.  So that might be the starting point but then it‟s starting to think about 
… what can we do in relation to the clients, what can we do in relation to these things 
… that might not be your core business but impact on outcomes for clients?  So how 
can you … work in that area and how might you measure that to show you have a 
level of performance that is contributing to the outcomes.  (WI national 7)   
Along similar lines, another national office manager observed: 
[W]e have our core business when we have to see people within two days and all 
those kind of basic measures that we‟ve had in place for years; but then we‟ve got 
this more holistic view of the client now when we are able to look at people from a 
family perspective, an individual perspective, a community perspective and just 
attach them to services that they need.  So we are doing a lot more in the way of 
health interventions and that sort of thing.  (WI national 11)   
Similarly, a local level a Service Centre Manager stated: 
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[W]e are definitely focusing more around the holistic approach - around social 
development as well as income support; finding people employment; building 
capability within the community (WI local 4). 
 
For regional managers the most important managerial function is Managing 
Broader Social Issues (see Figure 6.2 and 6.3).  The significance of this function at 
the national level was reflected in the suggestion by a national office manager that 
Work and Income is:  
… the only government department that is actually truly distributed.  We are installed 
in eleven regions, we have a hundred and fifty sites, we are out in every community.   
(WI national 11) 
The interviewee explained that, as a result of its wide geographical distribution, 
the agency has become the first port of call for a range of social issues:    
For example, the snow in Canterbury, the tornado in Greymouth, the floods in the 
Bay of Plenty, the floods in the Manawatu - the first person they call is us because 
we have got one of the biggest contact centres in the country so we can set up a 
flood line like that.  We have got an emergency line now permanently that we can 
reactivate as we need (WI national 11). 
Another national office manager explained:  
 … what happens now is people come to us to say I want you to have a look at this, 
we want you to be involved in this.  Because of that „can do‟ attitude, you know, it 
doesn‟t really matter whether you‟ve got a formal mandate.  It‟s just how you work 
with others to support them (WI national 7).   
 
These comments reflect a degree of discretion that is available to managers in 
Work and Income which enables them to adopt a holistic approach to the 
wellbeing of their clients.  This was illustrated by a Regional Commissioner who 
stated:  
There‟s two ways of reducing benefit numbers: one is to stop people going on the 
benefit, or helping them so they don‟t need to; and the other way is to help people 
who are on the benefit move off it … you can actually become more connected with 
 170 
schools, and trades training, and a whole range of other things, as pro-active 
initiatives if that‟s going to help you in the long run; that‟s a judgement that you can 
actually make. (WI regional 3)  
Another Regional Commissioner similarly explained the need to work with clients 
before they become beneficiaries by stating: 
[Y]ou can‟t demarcate it and say the youth and those clients who aren‟t receiving a 
benefit [are not our clients] because, if we don‟t have some engagement at that end, 
the flow of people likely to come into our negative funded area is never going to 
change.  (WI regional 9) 
(S)he provided an example of “preventative work” taking place in the Youth 
Transitions Service which (s)he described as: 
 … more of a partnership based approach.  Working with councils, working with 
strong community organisations to facilitate the transition of youth who are at risk of 
becoming unemployed or getting into trouble.  (WI regional 9)   
 
Although Managing Broader Social Issues is not generally an immediate concern 
for local level staff, a local Service Centre Manager explained how (s)he seeks to 
involve his/her staff in broader social issues:  
We go through the Social Report
33 
at times.  We talk about this is what we are here 
for, how can we bring change in peoples‟ lives; not just getting them to work, etc.  
It‟s just so different now - we‟re involved in the family violence prevention 
programme.  (WI local 1)   
(S)he went on to acknowledge that approaching clients about sensitive issues like 
family violence presents difficulties for his/her staff and that a quite different 
approach is required.  Nevertheless (s)he reported:   
[I]n the last month we actually referred twenty people.  Twenty people; and we are 
thinking, … if we‟re not doing this what would happen to these twenty people?  And 
we refer them to agencies like Parentline.  (WI local 1)  
 
                                               
33 „The Social Report‟ has been published annually since 2001 by the Ministry of Social Development and, on a 
regional and territorial basis, provides a range of measures related to social wellbeing that support monitoring 
progress in relation to Managing Broader Social Issues and Social Development.  .   
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The operational management function of Managing Local Community Issues is 
aligned with the institutional function of Managing Joined Up Government and 
Community but it involves a more detailed focus on local community groups and 
organisations and working with them to resolve issues of concern.  Although this 
function was mentioned by interviewees from all three organisational levels, 
perhaps not surprisingly, it is most important for interviewees at a local level.  An 
element of this function is concerned with appropriately managing cultural issues.  
A local Service Centre Manager explained:   
I have very high Maori and Pacific Island [population] and I‟ve got to deal with those 
issues that they face; whereas in [another city] they‟re predominantly European, 
very different, brought up differently, different values, different beliefs.  So I‟ve got 
to manage those first before we even look to move on to anything else.  (WI local 4)   
Geographic variations and the need to recognise different communities were also 
reflected in the comments of a Regional Commissioner who observed:   
… different geographic environments, different communities … there are different 
issues for those communities. …. [the local population] covers quite a broad 
spectrum and performance is quite closely associated with the challenges that are in 
those communities.  (WI regional 9)   
 
Managing Local Community Issues involves providing a wide range of services 
many of which may be intangible or difficult to measure and, as such, lie outside 
the formally recognised responsibilities and the performance management 
processes of individual staff.  This was explained by a local Case Manager in the 
following terms:   
You have lots of other little things that come in to it too.  Like, we might have to go 
to strengthening families meetings.  We might have to go to an FGC [Family Group 
Conference] of some sort.
34
  So there‟s little things that come in from outside but 
they are all part of [the job] ultimately.  (WI local 5)   
                                               
34 Strengthening Families meetings are held to bring together local health, education, welfare and police services to 
discuss and assist problem or at risk cases.  FGCs, or Family Group Conferences, are meetings more formally 
provided for in legislation and convened by Child, Youth and Family Services.   
 172 
 
Service Delivery Functions of Work and Income 
The interviewees from Work and Income identified three technical functions they 
are expected to undertake: 
(i) Getting People into Work; 
(ii) Managing Clients; and  
(iii) Paying People‟s Benefits.   
These functions closely reflect the official functions defined in the governing 
legislation and formal accountability documents.  Their relative importance at the 
three organisational levels is shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.4. 
 
Interviewees from all three organisational levels recognised Getting People into 
Work as a key function of Work and Income.  Its importance was conveyed by two 
Regional Commissioners in the following terms:   
[O]ur core function is to help and assist people to find employment, gain 
employment, through a range of different means wherever possible.  (WI regional 9)   
 
[O]ur strategic long term goal, if you wanted to refine it down to one particular thing 
that we actually do is to help people find sustainable long term employment.  (WI 
regional 3)   
 
At the local level, a Service Centre Manager conveyed a similar view but explained 
how the focus has broadened from targeted reductions in the number of people on 
the centre‟s unemployment register to embrace people receiving other benefits.   
That‟s our main focus here, to put people in employment; and it‟s not just from the 
unemployment register now, it‟s about looking at people who want to work from the 
domestic purposes benefit, sickness benefit, and the invalids‟ benefit.  Some …  
people may be only able to work part time; that‟s their call but we can still sort that 
out for them.  It‟s about putting people into work and keeping people in work.  (WI 
local 2) 
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More simply, a local staff member stated: 
I‟m a work broker so I‟m out talking to employers about opportunities for the 
unemployed, then list vacancies and try and locate the best person we‟ve got on our 
register for the positions we‟ve got available.  (WI local 10)   
 
However, as a national office manager explained, this function extends beyond 
putting people into, and keeping them in, employment.  (S)he said it could be 
regarded as “social investment” and explained:   
People say why do you focus so much on unemployment?  That‟s the reason; 
because it adds stability to the family and it gives people a far better feeling about 
themselves.  Maybe they won‟t hit their kids as much, or whatever.  (WI national 6)   
The same perspective is reflected in the function Managing Clients which is 
particularly important to local level interviewees.  A local Service Centre Manager 
described the role of his/her team as providing clients with income support and/or 
assistance in gaining employment:  
… so they can survive, get an income, and then we can work with them positively to 
make a difference in their lives.  Connect them with those agencies, put them back 
into work, give them some value, and things.  (WI local 8)   
Commenting on the change in the role of local Work and Income staff, another 
Service Centre Manager stated: 
Once upon a time … you were just a case manager sitting at your desk, delivering 
benefit.  And when they walked out the door, they walked out the door; and when 
they cancelled the benefit, they cancelled it and that‟s good, that‟s gone.  Now you 
become quite involved and a lot of the staff enjoy it.  (WI local 1)   
The enjoyment of staff members is reflected in a local level interviewee‟s 
description of working with clients:  
… I‟ve got some clients that, I‟ve been here since 2003, that are still my clients.  So I 
know lots and lots and lots about their lives and where they are at and what they are 
doing.  Working with them for that length of time you get to know what they need 
and what you can do best to help them. … If I wasn‟t helping anybody and all I was 
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here for was just to dish out money, I wouldn‟t be here to be quite honest.  (WI local 
5)   
 
A local level Service Centre Manager noted that this broader approach to 
managing clients requires front line staff to possess a different skill set.  (S)he 
explained: 
Previously it was about making sure that they could type and capture all that 
information whereas now it‟s: can these people have a conversation?  Can they get 
the information that we need?  Yes, you still need to be able to type to put it all in 
but you‟ve got to be able to have a conversation with the person and ask the right 
questions to get that information out. … You‟re looking for a very different … person 
than you would have been, I don‟t know, five or ten years ago.  (WI local 4) 
 
The function Managing Clients was also mentioned at the regional level where a 
Regional Commissioner described how an “outcomes approach” has empowered 
local Case Managers to adopt a broader focus.  (S)he suggested:  
[W]hat our … more outcomes approach has done [to] the way that case managers 
work is that they think of themselves as more [of] a broker, more of somebody 
who‟s interested in what‟s going to happen to this client after they leave us.  (WI 
regional 3) 
(S)he provided a powerful example of the broader approach to client management 
by relating the story of a client who had erroneously been fined for an offence 
they did not commit.  (S)he reported: 
[E]ffectively [the client] tried as much as possible to explain to people at the Court 
that they‟re not this person, this is not their debt, they shouldn‟t have to pay it.  But 
they didn‟t know any more how to deal with it so they just gave up and said its 
easier, it‟s only ten dollars a week, I‟ll just give up I can‟t be bothered.  (WI regional 
3)   
However, a Case Manager was able to intervene, explain the error to the Court 
and gain the client a refund of the monies already paid.   
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The function Paying People‟s Benefits, like Getting People into Work, is probably 
seen by the general public as a key function of Work and Income.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that it was mentioned by interviewees at all three levels of 
the agency.  A senior national office manager explained the function in terms of 
administering the Social Security Act 1964,  
 … which is paying out benefits, if you like, in a timely and accurate manner and to 
the right people.  (WI national 7)   
A regional level manager described paying people‟s benefits in rather broader 
terms.  (S)he explained: 
[I]ncome support is a safety net, social safety net, for a range of New Zealanders 
really … that includes people who are looking for work, those people who have sole 
parent obligations, who are sick or have disabilities, and also those who are in 
retirement.  (WI regional 9)   
A similar idea was conveyed by a local Service Centre Manager who noted that by 
paying income support, “we give them a financial base to work from” (WI local 8).   
 
6.3.3 Summary: Functions of Work and Income 
In terms of the organisational types proposed by Wilson (1989) and discussed in 
Chapter 1, the core functions of Work and Income (i.e. paying benefits and placing 
people into employment) have been characterised as belonging to a “production” 
organisation (Gregory, 1995a) on the basis that the work and activities of staff 
and the results of that work are both observable.  However, the emphasis placed 
on Social Development, Managing Broader Social Issues and Managing Clients by 
interviewees at all levels of the organisation suggests that Work and Income is 
more correctly characterised as a “procedural” organisation in which, while much 
of the work can be observed, little of the results can be, at least directly, 
observed.   
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As noted above and in the comparison between official and in use functions shown 
in Figure 6.5 below, the official functions of Work and Income, as contained in the 
Ministry of Social Development‟s key accountability documents, focus on four main 
functions.  However, the in use functions described by interviewees from Work and 
Income represent a much broader mandate than those espoused in its formal 
accountability documents and embodied in the common view that it is an agency 
responsible simply for paying benefits and placing people into employment.   
 
The Ministry‟s 2006 Statement of Intent noted the need for these functions to be 
undertaken with a shift in focus “from a transactional approach to one of achieving 
outcomes” (MSD 2006, p.21).  The longer term focus on client wellbeing and 
broader social issues reported by the interviewees suggests that Work and Income 
has, in large part, achieved that.  In so doing interviewees also indicated that they 
are seeking to go beyond the strict mandate of the external accountability 
documents.   
 
In relation to the „stewardship‟ functions of managing Work and Incomes capacity 
and capability, discussed above and in Chapter 2, the function Managing the 
Organisation, which encapsulates notions of stewardship, was mentioned by 
interviewees at all three organisational levels and was particularly important at 
national and regional level managers.   
 
In terms of the different organisational levels of Work and Income, as shown in 
Figure 6.2 local level interviewees principally focus on service delivery functions 
but this does not simply equate to a concern with the management of processes 
and inputs.  The emphasis at the local level on Managing Clients extends beyond 
paying people‟s benefits or placing them in employment.  It embraces a broad 
concern with managing client related outcomes in terms of their own and their 
families‟ long term wellbeing.   
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Figure 6.5: Official and In Use Functions of Work and Income 
Official Functions In Use Functions 
Services to minimise the duration of 
unemployment and move people into work 
Getting people into work  
Managing employer relationships & 
opportunities 
Services to provide benefit entitlement and 
obligations to working age beneficiaries and 
to promote self sufficiency 
Service to seniors 
Paying people‟s benefits 
Managing providers 
 Managing clients 
 Managing external accountabilities 
Managing the agency‟s capacity and 
capability 
Managing the organisation 
Providing social development leadership, 
including support of cross-sectoral 
government 
Managing joined up government & 
community 
Managing local community issues and risk 
Social development leadership 
 
Managing social development 
Managing broader social issues 
 
Similarly, regional level interviewees did not represent the middle level managers 
described by Kanter and Summers (1994) who focus principally on process and 
outputs.  Regional level interviewees in Work and Income principally identified 
institutional functions associated with Managing the Organisation and managing 
cooperative and productive relationships with other agencies and community 
organisations.  Nor did national level interviewees (at Mintzberg‟s (1996) 
“strategic apex”) entirely reflect the expected concern with longer term issues and 
the management of the political interface with Government and other 
organisations, as as they also reported significant concerns with operational 
management and service delivery functions.   
 
As discussed further in Chapter 9, Work and Income interacts with, and therefore 
is subject to sensegiving from, a broad range of external stakeholders.  
Nonetheless, it also appears to have a significant amount of „operational freedom‟.  
This plausibly reflects, in a period of economic growth and declining 
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unemployment (as existed during the period of the interviews), a decline in the 
political salience and sensitivity of the agency‟s core functions.  It also is facilitated 
by a shift to the more complex function of Managing Social Development which, as 
the interviewees pointed out, is not easily defined and discussed in the broader 
external environment of the media and general public.   
 
6.4 The Department of Corrections 
 
The Public Prisons Service and the Community Probation Service are the principal 
operational divisions of the New Zealand Department of Corrections.  The main 
functions of the Department (and therefore of the two agencies) are set out in:  
(i) the Corrections Act 2004, ss. 5-6,  
(ii) the Government‟s Estimates of Appropriations documentation, and 
(iii) the Department‟s key accountability documents (the Statement of 
Intent, Output Plan and Annual Report).   
 
Section 5 of the Corrections Act 2004 defines the following purposes of the 
corrections system: 
(a) ensuring that the community-based sentences, sentences of home 
detention, and custodial sentences and related orders that are imposed by 
the courts and the New Zealand Parole Board are administered in a safe, 
secure and humane, and effective manner; and  
(b) providing for corrections facilities to be operated in accordance with rules 
set out in this Act and regulations that are made under this Act ; and 
(c) assisting in the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the 
community, where appropriate, and so far as is reasonable and practical in 
the circumstances and within the resources available, through the provision 
of programmes and other interventions; and 
(d) providing information to the courts and the New Zealand Parole Board to 
assist them in decision-making.   
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In further setting out the principles which govern how the corrections system 
operates, section 6 (1) (a) of the Corrections Act 2004 states: 
[T]he maintenance of public safety is the paramount consideration in decisions about 
the management of persons under control or supervision.   
 
The Government‟s Estimates documentation and the Department‟s 2006 
Statement of Intent identify two high level outcomes to which Corrections 
contributes.  Firstly, Protecting the Public (which accounts for eighty five percent 
of the Department‟s output costs) involves: 
 providing a safe environment for staff and the public; 
 managing offenders in a safe, secure and humane manner; 
 ensuring appropriate compliance with, and administration of, 
sentences and orders; 
 providing information to the judiciary to inform the sentencing 
process and release conditions; and  
 supporting reparation to the community (Corrections, 2006b, p16).     
 
Secondly, the outcome Reducing Re-offending concerns changing offender 
behaviour by providing targeted rehabilitative and reintegrative initiatives.  Such 
initiatives require the provision of,  
 a risk and needs assessment for each offender to determine how best 
to address their offending behaviour; 
 programmes to encourage offenders to address their offending 
behaviour; 
 education, training and work experience to assist offenders to secure 
employment upon their release; and 
 assistance with accessing community services (Corrections, 2006b, 
p16).   
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In relation to the ownership role of the Minister of Corrections and the „stewardship‟ 
functions of the agency‟s managers, discussed in Chapter 2 and above in connection 
with Work and Income, one of the four themes of the Department‟s 2003-2008 
Strategic Business Plan is Enhancing Capability and Capacity.  Unlike Work and 
Income, this theme is analysed in some detail in the Department‟s 2006/2007 
Statement of Intent which defines four related strategies, namely: 
 develop the capability and capacity of staff and managers; 
 provide and increasingly safe and healthy work environment; 
 continue to develop information management processes that support the 
Department‟s business; and  
 provide facilities to meet projected demand.   
The 2006/2007 Statement of Intent also provides details of a range of initiatives in 
respect of each of these strategies.  The Department‟s 2006/2007 Annual report 
additionally states: 
The capacity of Corrections‟ structures, people, leadership and training, culture, staff 
recruitment and retention strategies, information technology, and physical assets are 
all critical to its ability to contribute effectively to achieving its outcomes.  
(Corrections 2007, p. 31) 
In this respect the report explains a range of achievements during 2006-2007 
which include: 
 a major review of the Department‟s head office organisational structure to 
realign functions and introduce a shared services model for support 
services;  
 a major recruitment and training initiative for Probations Officers and 
additional staff to implement a new home detention sentence and new 
community-based sentences of intensive supervision and community 
detention, that were introduced under the Effective Interventions 
programme from October 2007; 
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 the use of external assistance and the establishment of a national Internal 
Investigations Team to respond to claims about staff corruption and issues 
of integrity (Corrections 2007).   
 
As noted above, the principal operational arms of the Department of Corrections 
are the Public Prisons Service and The Community Probation Service; the functions 
of each of these agencies are considered below.   
 
6.5 The Public Prisons Service  
 
6.5.1 Official Functions of Public Prisons  
In the 2006/2007 fiscal year Public Prisons was responsible for nineteen prisons 
located between Northland and Invercargill which together accommodated an 
average of 1,633 remand prisoners and 5,898 sentenced prisoners (Corrections, 
2007).  Public Prisons contributes to the Departments‟ two outcomes Protecting 
the Public and Reducing Re-offending which, as is shown in Figure 6.6 below, are 
the primary focus of the functions described in the Corrections Act 2004, the 
Government‟s 2006/2007 Estimates documentation and the agency‟s own external 
accountability documents.   
 
As is the case with Work and Income, the ownership/stewardship function of 
managing organisational capacity and capability is mentioned in both the 
Estimates documentation and in the Department of Correction‟s Statement of 
Intent and Annual Report.  Collaboration with other agencies is only specifically 
mentioned in the Department‟s Statement of Intent and Annual Report.   
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Figure 6.6: Public Prisons Official Functions 
 Service Delivery (Purchase 
Perspective) 
Stewardship (Ownership 
Perspective) 
Legislation Ensuring that custodial sentences and 
related orders that are imposed by 
the courts and the New Zealand 
Parole Board are administered in a 
safe, secure and humane, and 
effective manner. 
Providing for corrections facilities to 
be operated in accordance with rules 
set out in this Act and regulations 
that are made under this Act. 
Assisting in the rehabilitation of 
offenders and their reintegration into 
the community … through the 
provision of programmes and other 
interventions. 
Providing information to the courts 
and the New Zealand Parole Board to 
assist them in decision-making. 
 
Government 
Estimates 
Custodial services, the provision of 
facilities and administering sentences 
of imprisonment.  
Custodial remand services and 
provision of services to hold people 
charged with offences and offenders 
convicted but not yet sentenced. 
Transportation of prisoners to and 
from court and their custody while at 
court. 
Provision of pre-release reports to the 
New Zealand parole board. 
Prisoner employment and training. 
Rehabilitative and reintegration 
programmes and services. 
Maintaining existing physical 
infrastructure and strengthening 
the skills of staff. 
 
Departmental 
Statement of 
Intent and 
Annual Report 
Custody of remand prisoners. 
Provision of custodial services. 
Provision of escort and custodial 
supervision at court. 
Prisoner employment in facilities 
within the prison environment and 
also on release to work schemes. 
Provision of a range of rehabilitative 
and reintegration programmes and 
services.  
Provision of pre-release information 
and advice to the New Zealand Parole 
Board. 
Enhancing capability and 
capacity. 
Collaboration with other 
agencies. 
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6.5.2 Interview Findings Related to Functions of Public Prisons 
As may be seen from Figures 6.2 and 6.7, comments by interviewees from all 
three organisational levels within Public Prisons in respect of function principally 
focused on the service delivery functions of:  
(i) managing safe secure and humane confinement, and 
(ii) the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders.   
However, as is noted below, comments by local level interviewees that related to 
rehabilitation and reintegration were less positive than those made by 
interviewees at regional and national levels.  Further unlike their national and 
regional level counterparts, local level interviewees placed significant emphasis on 
managing due process.   
Figure 6.7: Functions of Public Prisons Identified by Interviewees 
Grouped by Level in the Organisational Hierarchy 
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Organisational Functions of Public Prisons 
As shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.7, interviewees from the Public Prisons Service 
identified three organisational functions, namely: 
(i) Managing the Organisation; 
(ii) Managing External Accountabilities; 
(iii) Managing Individual (Staff) Performance; and 
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Two of these [(i) and (ii)] were also identified by interviewees from Work and 
Income, but Managing Individual (Staff) Performance was not directly referred to 
by interviewees from that agency.   
 
As noted in relation to Work and Income, the function of Managing the 
Organisation reflects the stewardship responsibilities described above and, in 
particular, is concerned with developing and communicating strategy and 
facilitating the provision of the required organisational capability and capacity.  In 
relation to this function, interviewees from Public Prisons at both the national and 
local level focused principally on the issue of attracting and retaining suitable staff.  
A senior national office manager, for example, explained:  
In terms of staff we struggle to recruit people at an appropriate level who really 
could do the job well.  We get some really good people but we get some dunces too 
and, I guess, the worse our public reputation is the harder it‟s going to be to attract 
good staff.  So that‟s one part of that leg; the other is that Prisons is actually quite a 
complex business and it needs good competent managers and good competent 
leaders.  We‟re not well dressed in that area; we have some really good managers 
and leaders but again some who just don‟t come up to scratch and we need to 
manage that big time.  (PP national 5) 
Similarly at the local level a Unit Manager35
 
noted: 
 … staff is probably your big issue.  It‟s like being a parent because you cannot 
expect a child to behave in a particular fashion if they have never been shown how 
to; so we have to role model on a regular basis.  However, you cannot assume that 
they are going to behave in an appropriate fashion; … They may not be the most 
appropriate staff that should be coming in off the street.  They are coming in, 
perhaps, with a misunderstanding of what they‟re coming in for.  (PP local 10)   
 
A number of Unit Managers also commented on the problems associated with staff 
shortages and turnover.  In the words of one of these interviewees:  
                                               
35 Within a prison a Unit Manager is responsible for a group of cells, usually containing between 20 and 25 inmates.   
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[A]s we have quite new staff, it‟s a continual roundabout of getting your staff up to 
grips with [the job] because from here they move on to somewhere else. So we are 
continually training to get people up so that we can keep looking like we are working 
on sentence management; so we can get our ICRs [internal control reports] looking 
good.  (PP local 10)   
Another Unit Manager suggested that, as a consequence of staff turnover, some 
staff are acting in more senior roles for which they are not adequately qualified:  
[W]e‟ve got PCOs36 that operate under us but the quality of some of those PCOs is ‒  
they‟re really COs being moved up to act in that position so they‟re still learning the 
processes they need to know. … Some guys are running before they‟ve learnt to 
walk, type of thing.  In theory they‟re good but in practicalities they‟re not so flash.  
(PP local 9) 
 
On the subject of staff development, a national office manager referred to Public 
Prison‟s “very important role as an employer” stating:  
We are an employer of almost four thousand people; we‟re a significant national 
employer.  And so there‟s a set of criteria around good performance for being a good 
employer which is about being able to attract and retain good quality staff, paying 
attention to things like their training and development, the evidence around that in 
terms of the proportion of our spend on training and the evidence that training 
actually happens.  (PP national 3)   
However, although a local Unit Manager acknowledged that (s)he had received 
formal “Manager in Corrections” training, (s)he did not believe it had helped 
him/her.  Rather (s)he said:  
We have to rely on solely the experience that we have gained and the experience 
that we bring with us … the rest of it we have to learn as we go.  (PP local 2)   
Also a local Prison Manager reported,  
The major issues that I have to manage are [the result of] the way my managers are 
managing their staff, or not managing their staff.  (PP local 4)   
 
                                               
36 PCO = Principal Corrections Officer; CO = Corrections Officer 
 186 
At the time of the empirical research (2008), a major project had been introduced 
at one prison in an attempt to change the local organisational culture.  It had been 
implemented primarily in response to concerns about the frequency with which 
prison officers were resorting to the use of force.  Whilst the project was strongly 
supported by the Regional and Prison Managers, a number of local Unit Managers 
complained about the incremental demands on their time resulting from this 
project.  In the words of one Unit Manager: 
Then on top of that we have two hundred meetings a day! [laughter]  Because of the 
amount of development going on in here, development work streams, the [prison] 
development plan, there‟s just a lot happening.  I‟m a pod37 manager so we‟ve got a 
work stream down there about changing the environment in the pod.  There‟s a lot 
happening down there at the moment so we‟re constantly having meetings.  (PP local 
9) 
 
As may be seen from Figure 6.2, in Public Prisons, unlike in Work and Income, the 
function Managing External Accountabilities appears to be significant at the 
national level and, more especially, at the regional level.  This function involves 
providing a broad range of information for purposes of external accountability and 
managing interactions with the media.38  It is reflected in the observations of a 
national office manager who described his/her job as managing “the interface 
between … field operation[s], the wider Department, and government more 
broadly” (PP national 3).  (S)he also noted that, at the national level, the function 
includes Public Prisons‟ contribution to the Department of Correction‟s key 
accountability documents such as the annual Statement of Intent and quarterly 
report to the Minister.   
 
                                               
37   A „pod‟ is a term used to refer to a „unit‟ or separate group of cells.   
38
 The Department of Corrections 2006/2007 Statement of Intent notes, “With high public interest in the 
Department‟s work there will frequently be reactive management of media interest in specific events” 
(Corrections 2006, p.45).   
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This function is also reflected in a Regional Manager‟s speaking engagements in 
which (s)he explains the benefits of providing rehabilitation programmes to 
inmates.  (S)he noted:  
[W]e haven‟t as an organisation been particularly good at spreading the message 
that you‟re paying for this.  Often, if I go out and do some public speaking, I will 
draw some figures around what we are talking about and tell people.  People don‟t 
know that a medium … life of crime costs the country about three and a half million 
[dollars].  A serious life of crime costs about five million dollars.  (PP regional 13) 
However, (s)he also revealed frustration in dealing with the media.  Following a 
number of recent high profile incidents and accusations against staff members in 
2007 and 2008, Public Prisons was the subject of significant media interest.  The 
interviewee observed: 
[W]ell it wrecked my Easter.  I spent all of Easter Monday on the „phone; I was 
trying to drive from Auckland to Wanganui and I ended up having to stop in rural 
New Zealand and do three interviews by „phone.  Then they don‟t publish what you 
say; they just make up their own story.   (PP regional 13)   
In the midst of the interview in which this statement was made the interviewee 
had to answer a telephone call in respect of another media issue.   
 
Although the function of Managing External Accountabilities is not significant at the 
local level, a Unit Manager complained about demands for information: 
[D]riven by our current climate … with so much negativity and investigation work 
going on … we have a lot of … outside agencies like head office and support agencies, 
that want information yesterday that we haven‟t really got so we have to go and 
hunt it.  (PP local 9)   
 
From Figures 6.2 and 6.7 it may be seen that Managing Individual Staff 
Performance is the organisational function that prompted most comment by local 
level interviewees and was also significant for interviewees at the national level.  A 
national level interviewee explained that performance expectations and targets 
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cascade down the agency‟s accountability framework into individual managers‟ 
performance agreements.  However, (s)he noted: 
It kind of works but it kind of doesn‟t as well.  The bit that doesn‟t work, I think, … 
it‟s about having everybody understand why you would do that and how it should 
work.  (PP national 3)   
 
Nevertheless, a description of the formal performance management system by a 
local Unit Manager suggests that the system may be viewed more positively than 
the national manager thinks.  The local manager perceived the system to be:  
… supporting the officers and trying to encourage them to do their levels [i.e. meet 
their performance targets]; to encourage them to expand their horizons.  And, if they 
don‟t perform, then you performance manage them to look at where to from there.  
(PP local 10) 
This interviewee went on to acknowledge that, whilst the system required reviews 
to be undertaken with each staff member on a quarterly basis:  
 … we do mostly half yearly.  We try to get a break in through that half yearly to 
have a catch up but in reality people are coming and going twenty four seven and it 
makes it very difficult to do that.  (PP local 10)  
A less positive view was provided by another Unit Manager who, in terms of 
his/her own performance review noted: “I‟m still waiting to have one done in the 
seven years I‟ve been here” (PP local 9a). Similarly, a somewhat jaundiced 
comment was provided by a Unit Manager who said of his/her own performance 
assessment: “I‟ve got one done but it‟s got other peoples names in it” (PP local 
9b).   
 
A number of local level managers described how they routinely set performance 
targets for their staff.  One described how (s)he had ranking39 staff below him/her 
                                               
39 The quasi-military term „ranking‟ is used to refer to Corrections Officers with supervisory responsibilities who 
report to a Unit Manager.   
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“tasked with measuring the performance of the staff” whilst (s)he managed the 
performance of the ranking staff.  (S)he explained:  
I sit down and attempt to have meetings with my ranking staff on a regular basis.  
Unfortunately it‟s easier said than done.  In those meetings I make it quite clear 
what are my expectations of them; they also have my expectations in writing …  If 
they step outside of my expectations and do not perform then they get pulled back 
into line (PP local 2).   
(S)he also noted that positive recognition might result in a “written letter of 
commendation” or an email, a copy of which would be placed on a staff member‟s 
personal file.   
 
An alternative perspective of Managing Individual Staff Performance was provided 
by a non Public Prisons staff member who was working within one prison and who 
described a quasi-military, command and control management culture in which 
subordinates are shouted at, sworn at, and bullied (PP external 12).  Along similar 
lines a local level manager in another prison talked about “bollocking” lazy staff.  
(S)he asserted:  
You have to be hard on them because the minute you take the soft approach they 
just totally ignore you; you get nothing done.  You need to keep your wits about you 
too, in this line of work.  (PP local 7)    
(S)he went on to say:   
Of course the staff‟s going to hate my guts because I‟m the one with the broomstick. 
… Some of them, if they had a turn acting up in my role then they‟d realise why I do 
that.  But if they haven‟t they just don‟t care; you know, „who cares, why do we have 
to do that?‟  It‟s not about what you want, or what‟s easiest for you; this is the 
process, that is the rule, you will do it that way.  (PP local 7)   
 
The difficulty of managing officers „on the prison floor‟ where, unlike staff within a 
Work and Income office, their activities cannot be routinely seen and monitored, 
was also recognised by a Prison Manager.  (S)he explained:   
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… we‟ve got three staff with sixty prisoners, and staff can‟t keep an eye on that many 
and each other. … [C]orruption‟s a hot topic at the moment and we do have corrupt 
staff here as you do in prisons.  It‟s an easy way to make money and it‟s very hard 
to catch them.  (PP local 4) 
 
Functions Relating to Other Organisations 
The one function relating other organisations mentioned by Public Prisons‟ 
interviewees is Managing Joined Up Government and Community.  This was  
mentioned by interviewees at all three organisational levels and encompasses 
activities associated with building and maintaining relationships with other 
government agencies and community groups.  A national level interviewee 
explained:  
Even inside the prison we‟ve got other agencies in the rehab stuff and the 
reintegration stuff.  Internally we work pretty closely with CPS, CPPS
40
 as it is now, 
and CIE just in terms of providing activity for the prisoners in the case of CIE but 
with CPPS in terms of their going home plan.  But also we‟re working with CYFS, 
Work and Income, Housing New Zealand, all of those other agencies who all need to 
be part of the reintegration plans for each prisoner.  …  Likewise in terms of security 
we need to be working with Police, we need to be working with Immigration ... So I 
think there‟s no way we can function independently anymore and nor would we want 
to.  We‟re all trying to make a better New Zealand at the end of the day.  (PP 
national 5)   
Another national level manager spoke of the importance of Public Prisons‟ role in 
the community saying: 
Part of that is our security role, like letting people know if somebody escapes, but 
part of that is just the role that we play in the community.  The extent to which 
people can come into the prison, the extent to which our staff and managers are 
represented in that community, the kinds of relationships that prison management 
                                               
40 CPPS = the Community Probation and Psychological Service; CIE = Corrections Inmate Employment; CYFS = 
Child, Youth and Family Service.   
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has with Work and Income, or Housing, or any of those people.  So there‟s a whole 
sense of our role in the community.  (PP national 3) 
Locally a Prison Manager expanded on this by explaining his/her attempts to build 
community understanding by speaking to local organisations:  
[W]e went out and spoke to Rotary, Lions people like that and made sure we ticked 
off specific items.  One is release to work – would you take on a prisoner to work?  
Another one was volunteers who come in and [teach] adult reading, one on one ‒  
target that.  And then we target, have you got any community work?  I did that at 
[one] prison and got a local kindergarten that dropped off all their broken desks and 
the guys in our joiners shop, our little work shop, fixed them.  So it‟s tiny, but it‟s 
work and the local kindergarten loved it; it saved them quite a bit of money.  (PP 
local 11) 
 
Operational Management Functions of Public Prisons 
As reflected in Figures 6.2 and 6.6, interviewees from Public Prisons identified 
three operational management functions, namely: 
(i) Managing Broader Social Issues; 
(ii) Managing Outcomes; and 
(iii) Managing Local Community Issues and Risk.   
 
Unlike in Work and Income, operational management functions do not appear to 
be significant in Public Prisons (see Figure 6.2).   Nevertheless, a Regional 
Manager commented on the function Managing Broader Social Issues in the 
following terms:  
[O]ne of the things I believe we miss the bus on in Corrections is we‟ve got a huge 
number of really talented people here who know why people come into our facilities.  
They know what creates the offending but we don‟t do any preventive work.  The 
health organisations do, they get out there in the community, … WINZ41 is starting to 
do it too, we‟re not. … [W]e‟re not tasked with it obviously but to me it seems that 
                                               
41 Although the name is no longer used by the agency in question, a few years previously Work and Income had 
been branded as „WINZ‟ or „Work and Income New Zealand‟.   
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we‟ve got this huge contribution that we could be making.  We do try by having 
people go out and do public speaking, and sometimes with youth groups, and 
sometimes we have kids from schools come and look through our facilities.  But I 
just feel there‟s a lot of skill there that we could be tapping into and putting out there 
in the community to do some of that preventive work.  I find that‟s a sadness.  
Everything we do in Corrections is ambulance at the bottom of the cliff.  (PP regional 
13) 
 
A national level interviewee mentioned the function Managing Outcomes but 
observed that moving to an outcomes focus is difficult given all “the short term 
reactive stuff” that staff have to deal with (PP national 5).  The same interviewee 
also mentioned the function Managing Local Community Issues, noting that 
Regional and local Prison Managers have targets relating to meeting community 
and neighbour responsibilities included in their performance agreements.  (S)he 
observed that this could encompass public speaking engagements as well as 
involvement in local community groups and activities. 
 
Service Delivery Functions of Public Prisons 
As shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.6, service delivery functions were the primary focus 
of comments by Public Prisons interviewees (for all interviewees an average of 
60%, compared to 31% for institutional functions and 9% for managerial 
functions).  They were particularly significant for interviewees at the local level 
(75%).  Five functions were identified: 
(i) Managing Rehabilitation and Reintegration; 
(ii) Managing Safe, Secure and Humane Confinement; 
(iii) Complying with Due Process; 
(iv) Managing Local Operations; and 
(v) Managing Offenders.   
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Managing Rehabilitation and Reintegration was a significant function for 
interviewees from all three organisational levels but particularly for those at a 
regional level.  The term rehabilitation was explained by a national level 
interviewee in the following terms:  
That‟s about providing programmes which will help to rehabilitate prisoners and help 
them move back into the community; and things like drug treatment, violence 
prevention, those kinds of programmes.  (PP national 5)   
Another national level interviewee described it as providing offenders:  
 … with an opportunity to address the issues that caused their offending and … to 
return to their home situation or community better placed in terms of education, 
work, or basic living skills.  (PP national 3)   
 
A regional level interviewee stressed the importance of the rehabilitation and 
reintegration function, noting:   
 … just locking people up certainly wouldn‟t be of any benefit to any society.  So we 
have a huge role to play in rehabilitation and re-integrative services and that‟s an 
endeavour, of course, to reduce re-offending in our society, and particularly among 
this criminal fraternity.  (PP regional 13) 
However, that interviewee also cautioned as to the difficulty of, and required time 
span for, rehabilitation:   
Are our expectations realistic - that if we do put a kid through a number of courses, 
or an adult through a number of courses, even over a two or three year period, we 
can address all of the harm that‟s happened in the twenty years prior to that?  (PP 
regional 13)  
Despite this view, (s)he believed: 
 … you couldn‟t do this job if you didn‟t think that you can make a difference and 
people can change.  (PP regional 13)
42
 
 
                                               
42 A parallel may be drawn with the comment from a Work and Income Case Manager noted above, “If I wasn‟t 
helping anybody and all I was here for was just to dish out money, I wouldn‟t be here to be quite honest”  (WI 
local 5). 
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A national level interviewee expressed the opinion that prison officers have a key 
role in modelling appropriate behaviour.  (S)he said: 
[C]orrections officers are the people that prisoners see most; they‟re there twenty 
four seven.  So, if there is any group that is going to be able to influence [them] by 
its behaviour, it‟s going to be that group.  (PP national 3) 
A local level Unit Manager made a similar observation:  
We train our staff, and we continually talk at staff meetings, about active 
management, working with the prisoners, talking with them one-on-one, trying to 
exert influence, trying to just give them the bigger picture.  It‟s just, as I say, active 
management and that‟s part of the job of a prison officer nowadays.  (PP local 9)   
 
Nonetheless, local level interviewees were not enthusiastic about the likely success 
of rehabilitation efforts.  The view of a number of these interviewees is reflected in 
the following statement by a Unit Manager:  
Rehabilitation, yes that is one of our goals, but it has to be balanced with the reality.  
If you‟ve got a person who has come back into jail after their fourth and fifth time of 
committing a crime, whether it be drink driving or hurting someone again ‒  
someone has to hit rock bottom before they are going to decide to change their life.  
(PP local 10) 
 
Other local level interviewees considered that the ability of prison officers to 
influence offenders‟ behaviour is made difficult by the role that officers are 
required to play and the limited skill sets they possess.  This was highlighted by a 
Unit Manager when talking about performance targets: 
[A] lot of … things are geared around staff having the ability to address the prisoner‟s 
re-offending.  A lot of our actions that they are required to do [to address re-
offending] are viewed as a negative by prisoners so they‟ve got an added task of 
trying to convince them [prisoners] that this is good for them.  So that‟s another 
hindrance that they [prison officers] have in meeting compliance with performance.  
(PP local 9b) 
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The limitation of Prison Officers‟ skills was noted by another Unit Manager who 
explained:   
A lot of what‟s required for the rehabilitation side of it is outside services coming in.  
We don‟t specialise in that; I believe you have to have more of a psychologist‟s 
background if you want to change people‟s way of thinking.  Our staff … some of the 
staff we‟ve got, I wouldn‟t even contemplate going near that area. … I think if you‟re 
going to convince people they need to change, you need specialist people that can do 
it.  (PP local 9a) 
 
Further it seems that, in the view of some of the local level interviewees, 
experienced prisoners have learnt how to „manipulate the system‟.  One of these 
interviewees observed:   
[I]f you get a prisoner that comes to jail and they say, “yes I want to change, I want 
all these programs, give me all these programs”, in my opinion ninety nine percent of 
the time they are prisoners who‟ve been through the system before.  They know 
what they need to say and what they need to do for reflecting well when they go to 
the Parole Board.  They know how to manipulate the system and other people will 
tell you the system can‟t be manipulated; these people are experts at it.  That‟s why 
they are in jail.  (PP local 2) 
Nevertheless, a local level Principal Corrections Officer pointed to the difficulty of 
filling places in an arduous, six month, Drug Treatment Programme.  In respect of 
the twenty bed unit (s)he explained:   
We‟ll be lucky to start off with say fifteen in a group, the first intake.  Gradually 
because it‟s a six month programme those numbers will reduce because often they‟ll 
be chucked out for misbehaviour or they become positive for drug tests.  By the end 
of the course we‟ll probably have two that‟s completed the course.  (PP local 7) 
 
Although identified as part of the same function as rehabilitation, the interviewees 
perceived reintegration to be different in nature.  As a national level interviewee 
explained:   
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[B]ecause some of these people are with us for quite a long time it‟s really important 
that we prepare them to move back into society.  Just in terms of the world‟s moved 
on in ten years while you‟ve been here and there are things other than TV‟s out there 
now.  But as well as that, what are you doing about thinking about accommodation?  
How are you going to become part of your family again?  Things like that.  (PP 
national 5) 
A local level Prison Manager explained that reintegration is currently being given 
greater emphasis and that a specialist „Reintegration Team‟, involving staff from 
other agencies such as Work and Income, has been established:  
[F]or years we did all we could [for prisoners] till we waved them goodbye at the 
door.  We didn‟t know what happened to them for so many years until they came 
back to jail.  But they‟d have to go out and find accommodation, make sure they had 
a job, make sure that there‟s some support out there.  (PP local 11).   
However, a local level Principal Corrections officer commented that, although the 
introduction of reintegration services is viewed by Corrections staff “as a huge 
benefit to the prisoners”, because of the work involved in arranging temporary 
release excursions for prisoners prior to their final release, “case officers see this 
as a whole lot of work, paperwork” (PP local 7).   
 
The function Managing Safe, Secure and Humane Confinement is another 
important function for interviewees from all three organisational levels in Public 
Prisons but particularly for those at the national level.  The function was explained 
by a national level interviewee in the following terms:   
I guess there are several legs to Public Prisons.  The first, obviously, is to keep the 
public safe; and that‟s in terms of the incarceration of prisoners and making sure 
they can‟t escape; but also making sure that the prisoners are kept safe as well; so 
safety of the public, safety of the prisoners.  (PP national 5) 
(S)he suggested that this is seen as Public Prisons‟ sole role, both by the general 
public and by many in the agency itself, but noted that from his/her experience as 
a Prison Manager it was possible to broaden this view:   
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[T]he traditional culture was that prisons are there to lock people up.  Prison officers 
are just turnkeys; they unlock the door in the morning and they lock it back up at 
night and that‟s all they do.  But over a few years we were able to raise the 
expectations of our managers, or for our managers, so they started to raise the 
expectations of staff and we quite successfully changed the culture.  (PP national 5) 
Nevertheless, Managing Safe, Secure and Humane Confinement appeared to 
remain as a priority throughout the organisation.  Another national manager 
explained: 
We get into more trouble if they get their core security stuff wrong than if they get 
the other stuff wrong.  (PP national 3)   
Similarly a Regional manager stated:  
[E]ssentially the Public Prison‟s role is to provide for the safe, secure, and humane 
containment of offenders. (PP regional 13) 
And a local level interviewee noted his/her key focus to be: 
Purely just to maintain prisoners in a safe environment both for them and for staff; 
and that‟s all we are doing at this moment in time I feel.  (PP local 6) 
 
Local level interviewees also conveyed the difficulties they face in trying to 
broaden safe and secure confinement into something more humane and 
constructive.  In the words of two of these interviewees:   
It would be absolutely weird to get out of here without being yelled at and screamed 
at and abused.  And that‟s what we have to live with on a daily basis so, you know, 
to think that you are really a social worker, to change these poor misunderstoods 
around is not going to happen; and I think that‟s quite difficult for some people to 
get to grips with.  (PP local 10) 
 
[I]t seems to me that, at the moment, we put the prisoner, who is our key focus, 
almost our key stakeholder, on the backburner and that we are just here to give 
society a break from these criminals.  We are not providing reintegration skills, 
constructive regime, or activity for guys.  (PP local 1) 
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To some extent, these views reflect those expressed, particularly by local level 
interviewees, in respect of the function Managing Offenders.  For example, a local 
level Prison Manager explained that working with offenders: 
 … has to be tempered with the reality of the job. … We can‟t afford to have officers 
who are social workers and social workers alone.  (PP local 11) 
That interviewee explained how Managing Offenders initially involves an 
assessment and development of a sentence plan:   
[P]retty much soon after they get inside, they are interviewed by a Sentence 
Planner.  That Sentence Planner will go through and check their history and work out 
with the prisoner what their needs are.  If the guy is an alcoholic then there‟s a drug 
treatment part of the person‟s programme.  If he steals because he‟s broke all the 
time then it might be a budget thing.  Anger problem ‒  you need to go on an anger 
management course.  (PP local 11) 
A local level Unit Manager further explained how it is necessary for him/her to:  
… read all their files and find out their background and make sure that the future 
they have in here is as safe for them, as well as the staff, as possible.  (PP local 10) 
Another local level interviewee commented:  
[W]e get this plan from the sentence planners; and what I do is go through that to 
ensure that this can be achieved here, at this particular prison; and if not, I‟ll forward 
it to the case officer to review the plan.  Like, de-activate an activity [that] can‟t be 
achieved here.  So what we do is enter an activity that can be achieved here.  (PP 
local 7) 
 
The subsequent management of inmates was described by local level interviewees 
as a function of “continually monitoring them and ensuring the safety and security 
aspect of being inside a jail” (PP local 10) and as a process of “getting them 
basically into a routine, having their day structured” (PP local 7).43  This latter 
interviewee also explained that each Corrections Officer is assigned about five or 
six prisoners for whom they become the case officer.  Each week they are:   
                                               
43 The Department‟s 2006/2007 Annual Report states: “a stable social environment within prisons helps to motivate 
prisoners to comply with the restrictions of their sentence” (Corrections 2007, p.11).   
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 … required to have a progress meeting with the inmate to find out how the inmate is 
doing with the activities on that [sentence] plan.  (PP local 7) 
However, that interviewee also noted that the inmates are: 
 … always playing games with you.  They‟ll show their true colours to the [prison] 
staff because they‟re face-to-face with the inmates.  So it‟s full on all the time.  
Whereas with external people that don‟t actually work in the wing, they‟ll come in 
and all they‟ll hear is the inmate [say] “please miss can you help me”.  A lot of 
people get sucked into that.  They get drawn into their world.  So if anyone can tell 
you about an inmate it will be a corrections officer.  (PP local 7) 
This interviewee also observed that managing change in offenders‟ behaviour, or 
getting them to the point when they are prepared to consider changing their 
behaviour through participating in a programme, may take many months if not 
years.  As a consequence, short term prisoners tend to be more difficult to 
manage, both for themselves and in the context of the rest of the unit:   
At the moment we are getting a lot of short serving prisoners who are serving three, 
let‟s say six months.  We get so many of those and they give us more problem than 
long term inmates because … they have this attitude, “who gives a shit; we‟ll come in 
here and cause trouble because I‟ll get released in a couple of months”.  They are 
more of a concern for the staff; they create more problems.  (PP local 7) 
 
Managing the problematic behaviour of prisoners can, at times, necessitate direct 
intervention and the use of force.  A local level Unit Manager explained how 
pressures can build up within a prison unit and if prisoners:  
 … don‟t like what they‟re hearing we come back to the use of force which has been a 
problem when they become non-compliant.  Or we have … what we call „non vol 
[voluntary] segregation‟ … till they can pull their heads in and behave. (PP local 9) 
An external person working in the prison environment explained that the use of 
force and application of control and restraint (C&R) techniques are the subject of 
one week of a six week initial training programme for corrections officers who are 
also required to be re-certified each year.  This interviewee explained:    
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They have a special C&R team which has highly prestigious membership; and then 
you have an advanced C&R which is … highly prestigious and very highly regarded.  
So the use of force is held up [i.e. assigned some prestige among prison staff] … 
“he‟s a member of the C&R team”.  (PP external 12) 
 
In Public Prisons, unlike the other two case study agencies, Complying with Due 
Process appeared to be an important functional concern of interviewees at the 
local level.  It was also mentioned by a national level interviewee when (s)he was 
referring to the difficulty of linking individual performance agreements for prison 
staff to the agency‟s outputs.  (S)he explained:   
So our performance agreements for individuals at the front line are more about how 
they do their job in terms of their personal style and approach, their ability to act 
with dignity, follow rules, progress their own development in terms of achieving unit 
standards, those kinds of things. … But, of course, a lot of the things we‟re looking at 
there are the reasons people end up getting fired at that level; do they follow the 
rules?  (PP national 3) 
Reflecting similar sentiments, a local level Unit Manager observed: 
Corrections is very much driven by policy and if you step outside of that policy you 
just get slapped, basically.  (PP local 6) 
 
Also at the local level, when explaining various tasks that have to be completed 
and recorded within the Integrated Offender Management System (IOMS) 
computer system within given timeframes, a Unit Manager stated:x “I‟m really 
measured on timeframes and adherence to business rules” (PP local 8).  Those 
rules are contained within the Public Prisons Manual (PPM) which another Unit 
Manager described as:  
 … our bible basically; … If you want to go outside of that you have to put a business 
case forward and then that goes to the Region and you take it from there really.  But 
that‟s a long process.  (PP local 6) 
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Notwithstanding local level interviewees‟ recognition of the importance of the PPM, 
there was some sense of frustration with staff members‟ failure to comply with it.  
This is reflected in the statement of a local manager: 
… people who don‟t understand the policy, or don‟t bother to understand the policy or 
the legislation and do dumb things.  (PP local 4)   
Another local manager explained his/her frustration by saying: 
[P]erformance, at the moment, here is set towards compliance rather than prison 
performance.  It‟s set all about are we ticking the right boxes when we check to see 
if a prisoner is in his cell.  …[W]e loose that element of trust in all this.  There‟s that 
element of micro management all the time. … It makes my job difficult in that I can‟t 
really focus on progression within my unit because I‟m always fire fighting, … I‟m 
always looking [to see] if somebody else has done their job.  (PP local 1) 
 
Another element of Complying With Due Process was highlighted by a local level 
manager who commented on an increased amount of paperwork.  (S)he 
explained: 
If they [prisoners] ask to speak to the PCO [Principal Corrections Officer] they have 
to fill out a form to do that.  That form is then put on to the computer, a receipt 
given to them, and a copy given to the PCO.  The PCO then does his bit, there‟s a 
receipt given to the prisoner and a copy kept with the original, and all of that is then 
filed.  So you could actually have a letter, and the paper that they were given to fill … 
in, then the paper that was put on to the computer, [and] then the PCO‟s copy as 
well.  So you are looking at huge amounts whereas initially it would have just been, 
“hey, can I have this organised”.  (PP local 10)   
Nevertheless, the requirement to capture this data was regarded more positively 
by another local level manager who stated that, in the past:  
 … an incident report would be written for a unit and, unless it needed to be 
progressed, that‟s where it [would remain].  The inspectorate, the Ombudsman, can 
[now] see what‟s happening so we‟ve become quite a fish bowl.  Whereas before we 
had concrete walls and it was quite hard to see in.  So that‟s a positive; I think that‟s 
a good thing, to be truthful.  (PP local 8) 
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The more general function of Managing Local Operations was not mentioned by 
regional and national level interviewees but was a concern to those at the local 
level.  Locally, managing prisons is regarded as a complex and demanding activity 
because, as one interviewee noted, prisons are a “reactive type of environment” 
and “anything can happen on any one day” (PP local 4).  Along similar lines 
another local level interviewee stated: 
It is a very stressful work environment ... Some days it is money for jam because 
everything goes sweetly; but some days you certainly earn your money.  (PP local 8) 
 
According to the interviewees, a key element of Managing Local Operations is 
managing staff resources.  In relation to a staff member being ill, a local Unit 
Manager explained:  
We can‟t live without that person for a day because they‟re all essential shifts. … I 
was on call over the weekend and I was shuffling people around and pinching one 
from there to cover in the morning and then had to go through the crises of covering 
in the afternoon.  So we are chasing our tail the whole the time just because we‟ve 
got a lot of staff on leave.  (PP local 8) 
 
The same interviewee also identified as a major issue the movement of prisoners 
and managing available beds so that inmates can be housed in appropriate 
categories: 
A lot of that is about how many beds have you got spare this week ... It‟s a 
balancing act.  We‟re looking at different categories; so we have remands, 
segregated and mainstream.  Remands can‟t mix with mainstream.  Segregated can‟t 
mix with mainstream.  So we manage our beds as well as the youth unit.  If you‟re 
under seventeen, you must go to the youth unit; it‟s the only place you‟re allowed to 
reside.  Movements are huge for us and it is a juggling act sometimes to manage our 
muster and ensure security and safety all of the time.    (PP local 8) 
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Managing prisoner numbers not only makes logistics difficult; as local level 
interviewees from a prison that had experienced rapid growth explained, it also 
impacts on the local organisational culture.  In the words of one local level 
manager: 
[W]hen we started, I think we had a muster of about three hundred and we had staff 
of about a hundred and thirty.  You knew all the prisoners and you knew all of the 
staff.  Now we‟ve more than doubled that; in both counts the place has got huge.  
The paperwork has just increased tenfold.  The expectations have gone up.  The risks 
have gone up.  (PP local 9) 
Another local level manager reflected on the implications of rapid growth in 
prisoner numbers for staffing:  
[S]ome of the issues we are dealing with now are because we expanded so rapidly 
that we had to employ so many staff so quickly that, I‟m not saying that we 
compromised on our standard, but … in a way I guess we did.  (PP local 8) 
Related to the rapid growth in prisoner numbers is the challenge that it presents 
in terms of providing work for inmates.  A local Prison Manager observed: 
[O]ne of our levels [performance targets] is we should be aiming for sixty percent of 
our prisoners working … So … I need to go out and find some sort of community 
work. … [A]t other places we‟ve looked at Victims Support [for whom] they made 
teddy bears.  In Wellington prison, we got in touch with the local zoo and we‟re 
supplying them with veggies in exchange for their zoodo [animal manure].  Just stuff 
like that which, if it means a job, will help us achieve the sixty percent.  (PP local 11) 
 
6.5.3 Summary: Functions of Public Prisons 
Considering the functions of Public Prisons in the light of the organisational types 
proposed by Wilson (1989), Gregory (1995a) identified prison management as 
belonging in a “procedural” organisation in which the work and activities of staff 
are observable but not their results or outcomes.  This categorisation was 
confirmed by the comments of interviewees from all three organisational levels of 
Public Prisons as they described an environment in which standard operating 
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procedures are pervasive.  The importance of following correct operating 
procedures and adhering to the Public Prisons Manual (referred to as “our bible”) 
was frequently emphasised.   
 
As explained in section 6.5.1, the official functions of the Public Prisons Service 
principally focus on the Department of Corrections‟ two outcomes Protecting the 
Public, through the management of remand and custodial services, and Reducing 
Re-offending, through prisoner employment and release to work schemes and 
the provision of relevant rehabilitative programmes and reintegrative services.  A 
similar focus was reflected in the in use functions identified by interviewees from 
Public Prisons.  However, as shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.8, a broad range of other 
functions was also described.  For local level interviewees in particular, this 
included the technical functions of Complying with Due Process and Managing 
Local Operations.   
Figure 6.8: Official and In Use Functions of Public Prisons 
Official Functions In Use Functions 
Custody of remand prisoners; 
Provision of custodial services; 
Provision of escort and custodial 
supervision 
Managing safe, secure and humane 
confinement 
Managing offenders 
Complying with due process 
Managing local operations 
Prisoner employment in facilities within the 
prison environment and also on release to 
work schemes 
Provision of a range of rehabilitative and 
reintegrative programmes and services 
Managing rehabilitation and reintegration 
Provision of pre-release information and 
advice to the New Zealand Parole Board 
 
Managing capability and capacity Managing external accountabilities 
Managing the organisation 
Managing individual (staff) performance 
 Managing joined up government & 
community 
Managing local community issues and risk 
 Managing outcomes 
Managing broader social issues 
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Interviewees from Public Prisons also identified the stewardship function of 
Managing the Organisation.  Although it received less emphasis than in Work and 
Income, it was mentioned by interviewees at the national and local levels of Public 
Prisons who principally focused on the difficulties of attracting and retaining 
suitable staff.   
 
As was the case with Work and Income, the functions described by interviewees 
from all three organisational levels of Public Prisons did not match the hierarchical 
division of focus suggested by Kanter and Summers (1993) or Mintzberg (1996) 
and described in Chapter 1.  Figure 6.2 illustrates that interviewees from all three 
organisational levels of Public Prisons principally described the functions associated 
with Managing Safe Secure and Humane Confinement and Managing Rehabilitation 
and Reintegration that may be categorised as being concerned with service 
delivery rather than operational or organisational management.  It would therefore 
appear that what managers manage in Public Prisons is more associated with 
technical level processes and outputs than it is with outcomes, as will be discussed 
further in Chapter 9.   
 
The internal de-coupling of the conceptual frameworks used to measure and 
manage performance will also be discussed further in Chapter 9; however, at this 
point the, at times, distinctly different viewpoints in respect of the agency‟s 
functions offered by Public Prisons interviewees at the national and local levels 
should be noted.   
 
A number of interviewees suggested that an irony of Public Prisons lies in the keen 
public interest in the results of its activities being coupled with limited interest or 
understanding of how those activities are undertaken.  The functions of Public 
Prisons are politically salient and of significant interest to the media who, during 
the period of the empirical research, publicised a number of perceived failures by 
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the agency.  As suggested in Chapter 4, the combination of political saliency and 
low perceived task complexity supports a context in which Public Prisons is subject 
to significant external sensegiving and enjoys limited operational freedom.  Its 
strategies and related functions are, therefore, generally constrained to passively 
responding to the workload generated by external factors.   
 
6.6 Community Probation Service 
 
6.6.1 Official Functions of the Community Probation Service 
During the 2006/2007 fiscal year, the Community Probation Service managed 
45,619 community-based sentences and orders (Corrections, 2007) as well as 
providing information and reports to Judges and the New Zealand Parole Board to 
assist them in making sentencing and release decisions.  The Service also referred 
“offenders to motivational and rehabilitative programmes and to reintegrative 
services to help address the needs that contribute to offending” (Corrections 
2006).    
 
As shown in Figure 6.9 below, the focus of the functions described in the 
Corrections Act 2004, the Government‟s 2006/2007 Estimates documentation and 
the agency‟s own external accountability documents is on the management of 
community-based sentences and orders, the provision of rehabilitative and 
reintegrative services and the provision of reports and information to the courts 
and the New Zealand Parole Board.  As is the case with Work and Income and the 
Public Prisons Service, the stewardship function managing organisational capacity 
and capability is mentioned in both the Estimates documentation and in the 
Department of Correction‟s Statement of Intent and Annual Report.  Collaboration 
with other agencies is only specifically mentioned in the Department‟s Statement 
of Intent and Annual Report.   
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Figure 6.9 - Community Probation Service Official Functions 
 Service Delivery (Purchase 
Perspective) 
Stewardship (Ownership 
Perspective) 
Legislation Ensuring that community-based 
sentences, sentences of home 
detention and related orders 
imposed by the courts and the New 
Zealand Parole Board are 
administered in a safe, secure and 
humane, and effective manner. 
Assisting in the rehabilitation of 
offenders and their reintegration into 
the community … through the 
provision of programmes and other 
interventions. 
Providing information to the courts 
and the New Zealand Parole Board to 
assist them in decision-making. 
 
Government 
Estimates 
Management and delivery of 
community-based sentences and 
orders and rehabilitative and 
reintegration programmes and 
services.   
Remand pre-sentence reports, 
reparation reports, same-day 
reports, home detention reports and 
assessments, oral information 
reports, information for extended 
supervision orders, and reports to 
the New Zealand Parole Board 
Maintaining existing physical 
infrastructure and strengthening 
the skills of staff. 
 
Departmental 
Statement of 
Intent and 
Annual Report 
The management of offenders 
sentenced to community based 
supervision; 
The management of offenders 
sentenced to community work; 
Administering Home Detention and 
Parole Orders imposed by the New 
Zealand Parole Board; 
Administering post-release 
conditions for prisoners with short 
sentences (as imposed by the 
judiciary at the time of sentencing); 
Administering Extended Supervision 
Orders (imposed to actively manage 
the long term risks posed by high-
risk child sex offenders in the 
community); and 
The provision of sentencing 
information and advice to the courts.   
Enhancing capability and 
capacity 
Collaboration with other 
agencies 
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6.6.2 Interview Findings Related to Functions of the Community 
Probation Service 
As is reflected in Figure 6.2 and 6.10, in contrast to the Public Prisons Service, 
interviewees from the Community Probation Service (especially those at national 
and regional levels) tend to focus on organisational more than service delivery 
functions.  Nevertheless, as was the case for Public Prisons, the interviewees 
conveyed that service delivery functions are also important at all three 
organisational and especially at the local level.  Also like Public Prisons, operational 
management functions appear to be of minor importance in the Community 
Probation Service.   
 
Comments by interviewees in respect of the functions of the Community Probation 
Service are reported below.  It should be noted that, at the local level, the 
processes of managing community based services are divided between (a) 
Community Work Supervisors, who are responsible for managing offenders 
sentenced to community work, and (b) Probation Officers, who are responsible for 
managing other community-based sentences.   
 
Figure 6.10: Functions of the Community Probation Service Identified by 
Interviewees Grouped by Level in the Organisational Hierarchy 
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Organisational Functions of the Community Probation Service 
As may be seen from Figures 6.2 and 6.10, interviewees from the Community 
Probation Service mentioned three institutional functions, namely: 
(i) Managing the Organisation; 
(ii) Managing External Accountabilities; 
(iii) Managing Individual (Staff) Performance; 
 
From Figures 6.2 and 6.10 it can be seen that Managing the Organisation is a 
function of primary importance for interviewees at all three organisational levels in 
the Community Probation Service.  However, as in Work and Income and Public 
Prisons, this function is particularly significant for national level interviewees.  In 
Community Probations, Managing the Organisation is primarily concerned with 
facilitating and developing the culture of the agency and ensuring the provision of 
the required systems and staff resources.   
 
A national level manager explained that, over the last five years, efforts have been 
made to change the organisational culture.  This has included adjusting to the 
2002 legislative changes44 which replaced a regime of periodic detention with one 
that provides for sentences designed to facilitate reparation to the community.  
The interviewee explained:  
It‟s a fundamental shift and a lot of those Community Work Supervisors can‟t get 
their head around it; won‟t get their head around it some of them.  So we‟ve worked 
quite hard with that part of the workforce. … A few years ago the workforce was 
dominantly social worker and one of the characteristics of the workforce at that time 
was that they wouldn‟t focus on risk; they were more interested in helping people 
who wanted to be helped which are generally the lower level offenders that will help 
themselves; the nicer people, nicer offenders if you can say that.  So they wouldn‟t 
                                               
44 The Sentencing Act 2002 abolished the sentence of periodic detention.  As Newbold (2007, p.269) points out, this 
occurred in part because of the declining number of offenders receiving this sentence, in part because of the rising 
use of imprisonment, and in part because of the use of alternative sanctions such as community service.   
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focus on high risk offenders and neither would they focus on taking enforcement 
action against offenders not complying with their sentence.  (CP national 7) 
(S)he stated that the agency‟s response has been “to widen the recruitment pool”; 
social workers can still be included but “they come in on the understanding that 
they are to be probation officers not social workers” (CP national 7).    
 
At the regional level, a manager also described his/her efforts to change the 
organisational culture and develop “a learning organisation”.  (S)he explained:  
We are trying to get into the more proactive end of things … become more forward 
focused, actually look to the successes rather than a lot of what we get caught up in 
which … is the kind of failure end of the business.  Our staff have repeatedly said to 
us we drive this kind of blame culture which we are trying to turn around and say 
there are successes but you have to show them to us by operating in certain ways.  
(CP regional 1a) 
Another Regional Manager described how (s)he wants to build a “culture of 
inclusiveness” in which staff could say “this is what I‟ve done to contribute to the 
community”.  (S)he noted:  
I want people to believe that the structures that we actually put in place, our policies 
and procedures, are things that they believe in and that they will actually deliver on.  
So there‟s a massive culture of ownership which we‟ve yet to achieve.  I believe that 
if we had ownership, quality indicators would follow; and there‟s no point in fighting 
for quality unless people believe that what you are actually asking them to do makes 
a difference.  (CP regional 1b)   
Local level interviewees also referred to attempts to change the 
organisational culture.  For example, an Area Manager asserted:   
I want to build a workplace … where people are feeling satisfied in their work.  People 
are very clear about their purpose [for] coming to work and what they‟re trying to 
achieve here.  And people feel that, if there are issues, they can get them resolved, 
or at least they can get some conclusion to it whether or not it can be resolved [in] 
the way they want it to.  There is some sense of process and there is some sense of 
they have a voice as well within the organisation.  (CP local 4) 
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Another element of Managing the Organisation identified by Community Probation 
Service interviewees is that of securing adequate resources.  In relation to staff 
resources a senior national level interviewee described a strategy to “drop the 
average age level” of the workforce.  (S)he explained: 
 … managers have thought they couldn‟t employ anybody in their twenties to do 
probation work, which is not our preference.  What we are finding, of course, is if you 
only employ people in their thirties and … forties and upwards, they have generally 
by that stage in their careers fixed their views on how they see the world and what 
they will and won‟t do.  So … picking them up and re-training them to the way we 
want the job done is actually harder than it is for a twenty five or twenty six year old 
who hasn‟t formed those views yet.  (CP national 7) 
 
Considering managing resources more generally, a regional level interviewee 
noted:   
[O]ur role is really overseeing that the structures and the resources and the 
management of all those operations happen. … [However, we] don‟t know, from a 
supply and demand model, where our demand will come [from].  We don‟t know that 
one … team will suddenly get a massive explosion of offenders arriving at their door 
that they can‟t possibly manage.  So it has to be by area, by region, by organisation.  
(CP regional 1a) 
 
Resource issues are also a concern for local level interviewees.  For example, an 
Area Manager explained:   
A lot of my role is much more about resourcing.  I‟ve got four new building projects 
on at the moment.  So that‟s being involved in the design and commissioning of new 
buildings, new service centres and so on, resource requests for funding, business 
cases; doing a soft fit-out of one of our current buildings in terms of working out the 
requirements; looking at our volumes in terms of how they track against our staffing 
numbers.  (CP local 4) 
Along related lines another Area Manager observed:  
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For me the issue is where do I shift the resource to meet the need? … it‟s a constant 
tension in this work … you are balancing volume against quality all the time.  Part of 
that is your resourcing ...  When you are having to respond to the Court, what 
happens if your resource doesn‟t shift?  When your volume increases your quality 
does drop; and that is what happens.  (CP local 9) 
A local level Service Manager also described the difficulty of scheduling and 
managing individual workloads given the volume of cases and the variability of 
their complexity and administrative requirements.  (S)he stated: 
Occasionally I would have someone in court and the next day they would be in court 
again.  With this day, generally you‟d start at eight preparing for a ten o‟clock start; 
with admin to do, sometimes you‟d finish half past five, six o‟clock.  You‟d still have 
some admin so I‟m very conscious of supporting the staff. … What I‟m trying to do is, 
people don‟t have court the next day; they have a sort of admin catch up day.  
Otherwise they‟ll be overwhelmed and it will have knock-on effects.  (CP local 10) 
 
In relation the level of resourcing, national and local level interviewees 
commented that the Minister was explicitly purchasing “a satisfactory service”; 
while it would be possible to provide a better, or indeed excellent, service this was 
not being funded.  However, the interviewees also noted that this presents 
problems in motivating staff performance.  In the words of a local Area Manager:  
[I]t‟s a difficult message to sell to people who are passionate about what they do … 
To say to them that you are going to do a satisfactory job just doesn‟t ring any bells 
for them.  So you have to temper that message a little.  (CP local 9) 
 
Managing External Accountabilities was the second most significant organisational 
function for Community Probation Service interviewees especially for those at 
regional and national levels (see Figures 6.2 and 6.10).  As was the case for 
interviewees from the Public Prisons Service, media reports of the agency‟s 
activities are a major concern for interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service.  A national office manager explained:  
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The media have been particularly vicious when we make mistakes, and even when 
we don‟t make mistakes.  Burton‟s45 [case is] interesting for that because actually 
ninety six percent of that was managed extremely well.  The one thing that wasn‟t 
was that a probation officer went on leave for a week and there wasn‟t any cover for 
her for five days and something could have been done in those five days.  But that‟s 
all.  But that‟s not the way it was treated from the Prime Minister down.  (CP national 
7) 
At the regional level, a manager suggested that responding to the media is now a 
key element of a Community Probation Service manager‟s performance, whereas 
previously it had been: “… the Minister‟s job or someone else‟s job and you 
burrowed away and got on the best you could” (CP regional 1a). 
 
However, Managing External Accountabilities is not simply a responsive function; 
the same interviewee outlined efforts to gain a more positive public image: 
Part of our work is delivering what we call community work where groups of 
offenders or even individuals work in different agencies and organisations or on 
projects that give back to the community.  That‟s kind of a bit of a shop window to 
our good news.  We‟re now getting more into saying, probation officers do this and 
this in the community, trying to get more into the public sell because it‟s hard to get 
those stories out into the media.  (CP regional 1a) 
Despite these efforts, another regional interviewee, commenting on the limited 
public understanding of a sentence of home detention, explained that: 
The public‟s expectation is that the satellite is … watching now.  [However], we are 
not watching in real time … we will know the next day, we‟ll get a report. 
(S)he suggested that managing home detention is therefore: “ … not managing 
performance.  I guess we‟re into managing expectations” (CP regional 1b).   
 
                                               
45 The high profile case of Graham Burton in 2007 concerned the release of an offender from prison on parole who 
subsequently failed to attend a number of meetings with his parole officer and then committed murder.  It was 
suggested by the media that, had the Community Probation Service acted sooner, this loss of life would have 
been prevented.    
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Local level interviewees also referred to ways in which they manage external 
accountabilities by building relationships with the local community.  One 
explained:  
[W]e have a good relationship with our kaitiaki, our manu whenua46 people here.  I 
met with them just last week to talk about some of our ongoing relationship issues.  
That includes not just offender focused outcomes but also things like the new 
buildings I‟ve mentioned.  So if we are proposing to build on a new site … we want a 
blessing for that site and so on.  (CP local 4) 
 
The function Managing Individual (Staff) Performance was mentioned by 
interviewees from all three organisational levels but it seems to be of significance 
only at the local level.  A local Service Manager explained how each staff member 
has an annual performance appraisal that develops “a live document” that is 
subject to a quarterly review that :  
 … will highlight minimum standards linking to the operations manual.  Beyond that 
there could be how those [standards] are going to be monitored.  And then there 
could be things about which training someone requires, which competencies 
someone is aiming for and what they need to get those competencies.  Then there‟d 
be a more general career long-term goal and how you‟re going to work to certain 
things.  …  Those are completed and passed to the Area Manager for sign off and it 
highlights certain points that should be cleared or sorted during that time.  It makes 
you review the situation.  (CP local 10) 
(S)he also described a more frequent process of professional supervision: 
I have supervision with staff members at least once a month.  For some of those, it‟s 
possibly once every three weeks, but at least once a month.  Coming out of that, I 
minute that and obviously have action points ...  There maybe things where we need 
separately to push things along and within that I‟ll be looking at performance.  (CP 
local 10) 
 
                                               
46 A „kaitiaki‟ is guardian or senior member of a local Maori tribe.  „Manu whenua‟ is a Maori term for the local 
Maori people.   
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However, as was the case in Public Prisons, local level interviewees were 
somewhat cynical about these processes.  A Senior Community Work Supervisor 
stated: 
[I]t‟s a bit of a nonsense that whole appraisal because you say things, you put it on 
paper, nothing happens when you achieve it, nothing happens if you don‟t achieve it.  
(CP local 11) 
Another Senior Community Work Supervisor described the process of setting and 
subsequently appraising individual goals: 
For our performance appraisals we sit with our service manager and he gives us five 
things, areas where he thinks we need to concentrate on with our job.  Then he‟ll 
probably sit with us in another month or so and see and do an appraisal on those five 
things, you know, your performance – [but] I‟ve only had one [performance 
appraisal] in all my time I‟ve been here.  (CP local 3) 
A Senior Probation Officer similarly observed: 
My personal opinion is that we‟ve never managed performance very well at all in 
Probations.  That‟s my experience of it. … I‟ve never, ever, yet had a [report]  at the 
end of it.  (CP local 6) 
Along similar lines a Probation Officer explained that performance appraisals are: 
 … not always consistent.  Sometimes it comes up to renewal time and then either I 
get a new manager or the manager‟s too busy and we just flag it for the next time 
and before you know it they‟re writing stuff which I don‟t even know where it‟s come 
from [laughter]!  Sometimes I‟ve had appraisals where they‟ve put in certain things 
that I‟ve got to do and I think … it‟s good, … because that‟s heading me in the right 
direction.  But other times it‟s like, I‟m sure you just put this in because you‟ve been 
directed to put that in.  I mean it‟s part of my job anyway, but sometimes I just feel 
unheard.47  (CP local 8) 
 
Another element of Managing Individual (Staff) Performance is associated with 
staff development.  A Regional Manager explained:   
                                               
47 This contrasts with the comment from a local manager, reported earlier, who wanted to build a workplace in 
which, for his/her staff, “there is some sense that they have a voice as well within the organisation” (CP local 4).   
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What we try and say is, there are certain skills we can give you, and certain training 
that we give everybody now.  We have a two year probation officer core curriculum 
that they go through.  (CP regional 1) 
Local level interviewees were more positive about staff development than they 
were about the appraisal process.  This is reflected in the comment of a local 
Service Manager described improvements in the following terms:  
There wasn‟t a manual to say you do this.  Now there‟s a Management at Corrections 
training package.  There‟s virtually a work book you can look into about things like 
finance or performance or various things which helps put things in context whereas 
before it wasn‟t there.  (CP local 10) 
Similarly, a Probation Officer explained:   
I‟m getting developed in my role from the Department, developing my skills to 
interact with the offenders … There‟s always ongoing training and, if we think that we 
should be needing that to make our job effective, then we can put our names in for 
that and get the training and develop ourselves.  (CP local 8) 
 
At the national and regional levels, the need to undertake disciplinary 
investigations was also mentioned.  For example, a national office manager related 
how: 
… we had one a couple of months ago where a community work supervisor didn‟t like 
something that an offender wasn‟t doing and made him walk back on his own to the 
service centre.  Well it was 22½ k‟s, so the guy got back to the work centre and 
promptly complained.  (CP national 7) 
 
Functions Associated with Other Organisations 
Interviewees from the Community Probations Service mentioned two functions 
relating to other organisations, namely: 
(i) Managing Joined Up Government and Community; and  
(ii) Managing Providers.   
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The function Managing Joined Up Government and Community was most 
significantly mentioned by interviewees from the regional and local levels; they 
explained efforts to build relationships with other agencies and local community 
organisations.  A Regional Manager described the agency‟s interactions with the 
Parole Board and Courts, stating: 
It‟s pushed us … to working closer with those organisations as well, on a more equal 
basis.  Not only, I guess, to avoid a public scrap but also to work with them in terms 
of managing offenders in our community, particularly around the high-end risk 
offenders.  So we are starting to see in certain parts, although I wouldn‟t get carried 
away, this whole of government approach with specific agencies like Police and 
Children and Young Persons Service working with offenders.  (CP regional 1a) 
Another regional manager suggested that the scope of this function has broadened 
to include working with mayors and local government: 
It seemed the right thing to do, to now speak with mayors and chief executives and 
local councils in terms of, you have these offenders in your communities, we are not 
just interested in pushing them out and seeing them leave town.  Can you help us 
provide housing for them?  If we place someone here, neighbours are more likely 
nowadays to come and see you and complain than they are to go and see their MP.  
We want an opportunity to work with those communities through you sometimes, or 
your permission to work with those communities and explain about the offender.  (CP 
regional 1b) 
 
At the local level an Area Manager suggested that links with other agencies had 
increased significantly over the last five years and also described efforts to work 
more closely with the Police in respect of high risk offenders:  
So we are working a lot more with them in terms of monitoring and enforcement 
action that we are taking.  If someone is in breach, or we are recalling them to 
prison, we are working much closer with the Police to action that quickly.  We were, 
locally at least, progressing the idea of joint management plans for some offenders.  
There‟s been some reluctance for us to go too far down that track from our Head 
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Office because there‟s a concern that we are getting into each other‟s business, I 
guess.  But certainly I can see that coming.  (CP local 9) 
That manager also described a local “Social Policy Interaction Network” that:  
 … meets monthly and we‟re looking at the moment at a project … looking at the top 
ten families … that contribute to a disproportionate amount of crime in the city.  
That‟s involved us working a lot closer with MSD [Ministry of Social Development], 
with Housing, with Child, Youth and Family to look at that group of families that we 
all actually impact on. … We can do all the work we like internally … but, until we 
have a broader strategy that‟s focused on outcomes that draws in other partner 
agencies, it‟s going to be very difficult to shift that and we will only just draw 
attention to ourselves because of the things that we haven‟t been able to achieve. 
(CP local 9) 
 
Interviewees at different organisational levels described different processes by 
which Managing Joined Up Government and Community occurs.  Whereas a 
national office manager explained that these relationships were guided by formal 
memoranda of understanding, local level interviewees referred to more informal, 
and at times ad hoc, arrangements.  A local Service Manager suggested, 
[I]t‟s being there, being a face and then from there if there are queries … we can 
resolve them quickly.  Because we‟re not on the same site you can‟t always respond 
by email, it‟s about knowing people.  I feel we‟ve got a very good working 
relationship.  There‟s no us and them; it‟s not that.  We‟ve responded to a number of 
things and shared information or stopped something becoming an issue quite quickly. 
(CP local 10) 
 
The function of Managing Providers refers to the management of external 
providers of training and rehabilitation programmes and other organisations with 
whom individual offenders may be placed to undertake community work.  This 
function was referred to by a national office manager and a local level Senior 
Community Work Supervisor.  The national office manager, when describing 
difficulties in sourcing effective rehabilitative programmes, explained: 
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I think there are some real challenges as to how you get high quality programmes 
being delivered by people who don‟t have six years‟ specialist training leading up to 
that.  I think you can do it but at the moment we aren‟t doing it.  There‟s a whole 
issue about how you measure what they‟re doing in order to improve their 
performance. … There‟s a highly variable workforce out there so issues of 
performance as to programme delivery become absolutely critical.  (CP national 2) 
 
The local level interviewee focused on the organisations that provide opportunities 
for offenders to undertake community work.  (S)he stated that there was no 
formal process by which (s)he maintained a portfolio of local organisations with 
whom offenders were placed, but rather (s)he used: 
 … cold canvassing, advertisements, charitable organisations and things; you try to 
remember where they are and we‟ve got catalogues and things.  (CP local 11) 
(S)he further explained that this task is not part of the formal performance 
management framework: 
Nobody knows how many agencies [organisations] we‟ve got.  It‟s not even in our 
system.  I don‟t know at this point in time how many agencies I‟m using.  I know if I 
go to my list and I calculate them all, but I can‟t give you a figure.  That‟s not part of 
the [performance] criteria ever.  (CP local 11) 
 
Operational Management Functions of the Community Probation Service 
As shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.10, interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service identified two managerial functions, but as in the Public Prisons Service, 
this group of functions appear not to be significant.  The two mentioned were: 
a) Managing Local Community Issues and Risk; and 
b) Managing Outcomes.   
 
Managing Local Community Issues and Risk was mentioned by interviewees at all 
three organisational levels.  At the national level, a manager explained how efforts 
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to improve the assessment of risks to the community posed by offenders have a 
broader, potentially political, impact: 
[The Minister] said who‟s going to carry the can if this fellow gets out …. that sort of 
stuff enters in; you know, you are very much aware of the potential public backlash.  
(CP national 2) 
 
A regional level manager referred to a recent high profile case in which a convicted 
sex offender was initially placed in a small community but was subsequently 
removed in response to sustained local protests.  (S)he explained that the use of 
appropriate communication strategies could prevent such incidents from 
occurring:  
If you put out to the media, … such and such an offender is living next door to you, 
well! … but if we have the opportunity to go and speak to the neighbours and the 
communities and explain how to keep themselves safe and what to look for, etc, the 
response is quite different.  We‟ve found that time and time again.  (CP regional 1b) 
 
A local level Senior Community Work Supervisor explained how (s)he worked with 
local councils and schools on community projects such as planting trees and 
removing graffiti but also noted the difficulties involved: 
There are criteria that have to be met every time we go into schools.  It has to be 
made sure that there are no children on site.  I could go to a school and it‟s the 
weekend and if there are children playing on the school [grounds] we will leave 
immediately.  (CP local 3) 
 
The function Managing Outcomes was principally mentioned at the national office 
level.  A senior national office manager reported, for example, that:  
Our re-offending rates in the community are going down and I do think we can take 
some responsibility for that.  We can‟t take absolute responsibility because, of 
course, laws change, judges behave differently, the Police may or may not catch 
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people, and so on and so forth.  And the offenders themselves have a bit of a role to 
play!  I don‟t think we can say we can control it; we can influence it.  (CP national 7) 
However, a local level manager cautioned: 
[O]ur ability to forward plan and look where we want to go and be strategic in focus 
has been difficult.  I think we are working on that and I think a move to more of a 
focus on outcomes will assist with that, but we are definitely not there at the 
moment.  (CP local 9) 
 
Service Delivery Functions of the Community Probation Service 
Figures 6.2 and 6.10 show that interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service identified the following five technical functions:  
(i) Managing Offenders; 
(ii) Managing Rehabilitation and Reintegration; 
(iii) Complying with Due Process; 
(iv) Providing Reports to Other Agencies; and  
(v) Managing Local Operations.   
 
As might be expected, the most significant service delivery function, particularly 
for interviewees at the local level, was Managing Offenders.  A Regional Manager 
explained that offenders “either come to us directly from the Court on a 
community based sentence or they come through a sentence of imprisonment 
back into the community” and suggested that managing offenders comprises two 
parts of an “interlocking system”: 
[W]e still have the social work sense that it‟s all about the relationship and [we also 
have] risk management that says it‟s all about the procedures and the process of 
holding someone accountable.  To me they are just two parts of the same solution 
because we‟ve got these two roles.  (CP regional 1b) 
 
A local level Senior Community Work Supervisor described this function by saying: 
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I‟m in charge of running operations, placing offenders out into work parties and 
sending them off into the community to work.  We also have agencies where those 
with lesser offences are going to spend their time. … [I]t‟s [about] setting boundaries 
and telling them right from the start this is what‟s going to happen and this is what‟s 
going to happen if you don‟t. … I won‟t hesitate in sending you back to Court.  (CP 
local 3) 
Another local level Senior Community Work Supervisor explained that many 
offenders do not readily comply with the terms of their sentence: 
I would say about fifty percent you would have some problems with.  Either you 
must push them along and drag them through the sentence, and „phone them every 
so often to help them through the sentence, basically.  A lot of them will not comply 
and then you‟ll write them a final warning letter and then they‟ll start complying.  
About ten percent of the cases won‟t comply and you‟ll take them to Court and they‟ll 
get re-sentenced and a lot of them, out of those, will get a warrant for their arrest 
because they disappear.  (CP local 11) 
A Probation Officer similarly described his/her role by saying: 
I manage their sentences – standard conditions [requirements of their sentences] as 
well as the special conditions that were imposed by either the Court or the Parole 
Board. … Sometimes it‟s directly doing the conditions; other times it‟s motivating 
them to get over other barriers before we can get on to their conditions.  (CP local 8) 
 
From the interviewees‟ comments, it is evident that the relationship between a 
Probation Officer and an offender is an important factor in the successful 
management of offenders.  It was suggested by a Regional Manager that: 
 … we need to understand … that forming an engagement relationship with the 
offender is somewhat invisible.  That‟s the sort of nebulousness of the social part and 
social interaction, but the quality of that is hugely important to how you manage the 
person.  (CP regional 1b) 
Another Regional Manager similarly explained: 
[T]here‟s still quite a large part of the culture [of the Community Probation Service] 
that believes that what they do is correct, their advocacy role is what this business is 
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about, we‟re there for the offenders and our business is only about reducing re-
offending.  That‟s the part that‟s for the offenders, the rehabilitative, re-integrative 
role.  (CP regional 1a) 
At a local level, a Senior Community Work Supervisor described more specifically 
how (s)he talks to offenders: 
At the end of the day the only thing I say to them is “you are in control of your life, 
you are the one who decides where your life is going to go”.  I‟m not a counsellor 
but, you know, those are just words that I give to my kids [laughter].  They are just 
mother words I give to my children, “whatever you do, just make sure that you are 
accountable for it”. (CP local 3) 
 
However, this focus on the relationship with the offender contrasts with the efforts 
to change the organisation‟s social work culture reported above.  A senior national 
office manager was quite clear that probation officers are not social workers:48 
We took ourselves out of that whole social work field.  We still employ people that 
have been social workers but they come in on the understanding that they are to be 
probation officers not social workers.  (CP national 7) 
 
Apart from managing offenders and the risks they pose to the community, a major 
function of the Community Probations Service is associated with Managing 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration.  Although this function was mentioned by 
interviewees at the local and regional levels, it was the most significant technical 
function for interviewees at the national level.   
 
In terms of rehabilitation, a national office manager pointed to the difficulty of 
managing effective programmes that, although successful as small scale pilots, are 
problematic when rolled out across the country.  Nonetheless, (s)he explained: 
What the data says is that appropriately targeted high quality programmes bring 
about reductions of between, probably, … ten and twenty five percent in re-offending 
                                               
48 A similar tension between a (social work) focus on the offender and management of the offender‟s sentence was 
also noted in the Public Prisons Service; see section 6.5.   
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… .  So what you infer from that is, that those are certainly worthwhile benefits to 
have and justify the provision of the programmes. ... At the same time, the 
inescapable fact is the programmes don‟t work for the majority of people who receive 
them, even the good programmes that are appropriately targeted.  (CP national 2) 
At the local level a Probation Officer noted: “it‟s always been a problem, for me 
anyway, finding the appropriate programmes for them” [i.e. offenders].  (S)he 
continued: 
But they basically have to be motivated, really; because when I want to put a person 
on a programme and they‟re not motivated we‟re actually setting them up to fail as 
well.  Although they do know that they‟ve got to do some programmes and so, what 
we try to do, is motivate them first before we put them on the programme.  (CP local 
8) 
A local Senior Community Work Supervisor was less positive about rehabilitative 
programmes.  (S)he explained:  
In reality they‟ll be back.  I‟d probably say six out of ten, they‟ll be back.  And when 
they come back I‟ll go, “I‟m very disappointed you know”.  But every time my first 
conversation with every offender is that.  Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn‟t.  
(CP local 3) 
 
With reference to reintegration of offenders, a senior national office manager 
simply described the function as “our job”.  (S)he observed:  
That‟s why you have a Probation Service.  So every Probation Officer that manages a 
parolee, someone who‟s got out of prison, considers their job is reintegration.  (CP 
national 7) 
However, (s)he also suggested that a tension between managing offenders‟ 
compliance with their sentences and their reintegration represents “the most 
common dilemma that our staff would have”.  (S)he explained: 
We do have a bit of a battle between enforcement action and reintegration 
sometimes because a staff member will say that Johnny is … not complying but I 
think that, if they were to get breached and end up back in prison for a month they 
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would lose their house, their job, etc, etc and we‟d have to start all over again when 
they came out in two months time.  (CP national 7) 
 
The only other service delivery function to be mentioned by interviewees at all 
three organisational levels was Complying with Due Process.  For a senior national 
office manager, this function is central to managing performance.  (S)he also 
noted that (s)he explains the value of following procedures to subordinates as 
follows: 
[I]f I know we‟ve got procedures, I can get up and publicly defend you if you follow 
those procedures.  If we don‟t have procedures, I can‟t defend you because I won‟t 
know what‟s in your head about why you did things and why you didn‟t.  So every 
instance you‟ll have to get up there yourself and explain what you‟ve done and why 
you‟ve done it.  (CP national 7) 
Along similar lines, at the local level, an Area Manager suggested: 
I think that‟s a reflection of why we are drawn, pushed, into the process stuff.  If you 
are having to be so reactive to unanticipated, unexpected things that are going to 
pop up all the time, one of your protections is: “we‟ve followed the process properly”.  
(CP local 9) 
However, a Regional Manager acknowledged that, for his/her staff:   
there is a certain amount of unknown-ness about what goes on … [therefore] some 
of them [procedures] are set in concrete and we growl at people when they don‟t do 
them.  But, because you are dealing with people, there are certain decision-making 
processes that have to come in with that.  Sometimes people need to be able to 
exercise judgement and make a decision about which part of the procedures they go 
with or how they apply those procedures.  (CP regional 1) 
Adding to this at the local level a Probation Officer explained that due process 
provides a support when issues are not clear cut and discretion is required.  (S)he 
suggested:  
 … we‟re guided by management guidelines and job practices.  We have a [standard] 
sentence management profile that we use to manage those sentences.  So basically 
it‟s black and white really.  (CP local 8) 
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However, a local level Senior Community Work Supervisor was less supportive of a 
due process which requires that: 
 … you make a lot of unnecessary notes which is beautiful and possible if you‟ve got 
an eighty case load.  You can do that; you can manage those, I call it, silly notes.  
But if you‟ve got a huge caseload [150 offenders], and you want to keep on top of 
your caseload, and you want to keep on top of the enforcement action, then you 
must be brief because you don‟t have time for rubbish.  (CP local 11) 
 
The service delivery function Provide Reports to Other Agencies is associated with 
providing (a) information and advice to the Judiciary to assist in sentencing, and 
(b) advice, information and reports to the Parole Board to assist in its decision-
making.  This function was mentioned by local level interviewees and, to a lesser 
extent, those at the national level.  A local Service Manager explained what the 
function entails as follows: 
Each day we‟ll have staff in the main list court, which is the first court people 
generally appear in; and that‟s to provide information to the Judiciary on people 
being arrested and appearing before that court.  We also staff a court there which, in 
the mornings, is a Sentencing Court; and in the afternoon it‟s called Status Court … 
that‟s to support the reports we‟ve completed, to answer any queries from the 
Judiciary or any issues raised.  Plus we are also asked for information from judges in 
other courts which may include brief information on someone‟s current sentence or 
compliance, to providing a same day report.  On top of all that there‟s requests for 
reports and we have to process them.  (CP local 10) 
A Senior Probation Officer added: “[W]e write the reports that are provided for the 
Courts.  We do a little bit for the Parole Board in terms of home detention reports” 
(CP local 6).  A national level interviewee also explained that the Community 
Probation Service additionally: “ … provides some information to prisons to assist 
with home leave type reports, but that‟s quite minor”  (CP national 7).   
 
 227 
The function Managing Local Operations was mentioned by local level interviewees 
in relation to the problems of managing workload and the quality of that work.  
These comments reflect similar statements made by local level interviewees, in 
respect of Managing the Organisation, reported above.  A local level Service 
Manager, for example, explained that managing workloads is problematic when 
“all our numbers are going through the roof”.  (S)he observed:  
The office area hasn‟t got any bigger; we haven‟t got any more work stations.  So 
I‟m currently also meeting with the area manager to look at staffing numbers and 
how we can run this.  (CP local 10) 
A local level Area Manager similarly described how, despite the fact that the 
Service is actively recruiting staff in order to respond to the implications of 
pending legislative changes,49 some sites were already “at their cap”.  This results 
in a need to move work around.  (S)he explained: 
For example, this morning [one office] has had a blow out with their reports so we 
are taking some of their reports for them from next week.  So there is that sense 
there that we‟ll have to start moving work around and giving it to other people, even 
though technically we don‟t have the capacity to take the work either.  (CP local 4) 
 
Another aspect of Managing Local Operations is trying to check the quality of the 
reports.  A local Service Manager described how (s)he tries to check these on a 
daily basis by saying:  
 … the process is set up so that all reports should come to me once they‟ve been 
completed, spell checked, and everything else, and the officer has checked their 
report, for me to check it before it goes off.  That is the process across the area as 
well, or to a designated senior probation officer, experienced probation officer, who 
can check those against those minimum standards.  (CP local 10) 
 
                                               
49 As part of an „Effective Interventions‟ initiative, from October 2007, amendments to the Criminal Justice Act 
1985 expanded the range of community-based sentences to include a stand-alone sentence of Home Detention 
and two new sentences of Intensive Supervision and Community Detention.  New Post-Detention Conditions 
were also added to the community-based orders managed by the Community Probation Service.   
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6.6.3 Summary: Functions of the Community Probation Service 
In relation to Wilson‟s (1989) organisational typology discussed in Chapter 1, 
Gregory (1995a) has characterised the functions of community corrections as 
principally belonging to a „coping‟ type organisation in which neither the work 
undertaken nor its effects, or outcomes, are readily observed.  However, within 
the Community Probation Service the significant emphasis placed on measuring 
and managing due process results in the organisation being better characterised 
as „procedural‟.  Processes are a significant focus of the performance 
measurement and management framework described by the interviewees whereas 
the agency‟s contribution to its nominated outcomes of Protecting the Public and 
Reducing Re-offending remains much more difficult to determine.   
 
As shown in Figure 6.9 the Community Probation Service‟s official model of 
performance management principally focuses on the two (service delivery) 
functions of: 
(i) managing community-based sentences, and 
(ii) referring offenders to rehabilitative programmes and reintegrative 
services.   
However, as was the case with the other two case study agencies, the 
interviewees from the Community Probation Service described a somewhat 
broader range of functions, shown below in Figure 6.11.    
 
As shown in Figure 6.2, interviewees at the national level of the Community 
Probations Service focused on organisational functions (principally associated with 
Managing the Organisation and Managing External Accountabilities) and local level 
interviewees focused on service delivery functions (principally associated with 
Managing Offenders and Providing Reports to Other Agencies).   
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Figure 6.11:  Official and In Use Functions of the Community Probation 
Service 
Official Functions In Use Functions 
Management of offenders sentenced to 
community based Supervision and 
Community Work 
Administering Home Detention and Parole 
Orders imposed by the New Zealand Parole 
Board 
Administering Post-release Conditions for 
prisoners with short sentences 
Administering Extended Supervision Orders 
Managing offenders 
Complying with due process  
Managing local operations 
 
Referring offenders to rehabilitative 
programmes and reintegrative services 
Managing rehabilitation and reintegration 
Managing providers 
Provision of sentencing information and 
advice to the courts.   
Providing reports to other agencies 
Enhancing capability and capacity Managing external accountabilities 
Managing the organisation 
Managing individual (staff) performance 
Collaboration with other agencies Managing joined up government & 
community 
Managing local community issues & risk 
 Managing outcomes 
 
However, regional level interviewees provided few comments in relation to the 
expected operational management functions but rather principally described the 
same functions as national level interviewees.  Indeed, as shown in Figure 6.2, 
organisational functions, and in particular Managing the Organisation, were 
important for interviewees at all three organisational levels.  This may be 
explained by the internal consultation and organisational change processes that 
had, at the time of the interviewees, been recently completed in preparation for 
the changes to the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1985.   
 
Note was made above of the decoupling of the conceptual frameworks used to 
measure and manage performance at the national and local levels of Public 
Prisons.  Other than the focus on Managing the Organisation, this decoupling was 
also particularly evident in the comments of interviewees from the Community 
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Probation Service.  National level interviewees emphasised the importance of 
following standard procedures and managing offenders‟ strict compliance with the 
terms of their sentences and suggested that, in the past, inadequate emphasis 
had been placed on sentence management and the risk that offenders pose to the 
community.  On the other hand comments from local staff frequently described a 
more flexible and supportive (“social work”) approach to managing offenders.  The 
reasons for this difference will be explored further in Chapter 9.   
 
Unlike Public Prisons which manages offenders „behind closed doors‟, the 
Community Probation Service manages offenders within the community and, as a 
consequence, is less able to remain internally focused.  Interviewees from all three 
organisational levels of the Community Probation Service described processes by 
which they interact with, and attempt to gain the support of, local communities.  
However, according to the interviewees, that support has not always been 
forthcoming.  A number of adverse incidents have resulted in the functions of the 
agency being subject to media scrutiny and criticism and, as a result the agency‟s 
functions have a high level of political salience.  Media coverage of the work of 
managing offenders in the community, like that of managing offenders in prisons, 
does not dwell on the complexities of the individuals involved, but rather simplifies 
the tasks involved.  The functions of the Community Probations Service are not, 
therefore, seen as technically complex.  As with Public Prisons, given this 
combination of political saliency and perceived lack of technical complexity, the 
Community Probation Service is subject to significant sensegiving from external 
stakeholders.  The agency also experiences limited operational freedom.  This was 
noted in particular by interviewees describing the problems of balancing limited 
resources and the flow of offenders provided by the decisions of the Courts and 
the Parole Board over which, it was suggested, they have no control.   
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6.7 Functions – A Summary 
In responding to the question “what do you and your team do?”, interviewees 
from all three case study agencies described the significant role that standard 
procedures play in the measurement and management of performance.  This 
emphasis on the management of processes contrasts with the expected focus on 
outputs and/or outcomes described by Wilson (1989) and employed, amongst 
others, by Gregory (1995a).   
 
As noted above in sections 6.3 and 6.4, each year the functions undertaken by 
public service agencies are set out in the Government‟s Estimates documentation 
and, in more detail, in each agency‟s Statement of Intent, Output Plan and Annual 
Report.  However, from the semi-structured interviews with managers and staff in 
Work and Income, the Public Prisons Service, and the Community Probation 
Service, it is evident that within each organisation there exists a more complex 
and richer conception of the functions for which that agency is responsible.   
 
It should be noted that the official functional model contained within the external 
accountability documents principally focuses on accountability for the outputs and 
outcomes that are „purchased‟ from each agency.  For each of the case study 
agencies the official model makes little mention of the „ownership/stewardship‟ 
functions such as Managing the Organisation and Managing External 
Accountabilities but these functions do figure prominently in the comments 
provided by interviewees from those agencies.   
 
Only in Work and Income does the hierarchical division of focus on functions 
generally follow the pattern suggested by Kanter & Summers (1994) and 
Mintzberg (1996).  As shown in Figure 6.2, interviewees from the national and 
regional levels of that agency described activities principally concerned with 
organisational and operational management functions, and those from the local 
 232 
level principally focused on operational management and service delivery 
functions.  In contrast, interviewees from all three organisational levels of Public 
Prisons principally described service delivery functions and those from the 
Community Probation Service principally focused on organisational functions.  
However, as will be explored further in Chapter 9, it was noticeable that, in both 
Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service, the interpretation of these 
functions varied significantly between national and local level interviewees.   
 
The interviewees also described different degrees of interaction with, and 
sensegiving from, other agencies and external stakeholders.  While interviewees 
from Work and Income explained how their functions interact with a broad range 
of other agencies and external stakeholders, little comment was made about their 
interaction with the media.  In contrast interviewees from both Public Prisons and 
the Community Probations Service described a more politically salient environment 
which appeared to result in more internally focused strategies and significant 
concerns over how interactions with the media are managed.  Both Public Prisons 
and the Community Probations Service evidently have limited operational 
autonomy as interviewees, particularly at the local level, described an 
environment in which they respond, as best they can, to the demand pressures 
created by the courts and Parole Board.   
 
The next chapter will consider the lens of purpose and interviewees‟ responses to 
the question, “what do you use performance information for?”.   
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Chapter 7 
PURPOSE AS AN ELEMENT OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT IN THE THREE CASE STUDY AGENCIES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, three key elements of performance measurement and 
management are function, purpose and perspective.  This chapter outlines the 
construct of purpose (why performance is measured and managed) and examines 
the purposes described by interviewees in each of the three case study agencies 
(namely Work and Income, the Public Prisons Service, and the Community 
Probation Service).  For each agency, consideration is also given to:  
 whether the information is used to objectively or subjectively represent 
performance; 
 the extent to which some purposes of the measurement and management 
of performance are excluded from the official model for each agency; 
 the extent to which these purposes are concerned to measure and manage 
internal or external factors;  
 how performance is used for purposes of legitimisation; and 
 the use of performance information for internal sensegiving50 purposes.   
 
7.2 The Construct of Purpose 
The construct of Purpose identifies why performance is measured and managed.  
As shown in Figure 7.1, the interviewees from the three case study agencies 
described a total of eighteen different purposes that may be initially grouped 
based on the extent to which they relate to the in use, official and formal 
performance measurement and management models described in Chapter 1.  As 
might be expected the principal focus of the purposes described by interviewees 
                                               
50
 Refer footnote 5, (in Chapter 1).   
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relate to the performance measurement and management systems that are in use.  
However, some of the purposes they identified can be matched to the official 
performance measurement and management system; others can be further 
grouped under the rubric of legitimisation to the extent that they do not directly 
support the decision-making process of the interviewees involved but are 
nonetheless concerned with managing the authorising environment of 
stakeholders.   
 
Figure 7.1: Purposes of Measuring and Managing Performance Identified 
by Interviewees 
Joined Up Government external
purposes
Providers
Individual Performance
Team Performance
Local Performance organisational
purposes
National Performance
Managing the Organisation
  in use
Process
PURPOSE
Clients Why is performance
measured and
Offenders managed?
operational
Confinement management
purposes
Rehabilitation & Reintegration
Outcomes
Social Development
System Requirements formal
Public Expectations
legitimisation
National Reporting Requirements purposes espoused
Government Reporting Requirements
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 7.2, below, for all three case study agencies the 
principal purposes of measuring and managing performance are associated with 
the management of organisational factors.   
 235 
Figure 7.2: Summary of the Statements Concerning the Purpose of 
Measuring and Managing Performance by Interviewees in Each Case 
Study Agency 
PURPOSE
National Regional Local Average National Regional Local Average National Regional Local Average
 External Purposes
To Measure/Manage Joined Up Government 6           -        -        -        -        -        -        -        3           
To Measure/Manage Providers 6           29         -        -        -        -        -        -        -        
Total %  of issues mentioned
12% 29% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 1%
Organisational Purposes
To Measure/Manage Individual Performance -        7           34         7           -        24         23         6           29         
To Measure/Manage Team Performance 2           -        6           -        -        -        -        -        -        
To Measure/Manage Local Performance 9           10         15         14         22         43         5           -        15         
To Measure/Manage National Performance 31         7           2           36         7           -        30         41         5           
To Measure/Manage the Organisation 4           10         1           -        -        -        -        6           5           
Total %  of issues mentioned
45% 32% 57% 45% 57% 29% 67% 51% 58% 53% 54% 55%
 Operational Purposes
To Measure/Manage Process 1           7           2           -        7           7           13         29         3           
To Measure/Manage Confinement -        -        -        15         -        -        -        -        -        
To Measure/Manage Clients -        4           2           -        -        -        -        -        -        
To Measure/Manage Offenders 5           6           8           
To Measure/Manage Rehabilitation and Reintegration -        -        -        15         -        6           10         -        15         
To Measure/Manage Outcomes -        -        -        15         21         -        8           6           4           
To Measure/Manage Social Development 18         10         6           -        -        -        -        -        -        
Total %  of issues mentioned
19% 20% 10% 16% 44% 28% 12% 28% 36% 41% 30% 36%
 Legitimisation Purposes
To Measure/Manage Public Expectations 9           3           1           -        22         -        -        6           -        
To Meet System Requirements 7           -        11         
To Meet National Reporting Requirements 3           17         20         -        21         13         7           -        12         
To Meet Government Reporting Requirements 5           -        1           -        -        7           -        -        -        
Total %  of issues mentioned
24% 20% 33% 25% 0% 43% 20% 21% 7% 6% 12% 8%
Total
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
PERCENTAGE OF ISSUES MENTIONED
Work and Income Public Prisons Service Community Probation Service
 
External purposes are fairly important for Work and Income, particularly at the 
regional level, but were not mentioned by interviewees from Public Prisons and 
only to a minor extent by interviewees from the Community Probation Service.  
Operational purposes were also mentioned frequently by interviewees from Public 
Prisons and, more particularly, by those from the Community Probation Service.  
Legitimising purposes (especially the need to Meet National Reporting 
Requirements) are relatively important in both Work and Income and Public 
Prisons.     
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7.3  Work and Income 
As is shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, although the reasons why performance is 
measured and managed that were identified by interviewees from Work and 
Income vary between the agency‟s hierarchical levels, they are principally 
associated with managing internal organisational factors. Across all three levels an 
average of 45% of the purposes explained by interviewees related to 
organisational factors.  Legitimisation purposes were also significant at all three 
levels (an average of 25%) but regional level interviewees made significant 
mention of the external purpose to Measure and Manage Providers.     
 
Figure 7.3: Purposes of Measuring and Managing Performance in Work 
and Income as Identified by Interviewees Grouped by Level in the 
Organisational Hierarchy 
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Organisational Purposes of Measuring and Managing Performance in Work 
and Income 
As shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the interviewees from Work and Income 
described five purposes related to their decision making in respect of managing 
the organisation, namely to: 
(i) Measure and Manage Individual Performance; 
(ii) Measure and Manage National Performance; 
(iii) Measure and Manage Local Performance; 
(iv) Measure and Manage the Organisation; and 
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(v) Measure and Manage Team Performance. 
 
To Measure and Manage Individual Performance is the most significant purpose of 
performance measurement and management for interviewees at the local level but 
was also mentioned by those at the regional level.  Local level interviewees 
described how individual performance is evaluated both in terms of objectively 
represented numerical targets and, more subjectively, in relation to how staff 
behave in their interactions with clients.   
 
In relation to numerical targets, a local Service Centre Manager explained that 
Case Managers are required to do more than just put people into work; they are 
required to focus on reducing the total number of people on the unemployed 
register: 
[T]hey have specific individual targets which they need to achieve which feed into 
what we‟ve got to achieve as a site. … it is important that they understand though, 
that it‟s not necessarily just cancelling a benefit because you‟ve also got to bear in 
mind the incoming [numbers on the register].  So it‟s about managing the incoming 
[and also] the outgoings … to achieve that overall reduction.  (WI local 4) 
However, a local level Work Broker51 described the target more simply, saying:  
In our performance appraisal our requirement is fifteen clients per month into 
employment. … [W]e must do that every month, either exceed or achieve that goal.  
(WI local 10) 
 
Local interviewees described a range of information they regularly receive which 
facilitates monitoring and managing their performance.  A local Work Broker, for 
example explained:   
We get a report that comes out at the end of every month and that tells us exactly 
who we‟ve placed where and gives us a whole variety of columns on how long they‟ve 
been on benefit, what their duration was in our work system, who their case manager 
                                               
51
 See footnote 32 (in Chapter 6).   
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was, who referred them, where the job or the opportunity number is linked to the 
employer whether a subsidy has been initiated, and several other bits of statistics.  
(WI local 10) 
However, this same interviewee explained that not all of their performance 
information comes from the formal systems.  (S)he stated: 
It happens with redundancies a lot; people have been made redundant and the Work 
Brokers carry around a folder of CVs, show them to employers, talk to them about the 
clients who potentially aren‟t even on our register but go into employment.  So we are 
required to keep statistics ourselves to ensure that that‟s captured in our performance 
appraisal.  (WI local 10) 
Along similar lines, a local Service Centre Manager described how (s)he maintains 
his/her own reporting system: 
I run a six monthly spreadsheet for each staff member and down the side it has sort 
of the things we are measuring and then it has what the targets are for the individual 
– the percentage.  And then at the end of every month … I‟ll update it and enter what 
they‟ve achieved in respect of that month.  And we‟ll keep monitoring and doing that 
so when I sit down to coach them I‟ll be able to talk to them about what they 
achieved … and what we have got to do to either lift performance, keep going, all 
those sorts of things.  (WI local 8) 
 
In relation to how Work and Income staff manage clients, a local Service 
Centre Manager explained: 
… that‟s about … are they effective, do they always demonstrate the standards of 
behaviour and example role models, consistently.  So it‟s about people skills, and 
that‟s huge.  (WI local 1) 
A regional level manager added to this by describing a framework within which 
individual performance could be managed: 
If you‟re a Case Manager and you are dealing with a client, here‟s a range of activities 
and approaches that you would actually take if you were dealing or working with that 
client in a way that we would want.  Here‟s a range of factors that might indicate that 
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you are not doing that … in the way that we would like and we would critique against 
that.  (WI regional 3) 
 
The behavioural aspects of individual performance are less easy to measure than 
quantified targets but a local Service Centre Manager explained how (s)he relies 
on observations of staff members‟ behaviour by him/herself and by other 
members of his/her staff.  (S)he stated: 
I‟ve built an environment where it‟s OK to talk to me about what you have seen, 
good, bad, or otherwise, because we are only as strong as our weakest link.  So, if 
our weakest link is pulling us back then I need to know about it so that I can support 
them and help them through that.  (WI local 4) 
Another Service Centre Manager similarly explained that his/her site periodically 
uses “peer assessments” of performance but more regularly relies on the feedback 
received from a local trainer and from clients:  
I‟ve got a service centre trainer; she does observational checks as well.  So she sits in 
the background and watches them as they work; and feeds that back to them and 
also that forms part of the performance picture that we get.  Some of it‟s your own 
interactions that you have and that you see.  Some of it you can gauge by complaints 
that you receive or, though we rarely get, „thank you‟s‟.  Some staff do get [them] on 
a consistent basis so, … it generates some level of confidence that they are delivering 
a good service; that they‟ve got those skills.  Then on the other hand if someone‟s 
getting a whole lot of complaints you start to think, “well what is it that they are 
doing that does that?”. (WI local 8) 
Another Service Centre Manager described how (s)he uses the agency‟s Code of 
Conduct to reinforce the need for appropriate behaviour:  
We‟ve got a lot of rules in place in terms of making sure that everybody is meeting 
the Code of Conduct.  I mean, that‟s really important to Government …. I personally 
believe that having all these rules in place is making us a better organisation, 
especially with the public looking in.  I guess … because we are so busy in our jobs it‟s 
a reactive thing when someone stuffs up by doing something then it‟s time to remind 
everyone that, under the Code of Conduct, you shouldn‟t be doing this.  (WI local 12) 
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As might be expected, and is shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, to Measure and 
Manage National Performance is the most significant purpose of performance 
measurement and management for national level interviewees.  It was also 
mentioned to a limited extent by interviewees from the other two organisational 
levels.   
 
At the national office level a manager also emphasised the difficulty of measuring 
and managing performance at that level and, as a result, the accompanying need 
for anecdotal evidence.  (S)he explained: 
You can‟t compare one region to another really because there are so many different 
factors that are influencing that region. … [E]very client has a different circumstance 
and every client will react in a different way too.  I‟m a great fan for … anecdotal 
evidence because we are bereft of a lot of other „science‟ to determine that [i.e. 
performance].  We know when we‟ve reduced unemployment.  We know when we‟ve 
kept people in work for more than six months.  It‟s defining exactly what parts of our 
programmes we do better than others.  We have a raft of things we are doing; it‟s 
trying to isolate what works best, that is the hardest thing to do.  [WI national 6] 
Also at the national level a manager provided an example of how a success story 
of one young Maori man, who was a sole parent, and a sickness beneficiary but 
had been found full time employment, had been used to reinforce quantified 
performance information.  (S)he commented:  
[W]e back up a lot of our Cabinet papers and things like that with anecdotes because 
they are the most powerful way of actually demonstrating that our interventions 
made a difference.  Otherwise, you‟d have a real attribution problem in Work and 
Income, huge.  Just because we‟ve looked at you and trained you, would you have 
got a job anyway?  (WI national 11) 
 
Whilst that manager explained the use of performance measures to allocate 
funding on the basis of the number of people on benefit in each region, (s)he also 
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reported concerns about the range and impact of performance measurement.  
(S)he observed:   
[W]hat gets measured gets managed so we have to be careful that there aren‟t some 
adverse behaviours that happen because we are measuring it.  What we do is have a 
whole lot of performance measures – reducing unemployment and benefit numbers, 
getting people into work and getting them to stay there, etc.  Now there is a real 
danger that they actually drive performance.  In a sense they need to drive 
performance, we need to get our reductions, but it‟s not enough just to get a quantity 
of people reducing from this to this.  It‟s the quality of the work that they get into; it‟s 
the quality of the assistance they get if they‟re a solo mum; and all that sort of thing.  
So what people do is human nature; they grab hold of the things that they can count 
and they use them to drive performance.  [WI national 6] 
Similarly a regional level manager suggested: 
Targets tend to become the things that people aim for, at the cost of anything else.  
And quite often people will be deceptive and organisations will, by default, allow that 
to happen if it means their targets are being achieved.  The risk is that people will go 
out there and they will do a range of different things … to make it look like they are 
actually achieving it but in actual fact it‟s just superficial.  (WI regional 9) 
 
As is shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the purpose to Measure and Manage Local 
Performance was mentioned by interviewees from all three organisational levels.  
Its importance at the national level was explained by a national office manager 
who said: 
What we are finding out is that, more than ever before, we are interested in what‟s 
happening at a site level.  I don‟t know if it‟s as our performance has reached a 
particular level or if it‟s we are at a stage where we are building strategy that is 
looking for a quicker impact, but we are finding that you can not even average out to 
a regional level.  (WI national 7) 
The issue of local variation was also mentioned by local level interviewees.  A 
Service Centre Manager explained this by saying: 
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The make up between this site and [another site], which is only twenty minutes down 
the road, is different; and they are quite different socio-economic areas.  [This site] is 
quite wealthy.  [Another site] is quite farm/rural based but certainly in the town there 
are some quite low socio-economic pockets in there.  (WI local 8) 
The implications of this variation for local practices were also explained by another 
Service Centre Manager who said: 
Sometimes I might not follow the guidelines as … one set of guidelines doesn‟t 
necessarily fit each service centre within the country.  (WI Local 4) 
 
Therefore managing performance at the local level is, to some extent, reliant on 
making sense, in the local context, of operational guidelines set in a broader 
regional and national perspective.  One key mechanism by which this occurs in 
Work and Income is the „Wednesday Brief‟ in which both national and local issues 
are discussed by the whole team at each service centre.  This was described by a 
Service Centre Manager as follows:  
On a Wednesday morning, the office isn‟t open till 9.30, it‟s called Wednesday Brief.  
We get a Wednesday Brief sent to us from national office and we are to talk about the 
things that come up there; but sometimes there‟s not much, so we actually call it a 
Wednesday Workshop. … [I]t‟s interesting and there‟s an hour and a half that we are 
allowed to have on a Wednesday morning that is very important, because you don‟t 
get any other opportunities unless you want some training up at region.  (WI local 1) 
Another mechanism for managing performance was suggested by a local Service 
Centre Manager who explained the importance of his/her relationship with regional 
and national offices as follows:  
[I]t‟s important, the relationship that I have with our regional office and our national 
office, because they [provide] feedback – good, bad, or otherwise; because if I don‟t 
get it I don‟t know how we are doing.  (WI local 4) 
 
In respect of measuring local performance, interviewees reported that they receive 
„myriads of reports‟.  A regional level interviewee stated: 
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We‟ve probably got more information than most people on everything we do. … I‟ve 
got information systems that report every Monday, that tell us everything about our 
centres and about our clients across every area that we measure. 
Similarly a Service Centre Manager explained: 
We have a tool called Briefcase and that basically is like an Excel spreadsheet that will 
let you download all your clients, who they are assigned to, if they‟ve got plans in 
place, if they are registered in „Jobs for You‟, if they are enrolled in „Solo‟.  It gives 
you a myriad of information in a spreadsheet that you can just filter as you need it.  
(WI local 8) 
However, the same interviewee also observed that not all the work undertaken 
locally is captured in these reports.  (S)he stated: 
We don‟t capture everything that a Case Manager does which can be highly 
frustrating.  Like, they can have someone that comes on the books today and they 
can work with them intensively and then they go and get their own job.  You cannot 
capture that stuff.  (WI local 8) 
 
Perhaps as a result of this, interviewees at all three organisational levels pointed 
to the importance of non-numerical, more subjectively framed information in 
respect of local performance.  A local Service Centre Manager described how (s)he 
requires her staff to put stories of their successes in a specially designated folder 
on their local network:   
I can go in there and know that this month we did [this] and I‟ve got the evidence 
because they‟ve told me who the person was, what they did, all that sort of stuff.  
And then I get pretty annoyed if I go in there and there is nothing there because I‟m 
like, „I know you‟ve done something!  You just need to make sure that you put it in 
there so that I can capture that‟.  (WI local 4) 
That same manager also explained that a chart had been put up in the lunch 
room:  
„Growing Our Communities‟, it‟s a tree, and that‟s to capture social development.  
That‟s to celebrate our successes of what we get through social development; 
whether that‟s feedback, observation, it doesn‟t matter.  That‟s something that you 
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can‟t pull from anywhere so we are reliant on the staff or clients or external 
organisations to give us that feedback.  We encourage that.  (WI local 4) 
Another local Service Centre Manager described how (s)he uses Work and 
Income‟s intranet to learn of success stories from other centres.  She explained:  
[T]hat‟s a good place … you get some of those good stories that are coming through.  
Every day they do a story on a staff member, nationally, about what people are up to.  
It also enlightens you as to what other people are doing in other regions. … it‟s 
always interesting to go and glean some ideas and see what they are up to … the 
regions that are quite proactive, and are talked of highly at a national level, and are 
performing really well.  (WI local 8) 
„Labour market intelligence‟ is also important in the process of managing local 
performance in that it provides insight into the flow of new work or opportunities 
that are likely to affect each centre.  As a regional level interviewee noted: 
Our labour market intelligence should be telling us if there‟s a big closure, shut down, 
seasonal lay offs, or whatever.  We should well and truly know that stuff before it 
even happens; and if we do, let‟s get in there and stop them from coming in the door 
by being proactive and averting people from unemployment into jobs.  (WI regional 
9) 
 
The broader purpose to Measure and Manage the Organisation ( associated with 
the concept of organisational capital discussed in Chapter 3) was, to a limited 
extent, mentioned by interviewees from all three organisational levels.  A national 
office manager explained some broader issues of monitoring and managing 
performance by saying: 
[I]t‟s not just looking at results, it‟s looking across our HR stats and all those kinds of 
things.  Once you understand what is a good performance and one that is not so good 
[you can] actually start to understand what is an issue of leadership.  [That means] 
getting a profile of what is a good leader and what you are looking for in your 
recruitment and development of those people.  (WI national 7) 
Similarly a regional manager stated that, although harder to measure, qualitative 
information on the organisation‟s health is important:  
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The targets being achieved and exceeded is one indicator.  Other measures for me 
are core human resource measures such as sick leave usage, such as attrition. … Are 
staff more satisfied with their job?  Are we an attractive organisation when we do go 
out for recruitment?  Do we have the best possible candidates lining up to get in the 
door because they see us as an employer who provides an opportunity … that we are 
attractive to the kind of people who we would like to do the work that we have to do?  
(WI regional 9) 
 
Interviewees at the local and national levels also provided some observations on 
the purpose to Measure and Manage Team Performance.  One local Service Centre 
Manager described how (s)he provides information on how each team52 is 
“tracking in terms of our targets” and reinforces this with “any good news stories” 
(WI local 12).  Another Service Centre Manager explained how a planned move to 
a new Job Search Service will result in a change in work practices at the local 
level:  
I won‟t be able to set individual targets on that group.  It‟s going to be very hard to 
[do so] because you don‟t have a case load, as such, to manage.  It‟s going to be 
more around what has been your contribution to the site to achieve what it has.  (WI 
local 4) 
At the national level a manager also pointed to the difficulties that will result from 
this change in terms of assessing individual performance: 
What we are getting into now, particularly at a case manager level, is … looking at 
what else you might get some measurement around to see how they contribute to the 
team.  As opposed to that more number-type measurement, like how many things did 
you get right.  (WI national 7) 
 
                                               
52
 At a service centre, teams are usually arranged around particular types of social welfare benefits.   
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Legitimising Purposes of Work and Income 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show that interviewees from Work and Income mentioned four 
purposes that are concerned with establishing or maintaining legitimacy rather 
than supporting their own decision-making processes, namely to: 
(i) Meet National Reporting Requirements; 
(ii) Meet System Requirements; 
(iii) Measure and Manage Public Expectations; and 
(iv) Meet Government Reporting Requirements. 
 
The most significant of these purposes, particularly at the local and regional levels, 
is to Meet National Reporting Requirements.  A regional level manager explained 
how national key performance indicators are “divided out and rolled down to a site 
level” (WI regional 3).  (S)he described the monthly reporting process as follows:   
A lot of our performance comes back to the overarching target of sustainable 
employment and registry reductions.  Then there are a whole lot of variables around 
client service, the way that you actually do that.  There‟s timeliness around the 
maintaining of the benefit system and how quickly you actually grant benefits and 
deal with people who want to make appointments; how long our waiting times are; 
and of course our client satisfaction survey that‟s undertaken every month as well.  
On top of that we are required to develop a regional strategy, a regional approach to 
other things that we actually do and other projects that we are involved in, and 
monitor and report back on those projects as well. (WI regional 3) 
At the local level a Case Manager explained: 
We have to meet targets … and then it‟s broken down again as to who goes into 
employment - whether it‟s sustainable employment, whether the client has found the 
position themselves, whether we‟ve helped them into employment through our own 
list of vacancies.  (WI local 5) 
In relation to monthly targets a Service Centre Manager observed:  
We are measured by targets … All of the ones I don‟t meet I‟ve got to report on.  
Even the ones I do meet I have to report on as well because it‟s important to see 
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what we are doing because it might mean that we are doing something really good 
that we can share with everyone else. 
That interviewee also explained the requirement to report on the service centre‟s 
interaction with the community and other agencies:  
[W]e‟ve got to report on what happened in our community.  Did we do any 
presentations, and expos?  And participation [in community matters] is … mainly 
around ill health and disabilities … when you are referring them to other agencies, like 
support agencies.  (WI local 4) 
 
The purpose to Meet System Requirements reflects the demands placed on staff to 
follow procedures, and comply with the data entry requirements, formally encoded 
within the agency‟s computer applications.  Unlike the interviewees from the other 
two case study agencies, those from Work and Income described few problems 
with these requirements.  A national office manager explained that the unwieldy 
nature of a number of the agency‟s older computer systems, that were due to be 
replaced with a single, integrated client management system, was resulting in a 
number of managers creating their own client databases in Microsoft Excel.  (S)he 
commented: 
You can go to them and say, who‟s that guy, can you tell me something about him? … 
And it would be seconds as opposed to going through a number of [screens] … and 
you can‟t argue with that.  You can‟t go, „oh, I can‟t let you do this‟.  But longer term 
you can‟t continue with that because you can‟t report on it.  You can‟t get information 
out of each and everybody‟s Excel spreadsheet.  (WI national 6) 
At the local level a Service Centre Manager noted: 
We are very much reliant on the information and technology.  I think we use about 
seven [different systems].  (WI local 4).   
That interviewee also reflected the comment of a local Case Manager that “the 
system changes all the time” (WI local 5) when (s)he reported:   
When Jobs for You [a new system] was released some staff brought into it and some 
staff didn‟t …  we need to make sure that, at the end of the day, staff understand 
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what Jobs for You is about and the reasons why we need to put in quality information.  
(WI local 4).   
However, in general, the comments of interviewees from Work and Income 
reflected the opinion of a local Case Manager who stated:   
I don‟t have any issues with any of our systems actually.  In fact they‟re all really 
good.  (WI local 5) 
 
With reference to the purpose to Measure and Manage Public Expectations (which 
reflects the concept od public capital discussed in Chapter 3), a national office 
manager conveyed the importance of monitoring and managing the confidence 
that stakeholders have in Work and Income:   
Sometimes organisations become internally focused and thinking that they are doing 
a good job because it might be in line with their output plan or they actually think 
because their particular measurements are all achieved they are doing a good job and 
they have public confidence.  But I don‟t think these two always go hand in hand.  So 
you have to make sure that you are always engaged with stakeholders so you always 
maintain confidence and that you take any feedback on board as you‟re moving ahead 
in whatever direction.  (WI national 7)   
As well as receiving feedback from stakeholders, the agency seeks to provide 
information to them and the broader community.  A regional manager explained 
how the Ministry‟s annual Regional Strategic Plans seek to explain Work and 
Income‟s (and the broader Ministry of Social Development‟s) objectives and 
activities.  (S)he observed: 
[T]he strategic plans are really just a communication document to the community and 
to stakeholders to say these are the areas we are focusing on as an organisation, 
these are the key outcome areas for us, and these are some of the strategies that we 
will be implementing to achieve that for our region.  (WI regional 9) 
However, a national office manager suggested that, despite the agency‟s success 
in lowering the unemployment rate, it had been less successful in communicating 
that success to the public.  (S)he said: 
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We are not very good at telling that story, so I think we have to go out there and talk 
about the things that we do and where we might like to go.  (WI national 7) 
Significantly in the Ministry‟s Regional Plans, and in other approaches discussed by 
Work and Income interviewees which are designed to Measure and Manage Public 
Expectations, the emphasis is on narrative rather than on numerical information 
(i.e. “telling that story” and “talking externally about some of the things that we 
do”).   
 
In relation to the purpose to Meet Government Reporting Requirements, a local 
Service Centre Manager explained that measuring and managing performance is: 
 … also about what government expects of us … [and] the Statement of Intent that 
Government and the Ministry have agreed to - they‟ll give us the money if we do it 
like this.  (WI local 1) 
However, the major focus on this purpose was at the national level where an 
interviewee described the need to prepare information “as a result of a 
parliamentary question, OIA,53 [or] Minister‟s request” (WI national 6) as well as 
for the purpose of the agency‟s quarterly reporting to the Minister and for the 
agency‟s contribution to the Ministry‟s Annual Report.   
 
Operational Purposes of Work and Income 
As shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, in relation to managing performance for 
operational purposes, interviewees from Work and Income identified three 
purposes, namely to: 
(i) Measure and Manage Social Development; 
(ii) Measure and Manage Processes; and 
(iii) Measure and Manage Clients.   
 
                                               
53 A request for information, generally directed at a Minister, under the Official Information Act 1982.    
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The most significant of these is to Measure and Manage Social Development.  At 
the local level, a Service Centre Manager recognised the significance of a broad 
focus on outcomes.  (S)he noted:   
It‟s more about managing outcomes than managing outputs and I think that‟s where 
our organisation is going. (WI local 4) 
However, the only outcome specifically mentioned by interviewees from Work and 
Income was Leading Social Development (refer Chapter 6) and a national office 
manager explained the difficulties of monitoring this:  
I believe that social development is purely a concept and it‟s un-reportable. … [I]t‟s 
very nebulous and often quite vague. You can see numbers; you can see reductions in 
youth unemployment rates, or engagement of youth in certain activities, but you 
can‟t necessarily say that that had a lot to do with the local plan or that it had a lot to 
do with anything necessarily.  (WI national 6) 
Nevertheless, another national office manager pointed to a number of possible 
measures, saying: 
[T]here‟s a whole bunch of things that you would … say [reflect] there is a measure of 
success here.  Maybe youth justice isn‟t required.  Maybe the cops aren‟t called in.  
Maybe there‟s a reducing amount of family violence.  All of those kinds of things. … 
That‟s what we are struggling with at the moment.  (WI national 7) 
 
A regional level manager pointed to the more formal framework provided by the 
annual Social Report:   
One of the other key indicators for us is the Social Report which is published every 
year and it gives us an index of key performance areas that the OECD monitors.  
Those are things such as road deaths, infant mortalities, imprisonment; and they‟re 
largely fairly negative indicators really.  There‟s a whole a whole raft of them and 
every region has a rating around how well it‟s doing against each one of those factors.  
(WI regional 9) 
 
The purpose to Measure and Manage Processes is an important element of the 
accuracy reporting process discussed below, and is also a significant focus of the 
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weekly Wednesday Briefs held at each site.  However, as a distinct purpose of 
performance measurement, it attracted little comment from the interviewees.  A 
national office manager did suggest:  
[Performance] can come down … to certain tools that we have implemented in the 
front line.  Are they working properly?  Are our people working with them properly?  
And, if they‟re crucial tools that support higher level outcomes, then they‟re very 
important to us.  (WI national 6) 
A local Service Centre Manager also explained his/her approach to managing 
performance by saying:   
It‟s important that if we haven‟t got it quite right, what happened in our process and 
what do we need to do to change it?  Was it a particular person, or was it something 
that we didn‟t deliver quite right, or what was it?  I like to find out what it is and then 
combat it to make sure that it doesn‟t happen again, or try and minimise the risk as 
much as possible.  (WI local 4) 
 
Interviewees at both the regional and local levels described an accuracy reporting 
process whereby a national office team routinely analyses a random sample of 
client files for accuracy: 
[E]very month the national office … accuracy reporting team … go through and pick so 
many actions out and they ask us to go through and send a copy of all the [relevant] 
paperwork.  They check it and then we get the results for that month.  Our super 
team are 100%; now they‟re a very experienced team and they are so proud of what 
their achievements are.  And they very rarely miss out on that.  (WI local 1) 
 
The third operational purpose of measuring and managing performance mentioned 
by interviewees from Work and Income is to Measure and Manage Clients.  This is 
principally concerned with understanding how well the agency‟s services are 
delivered from the perspective of its clients.  A local Service Centre Manager 
explained how nationally-managed client surveys are used to provide evidence of 
how clients experience the agency‟s services and noted that, whereas in the past 
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clients have been asked: “Did the person introduce themselves?” and “Were they 
wearing their name badge?, they are now more likely to be asked “Did you feel 
your case manager was respectful?” or “Did you feel that they care about you?”.  
However, in this interviewee‟s view: 
[S]ervice excellence is about more than client satisfaction.  It‟s about the quality of 
how you do your work for your client.  (WI local 1) 
 
In the opinion of another Service Centre Manager, these client satisfaction surveys 
are “taken with a grain of salt” (WI local 8).  (S)he explained that, although 
his/her team was not meeting the required standards, the matter is not as 
straightforward as it might appear: 
When I sit here and I listen to the interviews, I don‟t see it; I can‟t put my finger on 
why it is. … [P]otentially we‟ve got forty people that are registered unemployed; we 
see them every day; if we don‟t see them we ring them, they don‟t always like that … 
and they would moan about us because we‟re harassing them.  But that‟s part of 
what our role is; not so much the harassment but it‟s just to stay in touch to try and 
help them, to keep them up, to refer them for jobs; but at the bottom they don‟t want 
to work. (WI local 8) 
A regional manager also reported that some sites periodically conduct their own 
local surveys in order to “get more detail around where you are doing well and not 
so well” (WI regional 3).   
 
External Purposes of Work and Income 
Interviewees from Work and Income described two external purposes, namely to: 
(i) Measure and Manage Providers; and 
(ii) Measure and Manage Joined Up Government and Community.   
 
To Measure and Manage Providers is concerned with measuring and managing the 
training and development programmes that are delivered to Work and Income 
clients by external organisations.  It was the most significant purpose mentioned 
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by interviewees at the regional level and, to a limited extent, it was also 
mentioned by national level interviewees.   
 
The majority of the comments relating to this purpose focused on measuring and 
managing the effectiveness of the programmes delivered by external providers.  A 
regional level manager explained that Work and Income seeks to measure two 
things:  
One is around tangible outcomes in terms of a client getting a job, and staying in a 
job.  The other one‟s more around participation; [i.e.] if a client utilises or participates 
in an activity that we have purchased [e.g. producing a CV or getting a driver‟s 
licence] … that might be what we have purchased and that‟s the „outcome‟ that we 
are signing up for. … [P]robably in the region of sixty percent of our contracts are 
outcome based, of people going into work, and the other forty percent are client 
development related, which is preparing people - giving them a set of tools that will 
help them.  (WI regional 9) 
However, a national level manager explained that, in order to manage sustainable 
employment it is necessary to monitor the effectiveness of programmes beyond 
the immediate delivery of getting a job:   
[Providers] have a certain percentage of people that come out the end and we want 
to know whether we achieve or over-achieve that.  And then we [also] have an in-
work support component as well which checks with them about what they are doing, 
are they happy.  (WI national 11) 
 
Managing the efficiency of providers‟ programmes is more difficult.  A national 
office manager explained:   
It‟s defining exactly what parts of our programmes we do better than others.  We 
have a raft of things we are doing; it‟s trying to isolate what works best.  That is the 
hardest thing to do. (WI national 6) 
However, a regional manager explained how the economy with which these 
programmes are delivered is managed by reviews of the extent to which the full 
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capacity of contracts with providers are used.  (S)he stated that they would only 
contract for extra programmes when there was:  
... agreement from service centres and Service Centre Managers that they want them 
and what percentage of clients they will actually provide to the programme.  So we 
might have a programme for a hundred people and ten service centres might all 
agree to send ten people; we actually set up an agreement with them around what 
they are going to do to make that happen and the fact that that‟s actually part of 
their performance agreement.  (WI regional 3) 
 
As is shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the purpose to Measure and Manage Joined Up 
Government was only mentioned by Work and Income interviewees at the national 
level.  A national office manager explained that, at the local level, the 
effectiveness of these activities is difficult to determine.  In his/her words:   
I guess it‟s also easy to define success through the number of times that we meet 
with other agencies or the fora that we attend; and unquestionably we are talking 
more than we ever have and working together as parts of the whole.  But it still 
doesn‟t tell us whether we‟re actually better off through doing that or whether we are 
just having a collection of meetings that actually don‟t get us anywhere.  (WI national 
6) 
 
However, another national office manager suggested that, at a practical level, the 
extent to which joined up government is working could be determined “by the 
types of initiatives that are run” (WI national 7).  (S)he also explained that the 
effectiveness of these initiatives could be determined by the nature of the 
feedback received from the other agencies involved, because:  
 … you can get some pretty negative feedback about people trying to take over things 
and that kind of stuff.  …  If people do a really good job you get really good feedback 
and you see great things happening.  (WI national 7) 
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In turn, (s)he explained that, within the agency, as part of their annual 
performance review, managers are required to provide commentary on their 
collaboration with other organisations.   
 
Summary: Purposes of Work and Income 
In summary, interviewees from Work and Income suggested that why 
performance is measured and managed may vary across the three organisational 
levels, although the principal focus for all three levels taken together is on 
organisational purposes.  However, unlike the interviewees from the other two 
case study agencies, interviewees from Work and Income also emphasised 
external purposes.  As shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.6, taken together the external 
purposes to Measure and Manage Providers and to Measure and Manage Joined Up 
Government and Community the legitimisation purposes to Measure/Manage 
Public Expectations and to Meet Government Reporting Requirements, represent a 
significant proportion of the comments provided by interviewees at each level 
(national 26%, regional 32%, and local 2%).   
 
The use of both numerically targets and narrative and direct observation to 
evaluate their performance reflects the existence of both objective and subjective 
representation (discussed in Chapter 4 as the way in which performance is framed 
or symbolically described).  Interviewees reported that performance is objectively 
represented in a significant amount of quantified performance information.  
However, of equal importance is qualitative information relating to how services 
are delivered.  This adopts a more subjective representation that is provided by 
surveys and feedback (from clients, external organisations, and other elements of 
Work and Income), stories and direct observation of work practices.  Similarly 
although social development outcomes are quantified in the annual „Social Report‟, 
sense is made of this information via subjective evaluation (“gut feeling”) rather 
than by the application of a formal logic of cause and effect.   
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It is evident that some performance information is produced for purposes that 
appear to be more closely related to legitimising the agency‟s existence and 
functions than to supporting managerial decision-making processes.  As might be 
expected, in part performance information is managed at the local and regional 
levels for what are perceived to be national office reporting requirements.   
 
A number of interviewees suggested that the formal reporting requirements do not 
capture all of the work of local staff.  There is a performance „dark matter‟, not 
visible to regional and national level managers, but nonetheless seen at the local 
level as an important component of their work.  Interviewees at that level, 
therefore, described the use of manual systems and spreadsheets to record work 
that would otherwise not be taken into account in performance management and 
resourcing decisions.   
 
The narration of stories of actual events and experiences also plays a large role in 
„sensegiving‟ processes by which a consistent understanding of the agency‟s wider 
purposes and objectives is maintained.  Within Work and Income other internal 
sensegiving mechanisms include the regular Wednesday Team Brief and corporate 
artefacts such as desk calendars and wall charts.  Whereas the former appears to 
be highly effective in engaging staff, for most interviewees the latter artefacts 
appear to have become part of the corporate wallpaper rather than a source of a 
message that they are aware of.   
 
7.4  Public Prisons 
As is shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.4, especially at the national and local levels of 
Public Prisons, the key purposes of measuring and managing performance were 
seen by the interviewees as a whole to be those related to the organisation.  
However, the regional level interviewees identified legitimisation purposes to be 
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the most significant.  Unlike the interviewees from Work and Income, those from 
Public Prisons identified no external purposes.   
Figure 7.4: Purposes of Measuring and Managing Performance Identified 
by Interviewees from Public Prisons Grouped by level in the 
Organisational Hierarchy 
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Organisational Purposes of Public Prisons 
From Figures 7.2 and 7.4 it may be seen that the interviewees from Public Prisons 
described three purposes of measuring and managing performance that are 
concerned with factors relating to the management of the organisation.  These are 
to: 
(i) Measure and Manage Local Performance; 
(ii) Measure and Manage National Performance; and 
(iii) Measure and Manage Individual Performance.   
 
The most significant purpose of measuring and managing performance identified, 
particularly by local level interviewees, is to Measure and Manage Local 
Performance.  A number of interviewees commented on the extent of performance 
measurement and management at the local level.  For example, a Prison Manager 
observed “we‟ve very high compliance reporting” (PP local 11) and a Unit Manager 
stated “performance is managed in depth in Corrections” (PP local 6).   
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Commenting on the targets against which local performance is measured, a 
regional level interviewee explained that these targets “drop out” of the 
Statement of Intent and strategic business plan.  (S)he also explained that the 
performance measures are: 
… more the numeric things around how many programmes did we provide to 
prisoners, and what were the hours of Court attendance, and how many Parole Board 
reports did we write?  How many escapes did we have?  (PP regional 13) 
A local level Prison Manager also provided the following examples of his/her 
quantitative targets: 
 … unlock hours for prisoners, hours of work for prisoners.  We agree to supervise 
ninety thousand hours of community work for the financial year.  Prisoners go on 
programmes … attendance of programmes.  Drugs, we have drug testing so we put 
strategies in place to ensure that we get by the sixteen percent random positive drug 
testing.  And things like that.  (PP local 4) 
Financial targets were mentioned by another Prison Manager who said: 
We‟ve got the staff costs: salaries, overtime, leave [and] prisoner costs: bedding, 
food and cell costs.  (PP local 11) 
 
However one local Unit Manager suggested that routinely reporting against these 
targets was an unrealistic expectation.  (S)he explained:   
Each month, let‟s say for example, I put I came on target with my budget this month, 
I met the ICR [Internal Control Report] checks this month ….But I just don‟t have 
time to be doing that kind of stuff.  I strongly believe I shouldn‟t be writing my own 
report so I won‟t be doing it.  But that‟s how it‟s supposed to be; you are supposed to 
be saying: „did this this month‟, etc.  (PP local 6) 
Another Unit Manager described how (s)he measures local performance: 
I suppose by getting to the end of the day, end of the week and just seeing what‟s 
been achieved within the unit.  If your targets for the week have been met; if the 
assignments and the jobs you set your staff - have they managed to do them?  It‟s 
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simple things that the PCO [Principal Corrections Officer] runs like sentence 
management, sentence plan reviews, classification reviews.  (PP local 9) 
 
A local Principal Corrections Officer described how (s)he maintained his/her own 
weekly reporting system by which his/her staff submitted reports that (s)he 
summarised and then emailed back to them.  (S)he explained:   
It‟s like a narking sort of system.  They don‟t even know they‟re narking themselves 
in.  They‟re telling me how well they are doing or they‟re telling me that their 
colleague is not performing.  They don‟t know that but that‟s how I‟ve designed it.  So 
I get the report every Friday and I go through it.  And I also send that information out 
to all the staff on Friday so that they are aware of where they are with their progress.  
(PP local 7) 
 
Local interviewees additionally described a range of meetings.  For example, a 
Principal Corrections Officer explained how (s)he meets with his/her Unit Manager: 
… every morning and talk about issues.  Once a week we have a meeting here with 
the Prison Manager and all the other Unit Managers, PCOs like myself.  Fridays the 
Unit Manager and myself we have a meeting with our staff.  It‟s a good place for them 
to air whatever problem they have.  (PP local 7) 
Similarly a Prison Manager explained:  
We also have unit managers meeting as well when a lot of useful information gets 
cascaded down and we discuss issues and that sort of thing.  Every fortnight I attend 
RSMT, which is the senior management team for the region; and then quarterly 
there‟s a regional management meeting which is all the unit managers and all the 
support service managers and we get a „state of the nation‟ speech from the Regional 
Manager about things.  (PP local 4) 
 
However, a national office manager voiced concern that, although the formal 
systems have been designed to capture a great deal of information, at the local 
level this is not occurring consistently.  (S)he noted:  
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Our staff are not always that good at sharing, in a professional way, insights as they 
are at maybe doing some of the other parts of their jobs.  When you‟re talking about 
individual prisoner level, there is an attempt to design the gathering and the sharing 
of … all that information [so that it] is then available to everybody that has a 
responsibility for that prisoner.  And, you know, we‟ve got some staff who are very 
good at it and some that aren‟t.  We train them in the report writing, we … do 
refreshers in writing file notes and stuff.  It‟s not a natural inclination for a lot of our 
staff though, so it is a challenge. (PP national 3) 
An external person, who was working at one of the prisons in which the interviews 
were conducted, observed further that, although the Integrated Offender 
Management System (IOMS) contains a great deal of information in respect of 
inmates and offenders, there is a limited ability to extend and summarise this as 
much of the information is entered in narrative form and, as a consequence, is 
subject to the constraints of the limited literary skills of many of the corrections 
officers.  (S)he suggested that, as a result, “this place runs on folklore” (PP 
external 12). 
 
The purpose to Measure and Manage National Performance was the most 
significant purpose mentioned by national level interviewees and was, to a lesser 
extent, commented on by interviewees from the regional level.  A national level 
manager explained the range of different performance information (s)he receives:  
I get piles and piles and piles of paper and it‟s really hard to absorb everything that‟s 
in there.  I get a business report every month that shows me the stats and the 
reasons for the ups and downs. … [T]he exception report I get is just what‟s the really 
good stuff you‟re doing out there (the new initiatives, the good news stories) and the 
stuff that‟s gone really badly wrong.  I get written incident reports coming on my 
screen every day; I probably get a dozen from around the country.  I can choose to 
just read it and say that‟s OK, or read it and pick up the „phone and say: “Tell me 
some more about this” or, if it‟s really serious, “Lets get an investigation done and an 
investigation report”.  (PP national 5) 
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The same manager explained that a key reason for this volume of information is 
the management (or “avoidance”) of risk:   
[T]hat‟s because we‟ve been beaten up so badly in the media; I think the confidence 
is down.  So we want to get on top of things as soon as they happen.  (PP national 5) 
 
As indicated in Figures 7.2 and 7.4 the purpose to Measure and Manage Individual 
Performance was mentioned by both national and local level interviewees.  A local 
Prison Manager explained that individual performance plans are an outcome of 
targets being cascaded down from the General Manager of Public Prisons to the 
Regional Manager and then down to prison managers and unit managers.  In 
addition to these numeric targets, individual performance is measured in relation 
to a series of competencies.  This interviewee observed:   
I have a performance plan with targets that I have to meet … but then there‟s 
management competencies in there as well that you get marked on like leadership 
and decision-making and analysis and self-management, and all that sort of thing.  I 
have to provide evidence to my manager of competency.  For leadership competency, 
OK I‟ll say: “I‟ve provided leadership of my team and here‟s an example of what I 
did”.  It‟s just a matter of remembering what you did; what the problem was and how 
I fixed it sort of thing.  In this role, because you‟re doing ten things at once, I don‟t 
actually sit down and note what I‟ve done.  I should do; it would make things a lot 
easier for me at review time if I did that, but I just don‟t.  (PP local 4) 
 
In setting performance objectives for his/her own staff the same local Prison 
Manager explained that it is necessary to recognise that individuals face different 
challenges.  (S)he explained:  
Managers here manage different units and they have different challenges in those 
units.  Someone that‟s managing a Maori focus unit, for example, has different 
challenges and different things happen as opposed to someone that‟s managing a 
high-medium [security] unit that‟s full of nasty type people.  They certainly have 
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different challenges to face every day.  So I‟ve put in specific targets for different 
managers who manage different units.  (PP local 4) 
Nevertheless, a local Unit Manager suggested that, as it is not linked to their pay, 
his/her staff view their performance plan as a “going nowhere document”.  (S)he 
explained:  
[I]t‟s a tool that we can have to keep track of our staff‟s performance and it‟s a tool 
that we can say, “Well done”; or identify areas that aren‟t quite being achieved.  But 
it‟s not a great tool because it‟s not linked to anything.  And so it‟s sort of, “Well you 
didn‟t achieve this, oh well!”  That‟s the staff‟s attitude, not my attitude; but it‟s very 
hard to really get their involvement in it and to try and express the importance when 
they say: “So what if I don‟t!”  (PP local 8) 
A local Principal Corrections Officer described how his/her performance was 
measured by audits:   
We have an audit, that is how [my Unit Manager] knows if I‟m doing my job or not.  
Every three months we have the auditors come out here and review our systems, the 
way we do things here, what the outcomes are.  They put a report in and that tells 
the managers here how well we‟re performing.  That means how well I‟m performing; 
that‟s what it comes down to.  (PP local 7) 
 
Operational Purposes of Public Prisons 
As shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.4, interviewees from Public Prisons described four 
purposes of measuring and managing performance in relation to operational 
factors.  These are to: 
(i) Measure and Manage Outcomes; 
(ii) Measure and Manage Rehabilitation & Reintegration 
(iii) Measure and Manage Confinement; and 
(iv) Measure and Manage Process.   
 
As noted in Chapter 6, Public Prisons contributes to two of the Department of 
Corrections‟ outcomes, namely, Protecting the Public and Reducing Re-offending.  
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The purpose to Measure and Manage Outcomes was mentioned by interviewees 
from both the national and regional levels.  A national level interviewee reported 
that the extent to which Public Prisons is making a difference, at least in terms of 
reducing re-offending, is currently measured by a „recidivism index‟ and a 
„rehabilitation quotient‟ which measure “the extent to which people are re-
convicted and re-imprisoned” (PP national 3).  However, (s)he also suggested that 
these measures need to be extended to enable the agency to understand: 
[Whether there is] any evidence that our interventions reduce the severity of the 
crime … [and] the extent to which prisoners‟ behaviour changes when they‟re with us 
- that‟s about drug use incidents, holding down a job, progressing through from high 
security care to low security, and really self [management].  (PP national 3)   
 
The more specific purpose to Measure and Manage Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration was mentioned by interviewees at the national and local level.  A 
national office manager defined rehabilitation in terms of: 
… how many people come back into prison, how many people come back with a fall in 
the seriousness of what they were originally there for.  (PP national 5) 
However, linking to considerations of measuring and managing outcomes, (s)he 
also suggested:  
I don‟t know that those [rehabilitation measures] go far enough.  I don‟t know that 
we‟ve yet picked up on the fact that we have several generations from the same 
family in prisons and that I think we need to measure recidivism of families rather 
than individual prisoners.  I don‟t know that that‟s just a Corrections issue; I think it‟s 
a wider justice issue.  (PP national 5) 
 
In relation to the reintegration of offenders back into the community, a national 
level manager noted that, as yet, there was limited performance information: 
We‟ve put some proper resources in place to manage the reintegration processes; 
reintegration case workers, whanau liaison, but they‟ve only been in place over the 
last two or three years … we‟ve started to plan and get consistent practice around the 
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country, and working with other agencies outside Prisons.  So I think it‟s too early to 
talk about measures in that area.  We‟ve got measures around the numbers of people 
we‟re doing stuff with but we don‟t have measures of the effect.  (PP national 5) 
At the local level a Unit Manager also observed that for offenders that are not 
subject to probation orders, or any continuation probation orders from when the 
sentence was set, it is difficult to provide evidence of support for their 
reintegration:   
I‟ve talked to prisoners here, and they just say: “Well there‟s nothing out there for 
me; what is there for me when I go out?”  And I can‟t answer the question.  There‟s 
no support; we drop them out the front door here and that‟s it, “bye, bye”.  (PP local 
1) 
 
The purpose to Measure and Manage Confinement was principally mentioned by 
interviewees at a national level.  One such manager explained:  
There‟s a series of well accepted measures around that [confinement] in terms of 
escapes, and incidents in prisons, and deaths in custody, suicides, and unlock hours, 
which are well accepted measures internationally amongst like jurisdictions [in terms] 
of doing that core work of prisons well.  (PP national 3) 
Another national office manager similarly stated:   
[T]he safety and security stuff is quite easy to measure and I‟ve got to say that New 
Zealand stacks up pretty well against most overseas jurisdictions.  Suicide levels, 
escape levels, assault levels are reducing all the time, generally; there‟s a few bumps 
along the way, but generally.  So we stack up pretty well on those.  (PP national 5) 
 
A number of interviewees at the regional and local levels mentioned a regular 
audit process that serves to provide assurance in respect of the performance 
measures that relate to the purpose to Measure and Manage Process.  As a 
regional interviewee explained:  
We measure ourselves on things like internal control requirements, how many faults 
did we have, what about repeat faults.  We do a lot of audits so we measure on all 
those kinds of things.  (PP regional 13) 
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A Principal Corrections officer additionally explained how those audits are used to 
confirm that prisoners are being managed in accordance with their pre-defined 
plan:  
[The auditors look for] whether we are … managing the prisoners according to their 
plan, … And how do they get their information?  I have to keep a report on it.  I keep 
weekly reports so they‟ll come in my office and check my files.  And sometimes they 
will go and ask the prisoners just to make sure we are not … making it up. … They will 
sometimes go and check with the staff and with the inmates.  (PP local 7) 
A local Unit Manager further explained:   
[Performance] can be audited from Region and from National Office as well.  They 
don‟t necessarily come out here; they can do audits at the click of a button.  But we 
do have quarterly audits when they come out here and check that what is on IOMS
54
 
is actually on a prisoner‟s file.  (PP local 6) 
However, that Manager‟s opinion on the effectiveness of the audit process was 
somewhat ambivalent.  (S)he stated:    
We have audits that tend to come around very frequently.  We can have weekly, 
monthly and quarterly checks in various areas. … I think we are overdone with the 
audit type things; but then, depending on what comes back from them, I get my 
performance measured on the results of those audits.  So they are a good benchmark 
for me to see what we are doing right and what we are doing wrong.  (PP local 6) 
 
Legitimisation Purposes of Public Prisons 
As shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.4, interviewees from the regional and local levels of 
Public Prisons identified three purposes for measuring and managing performance 
related to legitimisation, namely to: 
(i) Meet National Reporting Requirements;  
(ii) Measure and Manage Public Expectations; and  
(iii) Meet Government Reporting Requirements.   
 
                                               
54 IOMS refers to the Integrated Offender Management [computer] System 
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The purpose to Meet National Reporting Requirements was explained by a local 
Unit Manager as follows:  
It‟s all just about reporting and giving the right information to the right people.  (PP 
local 9) 
However, in another Unit Manager‟s opinion, the need to respond to national 
reporting requirements is distracting resources from the agency‟s central role: 
We are now becoming a reporting agency as opposed to a prison agency.  From 
where I sit, we seem to be loosing focus on what our core functionality is.  (PP local 
2) 
 
At the regional level, a manager described attempts to develop a national 
“scorecard” but also expressed concern about the accuracy of the data and the 
extent to which a “league table” would take account of the local conditions and 
facilities at each prison.  (S)he commented: 
There is a bit of concern among a number of us at a senior level lest this be used as a 
weapon as opposed to a tool.  Particularly while there are no guarantees over the 
accuracy of the collection of data then, as I say, rubbish in rubbish out.  [The concern 
is] we are going to be beaten over the head with the results when there‟s no way of 
validating them.  (PP regional 13) 
 
Only one interviewee in Public Prisons identified the purpose to Measure and 
Manage Public Expectations as a reason to measure and manage performance.  
This regional manager noted a concern about the public‟s negative opinion of the 
agency55 and suggested this was unfair as it was based on a perception rather 
than reality.  (S)he noted:  
It‟s contributing to this whole overall measurement that politicians do of how well 
we‟re performing.  But that‟s not based on any fact, not even loosely based on fact 
                                               
55 At the time of the interview Public Prisons had recently featured in the public media on a number of occasions in 
relation to allegations of mismanagement and corruption within Prisons and an incident in which a young 
offender was murdered while being transported from a court appearance back to prison.   
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most of the time.  Sadly, the way we are measured on our performance in that public 
arena is often on a good story and not on the truth.  (PP regional 13) 
On the one hand the interviewee explained that there is a need for caution and 
suspicion about how material is reaching the media:  
Somebody wanted to put out a very proactive staff notice this morning and I said, 
“just be very wary; it will probably end up on the front page of the Dom Post56 
because we‟ve got a leak down here”.  (PP regional 13) 
However, (s)he also suggested:  
One of the things we don‟t do enough is use some of our more colourful people and 
do a „day in the life of‟, or stuff like that.  Or let‟s talk to somebody [i.e. a staff 
member] and find out what their opinions are because they are interesting to other 
people.  I don‟t think we are doing that sort of stuff.  (PP regional 13) 
 
A local level Unit Manager explained the purpose to Meet Government Reporting 
Requirements by describing the impact of an inquiry by the Ombudsman into the 
recent death of a young prisoner.  (S)he said:    
He‟s [the Ombudsman] asked the Department a huge number of questions about the 
way that we handle prisoners‟ movements and all the rest of it.  (PP local 2) 
That manager also described the workload associated with questions posed in 
Parliament to the Minister: 
[A Member of Parliament] fires a question at our current Minister.  So our Minister 
goes to our CEO who then goes to our General Manager, who then goes to … it filters 
down to us at the coal face who have to gather the information to answer the 
Minister.  This all takes time and it‟s my time; then I feed [the information] back to 
my boss who then feeds it back along the chain.  Well, when you sit down and 
calculate how much time and how much money it‟s cost the taxpayer to answer an 
absolutely ridiculous question that should never have been asked in the first place ...  
It‟s all political grandstanding created by one party against another; which is 
absolutely ridiculous but it costs the taxpayer hundreds of thousands of dollars every 
year.  (PP local 2) 
                                               
56 The Dominion Post is the local daily newspaper.   
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A similar sentiment was expressed by a local Prison Manager who said: 
[A Member of Parliament] is shocking; he has asked hundreds and hundreds of 
questions and then … he asks the same question in a different way.  And we‟ve got to 
spend time responding to it.  It‟s just a … nightmare sometimes.  (PP local 4) 
 
Purposes of Public Prisons 
In summary, interviewees at all three organisational levels of Public Prisons 
described the existence and use of a large amount of quantified targets and 
information by which performance is objectively represented.  Although 
performance information in respect of offenders is also subjectively represented in 
IOMS in the form of case notes, it was suggested that the variability in the skills 
and aptitude of front line prison staff result in the quality of this formal information 
being inconsistent.  Subjectively framed representations gained at the national 
level through written incident reports and telephone conversations with local 
prison managers are, therefore, also important.  More informally, at the local level 
subjective representations of performance were described as “folklore”.   
 
Figure 7.2 shows that, like the other two case study agencies, interviewees from 
Public Prisons principally mentioned the internal purposes of performance and 
management, particularly those associated with measuring and managing the 
agency‟s local and national performance.  No comments were made in respect of 
specifically external purposes.   
 
In Chapter 6 it was noted that national level interviewees from Public Prisons 
principally focused on service delivery, rather than the expected organisational, 
functions.  Plausibly reflecting this focus, national level interviewees from that 
agency did not identify any legitimisation purposes of measuring and managing 
performance.  Those comments in respect of legitimisation purposes that were 
made by regional and local level interviewees noted the difficulty of effectively 
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managing public expectations via the media and the burden and potential misuse 
of performance information reported to national office.   
 
Interviewees from Public Prisons provided little evidence of internal sensegiving 
activities other than a description of a hierarchy of meetings in which issues and 
“the state of the nation” are discussed.   
 
7.5  Community Probation Service 
As Figures 7.2 and 7.5 reveal, like their counterparts in Work and Income and 
Public Prisons, the interviewees from all three organisational levels of the 
Community Probation Service focused principally on organisational purposes.  
Interviewees from all three organisational levels also commented on operational 
purposes but external and legitimisation purposes were barely mentioned.   
 
Figure 7.5: Purposes of Measuring and Managing Performance Identified 
by Interviewees from the Community Probation Service Grouped by Level 
in the Organisational Hierarchy 
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Organisational Purposes of the Community Probation Service 
As shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.5, interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service identified four organisational purposes of measuring and managing 
performance.  They are to:  
(i) Measure and Manage National Performance; 
(ii) Measure and Manage Individual Performance;  
(iii) Measure and Manage Local Performance; and 
(iv) Measure and Manage the Organisation.   
 
The purpose to Measure and Manage National Performance was most frequently 
mentioned by national and regional level interviewees.  A regional manager 
explained that, nationally, performance is measured and managed against “a 
whole bunch of indicators … and masses of reports” that are derived from the 
Department of Corrections‟ Statement of Intent and added: “We have a manual 
that describes what people should do and what we are funded to deliver and we 
watch that performance against that” (CPS regional 1).   
 
The measurement framework within which the Community Probation Service‟s 
performance is measured and managed was further explained by a national level 
manager who noted that the base units for most of the Community Probation 
Service‟s work, for which actual volumes are tracked against budget, is “new 
starts or new reports” together with “the rehab type components and the 
programmes and those things that we purchase”.  (S)he explained:   
For each of those [factors] we have an expected volume on an annual basis that we 
use as the base for our budgeting and against that expected volume we track the 
actual volumes.  They‟re not items within our control so they don‟t really reflect our 
performance in terms of anything other than our forecasting ability.  But they do have 
an impact and their relationship with quality that is quite crucial.  (CPS national 5) 
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Within the Community Probation Service qualitative aspects of performance are 
measured and managed by an audit process that reviews the completion and 
timeliness of standard tasks.  However, a local level manager cautioned:  
I feel that it‟s very easy for us to become infatuated with our statistical results and 
there is a real danger in doing that.  (CPS local 4) 
By way of an example, (s)he explained how the introduction of quality audits 
undertaken by staff from another site, rather than from the site being audited, had 
resulted in a fifty percent decline in the reported results.  (S)he suggested:  
[B]ecause it is part of their performance pay and whatnot … managers [i.e. those 
conducting the audit at another site] were marking harder.  It‟s almost like, “f I can 
make your light a bit dimmer, mine will seem brighter”.  So we have this subversive 
agenda going on and the reality is people at a higher level go: “Don‟t worry about 
that, look at the results”.  And I say, “Well actually our results are completely flawed”.  
(CPS local 4) 
The same interviewee intimated that another site had inflated the recorded 
significance and complexity of their reports to the Court and Parole Board so as to 
justify the acquisition of more staff.   
 
The imperfect nature of some of the base data was also mentioned by a national 
office manager who explained how information in terms of the “notional unit of 
time” allocated to each task is provided by a time recording system that is 
completed by all frontline staff on a weekly basis.  (S)he stated: 
We get a lot of resistance and I think that we accept that the information we get from 
the time recording system is averaged averages based on a reasonable level of 
compliance.  As with any similar system, it‟s full of people driving their own results to 
suit what they think is an end.  But we believe, on the basis of the averages, we‟re 
getting an indication which we think is realistic.  (CPS national 5) 
The interviewee further explained the difficulty of measuring and managing 
performance within a standardised framework:   
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The reality is that they do miss deadlines and they do step on some of the manual 
standards when the work quota is above their resource.  That happens not just 
because we got the forecast wrong for the year but because we‟ve set a resource 
level … based on the funding we‟ve got available.  Or there‟s a seasonal pattern to 
some of the workload, and there‟s obviously a seasonal pattern to when people try to 
take their leave … and so we do see a fall off in quality across December, January, 
February as we‟ve got less staff on the ground for a similar amount of work to be 
done.  So there are a number of factors that come into it that aren‟t necessarily 
visible from what we‟re measuring.  (CPS national 5) 
(S)he concluded that, although the performance information is by its very nature 
incomplete, it reveals issues that could be further analysed “on an ad hoc, almost 
anecdotal, basis in many cases”.  (S)he explained: 
I think for senior managers or managers in Head Office what the tools do, what the 
data does, is give you something that you can talk about that‟s quite tangible.  So 
you have that discussion and you think what you can do about that and then you 
have a discussion about what‟s not in there or what you can‟t see in there.  (CPS 
national 5) 
 
Another national office manager described a less numeric approach to measuring 
and managing performance in the form of an incident reporting system.  (S)he 
suggested that this:  
 … is a system I guess we designed as a warning system.  Off the back of the 
incidents that come in we‟ll decide whether we do nothing, or we do what‟s called a 
quick case review, or we do a special investigation.  That whole thing is a sort of 
offender risk management system where we are picking up incidents and working out 
whether we need to go in and review something.  (CPS national 7) 
These reports relate to negative incidents such as offenders absconding, 
threatening staff members, or being of interest to the media.  Unlike the local 
practice described in Work and Income, in the Community Probation Service 
interviewees did not describe a mechanism for gathering good news stories, 
although a regional level interviewee observed:   
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Wouldn‟t it be great to have a positive incident mechanism … I think it would be quite 
counter culture for us but I think it would be enormously valuable.   (CPS regional 9).   
 
The purpose to Measure and Manage Individual Performance was the purpose of 
measuring and managing performance most frequently mentioned by interviewees 
at the local level.  However, a local Community Work Supervisor stated that the 
QUAS (quality assurance) system, by which his/her performance was judged, did 
not appropriately take account of the complexities of managing offenders.  (S)he 
explained: 
My performance gets measured on certain criteria and what happened in certain time 
frames … the book says I must assess them within seven days after Court, and I must 
induct them seven days after assessment, then I must place them within thirty days 
after that.  That doesn‟t take into consideration things that can go wrong.  They [the 
offenders] could „phone in with an excuse and I will be outside those limits.  But when 
I‟m outside those limits this QUAS system will give me a score of 2 [out of a possible 
4] because I didn‟t comply with all the right theory there.  And it looks at certain 
things like - did I make all the notes in IOMS, which is the computer system.  So 
sometimes they want me to state the obvious and sometimes I don‟t have time to 
state the obvious because I‟ve got a huge caseload.  (CPS local 11) 
A Probation Officer was similarly negative about, but less concerned by, the formal 
performance management system.  (S)he stated: 
We have to have our reports in on due times.  It‟s stupid things actually - one of them 
… was we had to have our timesheet to the Service Manager by Monday morning.  I 
mean what …!.   I‟m not even actually sure what I‟ve agreed to do!  It would be 
interesting to have a look back and see what I did agree to do.  But I sort of know I 
meet my work, my performance, by making sure my reports are to the Court on time, 
timely, and [provide] good advice.   (CPS local 6) 
 
A national level manager also acknowledged that the performance of individual 
staff members could not be entirely captured within the formal performance 
management framework.  (S)he explained:   
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If you‟re looking at individual performance … then you‟re into making some 
assessment of process.  [B]ecause we have to, for Departmental external 
accountability reasons, we do have criteria.  But the reality is, of course, you can 
meet those criteria and still deliver poor performance.  (CPS national 2) 
(S)he described how, whilst working as a line manager of specialist service 
providers, (s)he had managed the quality of service provision as a “good faith 
exercise”.  (S)he explained: 
[T]hey would accept that I knew high quality service and poor service when I saw it 
and it wasn‟t necessary, or indeed possible, to very clearly define a check list of items 
that said this is a very good report because they varied depending on the 
circumstances.  That worked quite well because they would accept that this was a 
professional judgement.  And, of course, that was always discussed with staff and it 
wasn‟t problematic.  (CPS national 2) 
 
In relation to the purpose to Measure and Manage Local Performance, a local 
Service Manager described the use of three different mechanisms to measure and 
manage the performance of those who report to him/her.  Firstly, the formal 
system allows him/her to track those activities that can be defined in terms of the 
number of items or tasks completed or the number of errors made.  (S)he 
explained that this provides:   
[a] monthly oversight which … is accountable further up.  It therefore goes [up] and 
queries come down; it highlights where we have a generic problem across the area 
with a certain thing.  (CPS local 10) 
Secondly, obtaining feedback in the form of narrative or anecdotal information 
from people, such as lawyers, court officers or groups of staff, also enhances 
his/her understanding of her team‟s performance.  (S)he explained: 
I also have good liaison with lawyers and the Crown through meetings and also 
through knowing them, and I get feedback in response to [issues and problems].  
(CPS local 10)   
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Thirdly, direct observation of the performance of his/her staff in a courtroom 
setting enables a further assessment of their performance:   
I‟ll go in … and watch a number of prosecutions to see how the person‟s going.  But I 
can‟t afford to sit there all day.  Obviously, if they‟re new staff it‟s different because 
you observe performance and it‟s part of the competency system.  (CPS local 10) 
 
A national office interviewee explained how a nationally developed reporting tool 
has been made available to local managers in an attempt to establish a consistent 
approach to performance measurement and management.  However, (s)he noted:  
I don‟t think the areas are making a huge amount of use of this structured format 
report, although it‟s no work at all for them to produce it.  They don‟t understand it 
[or] see the value in it.  So their use of it … hasn‟t saved them any time but in reality 
it‟s providing them with huge amounts of collated data that they don‟t have to collect 
for themselves.  But they still run off and produce their own.  (CPS national 5) 
 
The purpose to Measure and Manage the Organisation was mentioned to a limited 
extent by interviewees from both the regional and local levels.  The interviewees 
noted that, in addition to the task-related quantitative and qualitative performance 
measures, are measures relating to human resources management.  For example, 
a local manager explained:   
Three times a year I‟ll go through and I‟ll pull out a list of names.  So for each service 
manager I‟ll say: “These three people here show me your supervision records for 
them for the last three months”.  That may be, like, a third or a quarter of [the] 
team.  That to me is showing whether or not the service managers are actually doing 
their job.  Whether or not that supervision session was good or bad or what not, there 
at least is a record that it took place.  (CPS local 4) 
(S)he also explained how regular meetings with the union provided feedback and a 
gauge of how well staff were being managed and concluded:   
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When it comes to performance, it‟s actually those kinds of things that I hold quite 
highly but they‟re quite difficult to quantify, or even to sort of explain what my 
rationale is for realising that it is so important.  (CPS local 4) 
 
Another local level manager described processes by which work volumes and 
available resources are reviewed and managed by means of a local model that 
looks at three months of new start data.  (S)he explained:  
We look at fluctuations by sentence type, we look at fluctuations by team, and we try 
and move resources to meet that need.  We will have teams that, at different points, 
are under pressure and we try and shift resource around that.  (CPS local 9) 
 
Operational Purposes of the Community Probation Service 
Interviewees from the Community Probation Service identified four operational 
purposes of measuring and managing performance.  As may be seen from Figures 
7.2 and 7.5, they are to:  
(i) Measure and Manage Process; 
(ii) Measure and Manage Rehabilitation and Reintegration;  
(iii) Measure and Manage Offenders; and 
(iv) Measure and Manage Outcomes.   
 
The purpose to Measure and Manage Process was mentioned by interviewees from 
all three organisational levels but was particularly significant for those at the 
regional level.  When discussing how staff interact with offenders, a Regional 
Manager suggested that, compared to his/her previous experience in what was 
then the Department of Social Welfare:57   
We are a lot more prescriptive in what is expected so, in a way, you can measure all 
those interaction points and whether they are done, [but] probably not to the point of 
sitting behind a desk and watching someone but we do have some [measures].  (CPS 
regional 1) 
                                               
57 The Department of Social Welfare was a prior organisational incarnation of Work and Income.   
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(S)he explained how, in relation to processes, those „interaction points‟ and the 
delivery of reports are measured by means of three mechanisms.  Firstly the 
quality assurance system (QUAS) takes samples of work from each site which are 
then reviewed and scored against standards.  This system was described by a 
national level interviewee as being concerned with: 
… not really performance of staff as such; it‟s more … how well staff are complying 
with the manual standards that we put in place.  [Are] processes being followed or, if 
you wrote a particular report, has it contained all of these things as it‟s supposed to?  
(CPS national 5) 
The second mechanism referred to by the Regional Manager was the role of quality 
improvement advisors who, she explained:  
… sample pieces of work on a regular basis and again use some of the quality 
assurance standards.  The standards are all based on what the manual says people 
have to do.  (CPS regional 1) 
Thirdly, are the reports of incidents, such as offender suicide, very serious 
offending, re-offending, or a threat to a staff member, which may also result in a 
review of procedures.  (S)he observed: 
Some of those will automatically result in what we call a five day review and for some 
of them we will go in and do a full investigation.  Some of that depends on the profile 
that the particular incident has.  The initial checks against that are: how did we 
manage against what our procedures were?  The results of that become parts of the 
feedback loop.  (CPS regional 1) 
 
A local manager also described “operational reviews” and stated: 
Almost always there will be issues that we haven‟t followed up on completely; so 
there‟s always a series of recommendations and so on.  A big part of my role is 
implementing the recommendations and reporting back on how the implementing of 
those recommendations has gone.  (CPS local 4) 
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The purpose to Measure and Manage Rehabilitation and Reintegration was 
mentioned by interviewees at both the national and local levels.  A national level 
interviewee suggested that, although rehabilitating offenders was a difficult and 
frequently not successful process, there is enough evidence to suggest that it can 
work.  (S)he explained: 
There are about thirty meta-analytic reviews that, in total, encompass about two and 
a half thousand reasonably well controlled output statements and my take on that 
literature is that it‟s no longer in dispute that offenders can be treated and that we 
get a modest but worthwhile vector as a result of treatment.  (CPS national 2) 
However, in discussing the measurement of recidivism58 (s)he noted that, whilst 
“it‟s impossible to design a watertight evaluation”, the Community Probation 
Service had, over recent years, developed “some very good risk measures”.  A 
local level manager also explained that the recidivism rate is used: 
 … as a sort of indicator of the success of some of our programmes.  There are two 
programmes that we cancelled in the last year because the re-conviction or recidivism 
rates have shown that those programmes haven‟t worked. (CPS local 9) 
 
However, another local level interviewee observed that measuring the success of 
programmes is more difficult when offenders have self-referred to a community 
programme.  (S)he explained: 
Sometimes we put them on community programmes … well, we say to them: “Go and 
do a programme but you will have to do a self referral”.  Sometimes that‟s good 
because they don‟t have to pay for it; you can either pay a koha59 or they‟ll just flag it 
and put it under the health budget.  But sometimes we can‟t actually monitor how 
they [i.e. the offenders] are getting along; we just have to rely on the comments 
when we ask the offender what they‟ve been doing.  (CPS local 8) 
 
                                               
58 Re-offending 
59
 A koha is the Maori word for a gift or honorarium.   
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The purpose to Measure and Manage Offenders was also mentioned by 
interviewees from all three organisational levels.  The complexity of this purpose 
was explained by a regional level interviewee in the following terms:   
On the surface we deliver services for offenders but we manage quite a range of 
sentences and within those sentences there are quite a lot of different things that 
have to be done.  They‟re all component parts of how the offender is managed and 
what we have to do with that person … or for the judiciary.  So we cut and dice the 
business in quite a lot of different ways.  (CPS regional 1) 
A local level interviewee described how this information is provided by the IOMS 
computer system: 
We run the reports every month nationwide, to show whether or not the sentence 
plan is activated within the timeframe; whether or not it‟s in draft or hasn‟t been 
started yet.  Now that‟s purely statistical; no one‟s gone in and measured the quality 
or seen whether or not it‟s a good plan or a bad plan.  (CPS local 4) 
 
However, a local Senior Community Work Supervisor relies on a more informal 
approach.  (S)he explained how, at the end of a day, (s)he talks to the supervisor 
of each work party to find out if there has been any trouble and how much work 
has been completed.  This information is then used to provide positive 
reinforcement to the offenders.  (S)he explained:   
They line up to be released [and] I‟ll go out and say: “Good work today guys.  You‟ve 
planted nine hundred trees, well done.  I‟m really proud of you fellows.  You can go 
home now, you‟ve done a good day‟s work”.  Then I release them.  (CPS local 3) 
 
As can be seen in Figures 7.2 and 7.5, although the purpose to Measure and 
Manage Outcomes was mentioned at all three organisational levels, it generated 
comparatively few comments.  Nevertheless a national office manager explained 
that the agency was trying to protect the community and reduce re-offending.  
(S)he observed:  
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The ultimate measure of our performance, although we‟re not the only ones that 
contribute to that measure, is whether or not we‟ve reduced re-offending rates and/or 
the severity of offending from the offenders that come through our sentences and 
orders.  (CPS national 7) 
However, a regional level interviewee suggested that, although the Community 
Probation Service had a number of empirical measures in respect of re-offending 
rates, the general public are more concerned to receive assurances in respect of 
the safety of their local communities.     
 
At the local level, an Area Manager also recognised the two outcomes of protecting 
the public and reducing re-offending and suggested in respect of the former:   
You could take a benchmarking approach and look at how we compare with similar 
jurisdictions across the world in terms of victimisation from people who we are 
managing.  (CPS local 9) 
Regarding reducing re-offending, (s)he questioned the extent to which the 
agency‟s processes and outputs connect to that outcome.  (S)he noted:   
There is a whole range of social indicators that contribute to that outcome measure so 
we have found it difficult to just use that bald figure of recidivism rate as [a 
performance] indicator.  (CPS local 9) 
 
Legitimisation Purposes of the Community Probation Service 
Interviewees from the Community Probation Service identified two purposes of 
measuring and managing performance related to legitimisation, namely to:  
(i) Meet National Reporting Requirements; and 
(ii) Measure and Manage Public Expectations. 
 
The purpose to Meet National Reporting Requirements was mentioned by national 
and local level interviewees.  A national level interviewee summarised the national 
reporting process as follows:  
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Internally we bring everything together on a monthly basis.  We try and bring cost, 
quality, volume and all the other metrics of the different pieces of work together.  So 
there‟s an overall summary on the front and we look at that on a region by region 
basis - where we are year to date against the expected volumes [and] the expected 
time being spent.  On a quarterly basis we do quarterly reporting up through to 
corporate management on our Statement of Intent targets; and if we‟ve got a 
variance of plus or minus five percent we have to provide a variance explanation.   
(CPS national 5) 
However the same interviewee acknowledged that, although there is an attempt to 
“come up with an answer that‟s consistent, or a way of doing something that‟s 
consistent nationally”, it is necessary to acknowledge that the reported year to 
date results are an aggregate over time and across different local sites which 
generates a great deal of variation.  (S)he therefore suggested the reported 
results are a starting point rather than a definitive interpretation of the agency‟s 
performance:   
It‟s misleading to look at it at that level but it‟s the best we can do in terms of trying 
to bring it all together to start a discussion.  (CPS national 5) 
 
At the local level, an Area Manager explained that much of the formal reporting on 
performance indicators was generated by others and “presented to us”, so: 
The reporting that we do report up [to national office] tends to be more around the 
things that aren‟t as quantifiable.  What are the strategies that we‟ve trying to put in 
place to address a particular quality issue?  What are the strategies we‟ve got in place 
to address a risk issue?  (CPS local 9) 
Another Area Manager explained in more detail:   
Each month we have our rolling forecast so we need to work out our variances 
against where we had predicted it was going to be, estimate where we‟re going to be, 
and provide explanations against that.  Also, in terms of our volumes, if we estimated 
that we were going to do a hundred and fifty reports to Court this month and, in fact, 
we‟ve done a hundred and eighty, why have you done thirty more than you thought?  
(CPS local 4) 
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The process of locally gathering performance information to be reported upwards 
within the agency was described by an Area Manager as follows: 
We look at that result and then we have a meeting together with our service 
managers and senior probation officers who are like our clinical leaders, if you like, to 
discuss … this result.  Why have we got this result for level ones [reports], what‟s 
happening?  And we‟ll talk about … the things that we‟ve noticed.  We‟ve noticed that 
people aren‟t putting bits in the right place; all the information‟s there but it‟s just in 
the wrong place.  Or, people don‟t know how to do this piece of work.  We‟ll try and 
identify what is contributing to that result.  What are some strategies that we will put 
in place to try and address it?  And I report on those to our regional office.  [I] collate 
all that information once a quarter; these are the things we are going to do, and talk 
about our progress against the last quarter‟s work, and whether I need any input 
from the regional office.  (CPS local 9) 
 
A local Service Manager stated that, in terms of reporting: “there‟s very little I do 
with regard to budget”.  However, (s)he explained that (s)he is accountable for 
his/her staff‟s weekly time sheets that are input to the national QUAS (quality 
assurance) system:   
Everyone completes a timesheet, I then double check it.  I know what people are 
doing, I know if there‟s been annual leave, bereavement leave, sick [leave].  I will 
query and know what work they are doing.  I‟m aware of what they are doing and I 
have to account for that.  (CPS local 10) 
 
Only one interviewee in the Community Probation Service, a regional level 
manager, referred to the purpose to Measure and Manage Public Expectations.  
That interviewee observed:   
We don‟t sample the community in any empirical way.  We go and get feedback from 
… our stakeholders, I‟m not talking about the community, [but] judges and Police and 
other organisations.  So … we try and gauge that in not a scientific way but, I guess, 
it‟s feedback.  But in terms of public confidence, public … understanding, we look 
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through our own eyes, as members of the public, and see the picture we want to see.  
It would be interesting to actually go out there and say: “Where does the probation 
service sit for you at this time?”  (CPS regional 1) 
 
External Purposes of the Community Probation Service 
As indicated in Figures 7.2 and 7.5, just one external purpose was mentioned by 
interviewees from the Community Probations Service.  The purpose to Measure 
and Manage Joined Up Government attracted comment from only one interviewee, 
a local Service Manager, who explained that (s)he manages his/her relationship 
with the local Court staff through regular face to face meetings:   
I have quarterly meetings with the court managers; there‟s also a quarterly family 
violence [meeting]; and there‟s a judicial meeting every two months when I‟m seeing 
the liaison judge.  I also meet monthly officially, and unofficially more often, with the 
manager of the criminal section.  That‟s about feedback and problems; they want to 
know if papers are not coming through [on time] and [if the problem relates to] a 
certain clerk.  It‟s not trying to apportion blame; it‟s trying to stop things before 
issues arise.  In the same way I‟ll be responding to things.  I feel I‟m approachable 
and they come to me, say, about someone in court.  (CPS local 10) 
 
Summary: Purposes of Community Probation Service 
In summary, in a similar manner to the other two case study agencies, 
interviewees from the Community Probations Service described the use of a mix of 
both objectively and subjectively framed performance information.  The three 
purposes that elicited most comments, namely to Measure and Manage National 
Performance, to Measure and Manage Individual Performance, and to Measure and 
Manage Process, are linked by an objectively represented framework of quantified 
performance standards and measures.  However, the interviewees intimated that, 
in practice, this framework provides only a partial view and can, to some extent, 
be based on flawed data as a result of a reliance on incomplete or biased time 
recording and auditing processes.  It was also suggested that the framework does 
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not take account of an inevitable trade-off between the quantity and quality of the 
agency‟s work that periodically arises as volumes increase and resources remain 
fixed.  Interviewees, therefore, also described the use of a more substantive 
rationality in which performance information generated within the formal 
framework provides a “tangible” starting point for a discussion.  This may then 
raise the need for further “ad hoc” investigation that gathers and evaluates 
performance information by drawing on feedback and dialogue both within and 
outside of the organisation.  
 
In a similar manner to local level interviewees from Work and Income, a number 
of interviewees at the local level of the Community Probation Service commented 
that the formal performance measurement and management system does not fully 
encompass the scope and nature of their work.  As a result it was suggested that 
it is possible to meet the required performance criteria but only partially achieve 
what is required to deliver a good service.   
 
As was the case with the other two case study agencies, interviewees from the 
Community Probation Service described purposes of measuring and managing 
performance that are principally related to internal organisational and operational 
factors.  The only external purpose elated to management decision-making that 
was mentioned by interviewees from the Community Probation Service related to 
the use, by a local manager, of informal feedback to manage relationships with 
local court staff and judges.   
 
Unlike Work and Income and Public Prisons, in explaining the purposes of 
performance measurement and management the interviewees from the 
Community Probation Service provided no evidence of internal sensegiving 
activities.  Legitimisation purposes associated with Meeting National Reporting 
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Requirements were briefly mentioned by interviewees at the national and local 
levels, as was Measuring and Managing Public Expectations at the regional level.   
 
7.6  Purpose - A Summary  
In each of the case study agencies, interviewees at all three organisational levels 
described how performance is measured and managed in a nationally defined 
framework of objectively represented numerical standards and measures that are 
reflected in external accountability documents and internally cascaded down 
through the organisation.  However, the interviewees also acknowledged the 
difficulty of measuring some of the factors that they seek to control and the 
inadequacy or inaccuracy of some of their performance information.  As a 
consequence it was explained how the formal performance is frequently 
interpreted with the aid of a broader set of more subjectively framed information 
derived from incident reporting systems, feedback from and dialogue with external 
stakeholders, and, at times, direct observation of front line work practices.   
 
Within Work and Income the use of oral and written narrative or anecdote is not 
only concerned to capture system failures and errors but also focuses on „good 
news stories‟ that can be used internally to reinforce learning and required 
behaviours and externally to communicate success.  In contrast, Public Prisons 
and the Community Probation Service formally use narrative largely in the context 
of a risk management system of incident reports.  At the local level within Public 
Prisons it was suggested that the less formal practices by which performance is 
subjectively represented amount to management by folklore.   
 
The use of more subjectively framed performance information is also, in part, 
explained by the view, expressed in the Community Probation Service, that the 
formal system only partially reflects the required scope and detail of operational 
work.  Interviewees from Work and Income explained how the missing 
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information, that represents the „dark matter‟ of their performance, is recorded in 
local and individually operated systems.  Scepticism in respect of the official and 
formal performance management models and their objective representation was, 
for example, expressed by an interviewee from the Community Probation Service 
who suggested that it is possible to meet the standard performance criteria and 
only partially achieve the necessary result.   
 
All three case study agencies principally measure and manage performance for 
internal decision-making purposes associated with managing the organisation and 
its operations.  As shown in Figure 7.2, only in Work and Income did interviewees 
place significant emphasis on external purposes that are pertinent to managers‟ 
decision-making.   
 
As explained in Chapter 2, performance may be measured and managed for 
purposes which are not associated with the direct decision-making of managers.  
Instead, performance information is measured and managed in order to gain a 
regulative legitimacy by meeting national office and/or government reporting 
requirements or to manage a normative legitimacy with the public.  Interviewees 
from all three case study agencies described the legitimising function to Meet 
National Reporting Requirements.  However, although those from Work and 
Income did acknowledge that this involves the generation of “the mother of all 
reports”, they did not suggest that the information that it contains is not relevant 
to local decision making.  The purpose to Measure and Manage Public 
Expectations, which encompasses the external sensegiving activities of the agency 
in respect of its stakeholders (including the general public), was also mentioned by 
interviewees from all three agencies.  In Work and Income interviewees 
commented on the importance of not becoming internally focused and remaining 
engaged with stakeholders and explained that this occurs via the use of formal 
surveys, informal feedback mechanisms, and an active engagement with the 
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media and communities.  Interviewees from Public Prisons were more concerned 
with the extent to which information provided to the media is misinterpreted and 
therefore described a more defensive approach to managing public expectations.  
From the Community Probation Service only one interviewee mentioned the 
purpose to Measure and Manage Public Expectations in explaining how this is only 
monitored via informal feedback mechanisms.   
 
Interviewees from Work and Income described the use of performance information 
for internal sensegiving purposes via a number of different mechanisms.  These 
include regular team briefs, intranet news letters, and artefacts such as desk 
calendars and wall charts.  In Public Prisons interviewees described sensegiving as 
occurring via a hierarchy of regular meetings in which managers provide “state of 
the nation” speeches.  Interviewees from the Community Probation Service 
provided no evidence of measuring and managing performance for the purpose of 
sensegiving.   
 
Having reviewed interviewees‟ comments through the lenses of Function and 
Purpose, the next chapter will discuss performance measurement and 
management in the case study agencies through the lens of perspective.   
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Chapter 8 
PERSPECTIVE AS AN ELEMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE THREE CASE 
STUDY AGENCIES 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the construct of perspective as a lens through which 
performance measurement and management practices may be understood, and 
examines the perspectives described by interviewees in each of the three case 
study agencies.   
 
8.2 The Construct of Perspective 
As noted in Chapter 1, the construct of perspective seeks to identify those 
constituents for whom performance is measured and managed and/or whose 
influence is reflected in those practices.  The constituencies mentioned by 
interviewees when they described performance measurement and management 
practices within their organisation are summarised in Figure 8.1.   
 
As explained in Chapter 5, figures in this chapter represent summaries of the 
constituencies mentioned.  They do not indicate the relative importance of each 
constituency to the agency‟s performance measurement and management 
practices since the comments made by the interviewees concerned may be 
positive and/or negative in character.  It should also be noted that individual 
interviewees may recognise, and attempt to respond to, multiple constituencies.  
Thus they face, and seek to meet, multiple and potentially competing objectives 
(Trebilcock, 1995; Boston et al., 1996).    
 
 289 
Figure 8.1: Summary of Interviewees’ Statements Concerning 
Perspective for Each Case Study Agency 
PERSPECTIVE
National Regional Local Average National Regional Local Average National Regional Local Average
 External Perspective
External 31          41          4            34          52          9            14          36          12          
Total %  of issues mentioned 31% 41% 4% 25% 34% 52% 9% 32% 14% 36% 12% 21%
National/Government Perspective
National 29          15          24          39          26          29          41          30          22          
Government 16          9            6            2            -         4            5            6            1            
Total %  of issues mentioned 45% 23% 30% 33% 40% 26% 33% 33% 46% 36% 23% 35%
Internal Perspective
Organisation -         2            -         15          4            14          10          18          5            
Local 5            13          20          2            4            19          15          -         26          
Team 2            -         4            -         -         0            -         -         1            
Total %  of issues mentioned 7% 15% 24% 15% 16% 8% 34% 19% 25% 18% 33% 25%
Client/Offender Perspective
Client 14          18          31          -         -         -         -         -         -         
Offender -         -         -         9            11          15          9            10          23          
Total %  of issues mentioned 14% 18% 31% 21% 9% 11% 15% 11% 9% 10% 23% 14%
System Perspective
System 4            5            11          2            4            10          6            -         10          
Total %  of issues mentioned 4% 5% 11% 7% 2% 4% 10% 5% 6% 0% 10% 5%
Total 100% 101% 100% 100% 100% 101% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
PERCENTAGE OF ISSUES MENTIONED
Work and Income Public Prisons Service Community Probation Service
 
 
8.3  Work and Income 
As shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, the perspectives on performance measurement 
and management most frequently mentioned by all interviewees from Work and 
Income were National/Government and, to a lesser extent, External.  However, at 
the different organisational levels, the national and regional level interviewees 
commented primarily on external perspectives, while those at the local level 
principally focused on the Client perspective.   
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Figure 8.2: Perspectives of Work and Income Identified by Interviewees 
Grouped by Level in the Organisational Hierarchy 
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The External Perspective of Work and Income 
Interviewees from Work and Income identified four groups that constitute the 
agency‟s External perspective; namely: 
(i) other agencies, local organisations and community groups with whom 
the agency works cooperatively and collaboratively;  
(ii) actual and potential employers of the agency‟s clients and its corporate 
partners; 
(iii) the community; and 
(iv) the general public and media.   
 
The first of these groups recognises the role of other agencies, organisations or 
groups in contributing towards the agency‟s desired performance.  It was given 
particular emphasis by the national and regional level interviewees.  An 
interviewee at the regional level explained: 
We are required to identify projects that we are currently working on collectively, 
jointly, and organise regional manager meetings to move those programmes and 
initiatives forward.  (WI regional 3) 
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Interviewees at all three organisational levels of Work and Income described a 
range of these joint projects.  They include: 
 working with other agencies, including those in Education and Health, to 
address a range of issues that exist in a small number of „problem families‟ 
in South Auckland; 
 together with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and Child, Youth 
and Family Services, working with young offenders at an early stage of 
their offending; 
 working to created cadetships with local city councils; 
 establishing a multi-agency contract with a local Maori group for it to 
provide a range of services to its local Maori community; and  
 working with schools to provide support for young unmarried mothers to 
continue their education.   
Although of significance, these initiatives are not always successful.  A regional 
level interviewee provided an example of case managers working in prisons to 
assist with the reintegration of offenders back into society.  (S)he explained how 
they often experienced difficulties in gaining access to the prisoners and stated 
that, in his/her view: 
The difficulty, if I‟m being quite frank, is that in a lot of places Corrections don‟t give 
a damn about what happens after a prisoner gets out.   (WI regional 11) 
 
In respect of employers, a national level interviewee explained how the agency 
works with employers to identify their staffing requirements and to design related 
training programmes.  (S)he stated:   
We represent ourselves as having this machine that can make what they need and so 
we need to be able to deliver and we are constantly monitoring all of that.  (WI 
national 11) 
The interviewee also explained that, in addition to developing training 
programmes applicable to a particular industry sector such as roading, Work and 
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Income has developed a number of “corporate partnerships”.  (S)he provided the 
following example: 
We have a partnership with Air New Zealand because they have a huge number of 
jobs that are reasonably low skilled, high in number and nationally spread.  (WI 
national 11) 
 
In broader terms, the same interviewee explained that the External perspective of 
Work and Income has “branched out from dealing with the individual [client], to 
dealing with the family, to dealing with the community” (WI national 11).  This 
focus on the community and social development reflects a desire for the public to 
see the agency as somewhere that, rather than “just getting a benefit and getting 
into the system”, access can be gained to a range of services that, in many cases, 
could be provided prior to social security benefits being necessary.  It was also 
suggested that, in the event of local crises such as floods, the agency is now seen 
as a “first point of call” with an emergency line linking its many sites.   
 
Although the media were not widely mentioned by the interviewees from Work and 
Income, a comment was made concerning the need for the agency to manage the 
risk of adverse media coverage resulting from defalcations by staff members.  The 
national level interviewee concerned stated: 
Because Work and Income has been burned before about having bad press and 
media [attention] we are very, very focused and risk averse on those kinds of things.  
(WI national 11) 
 
National/Government Perspectives of Work and Income 
A local level manager likened the National perspective to “going to a different 
planet” quite different from front line operations.  (S)he explained: 
They are thinking way up at that strategic level, and what will work, and what looks 
good, and what going to be greater than …. and I‟m sitting there thinking now hang 
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on a minute, that‟s what you‟re thinking at that level, but that‟s not going to work at 
a site.  (WI local 1) 
Measuring and managing performance from the National perspective was 
described in terms of quantified targets that “come back to the [Minister‟s] 
Purchase Agreement, ultimately” (WI regional 9), and also in terms of the use of 
“success stories” and judgement.  A national level manager further explained” 
This stuff is a culture thing.  ....  We have targets around every single benefit type.  
Where a new strategy might come in that we need to focus on, like Maori and youth, 
we have a separate KPI that develops around them so we can monitor that.  (WI 
national 11) 
 
Other elements of the National perspective mentioned by interviewees from Work 
and Income included a move from a focus on timeliness, accuracy and client 
satisfaction to “this enormous sort of social development outlook as well” (WI 
national 11).  The same national level interviewee also described a concern with 
managing and appropriately allocating the limited financial resources available to 
the agency.  (S)he stated:  
Remember that people are getting more expensive yet we have the same resource 
so how will that work?  Are there better things we could do with our employment 
programme money?  Where do we get the best bang for our buck, basically?  (WI 
national 11) 
 
The Government perspective on performance measurement and management in 
Work and Income recognises performance as being “in line with what Government 
expects” (WI local 1) or, as another local manager suggested: 
We are measured in respect of what the Government of the day basically is asking 
around the Statement of Intent.  (WI Local 8) 
Another national manager further explained that, as well as “achieving targets that 
are set through Government” (WI local 2), the manner in which services are 
delivered is also important.  (S)he stated: 
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There are a range of measures that we achieve for Government and some are more 
technical; which is more about the way that we administer the Social Security Act; 
which is paying out benefits, if you like, in a timely and accurate manner and to the 
right people.  So performing in relation to those … [so that] the Government and the 
taxpayer has a level of confidence in the integrity of the system and how we are 
maintaining it.  (WI national 7) 
 
Interviewees from Work and Income recognised that, seen from the Government 
perspective, performance expectations are subject to change.  For example, a 
national level interviewee observed: “our focus shifts depending on how well we 
are doing and for political reasons as well” (WI national 6).  The point was also 
illustrated by a regional level interviewee who provided an example of how a 
target in respect of the number of unemployed Maori youth was superseded when:  
the Minister had a rush of blood to the head and decided no, it wasn‟t good enough, 
that we needed to increase that [target] because politically it wasn‟t acceptable to 
have this many Maori over represented in the unemployed.  So we increased the 
target, doubled the target.  (WI regional 9) 
Along related lines, a local level manager explained how pressures to provide 
performance information can come from Members of Parliament other than 
Ministers.  (S)he stated: 
I could be sitting here filling my day, and it all goes to [pot] because, if 
Government‟s in the House, you know damn well that someone‟s going to ask a 
question and they come running back to national office; the „phone goes red hot, 
we‟ve got to drop everything and get every bit of information we can because one of 
the MPs wants to know what happened with blah, blah, blah.  (WI local 1) 
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Another aspect of the Government perspective on managing and measuring 
performance mentioned by interviewees from Work and Income relates to the role 
of central agencies.60  For example, a national level manager explained that: 
We have some constrictions, obviously, that we need to work within.  Treasury have 
told us that we need to be financially sustainable [i.e. self-funding new initiatives] to 
2010 (WI national 11).   
Likewise, the role of the State Services Commission in managing the broader 
performance of the Ministry of Social Development (of which Work and Income is a 
component agency) was explained by another national office manager who stated: 
State Services ask a range of questions of other agencies and other people about the 
organisation and, I guess, the Chief Executive‟s performance in relation to that, and 
seeks feedback about how we go about doing that kind of work.  (WI national 7) 
It is interesting to note that much of the performance information gathered by the 
State Services Commission is non-numeric in character.   
 
Client Perspectives of Work and Income 
As shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, within Work and Income the Client perspective 
on performance measurement and management was most significant for 
interviewees at the local level although it was also mentioned by interviewees 
from the regional and national levels.  As a national office manager observed:  
Performance is very, very much targeted around what we‟re doing for the client.  And 
from a national office perspective it‟s very targeted around how we can assist our 
front line to do that.  So we try and think about that each day and in every decision 
that we make.  (WI national 6) 
 
At the local level this perspective was described in terms of a concern “to deliver 
professional and timely service to all our clients” (WI local 1); or, as another local 
interviewee explained: 
                                               
60 Those central government agencies that are charged with management of the public sector as a whole; namely, 
The Treasury, State Services Commission and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.   
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I think it‟s about helping people, in plain English. … For me it‟s about doing the best 
we can for the people that we serve in our community.  (WI local 4)  
 
The nature of the relationship that is established with clients was mentioned by a 
number of interviewees.  For example, a local manager stated:   
 … that‟s a thing I want to plug with my teams, all of the teams, that they talk to the 
people not at them.  Judgement and sermons - that is just not on.  (WI local 1) 
Similarly, a regional manager explained how an emphasis on outcomes has led to 
a broader interest in clients beyond simply paying a benefit or placing someone 
into employment.  At the local level this focus was also explained as being “more 
about understanding what that person is, and attaching things to support them” 
(WI local 4).  Or, as was summarised by another local interviewee: 
Performance is also about wellbeing; ensuring that clients are able to make decisions 
for themselves; empowering them to make some good life choices for them and their 
families.  Whether it be work - whether it be paid employment or voluntary – but 
also participating in the communities in different areas and just looking after the next 
generation, looking after their families and bringing them up in our society.  That‟s 
what performance means to us.  (WI local 2) 
 
Internal Perspectives of Work and Income 
Interviewees from Work and Income mentioned three internal perspectives on 
measuring and managing performance, namely: 
(i) Local; 
(ii) Team; and 
(iii) Organisation.   
 
Whilst the Team and Organisation perspectives received little mention, the Local 
perspective was of more significance particularly, as might be expected, at the 
local level of the organisation.  It was described as requiring the management of 
 297 
nationally defined targets which are subject to change.  A local manager 
commented:  
They keep shifting the goal posts in terms of our targets. … And so half the time the 
staff don‟t know where they are at because they keep introducing different things 
during the fiscal year.  They keep adding other things we need to do on top of the 
original targets they set us.  (WI local 2) 
It was also suggested that these targets do not fully encompass the reality of the 
local workload.  As one local manager explained: 
Case managers would have a feeling that there‟s a lot of stuff that they do that‟s 
important that we don‟t capture. (WI local 8) 
 
A number of local managers commented on the difficulty of implementing 
nationally defined policies and legislation; as one interviewee observed: 
It‟s like one size doesn‟t fit all; so policies and legislation are written but … because 
we are dealing with people there are all sorts of different circumstances … and we do 
come across some circumstances where the legislation and policy can not help this 
person as much as we want.  (WI local 2) 
A local manager additionally acknowledged that his/her response to nationally 
derived targets varied because: 
… depending on what they look like, depends on how I interpret them and how I am 
going to achieve them … sometimes I might not follow the guidelines as such 
because … one set of guidelines doesn‟t necessarily fit each service centre within the 
country.  (WI local 4) 
 
It was suggested at the local level that managing performance requires a focus on 
something other than just the formal targets.  As a local manager explained: 
[T]here‟s also part of it that is about their individual contribution to the soft skills like 
the team work, dealing with people, communication skills, the overall running of a 
site, making it all work, working together.  (WI local 8) 
 298 
Managers at the local level also described the use of “observational checks”, by 
themselves or by other staff members, as a performance management mechanism 
that is uniquely available at the local level.   
 
Gaining a perspective on and understanding performance at the local level is also 
seen as important by managers at the national office level.  This is reflected in the 
observations of one of these managers who explained: 
We want to know what‟s happening at a site level … which are the centres that are 
affecting regional performance and either making it better or worse, so that we can 
sort out what is best practice and start to look at what we can replicate in other 
places.  Or, if we are making assumptions that this region is good when actually you 
could have your worse service centre within that region but you have never noticed it 
because it‟s just averaged out and just gone under the radar.  (WI national 7) 
 
System Perspectives of Work and Income 
The perspective of System received a limited number of comments by 
interviewees from all three organisational levels.  A manager at the local level, 
explaining the range of different systems that are used to support operational 
processes, observed “we are very reliant on technology” (WI local 4).  The extent 
to which Work and Income‟s computer systems drive work practices was also 
remarked on by a national level interviewee who suggested that they are: 
… the spine or the life blood of how our case managers work out there in the front 
line.  They enter data into Swift or Solo and that not only advises them how they 
should proceed next in terms of what their interview should be, but it provides them 
with how much benefit this person should get or what opportunities there are for 
employment in certain areas.  (WI national 6) 
However, at the time of the interviews, these computer systems were being 
further developed as decision-support tools, interviewees from Work and Income 
acknowledged that, in the future, this process would place some constraints 
around how staff are able to operate.  A national office interviewee explained:   
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The side effect of that, of course, is that our very good case managers know exactly 
what to do with the client and shortcut everything.  And this is, very much, going to 
… slow them down.  It puts you through the process, which for us is fantastic, from a 
central perspective.  (WI national 11) 
 
Perspectives on Performance Measurement and Management for Work 
and Income 
In summary, interviewees from Work and Income identified a number of different 
constituencies from inside the agency (such as local and national managers) and 
more especially from outside (for example, clients, employers, the Government 
and the general public) whose perspectives affect the measurement and 
management of performance.  The expectations and informational requirements of 
these different constituencies often overlap and, at times, conflict with one 
another.  However, the interviewees from Work and Income described a common 
theme of social development and the wellbeing of their clients by which, in large 
part, those conflicts are reconciled.   
 
8.4   Public Prisons 
As in Work and Income, interviewees from Public Prisons as a whole most 
frequently mentioned the National/Government perspectives on performance 
measurement and management, followed by the External perspective.  At the 
different organisational levels, the National perspective was the primary focus of 
interviewees at the national and local levels and the External perspective was the 
most significant for regional level interviewees.  Although limited mention was 
made of particular internal perspectives, together they constituted the most 
significant group of perspectives mentioned by interviewees at the local level (see 
Figures 8.1 and 8.3).   
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The National/Government Perspectives of Public Prisons 
As may be seen from Figures 8.1 and 8.3, the National perspective on 
performance measurement and management was the most significant for 
interviewees at the national and local levels and was also important for 
interviewees at the regional level.  Interviewees from all three levels described a 
performance measurement and management framework based on the 
Department‟s key accountability documents, in particular its Statement of Intent 
[SOI] and its strategic business plan.  A national office manager explained: 
The theory is that we have the kind of accountability framework which gives us a 
broad set of volumes and a broad set of initiatives flowing out of the SOI, into the 
GM‟s [General Manager‟s] performance agreement, into my performance agreement 
or the regional managers‟, and cascaded down.  (PP national 3) 
These targets were described by local managers who commented: “I‟m really 
measured on timeframes and adherence to business rules” (PP local 8); 
“performance is meeting the objectives of the Department” (PP local 4); and 
“generally a good ninety percent of it is already set for us” (PP local 11).   
 
 301 
A number of interviewees also expressed concern about the burden associated 
with reporting against these national targets.  One local interviewee stated 
“Compliance has become more and more … it‟s almost taken over a huge part of 
the job” (PP local 11); and another warned: “You can become more focused on 
compliance than performance” (PP local 1).  The latter interviewee provided an 
example of the risks of being focused on “ticking the right boxes” when describing 
how the finding of illegal cell „phones is reported.  (S)he stated: 
You are given a target of, say, two a month to find and you find four and get a red in 
the box because you‟ve exceeded the target.  However, looking beyond that … I‟ve 
actually done the job properly by finding these additional ones [and] perhaps not 
putting them under the table or saying, “oh well, I‟m not going to report them”.  And 
there is a danger that you could under report or you could not do the job properly 
just to maintain your targets.   (PP local 1) 
 
The national performance framework of Public Prisons is also defined in detail in a 
manual which a local interviewee explained as follows: 
You‟re bound by our PPM [Public Prisons Manual], which is our bible basically; and 
you are supposed to follow PPM. … Corrections is very much driven by policy and if 
you step outside of that policy you just get slapped, basically.  (PP local 6) 
However, another local interviewee suggested that this framework was subject to 
frequent change and stated: 
The issue that we have is, because the PPM may be updated from time to time or 
superseded by circulars, the outpouring of information can sometimes - well more 
often than not - become overbearing on all staff from managers right the way down 
the line.  So there tends to be a lot of confusion as to what we are actually supposed 
to be doing because there‟s this big outpouring of information from national office.  
(PP local 2) 
(S)he also suggested that, whilst “we are driven by policy, we are driven by the 
Government, and we are driven by National Office”, there is little understanding of 
the practical implications of the framework that this creates.  (S)he observed: 
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The unfortunate fact of life is that these people that drive our policy and drive 
everything else have no experience, have never set foot in a prison, and do not 
understand our business.  They are the majority of people making decisions.  They 
do not have to implement any changes, they do not have to bear the brunt of any of 
the changes that they may make.  Yet operationally we are the ones that have to 
implement the changes and have to make it work.  (PP local 2) 
 
The External Perspective of Public Prisons 
As shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.3, the External perspective on performance 
measurement and management in Public Prisons was most frequently mentioned 
by interviewees at the regional level but was also significant for interviewees at 
the national level.  For Public Prisons, the External perspective is principally 
concerned with the public‟s understanding, or perceived lack thereof, of its role 
and functions.  At the regional level concern about the public‟s expectations was 
explained as follows:   
Society seems to think that they should have a kid for seventeen years ruin every 
aspect of its life and, with a magic wand or something, we‟ll fix it in six months.  It‟s 
never going to happen.  It‟s never going to happen with all of the adult prisoners 
we‟ve got here.  And so there are some quite unrealistic expectations out there about 
the role that we can play and just how quickly we can turn people around.  (PP 
regional 13) 
The public‟s understanding of the prison environment was also a concern for a 
local Unit Manager who suggested that:  
It‟s quite ironic talking to members of the public; they still seem to think we have the 
ability to lock them up and feed them bread and water.  They have got absolutely no 
concept, no idea, whatsoever of what prisons actually do.  (PP local 2) 
Another local interviewee similarly stated that the community: “try to sweep it 
under the carpet”; (s)he explained: 
The social focus here in New Zealand is that people want people locked up, keep 
them off the street.  They seem to forget that one day they are going to come back 
into the community and things need to be done.  (PP local 1) 
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Another local interviewee also observed: 
What the public forget is they are put in here because they can‟t deal with them out 
there; and what tools have we got to deal with them as well?  (PP local 9a) 
 
A national office manager suggested that the issue of Public Prisons is “not 
something that the New Zealand public think deeply about” but rather is one of 
public confidence.  (S)he stated: 
I don‟t know that it‟s a deserved situation but it‟s one we‟ve got, so we need to 
manage it.  So that‟s something that we put a lot of time into in terms of trying to be 
responsive to the Minister, trying to be responsive to the press, trying to get the real 
story out there; you know, these are isolated incidents but behind it there is a huge 
prisons machine that‟s actually doing a pretty good job.  (PP national 5) 
The problem of maintaining public confidence in the agency was further explained 
by a regional level interviewee who observed: 
We‟re being totally scrutinized by the media, politicians, and everyone else and 
having our performance judged on the basis of, frequently, a bunch of lies that 
appear in the media - the very, very biased opinions of union agitators who‟ve got 
agenda, some disgruntled ex-employees, some probably disaffected employees as 
well, and some ex-prisoners who‟ve got a bone to pick with us.  (PP Regional 13) 
The same interviewee suggested that Public Prisons is not good at providing 
positive information to the media and therefore the public‟s understanding is, in no 
small part, provided by popular television dramas.  (S)he explained: 
… it depends on television programmes like „Bad Girls‟ and things like that.  It‟s 
where people get their view from.  They put these crappy American television 
programmes on, people watch them, there‟s huge corruption in them, and they then 
think that everything they hear about our system is the same.  And so that‟s very 
difficult to deal with.  (PP regional 13) 
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The Offender Perspective of Public Prisons 
The Offender perspective on managing performance in Public Prisons was reflected 
in the comments of interviewees at all three organisational levels.  A manager at 
the local level explained that (s)he had to deal with a full range of offenders: 
 … from those with very high IQs to those with low IQs, people with mental 
disorders; and we have to look after them all and find out the best way to deal with 
them on a day to day basis.  (PP local 10) 
A regional level manager went further and identified three different types of 
offenders.  The first are: 
 … people who at some point in their life did something stupid and got on a slippery 
slope which is normally hard for them to get off because if you offend, and it‟s 
serious enough to bring you to jail, you then loose your job and your accommodation 
and everything else.  (PP regional 13) 
The interviewee asserted, with the right work, it is possible to rehabilitate these 
offenders.  The same applies to the second group of offenders – a group which is 
increasing in size and represents:  
 … those that are going through Child, Youth and Family and the whole process.  
Probably from the minute they drew their first breath they were destined to come 
through our doors because there are no role models, there are no values, there are 
no standards.  Their education lacks, and sometimes their nutrition lacks, and a 
whole raft of things are not done for them. (PP regional 13) 
The third group identified by this interviewee is very small, possibly of “no more 
than 20 offenders”, who:  
 … you will never rehabilitate and actually you shouldn‟t waste any time and resource 
on them; we should just shut them up and throw away the key.  (PP regional 13) 
 
At the local level, offenders‟ prospects for rehabilitation were seen less positively 
than conveyed by the interviewee cited above.  For example, a local level 
interviewee stated that a lot of prisoners don‟t want to change as: “that‟s their life, 
that‟s their lifestyle” (PP local 9b).  As noted in Chapter 6, at the local level it was 
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further suggested that offenders, particularly those serving longer term or repeat 
sentences, know how to manipulate the system.  As a local manager explained:   
They don‟t really care unless, for example, they might have a Parole Board hearing 
coming up and they think: “I had better do something to impress the Parole Board”. 
They‟re not really buying into it they‟re just doing what they think is required by the 
Parole Board.  (PP local 9a) 
Along similar lines, another local manager expressed the view that: 
There are some incredibly bad people here … who don‟t want to change really, that 
will keep coming back and escalate the type of offences that they come back for.  We 
can do everything we possibly can but there‟s no way you can change a drug addict 
unless that drug addict wants to change. (PP local 10) 
It was also suggested that many offenders become institutionalised because they 
“become somebody while they are in prison but … once they go out they become a 
nobody” (PP local 1).  Another local level interviewee similarly stated that 
offenders will return to be with their friends and because: 
… they‟re safe inside.  They eat better in here, rent free, the food is free, and it‟s a 
place where they can feel special, feel like someone.  (PP local 7) 
 
While acknowledging that it provides no excuse for offending, a regional level 
interviewee stressed the need to understand that prisoners have themselves been 
victims.  (S)he explained: 
They have been living in the criminal community since they were this big and they 
don‟t know any different.  They have really different sets of life standards than you 
and I would have.  They‟ve lived through the violence, they‟ve lived through the 
theft, and they lived through the deprivation.  (PP regional 13) 
Local level interviewees also suggested that young offenders showed “no empathy 
whatsoever because they have never been shown empathy” (PP local 10); family 
life has, in effect, failed these offenders.  That interviewee observed: 
Everyone talks about whanau and the extended family; my reality is in the job I 
haven‟t seen a great deal of that.  They might be there but they are not positive role 
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models.  The family is not trying to focus on a particular journey in life and go 
towards that with a positive aspect.  (PP local 10) 
Interviewees explained that, cognisant of this situation, local prison managers 
have sought to stress the importance of “active management” by which prison 
officers try to exert influence on individual offenders and provide them with “the 
bigger picture” (PP local 9b).  As a national manager noted:  
If corrections officers are not being fair and consistent, if they‟re not treating people 
with dignity, and if they‟re not making some attempt to positively influence, then 
that‟s a huge opportunity that‟s gone missing.  It‟s an opportunity to demonstrate 
the behaviour, the language, the pro-social stuff; really you‟re just talking about 
dealing with people in a polite, humane way and trying for that to positively influence 
them in some way.  (PP national 3) 
 
Internal Perspectives of Public Prisons 
Interviewees from Public Prisons identified two internal perspectives that impact 
on performance measurement and management in that agency, namely: 
(i) Organisation; and  
(ii) Local 
 
The Organisation perspective was principally mentioned by interviewees from the 
national and local levels who provided comments relating to the capability of the 
agency‟s staff and its culture.  For managers at the local level, the competencies 
and experience of staff are a significant concern.  One local manager explained: 
I think staff is probably your big issue.  It‟s like being a parent because you cannot 
expect a child to behave in a particular fashion if they have never been shown how 
to; so we have to role model on a regular basis. … (PP local 10) 
Another local level interviewee asserted that Public Prisons has lost many longer 
term and more experienced staff members who had “forgotten more than the new 
officers have learnt” (PP local 11) and who had, in the past, acted as mentors to 
new staff.  A local level manager described how previously:  
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One person coming into that culture learnt from very experienced officers and you 
were just the new boy and you did all the donkey work, almost like an apprentice.  
But you learnt your trade, you learnt your job.  (PP local 8) 
Another local manager complained about the removal of a more formal ranking 
structure which (s)he suggested had resulted in:  
 … the staff on the floor [having] their recognition taken off them.  Because a 
Corrections Officer, or a Prison Officer back in those days, could earn respect of the 
prisoners and respect of the new staff and respect of the older staff, just by sheer 
time spent on the floor.  (PP local 2) 
A number of local level interviewees observed that another result of the change in 
staff profiles is that for many staff, “it‟s not a career any more; it‟s just a job” (PP 
local 6). 
 
At the regional level an interview observed that, although Public Prisons has a 
broad numerical measurement framework for its internal controls, it has no way of 
measuring the “wellness of its environment” (PP regional 13).   
 
At the national level a manager explained efforts to change the collective focus of 
prison staff away from a traditional turnkey culture to one that is more concerned 
to make a constructive impact on prisoners‟ lives.  (S)he stated:   
It basically comes down to the prison manager and the group of unit managers they 
put around them and the role model they play.  If we get a prison manager and a 
group of managers that say: “We need to provide a service to these prisoners and to 
the families”, then we‟re going to make some headway.  If we‟ve got a prison 
manager who says: “No, our job is just to lock these guys up”, we‟ll get nowhere.  
(PP national 5) 
However, a local level manager was not supportive of prisoner officers having to 
assume a broader set of responsibilities; (s)he explained: 
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We‟ve gone from being prison officers, or expecting our staff to be prison officers, 
turnkeys keeping it safe and humane containment, to being social workers and we 
don‟t have the skills for that.  Then we obviously fall short of that.  (PP local 9b) 
 
As might be expected, whilst the Local perspective on performance measurement 
and management was significant for interviewees at the local level, it received 
little mention at the national and regional levels.  A local level interviewee 
described how managing performance within the prison requires the creation of a 
structured environment. (S)he explained: 
Because a lot of them don‟t have that; all they do on the outside is sleep all day and 
at night they‟re out raging, getting into trouble.  So they get unlocked at six thirty in 
the morning and they can get into a routine.  (PP local7) 
Also reflecting the day-to-day environment, another local level interviewee 
observed: 
You can‟t have a structured day; you can‟t come in and say today we‟re going to 
achieve this, this and this because by the time you finished your first coffee in the 
morning the whole thing‟s gone down the toilet because something else has 
happened, or someone above the food chain wants this or wants that, or you‟ve been 
summoned to a meeting, or this is happening, or we‟re doing this, or you‟re going 
there.  The structure just goes out the door.  (PP local 9a) 
 
As it is for the Organisation perspective reported above, the management and 
retention of staff is also a significant issue for the Local perspective.  Managers at 
the local level described the difficulties, when staff sickness, maternity leave or 
secondments occur, of juggling staff rosters to ensure adequate coverage.  The 
implications of this were further explained by a local level manager as follows: 
As soon as that [staff shortages] starts kicking in you have to cut things back; so 
one of the areas that you tend to cut back on is that one-to-one with your staff - 
when you pull them out for half an hour or forty minutes and have a chat about their 
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performance, what they want, where they see themselves going; that kind of stuff.  
(PP local 6) 
Another local level manager explained his/her rather different approach:   
I try to show them the big picture because troops on the ground, coalface workers, 
are often just told you go here, you go there; and I am now trying to offer rationale 
for why we are doing that because these are the targets that we have been set.  (PP 
local 1) 
As noted in Chapter 6, an added complication for managing local staff members is 
that, within the prison environment, much of their performance occurs literally 
„behind closed doors‟ and, therefore, cannot be observed.   
 
As noted above in relation to the National perspective, local level managers are 
provided with a range of quantified performance targets.  A local prison manager 
described how (s)he interprets these at the local level to provide different targets 
for local unit managers depending on the nature of the prisoners in that unit (i.e. 
their security classification).  Similarly, at the regional level a manager stated that 
there are environmental factors that need to be taken into account when 
establishing performance targets for different prisons.  (S)he provided an example 
of one prison that:  
 … shouldn‟t have any problem with random drug tests, quite seriously.  They‟ve got 
a single entry point, they‟ve got maximum conditions, they‟ve got a high level of 
staffing compared to a place … that doesn‟t have a perimeter fence and can have 
stuff chucked over the wall in a tennis ball.  (PP regional 13) 
 
The Systems Perspective of Public Prisons 
The Systems perspective on measuring and managing performance, reflecting the 
information requirements of computer applications, was mentioned by 
interviewees at all three organisational levels within Public Prisons but only to a 
limited extent.  The comments made centred on the Integrated Offender 
Management System (IOMS) which a local interviewee explained by saying: 
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Everything that you do for a prisoner, from their initial receiving to their discharge, 
and searching them, rubbing them down in between, putting their property on, 
„phone numbers, everything will go through that system.  (PP local 6) 
However, a local level manager considered the system to be “not user friendly … 
extremely complicated sometimes, and tediously time consuming” (PP local 8).  
Another manager suggested that the system represents “an onerous task for the 
staff” and commented that: “personally I only probably use a quarter of its 
capability because I‟m too frightened to go elsewhere in case I start deleting this, 
that or the other” (PP local 1).  IOMS was also described as a “big brother 
watching sort of situation” that is:  
 … taking front line staff away from the people  that they are there for … [because] 
none of that information is required by those working on the floor
61
 or working close 
to that floor; what [the system is] for is giving the ability for information to be 
collated and reports run from national office.  (PP local 10) 
Similarly a local level interviewee suggested that IOMS “is designed by IT [the 
Information Technology group] to meet national office requirements, not to meet 
the end-user needs” (PP local 8).  Additionally:   
It‟s a tool now that is, in many respects, ineffective for us because it hasn‟t got the 
speed at which we require the system to operate.  Therefore it‟s a redundant system.  
If we can‟t get the information that we need within a reasonable timeframe then 
what‟s the point in having it?  (PP local 2) 
 
At both the local and the regional level it was acknowledged that IOMS is only as 
good as the information put in to it and that the input of data is compromised by 
the limited competency of staff and by the time available for them to do so.  A 
regional level interviewee provided an example of a recent report on the number 
of cell searches that had been undertaken which showed numbers that (s)he could 
not believe.  (S)he explained that (s)he discovered this had occurred: 
                                               
61 The term “floor” is used to describe the area in and around the cells where prison officers interact directly with 
prisoners.   
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 … because the people who are doing the cell searching during the day time haven‟t 
actually got time to put it into the computer so they leave the night shift people to do 
it; and if you don‟t put two names in you can‟t save it in the system, so you loose it.  
(PP regional 13) 
 
Perspectives of Public Prisons 
From the interviewees‟ comments reported above, it is evident that the major 
perspectives affecting performance measurement and management within Public 
Prisons are those associated with the official model, and its reporting requirements 
against nationally defined targets, and external constituencies, such as the general 
public and media. 
 
As was the case with Work and Income, interviewees from Public Prisons identified 
a range of differing and, at times, conflicting perspectives.  Although both the 
External and the National perspectives were mentioned with some frequency, 
unlike Work and Income, they were mostly not described in a positive light.  The 
External perspective is perceived to be misinformed and unsympathetic, if not 
antagonistic, towards the agency.  Similarly, interviewees from the local level 
suggested that the National perspective on performance measurement and 
management is based on a framework that is driven by those who have no 
understanding or experience of the prison environment.   
 
8.5: The Community Probation Service 
Figures 8.1 and 8.4 show that, as for Work and Income and Public Prisons, the 
National and Government perspectives on performance measurement and 
management were those most frequently mentioned by interviewees from the 
Community Probation Service overall.  Interviewees from the national level 
focused mostly on the National perspective, those from the regional level 
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mentioned the External perspective most frequently, and those from the local 
level placed principal emphasis on the Local perspective.   
 
Figure 8.4: Perspectives of the Community Probation Service Identified 
by Interviewees Grouped by Level in the Organisational Hierarchy 
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The National/Government Perspectives of the Community Probation 
Service 
As in Public Prisons, the National perspective was the perspective on performance 
measurement and management most frequently mentioned by interviewees in the 
Community Probation Service.  This perspective is embodied in a formal set of 
guidelines and standards.  The interviewees explained that, in the Community 
Probation Service, those national standards also provide notional units of time for 
each piece of work and thereby a basis for resource allocation and performance 
evaluation.  The importance of this procedural focus was emphasised by a national 
office manager who stated: 
If following our procedures doesn‟t matter then what we do doesn‟t matter; and why 
do we do it?  Why does the Government bother having us here? … How does 
anybody know what our success is if we don‟t have procedures to follow?  (CP 
national 7) 
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Another national office manager suggested that, whilst in following procedures it is 
necessary for staff to consider the impact of what they are doing:  
You don‟t want them thinking too much because they haven‟t got much discretion 
and sometimes when they use the discretion they have got it‟s a bit of a disaster.  
(CP national 5) 
 
A regional level interviewee further explained that the definition and monitoring of 
detailed national standards and procedures is the agency‟s response to “a certain 
amount of unknown-ness about what goes on”.  (S)he stated: “We have a manual 
that describes what people should do and what we are funded to deliver and we 
watch performance against that” (CPS regional 1a).   
 
However, a regional interviewee acknowledged the danger that an emphasis on 
procedures could have the result that “you can start feeding the internal machine” 
(CP regional 1b).  Conveying a similar notion a local level interviewee commented: 
“I still see our system as very much ticking boxes” (CP local 6).   
 
A more sympathetic response to the National perspective was provided by a local 
interviewee who explained the impact of a recent high profile murder committed 
by an offender on parole and stated: 
Head office is influenced by the community really and the media as well.  So now 
there are tighter reins on our offenders so there‟s the bigger expectation – they want 
us to keep an eye on everything.  (CP local 8) 
Another local interviewee similarly observed: 
Certainly you feel at this level the pressure that our head office must be under 
politically.  And you can feel them responding to that pressure with the change of 
policy that might come out or the change in practice that might come out.  You can 
understand that that‟s a reflection of the pressure that they are under, the political 
pressure.  (CP local 9) 
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Interviewees from the Community Probation Service also acknowledged that the 
National perspective on measuring and managing performance is subject to 
imperfect information.  Its resourcing model is based on forecasts of demand for 
its services that, due to the volatility of a range of external factors, tend to be 
inaccurate.  Management of demand pressure at the national and regional levels is 
therefore very dependent upon information from local managers who are told: 
You have to let us know when things aren‟t going right when you are fielding those 
demands.  (CP regional 1b) 
However, a national manager also explained that the consequences of this 
demand pressure are not entirely clear and stated: 
We should see the correlation between under-resourcing and a fall off in quality.  We 
don‟t; there are other factors out there that we don‟t understand relating to the 
experience of the staff who are doing it, particularly right now we are in a position of 
massive growth. … The other difficulty is that there is a lot of variation between 
areas and regions so we can look at something and think we know the answer as to 
why quality has gone down but the answer might not fit another area, or another 
group of staff, or another region.  (CP national 5) 
Another national office manager described how (s)he had commissioned an 
independent consultant to interview staff and observe what they‟re doing as (s)he 
was concerned that (s)he did not have a full understanding of the work being 
undertaken by local staff.  (S)he stated: 
I think they are really working quite hard.  But certainly in terms of the activities that 
we‟re recording, we‟re not picking up what they‟re doing … it is not reflecting the 
reality of working within the Corrections setting.  (CP national 2) 
Along related lines another national office manager observed that, whilst there is a 
great deal of performance information, it exists at an aggregated rather than an 
individual case level.  (S)he explained: 
What we don‟t have is a finer cut of information. … An offender might have anywhere 
between six and twelve special conditions; we have no way of monitoring whether 
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those special conditions are being actioned or not at a national level except to go into 
the case notes offender by offender.  (CP national 7) 
However, it was suggested by a national level interviewee that despite the 
information‟s imperfection it does at least provide senior and national office 
managers with: “something that you can talk about that‟s quite tangible” (CP 
national 5). 
 
The Government perspective on performance measurement and management 
received little mention by interviewees from the Community Probation Service 
other than to acknowledge the significance of the targets set out in the 
Department‟s Statement of Intent.   A local interviewee claimed “our practice is 
shaped by what happened in Parliament” and stated: 
 … that‟s reflected in the fact that our practice is determined by the questions asked 
in the House, the pressure that the Minister is under at a particular time.  (CP local 
9) 
However, a national level interviewee observed that the agency‟s responses to the 
Government‟s requirements are not always as Ministers might wish.  (S)he 
explained:  
We haven‟t gone anywhere near as far as what the Minister wanted us to after 
Burton,
62
 and the reasons for that are we don‟t have the resources to do what he 
wants us to do.  (CP national 7) 
 
The Internal Perspectives of the Community Probation Service 
Interviewees from the Community Probation Service mentioned three internal 
perspectives on measuring and managing performance, namely: 
(i) Local, 
(ii) Organisation, and  
(iii) Team.   
                                               
62 As noted above in Footnote 45, Graham Burton was an offender who, whilst released on parole from prison, 
committed murder.   
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As shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.4, although it was also mentioned at the national 
level, the Local perspective was, not surprisingly, the perspective most commonly 
mentioned by interviewees from the local level.   A local interviewee described 
his/her role at that level as:  
 … a very difficult job because you‟re actually at the coalface of a lot of the noise; 
dealing with the offenders, dealing with the pressure of the reports from Courts, and 
so on.  (CP local 4) 
A number of local interviewees also explained the significant pressure they face in 
managing an increasing workload.  One local manager stated that “our numbers 
are going through the roof” (CP local 10) and explained how the opening of a new 
police station next to the local Court had resulted in a twenty-five percent increase 
in cases referred to Community Probations.  Another local manager suggested that 
“we are a reactive service” in which his/her major problem is deciding where to 
switch resources to meet unpredictable need.  (S)he explained: 
We are reactive in that we respond to the Court; so the Court says we want this 
report - we deliver it; the Court says we want you to manage this person - we 
manage them.  The Parole Board say we are going to release this person - we 
manage them.  (CP local 9) 
Similarly, in explaining how (s)he manages her/his own caseload, a Probation 
Officer observed: 
It‟s juggling it all so we can still maintain the weekly and fortnightly visits as well as 
getting them onto their sentence conditions if they have to do programmes.  So I 
feel my managing time has to be pretty important otherwise something lacks.  (CP 
local 8) 
However, a local manager further described the impact of volume pressures on the 
quality of the agency‟s work by suggesting that it was inevitable that less time 
would be spent with individual offenders when increases in the number of cases 
were not matched by more resources.   
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At the local level, the burden of data entry was described by a Community Work 
Supervisor who, whilst explaining the difficulties of managing his/her caseload and 
entering data into the IOMS system, asked: “Do you try and get them on track or 
do you keep your case notes nice and tidy?” (CP local 11).  A national level 
interpretation of this local perspective was provided by a national office manager 
who suggested that problems with accurate data capture within the IOMS 
computer system are explained by the fact that:  
… a lot of probation officers like the paper system and they feel much more 
comfortable with that.  And a lot of our other staff, who are not probation officers but 
deal with offenders, a lot of them don‟t have a lot of real computer knowledge 
anyway.  (CP national 5) 
 
That interviewee further explained how a standard reporting template has been 
made available to local managers in an attempt to get a common focus and 
consistent set of explanations around local performance.  However, (s)he 
suggested that it wasn‟t widely used because local managers:  
 .. don‟t understand it, see the value in it.  … [A] lot of managers at that level might 
not know how to interpret and how to then use it.  It‟s data for them but how they 
actually look at it and work out what that means for them in terms of their 
management of their staff going forward, some of them will be able to do it but 
others won‟t.  That‟s not saying anything about those managers; it‟s where they‟ve 
come from and what they‟re used to. (CP national 5) 
 
At the local level, a manager described a range of mechanisms by which (s)he 
measures and manages performance.  These include asking his/her managers to 
provide him/her with a sample of their staff supervision records to confirm that 
her managers “are actually doing their job”, as well as holding regular meetings 
with union representatives which also provide: 
 … a gauge as to whether or not we are doing our job well.  Because if we are being 
an inclusive employer we are actually getting staff on board in terms of where we‟re 
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going and how we‟re going to get there and clear messaging, I suppose, to staff. 
Then we find we have a very low instance of complaints from the PSA
63
 and a really 
high level of staff buy in.  So that‟s actually quite an important gauge for me in 
terms of what‟s the temperature of the PSA at the moment.  (CP local 4) 
However, that interviewee placed little faith in the QUAS (quality assurance) 
system which, (s)he explained, is based on assessments of client files by 
managers from other sites that affect performance pay but are not conducted 
objectively.  (S)he suggested that those managers doing the assessments will 
tend to mark low so as to make the site look worse and their own site look better 
in comparison.  (S)he commented: 
You‟re getting this really distorted view.  When you look at the QUAS results there is 
a nice kind of line to it but in actual fact what‟s happening underneath is almost like 
a war going on and people aren‟t actually seeing that.  (CP local 4) 
 
The Organisation perspective on performance measurement and management in 
the Community Probation Service is concerned with measuring and managing the 
culture, capability and capacity of the organisation.  It was mentioned by 
interviewees at all three organisational levels of the Community Probation Service.  
Particularly at the regional level, interviewees‟ comments reflected recognition of 
the importance of managing the culture of the organisation.  At the regional level 
a manager described a:  
 … battle to actually change the culture of our regions, become more forward 
focused, actually look to the successes rather than a lot of what we get caught up in 
which, as I say, is the kind of failure end of the business.  (CP regional 1a) 
That interviewee explained that (s)he wanted to establish “a culture of 
inclusiveness” where people want to come to work and “feel passionate and proud 
of what they do”.  However, (s)he suggested that, although in such a culture 
people should believe in and deliver on the organisation‟s policies and procedures, 
                                               
63  The union involved is the Public Service Association, or PSA. 
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“there‟s a massive [change to a] culture of ownership which we‟ve yet to achieve”.  
Similar sentiments were conveyed by a local manager who explained:   
I want to build a workplace … where people are feeling satisfied in their work.  People 
are very clear about their purpose of coming to work and what they‟re trying to 
achieve here.  ...  There is some sense of process and there is some sense of they 
have a voice.  (CP local 4) 
 
In relation to the organisation‟s capability, a national level manager described the 
use of measures to monitor both the skill and ages of the agency‟s staff.  (S)he 
also explained strategies to change the focus of probation officers away from being 
offender centred and social worker dominated to one that is more focused on 
managing sentence compliance and the related risks to the community.  (S)he 
recognised that, in order to achieve this, it is necessary to improve the capability 
of managers to ensure:  
… there‟s more discussion with staff about why am I getting you to do this, why is 
this important, what‟s the point of it; instead of just instructions to do things.  (CP 
national 7) 
 
At the time the interviewees were conducted, the imminent implementation of 
legislative changes64, that would introduce new community-based sentences and a 
significant increase in workload, represented a major challenge for the Community 
Probation Service.  A number of interviewees mentioned work that was being 
undertaken to prepare the agency for the changes.  For example, a local 
interviewee described efforts that were:   
 … two pronged.  One is from head office; they have presentations and are sending 
out information and asking responses from staff.  And secondly, locally we‟ve also 
tried to, certainly driven by the area manager, look to what may be happening and 
different ways of working things.  (CP local 10) 
 
                                               
64 Refer footnote 49, on page 227.   
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The Team perspective received only brief mention at the local level by that same 
manager who described a broader focus on performance by saying:   
There used to be a situation when you could just look after your little service centre 
and have great figures and the person three miles away could be drowning; but 
yours is OK.  I sense there‟s much more of an area focus, even a regional focus.  (CP 
local 10)   
 
The External Perspective of the Community Probation Service 
Within the Community Probation Service the External perspective on measuring 
and managing performance was most frequently mentioned by interviewees from 
the regional level, although it was also mentioned by those from the national and 
local levels.  The focus of these comments related to three groups of constituents, 
namely: 
(i) other agencies, local organisations and community groups; 
(ii) the media and the general public; and 
(iii) local communities.   
 
As noted in Chapter 6, a significant function of the Community Probation Service 
concerns building and managing relationships with other agencies.  A number of 
local level interviewees explained these relationships by describing the regular 
meetings that are held (both officially and unofficially) with judges, court 
managers, lawyers, Police and prison staff, as a means of gaining feedback on the 
agency‟s performance and any problems that may be occurring.  A local manager 
further described these relationships by saying:   
Obviously the courts and the Parole Board we have really close working relationships 
with.  They are really customers of ours.  We consider ourselves to be servants of the 
Court, if you like; and so we have our provider–customer relationship with them.  
(CP local 9) 
Another local interviewee described a relationship with the local Maori community 
that includes a member of that community acting as a guardian of the agency‟s 
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interest.  (S)he explained “we have a good strong relationship with our kaitiaki, 
our manu whenua”65 (CP local 4).   
 
Interviewees from the Community Probation Service suggested that the media‟s 
and the general public‟s perspective on the agency‟s performance is influential but, 
as was the case with interviewees from Public Prisons, they believe that the public 
is not well informed.  A regional level interviewee observed that the agency‟s 
performance is:   
 … being judged, certainly over the last six months, more by media and by the public 
about what they think we should and shouldn‟t be doing, which is again reflected in 
political opinion which drives our performance.  (CP regional 1b)   
A national level interviewee similarly acknowledged that: “public opinion shapes 
what we do” (CP national 7), and a local level interviewee observed: 
The community is certainly informed by what they hear from politicians [and] 
through the media, and so that does shape community opinion.  (CP local 9)   
Commenting on the public‟s understanding and expectations of what the 
Community Probation Service is able to do, that interviewee also explained: 
[W]e are a public agency and we are dealing with an issue that is close to the heart 
of many people and so I expect us to be in the spotlight and I expect us to be 
criticised and held to account.  What frustrates me is the lack of context around that; 
the lack of understanding of what we are actually dealing with on a day to day basis.  
(CP local 9) 
A regional level interviewee suggested that the agency‟s approach to the media 
and the general public is not about, “managing performance; I guess we‟re into 
managing public expectations” and as a result: 
People‟s performance is also reflected in how well they handle those situations. … 
Now just about, to a certain layer, everyone will have media training and be 
expected to be responsive.  (CP regional 1a) 
 
                                               
65 kaitiaki = maori for guardian;  manu whenua = maori for people of the land, or indigenous people.   
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Interviewees from the regional level also explained the importance of local 
communities‟ perspectives on the performance of the Community Probations 
Service.  A regional manager observed: “at the end of the day our communities 
measure us too” but, (s)he also noted, they do not use formal performance 
measures, because: 
… people‟s eyes glaze over once you go into a forum and start putting this stuff up.  
What they want to know is, is their street safe for them and their children; and that‟s 
quite a big ask.  Or, are we managing that offender so they won‟t offend?  And I‟m 
not sure that we can ever give that assurance. (CP regional 1a) 
However, another regional interviewee suggested that local concerns about the 
placement of offenders on community-based sentences can be managed 
constructively.  (S)he explained: 
…  If you put out to the media such and such an offender is living next door to you 
well! ….  But if we have the opportunity to go and speak to the neighbours and the 
communities and explain how to keep themselves safe and what to look for, etc the 
response is quite different.  We‟ve found that time and time again.  (CP regional 1b) 
 
The Offender Perspective of the Community Probation Service 
The Offender perspective was mentioned by interviewees at all three 
organisational levels within the Community Probation Service.  As noted in relation 
to the Organisational perspective, a key strategy of the agency is to change the 
focus of many staff who “believed they were all offender advocates” (CP regional 
1b) to one more concerned with managing offenders‟ sentences and risks to the 
community.  To this end a national office manager explained how (s)he had “got 
rid of” the word „client‟ from the Community Probation Service, because those 
concerned do not come to the agency by choice but as a consequence of having 
committed an offence.  (S)he explained: 
It wasn‟t a shift about “you must treat them with any less respect or treat them 
differently”; but “you must clearly see that these are people that the public must be 
protected from.  And your mind set in dealing with them has to be about making 
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sure that they comply with everything associated with their sentence; and you help 
them do that.  If they don‟t do that you‟ve got to take action against them”.  (CP 
national 7) 
 
At the local level an interviewee explained that helping offenders comply with their 
sentence initially requires an assessment when “we find out all their background 
[and] if they have any needs like unemployment [or] housing” (CP local 3) as well 
as any gang affiliations.  That interviewee described how different gangs need to 
be separated between work parties and managed by a male community work 
supervisor.  That interviewee described his/her own approach to managing 
offenders by explaining:   
I make sure that when they walk through that door I know them.  I call them by 
their first name; not like, what‟s your name again.  …  we treat them like people.  …  
I think, in community work especially, we like to treat them as human beings even 
though they‟ve committed an offence.  (CP local 3) 
 
Another local interviewee described a more flexible approach to the management 
of offenders that takes account of:  
… whether you had to battle to get him through, whether he skipped three or four 
weeks in between, does that make the sentence unsuccessful?  He completed the 
sentence within the time … even if it takes a full year I would actually QAS [score 
against the quality system standards] that person at four [out of four] because he‟s 
gone through more than he should have to get him through the sentence.  [But] in 
failing to send him a warning letter after the second time that he did not comply with 
his sentence, I failed everything if you look at an audit.  But I got him through the 
sentence.  That should jump my QAS on him to four despite all the failures.  (CP local 
11) 
That interviewee also described a more sympathetic view of offenders in which 
probation officers might provide support and assistance to an offender “to help 
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that person out of a bad situation, as a Samaritan”.  (S)he provided an example of 
an offender who had a small baby: 
… so she can do only two hours or so between feeding, so she must be close to her 
house because she‟s got somebody who can look after the baby.  So I went to [her] 
street and I went to the first church there, cold canvassing basically, and he said yes, 
we‟ll have her.  (CP local 11) 
 
A more formal view of offenders was described by a national level interviewee who 
explained that, in the provision of rehabilitative services, the agency adopts the 
„responsivity principle‟ by which: 
 … you should deliver your programmes in a way that‟s compatible with the 
expectations and learning styles of the offender.  So you don‟t give lots of written 
work to people that are illiterate.  You match the delivery of the programme to their 
learning styles.  (CP national 2) 
A regional interviewee also explained that it is necessary to match the intensity of 
programmes to the offenders so that while young and low risk offenders should be 
given limited exposure to programmes: 
 … with our really high risk people we have to give them a really intensive 
programme.  We can‟t just give them a little bit.  Unless we can give them a really 
intensive programme, … we‟re best not to touch them because if you give high risk 
people a little bit of something basically you immunise them against the impact of a 
more intensive programme.  (CP regional 1a) 
 
The System Perspective of the Community Probation Service 
The System perspective on performance measurement and management in the 
Community Probations Service received only limited mention by interviewees from 
the national and local levels of the organisation.  As noted earlier, within the 
Community Probation Service the principal computer system is the Integrated 
Offender Management System (IOMS).  Although the system was described by an 
interviewee at the national level as “an operational, day to day tool” (CP national 
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5), comments received at the local level did not generally convey a positive view 
of the system.  One local interviewee, for example, explained that (s)he initially 
created reports in Word before pasting them into IOMS: 
… because IOMS is a bit flaky, I find.  People say it‟s not done it for ages but I‟ve 
been known to lose work in it.  (CP local 6)   
The creation of duplicate systems was further described by another local 
interviewee who similarly believed that IOMS “is not reliable”.  (S)he stated that, 
in an ideal world, it should be possible: 
… to just open a computer file, type in what you do while you‟re doing it, and you 
don‟t have to open the manual file again.  But we must run the two systems hand in 
hand.  Most of the time it‟s quicker and easier to open the manual file and see the 
telephone number right there than to go into IOMS, page through three or four 
screens before you get to the offender‟s details to get to the telephone number in 
order to „phone him.  Once you‟ve „phoned him you must close three or four screens 
before you can get to notes where you can make a note.  (CP local 11) 
However, whilst acknowledging that “IOMS is going not 100% at the moment”, 
one local interviewee did comment 
I rely on IOMS because it tells me everything.  If someone else has dealt with this 
person previously it will tell me what that person felt. … If I say I want you to come 
back on Saturday, it will automatically generate to Saturday.  So when I go into 
Saturday it will have all these people and then I can take it from there.  (CP local 3) 
 
It was suggested that the system is of principal benefit at a national level, as a 
local interviewee observed: “If you look at our system you can sit in Wellington 
and judge more or less what‟s going on on Johnny‟s case in Christchurch” (CP local 
11).  A national office manager also noted: “Data can inform us an awful lot.  The 
more I can get good data from our system the better management information 
I‟ve got” (CP national 2).  However, another national level interviewee explained:  
We do use IOMS for a lot of our data capture but we are always aware that it might 
not be one hundred percent up to date or accurate.  (CP national 5) 
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Perspectives of the Community Probation Service 
As was the case with Public Prisons, the perspectives principally described by the 
interviewees from the Community Probation Service, taken as a whole, were those 
associated with the External and National/Government perspectives that represent 
the official model of performance measurement and management.  However, for 
interviewees from the local level of the Community Probation Service the Local 
perspective, associated with issues of local operational management, is most 
significant.   
 
In a manner similar to Public Prisons, interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service described a distinct difference between the National and Local 
perspectives.  They explained the former in terms of the establishment, 
measurement and management of detailed standards and procedures. The latter is 
more focused on managing the pressures of increasing workloads.   
 
8.6 Perspective – A Summary 
By means of the construct of perspective it is possible to identify the constituents 
for whom performance is measured and managed and/or by whom those practices 
are influenced.  As explained, particularly by the interviewees from Public Prisons 
and the Community Probation Service, those differing constituencies at times 
represent conflicting interests, values and objectives.   
 
In all three case study agencies the most frequently mentioned perspectives were 
those associated with the official model of performance measurement and 
management, i.e. the National and Government perspectives.  In each agency this 
reflected a focus on the requirements of the key external accountability documents 
that are cascaded down to the accountabilities of managers at each level of the 
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organisation.  However, particularly in Public Prisons and the Community Probation 
Service, the National and Government perspectives were not described 
sympathetically by interviewees at the local level.  Compliance with their reporting 
requirements was generally perceived as a burden.   
 
The External perspective of performance measurement and management is also 
important for the interviewees from all three case study agencies.  Those from 
Work and Income mentioned other agencies, community groups and employers, 
with whom they work towards common objectives, and clients, families and 
communities that they seek to assist.  On the other hand, the interviewees from 
Public Prisons described an External perspective that includes a lack of 
understanding and unsympathetic attitude by the media and general public.  
Interviewees from the Community Probation Service similarly suggested that, 
although influential, the general public was not well informed.  However, like Work 
and Income, they described a much more positive view of the other agencies, 
organisations and communities with whom they work.   
 
It is evident that, to varying degrees, the interviewees from all three agencies 
viewed their operational autonomy as being shaped by the sensegiving practices 
of the general public whose “opinion shapes what we do” (CP national 7) and the 
Government in line with the expectations of which performance is defined.  Thus 
as public opinion influences the Government‟s perspective on agency performance, 
so that in turn shapes the national perspective within each agency.  However, 
particularly in Public Prisons and the Community Probations Service, the 
perspectives emphasised by interviewees at the local level had an alternative 
focus.   
 
At the local level of Work and Income interviewees placed significant emphasis on 
the Client perspective of performance measurement and management.  What that 
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means, in terms of a broad approach to client wellbeing, is consistently 
understood at all levels of the organisation.  In contrast, the Offender perspective 
of performance is not commonly understood at the different organisational levels 
of either Public Prisons or the Community Probation Service.   
 
The next chapter will draw together the key elements that are embedded in the 
official, formal and in use performance management models of the three case 
study agencies.  It then suggests a framework that helps explain their diverse 
characteristics.   
 
 
 329 
Chapter 9 
AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
9.1 Introduction 
For each of the three case study agencies the previous three chapters have 
described the official performance management models as defined in relevant 
legislation, the Government‟s Estimates documentation and the agencies‟ external 
accountability documents (primarily their Statements of Intent and Annual 
Reports).  Those chapters have also provided an analysis of the in use 
performance management models, as revealed by the comments of the 
interviewees, and the formal performance management models encoded within 
the computer systems and other artefacts of each agency.   
 
In this chapter the key features of those models are identified and discussed.  
Those features are seen to form two continua that may be characterised as 
comprising: 
(i) The rationality of control – which is to say, the nature of the logic used 
to define and direct organisational performance.  That logic may be 
more or less instrumental or substantive in nature and employ 
management mechanisms that are based more or less on the use of 
rules and regulations or shared cognitive frameworks.   
(ii) The locus of control – which represents the extent to which that 
rationality is employed internally or externally to the given 
organisational setting.  The sensegiving practices and influence of 
internal managers and/or external stakeholders will shape how 
performance is defined and the level and nature of resources that are 
allocated to the management of its various facets.   
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The nature of these two continua is explored in more detail below.  They are then 
drawn together in a framework of competing values which provides an explanatory 
model against which the performance measurement and management practices of 
the case study agencies may be interpreted.   
 
9.2 Rationality and Control Mechanisms 
As shown in Figure 9.1, the rationality of control may be understood from the 
answers to a series of related questions.  For each of the case study agencies 
those answers are provided below.     
 
Figure 9.1: The Rationality of Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) Measurement and Management of What? 
It is an often repeated cliché that „one size (or performance measurement and 
management model) does not fit all‟ (agencies).  In this context, the framework 
suggested by Wilson (1989) which categorises organisations as „production‟, 
„procedural‟, „craft‟ or „coping‟ (depending on the extent to which an organisation‟s 
(iii) Using What 
Information? 
(iv) Employing an Instrumental or 
Substantive Rationality? 
Controlled via Rules and Regulations and/or 
Shared Understandings? 
(ii) Against What Criteria? (i) Measurement and 
Management of What? 
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work and the results of that work are to be observed and measured) has been 
widely quoted.  Indeed, one of the major criticisms of the New Zealand‟s public 
sector reforms of the late 1980s is that they treated all public sector agencies as if 
they are production organisations in which work can be both specified in advance 
and its results subsequently clearly identified and measured (Gregory 1995b).  
However, this typology has been somewhat simplistically used to interpret public 
sector management practices, despite Wilson‟s own warning that it is: “a crude 
effort to sort out some important differences.  It is hardly theory and many 
agencies do not fit its categories” (Wilson, 1989, p.159).  The current research has 
indeed found that (at least the case study) agencies do not simply display the 
characteristics of one of the four archetypes but may, for example, display the 
characteristics of both production and craft or coping and procedural 
organisations.   
 
The activities involved in Work and Income‟s core functions of paying benefits and 
placing people into employment can be relatively easily pre-defined and 
subsequently monitored.  Similarly the results of those activities (such as the 
number of benefits paid or the number of people remaining on the unemployment 
register) can be easily monitored.  As a result, the agency has been viewed as a 
typical „production‟ organisation.  However, the emphasis on client wellbeing and 
social development, which was described by interviewees at all levels of that 
organisation, involves activities which are much harder to pre-define and monitor 
and for which the causal links to results are much harder to determine.  
Nonetheless, those results and longer term societal outcomes can be pre-specified 
and ultimately measured through client surveys and the broader indicators 
published in the annual „Social Report‟ published by the Ministry of Social 
Development.  In this respect Work and Income displays the characteristics of a 
„craft‟ organisation.   
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Similarly, the core activities of Public Prisons and the Community Probation 
Service, associated with the management and rehabilitation of offenders are, in 
both cases, characteristic of a „coping‟ organisation in which neither the direct 
activities of prison officers and probation officers nor the results of those activities 
are easily observed and measured.  The activities of the staff in these agencies 
cannot be directly monitored in the same way as those of Work and Income‟s front 
line staff who sit in open plan offices.  Interviewees from Public Prisons, for 
example, remarked that prison officers work in a closed environment, with a ratio 
of three staff to sixty prisoners, and this makes observation of their work very 
difficult.  Further, the extent to which the amount of crime is lowered, the degree 
of re-offending is reduced, and beneficial changes in the behaviour of individual 
offenders occur, are all significantly affected by a range of societal and economic 
factors beyond the control of Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service.  
Notwithstanding these measurement difficulties, interviewees from these agencies 
explained that performance is largely measured and managed by means of a set 
of predefined and subsequently monitored procedures.  Thus these agencies also 
display the characteristics of „procedural‟ organisations.   
 
The research therefore suggests that, rather than being generically treated as 
production type organisations, the internal performance measurement and 
management practices of the case study agencies should more appropriately be 
interpreted as procedural or activity based. However, just as Wilson warned 
against over simplification, we should be aware that although internal performance 
measurement and management practices may principally focus on controlling the 
activities or procedures being undertaken they may also, to a greater or lesser 
extent, do so with a view to the broader impacts of that work.  
 
In all three case study agencies the focus on monitoring and management of 
procedural compliance therefore contrasts with, but accompanies, an emphasis 
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placed on outcomes in the official performance model of external accountability.  
As required by the Public Finance Act 1989 (ss. 40 and 45) and the guidance 
material issued by the Treasury and State Services Commission (see, for example, 
Figure 9.2 below), the external accountability documents of each agency provide 
descriptions of the specific impacts, outcomes or objectives that they seek to 
achieve or contribute to.   
 
Figure 9.2:  Appropriate Measures  
 
(State Services Commission, 2007, p.5) 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, how well those descriptions are providesd has been the 
subject of criticism (Controller and Auditor-General, 2008, 2009c) and the reasons 
for perceived shortcomings have been the subject of some speculation in respect 
of what it is that managers actually manage (Dormer, 2001) and the potential 
unattainably of attributable outcome measures (Gill, 2008).   
 
However, at the same time as the agencies‟ external accountability documents 
describe their performance in terms of outputs and outcomes and explain their 
concern to „manage for outcomes‟, this focus is not reflected within the agencies.  
The interviewees from each of the case study agencies largely defined their 
performance in terms of procedures and explained the importance of procedural 
compliance in the models, in practice, used to internally measure and manage 
performance.  They also noted how compliance with these procedures is audited 
by regular checks of both computer records and manually maintained documents.   
 
Impacts, Outcomes or Objectives 
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It might also be expected that, within each agency, managers‟ focus on inputs, 
processes, outputs and/or outcomes would be reflected in a hierarchical division of 
functions.  For example, senior, or national office, managers (at what Mintzberg 
(1996) has referred to as the “strategic apex”) might be expected to be concerned 
with longer term issues, managing the political interface with external 
stakeholders, and being able to provide “evidence that the organisation is meeting 
standards or engaging in activities that confer legitimacy on it” (Kanter & 
Summers, 1994, p.230).  Similarly, managers at the local level (in Mintzberg‟s 
“operating core”) would be more concerned with technical issues associated with 
the management of inputs and processes.  However, the current research found 
that managers at the national level may also be more concerned with shorter term 
issues associated with the management of operational procedures and inputs and 
managers at the local level may also adopt a longer term and more strategic 
focus.  Dangers therefore also exist in too simply categorising the performance 
management focus of managers at different hierarchical levels of the organisation.   
 
As was noted in Chapter 6, in its external accountability documents, the Ministry 
of Social Development has indicated its intent to shift Work and Income from a 
transaction-based approach of managing benefit payments and employment 
placements to one of achieving the outcomes associated with the Government‟s 
social vision.  The research shows that, to some degree, this has been achieved.  
This is illustrated, for example, by a local manager‟s description of the need, with 
the aid of the Social Report, to “paint the big picture” for his/her staff because 
(s)he believes performance is “more about managing outcomes than outputs” (WI 
local 4).  Other interviewees at the local level of Work and Income similarly 
described a strategic approach to the management of their clients in the broader 
community which included seeking opportunities to work collaboratively with 
elements of the community to identify and resolve issues in order to prevent 
unemployment as well as dealing with it once it occurs.  However, at the same 
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time, the agency‟s internal management reports and formal external accountability 
documents continue to place a significant focus on process-based indicators such 
as the accuracy with which standard documentation is completed or the timeliness 
within which key processes are concluded. 
 
National and regional level interviewees from Public Prisons placed an emphasis on 
the two outcomes Protecting the Public (through managing the safe secure and 
humane confinement of offenders) and Reducing Re-offending (through managing 
prisoners‟ rehabilitation and reintegration) (see Figure 6.2).  As reported in 
Chapter 6, local level interviewees from Public Prisons appear to place less 
emphasis on these outcomes and, in particular on Reducing Re-offending, and 
seem more concerned with managing standard procedures.  A concern to manage 
operational risk results in Public Prisons‟ national level managers also placing 
emphasis on the agency‟s compliance with standard procedures.  This was 
exemplified in the suggestion of a national office manager that, in effect, a failure 
it follow procedures is the reason why staff end up getting fired.  A similar concern 
with managing procedures is evident in the Community Probation Service where, 
as reported in Chapter 8, a national office manager stressed their importance in 
providing evidence of the organisation‟s success.    
 
As noted in Chapter 7, interviewees at the national, regional and local levels of the 
Community Probation Service also accord a significant importance to managing 
the culture, capability and capacity of the organisation.  As part of that culture 
change, managers described efforts to focus front line staff on the management of 
offenders‟ compliance with their sentences and to remove the idea that they are 
dealing with „clients‟.  More broadly, at the regional and local levels interviewees 
described a desire to build a “culture of inclusiveness” in which front line staff are 
able to take responsibility for the agency‟s objectives, and interviewees at all three 
organisational levels commented on the problems of balancing resources and 
 336 
workloads.  As noted in Chapter 6, this broad focus on managing the organisation 
and its resources might be explained by the fact that, at the time of the research, 
the Community Probation Service had recently undertaken an extensive internal 
consultation and change process in order to prepare for the legislative changes, 
introduced in October 2007, that resulted in a significant increase in the number 
and complexity of community-based sentences that the agency has to manage.   
 
The research findings therefore indicate that, although the management of longer 
term outcomes is discussed in the external accountability documents associated 
with the official model, interviewees from within each of the case study agencies 
placed limited emphasis on outcomes.  However, particularly within Work and 
Income, a focus on the medium term impacts of the agency‟s work does 
accompany the in use model‟s primary concern with the management of 
processes.  At the local level of each of the agencies managers also explained that 
they had limited or no discretion in respect of their major inputs such as staffing 
levels.  This suggests that input-based controls remain an important feature of the 
models in use at the national level.  Indeed, the continued focus on the 
management of inputs and processes may be seen as more reflective of an earlier 
model of administrative control than the emphasis on outputs and outcomes 
contained within the new public management.  In this respect the “rather 
paradoxical situation where inconsistent logics of control operate simultaneously” 
(Modell et al, 2007, p.457) points to the locally embedded “historical, political and 
institutional factors” that continues to shape the understanding and decision 
making of actors irrespective of, or together with, externally defined institutional 
frameworks.   
 
(ii) Measurement and Management Against What Criteria? 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that „performance‟ may be broadly defined as how some 
pre-defined task or action is undertaken and with what results.  However, in the 
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context of New Zealand‟s public service, both the „how‟ and the „results‟ are 
evaluated against a number of different criteria.  More specifically, the research 
revealed six criteria by which the performance of the case study agencies is 
evaluated by internal and/or external actors, namely: economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, equity, organisational capital and public capital.  It is also evident 
that the emphasis placed on each of these criteria varies significantly between the 
official model of external accountability, concerned with the management of the 
public sector, and the models in use within individual agencies.    
 
Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
The focus on inputs and processes noted in respect of the performance 
management models in use within the case study agencies reflects a broader 
concern, also present in the official model, with the economy with which inputs are 
procured and the efficiency with which those inputs are used to produce outputs.  
With varying emphasis at different times, New Zealand‟s official model of public 
service performance management has also emphasised the effectiveness of those 
outputs in achieving desired impacts or outcomes.  While interviewees from all 
levels of the three case study agencies discussed the effectiveness of their 
activities, they did so with differing emphasis.  The comments provided by 
interviewees from Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service were 
generally reflective of a belief that it is very difficult to make a difference in the 
lives of offenders or to measure any attributable difference.  In contrast the 
comments of interviewees from Work and Income were richly populated with 
success stories in respect of the agency‟s clients.   
 
In both the official and the in use models it is evident that this tension, between 
agency performance defined and managed in terms of the economy and efficiency 
of output delivery and the broader, longer-term concepts of the effectiveness of 
performance defined in terms of impacts and outcomes, remains an unresolved 
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issue in the ongoing evolution of the New Zealand model of public sector 
management.   
 
Equity 
Little explicit consideration is given in the official model to the equity with which 
outputs are provided in terms of the equal availability of services (as in the case of 
New Zealand Superannuation) or the targeted provision of services to those most 
in need (as is the case with social security benefits paid to invalids).66  However, 
particularly at the local levels of Work and Income and the Community Probation 
Service, the comments of interviewees suggested that the in use models within 
those agencies, with their more subjectively framed performance information, are 
more concerned with the equity of service provision as a dimension of their 
performance.   
 
Organisational Capital 
In a similar manner to the criteria of effectiveness, over the last two decades New 
Zealand‟s official model of public service performance management has placed 
varying degrees of emphasis on the measurement and management of 
organisational capital.  Although performance information in respect of 
“organisational health and capability” is now required by the Public Finance Act 
1989 (S.40 (d) (iii)) a review of the case study agencies‟ external accountability 
documents for the 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 financial years provided limited 
information in this respect.  As noted in Chapter 2, a further reduction in the focus 
on this dimension may follow the decision of the State Services Commission to 
abandon its annual report against the „Development Goals for the State Sector‟.   
 
                                               
66 The previous Labour Government in New Zealand had required a number of public service agencies to report 
annually on their efforts in „Closing the Gaps‟ to target those elements of New Zealand society at the lower end 
of the economic scale.   
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However, interviewees at the national, regional and local levels of the case study 
agencies placed a significant importance on managing the culture, capability and 
capacity of the organisation.  At the regional and local levels of the Community 
Probation Service interviewees described a desire to build a “culture of 
inclusiveness” in which front line staff are able to take responsibility for the 
agency‟s objectives and a common theme in all the agencies studied was the 
problem of balancing organisational resources and workloads.   
 
Public Capital 
As explained in Chapter 4, the dimension of performance associated with public 
capital (i.e. the trust and confidence in the agency held by Ministers, major 
stakeholders and the general public) receives limited explicit recognition in the 
official model of performance management.  However, interviewees at all levels of 
the three case study agencies explained the importance of the public‟s 
understanding of, and support for, their activities.  In particular, it is evident that 
the externally focused sensegiving of Work and Income‟s managers, together with 
the extent of their relationships with other agencies and community groups, has 
successfully developed that organisation‟s public capital.  At the local level of the 
Community Probation Service interviewees also provided evidence of their efforts 
to build that agency‟s public capital with their local communities.  However, Public 
Prisons would seem to have been less successful in this respect.   
 
From the research it is therefore evident that organisational performance is 
evaluated against a number of different, and at times conflicting, criteria.  Thus, 
for example, it is possible for performance to be managed efficiently (in terms of 
the relationship between inputs and outputs) but not effectively (in terms of the 
relationship between outputs and impacts or outcomes).  Similarly, the economy 
of service provision in the current period may occur at the cost of organisational 
capital and the ability to provide services in the future.  For the case study 
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agencies, the difficulties of managing organisational performance reflect the 
complications of taking account of each of these criteria and their, at times, 
conflicting requirements.   
 
(iii) Measurement and Management Using What Information? 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that the construct of representation is concerned with 
how (i.e. in what form) performance is depicted or symbolised.  In the legislation 
(such as the Public Finance Act 1989) and guidance material published by the 
Treasury and State Services Commission, the official model of performance 
measurement and management is largely based on the notion that performance 
information can be objectively represented in (primarily) numeric terms.  However 
the current research found that in each organisational setting (be that a whole 
case study agency or a part thereof) a mixture of representational methodologies 
exists on a continuum from objective to subjective.   
 
Interviewees from all three case study agencies described the use of formal 
reports containing quantified financial and non-financial information in respect of 
their planned performance, actual performance and future performance 
expectations.  In Work and Income, this information includes the number of 
people registered for each form of benefit, the results of audits that measure the 
extent to which case records comply with documentation standards, ratings of 
service quality revealed in client surveys, as well as employee numbers and actual 
expenditure against budget.  In Public Prisons, quantified performance information 
includes the number of cell searches conducted, the timeliness of sentence plan 
reviews, the number of hours prisoners spend outside of their cells, and the hours 
they spend in some form of employment.  In the Community Probation Service, 
interviewees described “a whole bunch of indicators” that include the number of 
new sentences managed, reports written, and the timeliness with which standard 
tasks, such as offender assessments and work placements, are completed.   
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However, the interviewees also described subjective representations of 
performance that include the use of formal and informal feedback, anecdote and 
direct observation of work practices.  In the State Services Commissioner‟s annual 
evaluation of the performance of the chief executives of all public service 
departments67, feedback from other agencies and stakeholders plays a central 
role.  Within the agencies studied, feedback can also be a significant element of 
managers‟ own performance information.  This was emphasised by a national level 
interviewee from Work and Income who explained the importance of engaging 
with stakeholders to gain feedback on the agency‟s performance as a counter to 
any expectation by managers that the public will have confidence in the agency 
doing a good job simply because it has achieved the largely internally focused 
measures defined in the output plan and public accountability documents.  Another 
interviewee at the local level of Work and Income explained how, as well as 
actively encouraging local community groups to provide feedback, (s)he relies on 
feedback from regional and national office managers as an indicator of his/her 
site‟s performance, “good, bad or otherwise” (WI local 4).  Similarly, a number of 
local level managers within the Community Probation Service described how they 
regularly seek feedback on that agency‟s performance from judges, court 
managers, Police and prison staff.  One local manager from that agency also 
suggested that his/her regular meetings with Union representatives provide a 
gauge of how well staff are being managed.   
 
The use of anecdote to help explain, or make sense of, more objectively 
represented performance information was also mentioned by interviewees.  Within 
Work and Income, interviewees at the national, regional and local levels narrated 
anecdotes to explain how the agency has helped its clients.  A local level manager 
described how (s)he requires his/her staff to record “good news stories” in a local 
                                               
67 The New Zealand State Services Commissioner is the employer of all public service chief executives.   
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computer file that (s)he then uses to provide positive examples of the site‟s work 
to national office and to reinforce his/her efforts to manage staff locally.  At the 
national level an interviewee explained how such anecdotes are used to 
supplement performance information provided to the Minister.   However, within 
the Community Probation Service, a national level manager was less supportive of 
the use of anecdote.  (S)he stated: “Anecdotal evidence … there‟s a tautology for 
you; there‟s no such thing as „anecdotal‟ beside the word „evidence‟.  You‟ve got to 
have something that backs it up” (CP national 7).   
 
The direct observation of how staff interact with and manage clients is relatively 
straightforward in the open plan environment of Work and Income‟s local offices.  
Local managers described how they might observe staff or how that might occur, 
both formally and informally, by other staff who then report back to the manager.  
One local manager from the Community Probation Service also explained how 
(s)he periodically sits at the back of the Court and observes the performance of 
individual staff members.  As noted in Chapter 8, the prison environment makes 
the direct observation of prison officers much more difficult.    
 
It is indeed evident that some tension exists between the use of subjectively 
framed local knowledge for local decision making and the standardisation and 
objectification of that knowledge for purposes of upward accountability and control 
at the national level.  However, the research showed that at the local level 
managers rely heavily on objectively quantified information and (as noted below) 
managers at the national level are not averse to picking up the „phone to find out 
what is really going on.   
 
 343 
 (iv) Measurement and Management Using an Instrumental, Calculation-
Based, Rationality and/or a Substantive, Judgement-Based, 
Rationality 
The idea that performance can be measured and managed through calculation-
based, empirically sourced knowledge underpins many of the changes in public 
sector management practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  However, the 
research found that, in practice, performance management is equally dependent 
on a judgement-based rationality that draws on prior experience, tacit knowledge, 
values and flexible targets.  In this respect, performance management may be 
seen as involving either the recognition of an independent reality or an emergent 
and socially constructed process by means of which sense is retrospectively made 
of a diverse, and at times conflicting, set of information.   
 
An instrumental rationality is evident in the management of the operational 
processes of all three case study agencies.  Interviewees at all three hierarchical 
levels of Work and Income commented on the broad range of formal targets they 
are required to manage and report on.  At the national level an interviewee from 
that agency explained how funding is allocated on the basis of the expected 
number and characteristics of the clients at each site.  (S)he also described how 
the value for money of the programmes the agency purchases is evaluated in 
terms of their costs and specific deliverables, such as the number of people 
gaining employment from the programme.  Interviewees from the Community 
Probation Service similarly described a framework of standard tasks to which 
notional units of time are allocated and which is used as a basis for resource 
allocation and operational performance assessment.   
 
It might be expected that managers at the national level, removed from the 
complexities of public/client/offender contact, would base their performance 
measurement and management practices on a formal logic directed at high level 
targets or objectives.  The higher up the organisational hierarchy that managers 
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operate the broader will be the range of performance issues and information to 
which they are, potentially, exposed.  As one national level interviewee from Public 
Prisons observed, “I get piles and piles and piles of paper; and it‟s really hard to 
absorb everything that‟s in there” (PP national 5).  Such managers must, 
therefore, make decisions on what is important and what they must respond to.  
National level interviewees from all three case study agencies explained how, in so 
doing, they use both formal reporting processes and a more substantive logic that 
utilises more subjectively framed performance information.  For example, the 
Public Prisons manager quoted above explained how (s)he may either choose to 
just read a report or to pick up the telephone and ask the manager concerned for 
a verbal briefing.  Adopting a more formal approach, a national level manager in 
Work and Income explained that (s)he pays specific attention to the nature of the 
information (s)he receives and works with the reporting team to craft performance 
information that focuses on his/her particular concerns.  However, (s)he observed 
that this information is increasingly at the less tangible end of the measurement 
spectrum which focuses on those aspects of their clients‟ lives that could be taken 
as indicative of a broader movement toward desired social development outcomes.   
 
A further example of the use of a more substantive, and less formal, logic was 
provided by another national level interviewee from Work and Income who, in 
describing his/her role in managing strategy, observed that this is concerned with 
“where we feel we want to be”68 (WI national 6).  Similarly (s)he suggested that 
measuring and managing social development involves managers sitting down in 
the light of available information and asking, “gut feeling guys, what do we 
think?”.  Nevertheless, some interviewees conveyed a concern about performance 
may not always being formally evaluated in objective terms.  For example, within 
the Community Probation Service, a local manager explained his/her concerns 
with the subjective nature of the quality audits of case files and suggested that 
                                               
68 Emphasis added.   
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they reflect the good and/or bad prejudices of the managers from other sites 
conducting the evaluation.   
 
Interviewees at the local level in all three case study agencies are concerned to 
manage the delivery of services that directly affect individual members of the 
public, be they referred to as clients, as for Work and Income, or offenders, as is 
the case in Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service.  A characteristic 
of the relationship between these local staff and their clients/offenders is the need 
to understand and appropriately respond to the complex reality of the 
client‟s/offender‟s previous experience and cognitive framework.  This can never 
be known with objective certainty but can be subjectively understood.  The 
research found that such an approach is encouraged within Work and Income 
where it was explained that being able to address broader issues of client 
wellbeing, such as family violence, requires a very different kind of staff member 
who is “able to have a conversation with the person” (WI local 4) rather than 
simply fill in forms.  Along similar lines, national office managers from Public 
Prisons expressed a view that prison officers should adopt a less rule-based and 
more prisoner-focused approach.  However, a local staff member from that agency 
expressed a contrary view, stating that (s)he did not believe it was possible to 
understand an offender‟s life and view of reality as: “we can‟t stand and say to 
these guys what you‟re doing is wrong, because we haven‟t walked in their 
footsteps” (PP local 9b).  In contrast to their colleagues in Public Prisons, national 
office managers from the Community Probation Service expressed the view that 
front line staff should establish a less empathetic, and more rule-driven, 
relationship with offenders on community-based sentences.     
 
Thus while the official model of performance measurement and management 
employs a calculation-based logic, explicit cause and effect relationships, and 
specific targets or objectives, it is evident that managers at all levels also employ 
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a more substantive, judgement-based rationality.  In this respect the research 
supports the contention that “measurement in the public sector is less about 
precision and more about increasing understanding and knowledge” (Mayne, 1999, 
p.5) 
 
(v) Control via Rules and Regulations and/or Shared Understandings 
As explained in Chapter 2, the ongoing reforms of New Zealand‟s model of public 
service management are predicated on the notion of an integrated framework of 
performance objectives and information that cascades down from Government‟s 
identified priorities, to Ministers‟ „purchase‟ of goods and services, to the 
specification of managerial objectives at each layer of the organisation.   
 
While this integration is desirable, the research found that, at least in the case 
study agencies, this is not always achieved.  In practice, the extent to which the 
official model of performance measurement and management is reflected (in 
detail) through the different levels within an agency will be determined by the 
institutional context of that agency.  As noted in Chapter 4, that context is 
reflected in, and may be understood from, a series of institutional „carriers‟, 
namely: 
(a) formal rules and procedures; 
(b) routines; 
(c) artefacts; 
(d) social networks of roles and positions; and 
(e) shared understandings and logics of action.   
 
Dillard et al. (2004) have suggested that these carriers exist on a continuum from 
being more regulative in nature to being more culturally and cognitively based.  
While the official model of external accountability impacts on internal performance 
measurement and management practices, that model will become increasingly de-
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coupled from the models in use internally as the institutional carriers within each 
organisation move from being more culturally and cognitively based to being more 
regulative in nature.  The role of each of the institutional carriers in the case study 
agencies is summarised bellow.   
 
(a) Formal rules and procedures 
As noted in (ii) above, formal rules and procedures are important in all of the case 
study agencies and act as regulative mechanisms by which performance 
measurement and management models are communicated and reinforced.  In 
Work and Income, the rules and procedures are an essential safeguard against the 
risk of inappropriate payments to beneficiaries.  They are supported by an 
accuracy reporting process whereby a random sample of client files is routinely 
analysed for correctness by a national office team.  However, while formal rules 
and procedures are an important performance management mechanism within 
that agency, they are not seen as separate from the requirements of operational 
management and appear to be part of a common framework of values and 
objectives understood by front line staff.  For example, a local level manager 
described the pride his/her staff take in regularly meeting the required standards 
for the accuracy of their client documentation.  The local level acknowledgement of 
the importance of formal rules and procedures was also reflected in a Wednesday 
Brief that was observed at one site office.  During the meeting the staff staged 
their version of an Oprah Winfrey chat show to „interviewee‟ a number of their 
colleagues who explained the requirements and significance of various key 
processes and related computer fields.  It was also illustrated by the observation 
of a local Service Centre Manager, reported in Chapter 7, that it is important, 
when things don‟t go quite right, to understand “what happened in our process 
and what do we need to do to change it” (WI local 4).    
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Interviewees from Public Prisons described how formal rules and procedures, 
contained in the Public Prisons Manual, are central to performance measurement 
and management practices in that agency.  Compliance with these rules and 
procedures is audited by means of periodic reviews of computer files as well as the 
manual files kept within the prisons.  Further, as reported in Chapter 7, prisoners 
may be interviewed to confirm the veracity of the recorded information.  However, 
unlike their counterparts in Work and Income, local level interviewees in Public 
Prisons were less supportive of this audit process.  While they acknowledged that 
audits provide a benchmark against which performance may be managed, they 
also suggested that their frequency reinforces a culture of “compliance rather than 
prison performance” (PP local 1).   
 
Within the Community Probation Service, formal rules and procedures were 
mentioned by interviewees at all three organisational levels but appeared to be 
particularly significant for those at the national level.  As in Public Prisons, those 
rules and procedures are contained in “manual standards” against which samples 
of work are checked and practices surrounding critical incidents are reviewed.  
National level interviewees explained that requiring and managing compliance with 
the rules and procedures is a mechanism by which the “unknown-ness” of what 
front line staff do is able to be measured and managed.  They noted that it also 
provides a defence against media and public accusations in the event of incidents 
such as re-offending by offenders serving a community-based sentence.  However, 
similar to their Public Prisons counterparts, interviewees at the local level in the 
Community Probation Service commented on “unnecessary” problems associated 
with an undue emphasis on rules and procedures that result in staff “ticking the 
boxes” and “feeding the internal machine”.  In contrast to Work and Income, 
therefore, local level operational interviewees from Public Prisons and the 
Community Probation Service tended to see their agencies‟ rules and procedures 
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as something with which they have to comply rather than something which relates 
to their operational objectives.   
 
In summary, rules and procedures are used to both frame and control 
organisational performance, particularly where the activities of staff members are 
more difficult to predefine and subsequently monitor.  However, the danger exists 
that staff see an organisation‟s rules and procedures as something that they have 
to comply with rather than something which relates to their operational objectives.   
 
(b) Routines 
The most significant routine mentioned by interviewees from all three case study 
agencies was the monthly reporting cycle.  However, it seems that the production 
of performance information is often more concerned with legitimising (to 
superiors) the existence and activities of a given unit rather than informing and 
supporting the decision-making of that unit‟s management.  As a local level 
interviewee from Work and Income explained, the monthly production of “the 
mother of all reports … gives them [national office] some assurance that we are 
managing it … and it alerts them to issues” (WI local 8).  Nevertheless, although 
some local level Work and Income interviewees commented on the demands of 
the monthly reporting process and the size of the reporting package, it was not 
seen as irrelevant to operational decision-making.   
 
In contrast, for local level interviewees within Public Prisons the monthly reporting 
cycle was a concern; as one interviewee observed: “We are now becoming a 
reporting agency as opposed to a prison agency.  From where I sit, we seem to be 
losing focus on what our core functionality is” (PP local 2).  Concern about formal 
reporting within Public Prisons was also conveyed by a regional level interviewee 
who commented: “There is a bit of concern among a number of us at a senior 
level, least this be used as a weapon as opposed to a tool” (PP regional 13).   
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Interviewees from the Community Probation Service described the process by 
which quantitative reports are prepared at the national level, received and 
discussed at the local and regional levels, and then returned, together with 
commentary, to the national office.  However, as was the case in Public Prisons, 
the interviewees did not view the process positively and suggested that the 
demands of the reporting cycle divert resources from the agency‟s core functions.   
 
Particularly at the local level of all three case study agencies, routines are closely 
associated with the processes by which performance is defined and managed.  
They provide the rhythm to the daily life of staff and in Public Prisons establishing 
and managing an environment governed by routines is a critical element in the 
management of offenders.   
 
(c) Artefacts 
As noted in Chapter 4, artefacts are physical and technical objects which are given 
shape by human action but which also, through a process of reification, assume a 
role that both enables and constrains human action (Giddens, 1976).  An 
organisation‟s national computer systems are artefacts that embody a codification 
of a particular view of what performance is and how it should be managed.  In 
most organisations the creation and maintenance of these systems requires a 
significant investment of money, effort and intellect and as a consequence they 
become entrenched within the organisation and are protected from significant 
change or replacement.  Although national level interviewees from the case study 
agencies used the rhetoric of „supporting operational decision-making‟ to justify 
the existence of such systems, the reality seems to be more concerned with 
making those operational decisions visible at the national level. 
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Within Work and Income, staff use a range of legacy computer systems that are 
not integrated and allow staff a degree of freedom in how they are used.  
However, interviewees from that agency reported that this situation is likely to 
change with the planned development of a single integrated new system.  In 
contrast, both Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service rely heavily on 
the relatively new Integrated Offender Management System (IOMS) that requires 
more strict adherence to due processes and provides less freedom to operational 
staff.  IOMS was described by a local level interviewee within Public Prisons as “not 
user friendly … extremely complicated sometimes and tediously time consuming” 
(PP local 8).  Another local interviewee described IOMS as “a big brother watching 
sort of situation” and suggested that it is “… taking front line staff away from the 
people that they are there for” (PP local 10).  Similarly, local level interviewees 
from the Community Probation Service suggested that IOMS provides benefits 
principally at the national level.  They also suggested that IOMS is unreliable and 
provided examples of alternative systems that, locally, are run in parallel to the 
national system.   
 
From visits to agency sites, it was apparent that other performance related 
artefacts do not always provide the intended results.  For example, Work and 
Income has invested in a range of wall posters, desk calendars and computer 
screen savers to carry corporate messages relating to the agency‟s performance 
objectives.  However, Work and Income interviewees suggested that these are not 
an effective form of communication; they explained, for example, that they look at 
the calendars to see if they can recognise any of their colleagues rather than to 
remember the messages about performance objectives they contain.  Similarly, in 
general, interviewees from all three case study agencies could not remember the 
content of the wall posters they sat beneath every day.   
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(d) Social networks 
In relation to social networks, interviewees from both Work and Income and the 
Community Probation Service reported a broad interaction with other government 
agencies and the community.  Interviewees at all three organisational levels of 
Work and Income described a strong focus on the need to work with other 
government agencies and community organisations to achieve the outcome of 
social development.  A local level interviewee, for example, commented: “we can‟t 
do that by ourselves” (WI local 4).  A number of local level managers also 
explained that they are expected to routinely report on initiatives they have 
undertaken with other agencies and community groups.   
 
Interviewees from the Community Probation Service similarly described efforts to 
build and manage relationships with other agencies and the community.  A 
number of local level interviewees, for example, explained these relationships by 
describing regular meetings that are held (officially and unofficially) with judges, 
court managers, lawyers, police and prisons staff to gain feedback on the agency‟s 
performance and any problems that may be occurring.  Attempts to build social 
networks are also reflected in a local level interviewees reference to the courts and 
the Parole Board as “customers of ours” (CP local 9) and a regional level 
interviewee‟s explanation of the importance of working with local government in 
the communities within which offenders are managed in order to gain their 
support.   
 
Unlike the other two case study agencies, interviewees from Public Prisons made 
little reference to their interaction with other organisations and the community.  
One Prison Manager explained how (s)he sought opportunities to employ prisoners 
on community work, such as repairing desks for a local kindergarten.  However, 
most of the interviewees represented themselves as a recipient of, rather than a 
participant in, the work of the Justice system.   
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While the internal social networks of the other two case study agencies appeared 
to be much less formal, a number of local level interviewees from Public Prisons 
suggested that, for prison officers, social networks are delineated by rank and one 
interviewee, external to the organisation, described Public Prisons as having a 
“quasi-military, command and control culture” (PP external 12).  The potentially 
dangerous nature of prison inmates also reinforces a culture between prison staff 
who take pride in the extent to which they will „watch each others‟ backs‟ in the 
event of violent incidents.  However, because there are also concerns over the 
potential for prison officers to collaborate in corrupt practices, it was suggested 
that staff are regularly moved around to prevent small scale networks from 
forming.   
 
Relationships with the media also differed between the agencies studied.  
Reflecting a generally positive relationship, interviewees from Work and Income 
made little mention of the media other than to note it is important to manage the 
risk of adverse media coverage resulting from defalcations by staff members.  
However, interviewees from all three organisational levels of Public Prisons and 
the Community Probation Service revealed a more defensive attitude to the 
media.  Their comments suggested that they are keenly aware of the media and 
the role it plays in, what is seen to be, a lack of public understanding of the role 
and functions of these agencies.  A regional level interviewee from the Community 
Probation Service commented that the agency‟s performance is judged and driven 
by the media and its impact on public and political opinion.  Along similar lines a 
regional level interviewee from Public Prisons explained the difficulty of managing 
the agency‟s relationship with the media and stated that, despite his/her attempts 
to provide the media with the correct information, “they don‟t publish what you 
say they just make up their own story” (PP regional 13).  
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(e) Shared understandings and logics of action 
As explained in Chapter 4, shared understandings of performance management 
models and their related logics of action are created and maintained by 
„sensegiving‟ mechanisms.  These are defined by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) as 
attempts to influence others‟ understanding of an issue.  As might be expected, 
senior level interviewees from all three agencies described routine processes by 
which they visit operational sites and brief the staff.  All three case study agencies 
also use artefacts such desk calendars and wall posters in attempts to reinforce 
key messages about the organisation‟s goals.  However, the most effective 
sensegiving mechanism in Work and Income appeared to be the regular 
Wednesday Brief that is held each week at every operational site.  As noted in 
Chapter 7 these meetings involve all local staff and are centred on, but not limited 
too, a set of topics, instructions or issues specified by the national office.  Local 
level interviewees from Public Prisons also described a hierarchy of meetings in 
which “a lot of useful information gets cascaded down and we discuss issues and 
that sort of thing” (PP local 4).  Interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service explained how an extensive internal consultation process had recently 
preceded a range of operational and organisational changes resulting from 
amendments to legislation governing community-based sentences.   
 
As noted above in the discussion of the way performance is represented in each 
agency, interviewees from all three case study agencies described national 
performance measurement and management models, based on quantified 
performance indicators, which are established in the agencies‟ external 
accountability documents and rolled down through the organisation.  However, the 
extent to which these indicators are commonly understood and accepted varies 
between, and within, the agencies studied.  While regional and local level 
interviewees from Work and Income commented on the scope of formal, 
quantified reporting models, they did not question their relevance.  Particularly at 
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the local level, interviewees from Public Prisons and the Community Probation 
Service were not so supportive of the national model and its emphasis on 
procedural compliance.  As a local level interviewee from Public Prisons observed: 
I think we have been experimenting …really, because the targets haven‟t been set 
they have just been plucked out of the air …  So I think the targets need to be 
revisited here in particular.  There are some pretty unrealistic targets.  (PP local 1) 
 
The existence of differing cognitive frameworks within the three case study 
agencies was also illustrated by attempts to change staff attitudes to offenders in 
Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service.  A national level interviewee 
from Public Prisons described attempts to change the focus of prison staff to one 
that supports prisoners “so that when they walk out the door they are a better 
person” but acknowledged that this had not, as yet, been broadly achieved.  
Similarly, but with a contrary emphasis, a national level interviewee from the 
Community Probation Service described attempts to shift the culture of that 
agency away from helping „clients‟ to holding „offenders‟ to account for the proper 
completion of their sentences.  In both Public Prisons and the Community 
Probation Service the research found that different conceptual frameworks are 
being employed in different parts of the organisation.  This was reflected, for 
example, in the suggestion by a local prison officer that those who develop policy 
at the national level “do not understand our business”.  Similarly, a local level 
interviewee from the Community Probation Service acknowledged: 
We see the managers as outsiders, as the enemy instead of someone who‟s with you 
who‟s pulling this car together.  Because we‟re not a team; it‟s us lot of workers 
against management and it shouldn‟t be like that.  It‟s always, “they don‟t see this, 
they don‟t know, they don‟t ….” (CPS local 11)   
The problem of differing conceptual frameworks was summarised by a national 
manager within Public Prisons who observed: 
It‟s one thing to have … quite clear and specific performance agreements that people 
are reporting against and saying … it‟s either achieved or it‟s not achieved.  It‟s quite 
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a different thing for people to be seeing that that‟s a tool that‟s helping them do their 
job well.  And that‟s the bit that I think that we fall down on.  (PP national 3) 
The existence of shared understandings and logics of action in respect of 
performance objectives may, therefore, be facilitated by a common vision such as 
that facilitated by the provision of assistance or support to individuals.  However, 
it may also be frustrated to the extent that functional or professional groupings 
within an organisation are not aligned with its central management or, in more 
complex organisations, with each other69.   
 
Summary 
From the discussion above on institutional carriers in the three case study 
agencies, it appears that the performance measurement and management models 
of Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service, as contained in their 
accountability documents (the official model) and encoded in their computer 
systems (the formal model), can be principally characterised as regulative and 
rule-based.  However, the comments from the interviewees of those agencies also 
indicate that the official and formal models are not internalised or owned by local 
staff and are, at best, loosely-coupled with the performance measurement and 
management models in use, particularly at the local level.  There is a resultant 
growth in local, alternative performance frameworks and systems.   
 
In contrast, interviewees from Work and Income described performance 
measurement and management practices that have been more successfully 
embedded in a common cultural and cognitive framework.  For example, the 
importance of the agency‟s formal rules and procedures was broadly recognised by 
the interviewees and appeared to be embedded in the performance objectives of 
staff at all levels of the agency.   
                                               
69 Ackroyd et al (2007), amongst others, have pointed to the competing objectives of professional groupings (in 
sectors such as health and education), that have traditionally emphasised public service and the effectiveness of 
service provision, and those of central managers, concerned with the economy and efficiency of service provision.   
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9.3 The Locus of Control and Operational Autonomy 
As explained in Chapter 4 and shown in Figure 9.3, performance management 
practices within individual public service agencies are influenced by: 
(i) the degree of political saliency and perceived complexity of each 
agency‟s core functions; 
(ii) the nature and extent of the sensegiving activities undertaken by 
external stakeholders and/or internal management; and 
(iii) the extent to which managers maintain and develop the agency‟s public 
capital.   
 
Figure 9.3: The Locus of Control and Operational Autonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While each of these factors is linked they ultimately all impact on the internal 
versus external locus of control and the degree to which managers experience 
autonomy in terms of how performance is defined and directed.  The role of these 
factors within each of the case study agencies is summarised below.   
 
(i) Political Saliency and Perceived Complexity 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that political salience or sensitivity is significant for 
agencies that are managing functions associated with issues, such as crime and 
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public safety, that are of high public concern.  The activities of an agency‟s staff 
members may also increase public and political interest if they contravene the law 
or are otherwise seen as inappropriate.  Public Prisons has experienced a series of 
instances when prison officers have been accused of corruption, the Community 
Probation Service has had to respond to allegations of negligence when the failure 
of staff members to follow procedures resulted in harm to members of the public, 
and a previous Chief Executive of Work and Income was perceived as flamboyant 
and extravagant when trying to change that organisation‟s culture and focus.   
 
In the time of economic growth and declining unemployment during which the 
research took place, the functions of Work and Income were not politically salient.   
Also, as Work and Income has moved to place more emphasis on broader issues 
of social development, its activities and their results have become more technically 
complex and harder to directly monitor.  In contrast, public concerns associated 
with crime, and the perceived risk of crime, work to ensure that the functions of 
both Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service are politically salient.  
Further, although the offenders for whom those agencies are responsible embody 
a number of complex social and psychological issues and are subject to a range of 
extraneous forces, their management is generally represented in simple terms by 
both the media and politicians.  As an interviewee from Public Prisons observed, 
“it‟s not something that the public thinks deeply about” (PP national 5).   
 
(ii) Sensegiving 
As a consequence of strong internal leader sensegiving, through regular 
communications such as the Wednesday Team Brief, and external stakeholder 
sensegiving resulting from regular interactions with other agencies and community 
groups, Work and Income exhibits guided sensemaking practices in respect of its 
performance that are both consistent and rich in their scope.  These involve a 
consistent and composite perspective of the agency‟s performance that not only 
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encompasses recognition of the significance of procedures but also the primacy of 
the outcomes it seeks for its clients and the broader community.   
 
The political saliency of the functions of Public Prisons and the Community 
Probation Service should result in their being subject to strong external 
stakeholder sensegiving.  However, in this respect the two agencies display 
different characteristics.  Interviewees from Public Prisons provided little evidence 
of responding to sensegiving by external stakeholders.  Comments by interviewees 
from Public Prisons in respect of external stakeholders largely reflect a concern 
with the public‟s understanding, or lack thereof, of the agency‟s role and functions.  
The political saliency of those functions and their critical coverage by the media 
has led to somewhat defensive sensegiving strategies and an internal focus.  
Indeed, an external service provider described Public Prisons as being difficult to 
work with and suggested that it has a “culture of control” in which “there is a 
belief that no one can do corrections as well as Corrections” (COR external 5).  
Public Prisons therefore displays a pattern of restricted sensemaking in which 
internal leaders provide a unitary but narrow perspective on organisational 
performance.   
 
Unlike those from Public Prisons, interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service described processes by which sensegiving by external stakeholders plays a 
more important role.  For example, as noted in Chapter 7, local level interviewees 
explained how they actively seek feedback on their performance from the Police, 
judges and employee union representatives.  This suggests that, like Work and 
Income, the Community Probation Service is subject to guided sensemaking in 
which both internal leader and external stakeholder sensegiving plays a role in 
shaping a unitary but rich perspective on performance.  However, the apparent 
disparity between the need to focus on managing offenders‟ compliance with the 
terms of their sentence and supporting them through the term of their sentence, 
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suggests that sensemaking practices in the Community Probation Service are, to 
some degree, fragmented.  Chapter 6 reported a national manager‟s comments on 
the need to change the culture of front line probations officers from being social 
workers with „clients‟ to probation officers dealing with „offenders‟.  From the 
comments of the front line staff who were interviewed, it is evident that that 
culture change had not, as yet, occurred.  As a result many front line Probation 
staff have a distinct culture and value system that supports their own 
sensemaking practices.   
 
(iii) Public Capital 
At the national level of Work and Income a manager explained the importance, in 
seeking to achieve the agency‟s targeted outcomes, of monitoring and managing 
the confidence that stakeholders have in the agency.  As reported in Chapter 8, 
one way that is achieved is through the development of corporate partnerships 
with major organisations to whom Work and Income is able to supply staff.  It was 
also explained that as a result of being seen as a „can do‟ organisation the agency 
is a first point of call in the event of local crises such as floods.   
 
Interviewees from all three levels of Prisons Services commented on the problem 
of maintaining public confidence.  It was suggested that despite “trying to be 
responsive to the Minister, trying to be responsive to the press, trying to get the 
real story out there” (PP national 5) the public generally have a negative opinion 
of the agency.  The resultant lack of public capital was also reflected in the 
comment of an ex-Minister of Corrections who was interviewed and stated: 
… in a portfolio like Corrections there are always problems.  People escape … there 
are just a myriad [of problems].  It‟s just a difficult portfolio because you‟re never on 
top of it.  (COR external 6) 
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Like those from Prisons Services, interviewees from the Community Probation 
Service expressed concern over the lack of public understanding “of what we are 
actually dealing with on a day to day basis” (CPS local 9).  They described 
attempts to address this by working more closely with local authorities and 
communities where potentially high risk offenders are being housed in order to 
provide assurance, build confidence and prevent “a potential public backlash” (CPS 
national 2).  Interviewees also described processes by which the agency attempts 
to be responsive to, and gain the confidence of, the Police, courts and Parole 
Board.  It was suggested that gaining a more positive public image is about 
managing public expectations and that to this end, to a certain organisational 
level, the performance of individual staff members includes how well they handle 
the media.   
 
As noted above, a significant element of the State Service Commissioner‟s annual 
review of the performance of the Chief Executives of the Ministry of Social 
Development (parent organisation of Work and Income) and the Department of 
Corrections (parent organisation of Public Prisons and the Community Probation 
Service) is, in effect, based on an assessment of the trust and confidence that 
other agencies and external stakeholders have in those agencies.     
 
Operational Autonomy 
Low political saliency, a perception that social development is technically complex, 
and high levels of public capital, all lead to managers in Work and Income 
experiencing a degree of operational autonomy.  Interviewees at all levels of the 
agency explained how they were concerned to go beyond their core business, of 
paying benefits and placing people into work, to attempt to more holistically tackle 
the factors that impact on, or impede, the accomplishment of their targeted 
outcomes.  This was evidenced in the statement of a manager at the national level 
of Work and Income who commented: “… it doesn‟t really matter whether you‟ve 
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got a formal mandate.  It‟s just how you work with others to support them” (WI 
national 7).  The operational autonomy within the agency is also reflected in the 
ability of, and requirement for, operational managers to respond to local 
conditions and to develop appropriate initiatives with other agencies and 
community groups.  It may also be noted in the comment by a local manager, 
reported in Chapter 7, that (s)he does not necessarily follow the guidelines as: 
“one set of guidelines doesn‟t necessarily fit each service centre within the 
country”  (WI Local 4).   
 
With high political saliency and low perceived technical complexity, both Public 
prisons and the Community Probation Service are subject to significant external 
sensegiving.  Both agencies also have limited public capital, although interviewees 
from the Community Probation Service did describe efforts to address this at the 
level of local communities.  As a consequence interviewees from Public Prisons and 
the Community Probation Service indicated that they have limited operational 
autonomy and, particularly at the local level, described an environment in which 
they simply respond, as best they can, to the demand pressures created by the 
Courts and Parole Board. 
 
9.4 Four Models of Performance Measurement and Management 
In Chapter 4 the themes discussed above were combined in a framework of 
competing values based on (i) the nature of the rationality and control 
mechanisms used to measure and manage performance and (ii) the locus of 
control over the definition and direction of that performance between internal 
management and external stakeholders.  These two sets of competing values can 
be represented as the intersecting axes of two continua that form four archetypical 
performance measurement and management models.   
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As noted by Talbot (2008), agencies are not limited to one of the quadrants of a 
competing values framework, and may demonstrate characteristics of all four.  
However, they will have characteristics that more distinctly typify one or more 
models.  For each of the case study agencies the spread of these is shown in 
Figure 9.4 and discussed below.    
 
Figure 9.4: Performance Measurement and Management Models 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONTROL MODEL
RATIONAL GOAL 
MODEL
MULTIPLE 
CONSTITUENCY MODEL
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICE MODEL
REGULATIVE
(control & fixed targets)
CULTURAL/COGNITIVE
(learning & flexible targets)
INTERNAL
POWER & FOCUS
EXTERNAL 
POWER & FOCUS
Public Prisons
Community Probations
Work and Income
 
Work and Income 
In terms of the rationality of control, the measurement and management of Work 
and Income‟s core functions, and their related processes, that are associated with 
the outputs of paying benefits and placing people into employment, is relatively 
straightforward.  Compliance with standard procedures and the delivery of outputs 
are measured and managed using objectively framed timeliness counts, quality 
scores and volume counts.  However, procedural compliance is also measured in 
more subjective terms through the direct observation of how staff interact with 
their clients.   
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The broader and underlying functions described by the interviewees that relate to 
the outcome of social development are more complex and more difficult to 
measure.  In this respect interviewees from Work and Income described the use of 
the detailed indicators contained in the annual Social Report but also explained the 
use of more subjectively framed information gained through conversations and 
feedback internally with other managers and staff and externally with 
stakeholders.   
 
The interviewees also described the use of both a formal and a substantive 
rationality.  A formal rationality is employed, for example, in measuring and 
managing the planned reductions of numbers of beneficiaries and to allocate 
funding and resources to sites on the basis of the numbers of beneficiaries 
registered at each site.  A substantive rationality, using more subjective forms of 
evidence and values-based judgements, is employed in respect of the wellbeing of 
clients and the progress being made toward targeted outcomes.   
 
Although the performance management model within Work and Income appears to 
emphasis both processes and outcomes, objective numerical indicators and value-
based judgements, the overall rationality of control, as evidenced in the 
institutional carriers discussed in section 9.2 (v) above, appears to be culturally 
and cognitively-based.  There is little evidence of any uncoupling between the 
national performance management model and that used by operational managers 
and their staff at the local level.  Work and Income may, therefore, be positioned 
at the cultural/cognitive end of the rationality of control continuum.   
 
In terms of the factors influencing the locus of control, Work and Income‟s 
functions have not been politically salient and, at least in respect of the agency‟s 
role in managing social development, they have been perceived as technically 
 365 
complex.  As a consequence external sensegiving practices have not been 
coordinated but are diverse as a result of Work and Income‟s interaction with a 
broad range of external stakeholders.  Strong management leadership has, 
however, provided significant internal sensegiving.  The resulting guided but rich 
sensemaking practices are reflected in the flexibility with which local managers 
interact with other agencies and community groups.  For Work and Income, the 
locus of control therefore lies between the two extremes of the continuum with a 
slight emphasis towards the external end.   
 
Plotted on the two continua of the competing values framework, these 
characteristics place Work and Income in the quadrant of the Multiple 
Constituency Model.   
 
Public Prisons 
While, in its official model of performance management, Public Prisons‟ outcomes, 
or impacts on the community, are ultimately difficult to determine, its core 
functions in relation to the safe secure and humane containment of prisoners are 
relatively easily defined and measured in terms of quantified outputs.  These count 
performance indicators such as the number of prisoners, the number of escapes, 
and the number of cell searches revealing contraband items (i.e. drugs and cell 
„phones).  Similarly the agency‟s other functions associated with the rehabilitation 
and reintegration of offenders are defined and measured in terms that include 
counts of the number of prisoners attending drug treatment programmes or on 
release-to-work schemes.   
 
However, at the local level, interviewees described an in use performance 
management model that is principally focused on the management of processes 
which are, again, measured and managed in terms of an objectively framed and 
numerically stated set of performance measures.  Interviewees largely described a 
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formal rationality which focuses on the management of standard procedures, as 
set out in the Public Prisons Manual, and the requirements of sentence plans 
established for individual inmates.  While, at the national level, some mention was 
made of a more substantive, prisoner-focused logic, the research provided little 
evidence of this at the local level.   
 
For Public Prisons the overall rationality of control appears to be regulative in 
nature focusing on fixed targets and management control.  At the local level 
interviewees provided evidence of a degree of de-coupling between the nationally 
official model and the models in use within individual prison environments.  Little 
confidence was expressed in the requirements of the formal model encoded in the 
main IOMS computer system and a number of interviewees described independent 
systems that they have developed and run locally.   
 
In respect of the factors influencing the locus of control for Public Prisons, as noted 
above, the functions of the agency are politically salient and, in general, not 
perceived as technically complex by the media and general public.  It is therefore 
subject to significant sensegiving through the media and the pronouncements of 
politicians and lobby groups such as the Sensible Sentencing Trust.  However, the 
degree to which Public Prisons directly responds to these influences is unclear.  
Interviewees from both within and outside the agency described a largely 
internally focused set of sensemaking practices that produce a unitary but 
somewhat narrow account of its performance.  For Public Prisons the locus of 
control therefore lies toward the internal end of the continuum.   
 
In the context of the competing values framework, as shown in Figure 9.4, these 
characteristics principally represent Public Prisons as adopting the Administrative 
Control Model.   
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Community Probation Service 
Like Public Prisons, the Community Probation Service‟s official model of 
performance management places emphasis on the numerical representation of 
outputs such as, for example, the number of community-based sentences 
managed and the number of reports provided to the Courts and Parole Board.  At 
all levels of the agency interviewees also explained how the in use models focus 
on the measurement of fixed targets in respect of standard procedures.  However, 
at the local level this objectively framed measurement is complemented by a more 
substantive rationality by which probation officers employ more subjective, value-
based forms of performance information to support their interactions with 
offenders.  In the case of one local interviewee this substantive rationality included 
acting as “a good Samaritan” (CP local11).   
 
Although the Rationality of Control employed with the Community Probation 
Service is principally regulative in nature, with a strong emphasis on rules and 
procedures, this does not appear to have integrated the nationally defined 
performance management model with those in use at the local level.  This was 
evidenced by the critical comments of local interviewees in respect of the formal 
model encoded within the IOMS computer system.  As is the case within Public 
Prisons, the view that this system is not supportive of the work of local staff has 
led to them locally developing alternative systems.    
 
As noted above, also like Public Prisons, the functions of the Community Probation 
Service are politically salient and not perceived as technically complex by the 
media and general public.  Unlike Public Prisons, the interviewees from the 
Community Probation Service described active relationships with their external 
stakeholders, particularly at the local level.  As a result, the agency is subject to a 
range of external sensegiving as well as that provided by the internal leadership in 
its attempts to change the organisational culture and manage its response to 
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changes to the legislation relating to community-based sentences.  The 
Community Probation Service therefore displays a degree of fragmentation in its 
sensemaking practices that leads to inconsistency in the agency‟s performance 
management practices.  For the Community Probation Service the locus of control 
therefore lies more toward the external end of the continuum.   
 
Within the competing values framework shown in Figure 9.4, these factors 
characterise the Community Probation Service as adopting the Rational Goal 
Model.   
 
9.5 Summary 
A number of themes emerged from the semi-structured interviews described in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  As explained in Chapter 4, these themes represent the 
characteristics of two continua, the rationality of control and the locus of control, 
which together create a competing values framework of four possible models.  
That framework represents an interpretative mechanism that captures the 
paradoxes inherent within performance measurement and management practices 
within a public service context.  Understanding those practices requires a flexible 
approach that recognises the diversity of functions, the socially constructed nature 
of organisational performance, and the extent to which political saliency and 
external sensegiving shape internal management practices. 
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Chapter 10 
Missing Links – Conclusions 
 
10.1 Introduction 
In the context of the worst economic shock that the world has experienced for 
eighty years, the New Zealand Government has announced a campaign to 
establish “a more focused, efficient and productive public service” (Whitehead, 
2009).  As the resulting emphasis of managing the performance of the public 
service swings away from effectiveness and outcomes back towards efficiency and 
outputs, the practical and underlying tensions of managing within individual 
agencies remain and may have been heightened.  This research has explored 
these tensions in relation to the performance measurement and management 
practices in three of New Zealand‟s public service agencies, namely Work and 
Income, Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service.   
 
10.2  Project Overview 
The research was conducted against a background of public sector reforms that, 
as outlined in Chapter 2 and noted above, have continued to evolve following the 
major changes that were introduced in the mid to late 1980s.  As noted in Chapter 
2 despite, or perhaps because of, these ongoing changes a number of perennial 
tensions (Pallot, 2001) remain.   
 
Perhaps the most obvious of these is the tension that exists between the 
autonomy that is given to public service agencies to acquire inputs and decide how 
to provide outputs, and the desire by Ministers and the central agencies to 
exercise control and gain assurance that those agencies are providing „value for 
money‟.  The need for agencies to provide that assurance, and meet the external 
accountability requirements of the official model for managing the performance of 
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the public service, has not always reflected the exigencies of operational 
management within individual agencies.   
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the logic underpinning that official model was drawn 
from institutional economics and ideas based on private sector management 
practices.  Over the last two decades this logic has tended to emphasise the 
economy and efficiency of output provision while, at different times during that 
period, the effectiveness of those outputs has been the subject of varying degrees 
of attention.  Similarly, the recognition of the responsibility of public service 
managers to maintain and develop the capacity and capability of their agencies to 
continue to effectively function in the future has also fluctuated.  As a 
consequence, particularly in times of economic pressure, short term efficiency has 
been achieved at the cost of long term capacity.  Over the same period successive 
Governments have been averse to acknowledging, at least explicitly, the 
importance of measuring and managing the public‟s understanding of, and 
confidence in, the activities of public service agencies.  Nonetheless, although 
periodically the subject of political criticism, the number of communications 
specialists employed by public service agencies has grown significantly over the 
last two decades.  Other than media liaison staff these specialists include: “web 
and publications staff responsible for brochures, corporate documents, staff 
communications and management of events” (Sunday Star Times, 2008).  The 
concept of public capital (i.e. trust and confidence) remains a significant element 
of the „dark matter‟, i.e. the unseen or not measured elements, of performance.  
However, perhaps the most significant tension is that relating to the difficulties of 
measuring many elements of the performance of public service agencies.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, many of the functions remaining in the public service are there 
simply because of measurement problems that do not facilitate provision by the 
private sector, or even public sector corporations.  The applicability of these 
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tensions to the three case study agencies is explored further in section 10.4 
below.   
 
The research was designed to ascertain the extent to which the performance 
measurement and management models in use in the three case study agencies 
are de-coupled from  
(i) the official performance management model primarily contained in 
relevant legislation, the Government‟s Estimates documentation and the 
agencies‟ external accountability documents (in particular their 
statements of intent, annual reports and output plans); and  
(ii) their formal performance management models encoded within the 
agencies‟ artefacts and, in particular, their computer systems.   
The research also sought to identify reasons which could explain any de-coupling 
of the performance management models found within the case study agencies and 
any differences in the extent of de-coupling between the three agencies.   
 
As explained in Chapter 5, in order to achieve the research objectives relevant 
legislation and accountability documents were reviewed for each of the case study 
agencies.  Between 12 and 14 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
managers and staff at different levels of the organisation and observations were 
made at meetings and during site visits.  Note was also made of the role played by 
the formal models of performance measurement and management encoded within 
each agency‟s artefacts, particularly, in its computer systems.   
 
10.3 Theoretical Approach Adopted 
It was argued in Chapter 4 that while theories drawn from institutional economics 
have provided a normative logic for the official model for managing the 
performance of the public service, they do not help explain practices in use within 
individual agencies.  To that end the research has drawn on new institutional 
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sociology as a means to explore the procedures and practices of organisational 
actors together with the meanings in respect of organisational performance that 
those practices reinforce or recreate.  The meanings and thereby the actors‟ 
understanding of „performance‟, are further explained by the ideas of sensegiving 
and sensemaking which are embedded in actors‟ past experience and current 
expectations.   
 
Performance in a public service context is a complex construct that goes beyond 
the achievement of pre-defined objectives, however they may be conceived.  
Indeed, given the wide range of stakeholders in public service agencies, there is 
likely to exist a range of different conceptions of what represents good, or bad, 
performance.  From the research it is evident that the identification and use of 
performance measures are not value neutral or merely technical processes.  
Rather, they are the result of a prior and ongoing process of social preconditioning 
as to what is important and what is not.  The end result is inevitably value laden.   
 
How performance is defined will affect how performance is measured and this, in 
turn, will determine the aspects of performance to which attention is paid and 
what performance information is generated.  Thus, by means of a „double 
hermeneutic‟ the processes of definition and measurement reinforce one another.  
As Weick (1996), amongst others, has observed, actors‟ responses to the 
environment are selective and governed by past experience.  Such selective 
noticing of environmental events and conditions affects sensemaking in that, “if 
events are noticed, they are available for sensemaking; and if events are not 
noticed, they are not available for sensemaking” (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988, 
p.60).  Actors may help shape these events and conditions that do not exist 
independently of the observer since, “the world is not fixed and pre-given but 
continually shaped by the types of actions in which we engage” (Varella et al, 
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1991; quoted by Weick, 1995, p.38).  It is these actions that the research sought 
to understand.   
 
10.4 Findings 
The complexity and contrasting roles in the official, formal and in use performance 
management models highlight that, within individual agencies, performance 
management models are not based on absolute distinctions.  Rather, they can be 
seen to contain a series of paradoxes by which agencies may: 
 display the characteristics of both production and craft, or coping and 
procedural, organisations; 
 focus on managing both inputs and processes and outputs and outcomes; 
 represent performance in both objectively and subjectively framed terms; 
 utilise an instrumental and a substantive rationality;  
 contain regulative and cultural and cognitively-based institutions; and  
 be subject to both internal leader and external stakeholder sensegiving.   
 
In seeking to better understand these paradoxes, the research has shown that, 
even in the official model of performance management, performance objectives 
are not always clearly stated or, indeed, defined in advance.  Interviewees 
explained how ex ante accountability documents, such as the statement of intent 
and output plan, can quickly become irrelevant in the context of changing 
ministerial priorities and the exigencies of operational management.   
 
Although the official performance management model places significant emphasis 
on the use of an instrumental logic to link objectively quantified outputs with their 
clearly identified impacts, this is not entirely practical for functions such as Public 
Prisons‟ Reintegration Services or Work and Income‟s Leading Social Development.  
However, if outputs and outcomes are difficult to measure, this is generally not 
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the case with processes.70  In all three case study agencies process measures both 
render operational work visible and provide a form of accountability.  Nonetheless, 
although the in use models in each agency are primarily concerned with process 
measures, the emphasis on clients described by interviewees at all levels of Work 
and Income demonstrated that this does not preclude a concern for how those 
processes enable the agency to contribute to its outputs and outcomes.   
 
Another consequence of the difficulty of objectively, and in quantified terms, 
measuring some aspects of the performance of public service agencies is the use, 
by managers at all levels of the case study agencies, of more subjectively framed 
information in the form of stories and the direct observation of activities being 
performed.  Thus, together with instrumentally rational models that employ 
standardised performance measures, managers also make use of a more 
substantive rationality based on values, norms and prior experience.  This was 
particularly evident at the local levels of Work and Income and the Community 
Probation Service where the complexities of interaction with clients and offenders 
are more directly pertinent.  However, in the structured and more formal 
environment of Public Prisons managers at the local level appeared to principally 
employ an instrumental rationality that employs standard rules and procedures.   
 
In Chapters 4 and 9 it was argued that the differences identified between the 
official, formal and in use performance management models within each agency 
may be lessened where performance and performance management are based on 
a consistent cultural and cognitively-based institutional framework.  As was 
evident in Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service, the use of more 
regulative institutional arrangements increases the likelihood that the official and 
formal models of performance management will be loosely-coupled with the 
                                               
70
Processes represent the functions over which managers have direct control (unlike most outputs which frequently 
involve a number of processes for which other managers are responsible) and have a direct link to resource 
consumption (Dormer, 2001).   
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models in use in different parts of the agencies.  It was also argued that an 
important element of those institutional arrangements is the sensegiving practices 
of internal leaders and external stakeholders.  As Work and Income, and to lesser 
extent the Community Probations Service, evidenced, it is possible for the 
sensegiving activities of an agency‟s managers to shape the cognitive frameworks 
of internal staff and external stakeholders.  Work and Income appears to have 
been particularly successful in this respect by creating fora in which sensegiving is 
a two way process.  Interviewees explained how this occurs internally in regular 
Wednesday briefs and „town hall‟ meetings between senior managers and staff.  
They also described external mechanisms such as industry partnerships and cross-
agency initiatives.   
 
The complexities and paradoxes of performance management in a public service 
context are captured in the competing values framework shown in Figure 4.3.  
This suggests that understanding performance measurement and management 
practices in a public service context requires an approach that recognises the 
diversity of functions, the socially constructed nature of organisational 
performance, and the extent to which political saliency and sensegiving practices 
shape performance management practices within individual agencies.  It also 
points to how, in a multiple constituency model, it is possible to take a broader 
view of organisational performance that combines the formal logic of standardised 
and quantified performance indicators with an interpretative understanding of 
complex, and at times difficult to measure, issues.  This model also encompasses 
practices that seek to gain public confidence and support and recognises the need 
to work with other agencies and community groups to identify and achieve 
common objectives.  Within an agency, the multiple constituency model is based 
on an institutional framework that emphasises cultural and cognitively-based 
controls that support a consistently applied understanding of what performance is 
and how it should be achieved.   
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10.5 Contributions, Limitations and Opportunities for Further 
Research 
Much of the existing research and commentary on New Zealand‟s public sector has 
adopted a public policy perspective.  As a result, it has focused on management of 
the public sector‟s performance as a whole, or what individual organisations do, 
rather than management of performance within the public sector, and how 
individual organisations do it.  Nevertheless, an efficient and effective public 
service relies, to a significant extent, on the performance of individual managers 
and their teams  
 
The research described in this thesis has been exploratory in character in that, in 
respect of the three case study agencies, it sought to identify and explain: 
 the official model of performance management contained in relevant 
legislation, central agency instructions and guidance material, and the 
external accountability documents of the agencies concerned; 
 the formal performance management models encoded within artefacts, 
particularly the computer systems, of each case study agency; and 
 the in use performance management models representing the differing 
performance measurement and management practices of managers and 
staff in different organisational settings.   
Together these models provide a holistic view of performance rather than the 
varying and incomplete schemas that are individually contained in any one of 
them.   
 
In particular, the research involved a comprehensive examination of performance 
measurement and management practices in the selected agencies.  It examined 
the different performance management models that apply to, and are used within, 
these agencies and thereby it contributes to an understanding of the complexities 
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of managing performance in a public sector context.  It also provides an empirical 
basis for the development of more comprehensive and cohesive performance 
management frameworks than currently exist.  This should assist in improving 
performance within individual public service agencies and, thereby, the 
performance of the sector as a whole.  However, any such development needs to 
be cognisant of the fact that, despite the extent of the privatisation, 
corporatisation and outsourcing that has occurred in the context of New Zealand‟s 
public sector reforms, a diverse range of functions remains in the core public 
service.   
 
The findings of the research have highlighted this diversity and provided an 
analytical framework by which the performance measurement and management 
practices within different organisational settings may be better understood.  While 
the four archetypical models contained within the proposed competing values 
framework are descriptive rather than specifically applicable, they do provide a 
mechanism by which the complexities and paradoxes of the practices in use may 
be interpreted and understood.   
 
However, it should be noted that the research was limited to just three agencies 
within New Zealand‟s core public service.  As each agency is unique, its findings 
may not be applicable to other public sector agencies in New Zealand or to similar 
agencies in other countries with similar systems of government (such as Australia 
and the United Kingdom).  A further limitation of the research is that, although 
some effort was made to explain historical factors that have affected the existing 
performance management models, it represents a snapshot of the three agencies 
at a particular point in time.  Since the research was completed further changes to 
the official, formal and in use models have undoubtedly occurred.  Similarly, 
although a number of research methods have been employed, the documents 
studied, the meetings attended and the individuals interviewed represent a limited 
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sample of these data sources within the case study agencies.  As a consequence, 
there is a risk that the samples studied are not representative of the population 
from which they are drawn.   
 
A further limitation of the research, common in other qualitative research, is that 
the research (and in particular the interpretation of the empirical data) is likely to 
have been influenced, at least to a degree, by the researcher‟s prior experience 
and preconceptions.  This particularly applies to this research as the researcher 
has a broad practitioner experience of performance measurement in both the 
public and the private sectors.  In order to reduce the likelihood of research bias, 
the research methods adopted facilitate cross-referencing of the observational 
data with that gathered from the semi-structured interviews, documentary 
evidence, and the feedback provided on the research findings by relevant groups 
within the agencies concerned.  This has enabled the researcher to “remain 
sensitive to the data and input from the field” (Goulding, 2002, p.19). 
 
Further research might, therefore, explore in more detail to what extent and why 
the official, formal and in use performance management models, and the criteria 
applied within them, have changed over time.  An opportunity also exists to test 
the validity of the findings within the contexts of other public service agencies and 
the broader public sector.  Such further research could encompass the extent to 
which the six performance criteria are applied by different organisations in 
different organisational settings and in different performance management 
models.  The competing values framework of performance management models 
also warrants further testing against different organisational settings in both 
central and local government.   
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10.6 Conclusion 
Managing performance in a public service environment provides some unique and 
important challenges.  Those challenges are neither explained nor resolved by the 
broad application of institutional economic theories or managerial models 
borrowed from the private sector.  Rather this research has shown that it is 
necessary to identify the distinct characteristics of each public service agency and 
the underlying social institutions that both support and re-form them.   
 
How performance is measured and managed by public service agencies is 
determined by how performance is defined by the actors involved (i.e. agency 
staff, managers and key stakeholders).  How performance is defined is determined 
by the prior experience and expectations of the actors involved and the 
sensegiving activities of internal management and external stakeholders.  Those 
actors use both objectively and subjectively framed information and apply that 
information through an instrumental and a substantive rationality.  However, the 
official model by which the performance of public service agencies is managed is 
more narrowly focused, principally on the economy and efficiency of output 
delivery.  It takes little account of the use of subjectively framed information and 
substantive rationality.  The regulative application of the official and formal 
performance management models therefore supports the loose-coupling (if not the 
decoupling) of the performance management frameworks used for internal 
decision making from that used for purposes of external accountability.   
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MISSING LINKS 
A RESEARCH PROJECT INTO PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SERVICE AGENCIES 
Researcher:  
Rodney Dormer, School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria University of 
Wellington.   
“Missing Links” is a research project, culminating in a doctoral thesis, which will 
provide empirically based information on how information is used to shape and 
direct organisational performance in the context of New Zealand‟s public service, 
both at the level of the total organisation and at the level of the various functional 
and operational units within each organisation.   
It is something of a cliché to suggest that “what gets measured gets managed”.  
This research will explore the question: “is what gets managed, what gets 
measured?”  An efficient and effective public service is in no small part reliant on 
the actions of individual managers and their teams.  The research will provide an 
empirical analysis of the focus of those actions in two agencies studied.  It will also 
suggest how that focus might be integrated and better aligned with broader 
organisational and stakeholder objectives.  Understanding and aligning the factors 
that affect the formation of the frameworks within which organisational 
performance is understood and measured, will support better coordination 
(efficient) and focused (effective) use of the limited resources available to public 
sector organisations.   
The research is being undertaken in Work and Income and the Department of 
Corrections and in each organisation it will involve document studies, observation 
of meetings, and taped interviews with a number of staff.  The thesis will 
eventually be deposited in the University Library.  It is also intended that one or 
more articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly journals.   
Material provided during the interviews and collected during the observation of 
meetings will not be attributed to individuals in the outputs of the research.  
However, comments may be attributed to the role of an interviewee along with 
those of other interviewees in similar roles.   
All material gathered during this research will be kept confidential.  No other 
person other than the researcher and the supervisors, Professors Brenda Porter of 
Victoria University of Wellington and Trevor Hopper of Manchester University, will 
see the transcripts of the interviews.    
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the 
project please feel free to contact the researcher, Rodney Dormer, at 
rodney.dormer@xtra.co.nz, phone 021 450 482; or you may contact his 
supervisor, Professor Brenda Porter, at brenda.porter@vuw.ac..nz, or at Victoria 
University of Wellington, P O Box 600, Wellington.   
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Appendix III – Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
MISSING LINKS 
A RESEARCH PROJECT INTO PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SERVICE AGENCIES 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research 
project.  I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them 
answered to my satisfaction.   
I understand that my interview will be recorded and that I will be given the 
opportunity to review the transcripts of the interview.  I also understand 
that I may withdraw any information that I have provided from this project 
within one month of the date below.   
I understand that the information that I provide will be kept confidential 
the researcher, the academic supervisor, and the person who transcribes 
the recording of my interview.     
I also understand that any outputs from this research will not use my 
name but may be attributed to the role that I fulfil along with those of 
other interviewees in similar roles.   
I wish to receive a summary of the research when completed Yes No 
   
 
I agree to take part in this research. 
Signed: 
 
Date: 
Name: 
Please print clearly 
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Appendix IV - Interview Guide 
 
MISSING LINKS – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS? 
 
The following questions are a broad outline of the topics I discussed rather than a 
specific list of questions.   
Organisational Context 
1. Can you briefly describe what “the agency” does? 
2. What do you and your team do? 
Performance 
3. When we talk about the performance of “the agency” what aspects first 
come to mind? 
4. In terms of the performance of your team, what are the aspects that first 
come to mind? 
a. what are your objectives? 
b. what are the key factors affecting their objectives? 
c. how do you plan for them? 
d. how do you monitor them? 
5. Have there been any significant changes to the way that performance is 
thought of in “the agency”?   
6. To do your job, what formal systems and/or computer applications do you 
use? 
7. What do you use them for?   /   How do you use them? 
Performance Measures 
8. What performance measures or indicators are you required to report on? 
9. (How) does that information help you plan and manage the performance 
of your team? 
10. Do you use other performance measures or indicators? 
11. Is performance information discussed much within “the agency”? 
12. Who makes use of the performance information within “the agency”? 
13. Can you give me an example of their use? 
14. Who makes use of performance information outside of “the agency”?   
15. Can you give me an example of their use?   
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Appendix V - Interviewees 
A schedule of the interviews conducted with each agency is as follows:   
WORK AND INCOME 
 Service Centre Manager 
 Service Centre Manager 
 Service Centre Manager 
 Service Centre Manager 
 Regional Commissioner 
 Regional Commissioner 
 Chief Financial Officer 
 Manager Planning & Performance 
 Deputy Chief Executive Work & Income 
 Case Manager 
 Work Broker 
  
CORRECTIONS - PUBLIC PRISONS 
 Unit Manager 
 Unit Manager 
 Unit Manager 
 Unit Manager 
 Unit Manager 
 Prison Manager  
 Prison Manager  
 Regional Manager 
 Principal Corrections Officer 
 Principal Corrections Officer 
 
 Principal Corrections Officer 
 Planner HO 
 General Manager 
  
CORRECTIONS - PROBATIONS 
 General Manager 
 Manger Finance & Analysis 
 
 Manger Planning & Development 
 Regional Manager 
 Regional Manager 
 Area Manager 
 Area Manager 
 Service Manager 
 Senior Probation Officer 
 Probation Officer 
 Senior Community Work Supervisor 
 Senior Community Work Supervisor 
 Manager Psychological Services 
 
Note: In order to ensure confidentiality of the interviewees the codes for each 
person are not shown.   
